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TWENTY YEARS FROM NOW YOU WILL BE MORE DISAPPOINTED
BY THE THINGS YOU DIDN’T DO THAN BY THE ONES THAT YOU DID DO.
SO THROW OFF THE BOWLINES. SAIL AWAY FROM THE SAFE HARBOR.
CATCH THE TRADE WINDS IN YOUR SAILS. EXPLORE. DREAM. DISCOVER.
                                    Attributed to Mark Twain
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Invitation Letter
The goal of the Risk and Exploration Symposium is to engage in an open discussion about the 
issue of risk—identifying it, mitigating it, accepting it—all in the course of exploration. Yes, 
risk taking is inherently failure-prone. Otherwise, it would be called “sure-thing-taking.”
Challenge fosters excellence, often drawing on previously untapped skills and abilities. 
Each of us takes and accepts risk as a part of our daily existence. We often go out of our way 
to seek challenge. However, seeking challenge often means accepting a high level of risk. 
The dictionary deﬁ nes risk as being exposed to hazard or danger. To accept risk is to accept 
possible loss or injury, even death. 
One of the key issues that continues to be debated in the tragedy of the Space Shuttle 
Columbia is the level of risk NASA accepted. And, ultimately, the entire nation is now 
engaged in a broader debate over whether or not the exploration of space is worth the risk 
of human life. 
While risk can often be reduced or controlled, there comes a point when the removal 
of all risk is either impossible or so impractical that it completely undermines the very 
nature of what NASA was created to do—to pioneer the future. 
Everyone today understands that human space exploration is a risky endeavor. 
However, the quest for discovery and knowledge, and the risks involved in overcoming 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles is not unique to NASA. Whether the challenge is 
exploring the depths of our oceans or reaching the top of our highest mountains, great 
feats usually involve great risk. 
During this symposium, we want to examine the similarities between space 
exploration and other terrestrial expeditions, and examine how society accepts risk.  For 
example, more than 40,000 Americans die each year in automobile accidents. A recent 
study of 22,000 fatal accidents showed that nearly two-thirds of the victims were not 
wearing seatbelts—a clear indication that too many of us fail to understand the risks when 
we get behind the wheel of a car and fail to buckle up. 
Why are sacriﬁ ces made in the name of exploration more notable than the losses 
suffered in the course of everyday life? What lessons can be learned by studying the history 
of exploration and risk? And why are so many people willing to risk their lives to advance 
adventure, discovery, and science when, often, the beneﬁ ts are unknown and indeﬁ nable? 
We have assembled an invitation-only audience of participants for this important 
event comprised of NASA astronauts and leaders, as well as world renowned mountain 
climbers, deep sea explorers, cave explorers, Arctic and Antarctic researchers, scientists, 
communication experts, and others. These participants are involved, in a personal way, 
with risky endeavors, which serve to expand the frontiers of human knowledge beneath the 
sea, on the surface of Earth, and in outer space. 
We look forward to your participation in what we believe will be a spirited and highly 
beneﬁ cial public discussion of risk and exploration.
 
Sean O’Keefe, NASA Administrator

1Introduction
On behalf of Ames Research Center, one of your local hosts, I bid you greetings: to the 
Administrator, to my fellow Center Directors, distinguished guests from Headquarters, 
members of the NASA family. Our thoughts go out today to members of the Kennedy Space 
Center who cannot be here with us. They are attending to the damage from the hurricanes 
that have hit them recently. Greetings also to the rest of the distinguished guests here, and, 
of course, to our gracious hosts at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
We are here today to look at risk. How do we perceive risk, real and otherwise? How 
do we identify risk? How do we mitigate risk? And ﬁ nally, when and how should we tolerate 
and accept risk? And all of this discussion, of course, is in the context of exploration, the 
essence of what we do.
What is risk? In our daily lives, we all assume multiple levels of real risk. We get 
into cars. We get into airplanes, some of us far too often. We cross roads. We use cell 
phones while we’re driving. We eat bacon and barbecued chicken that contain potentially 
carcinogenic nitrites. One way or another, all these things represent real risks that we 
tolerate and accept. Most of us mitigate these risks in some measure by doing things like 
wearing seatbelts, using the oversight of agencies like the FAA, remembering to look both 
ways, and getting our annual physical checkups. We are accustomed to living with risk, 
whether we realize it or not.
Today, tomorrow, and Wednesday morning, we are going to explore risk in the ﬁ eld 
of exploration. There is monetary risk, programmatic risk, and, of course, the far more 
compelling issue of risk to life and limb of the explorers. We look at how we decide what 
risks are acceptable, both for the individual and the institution. I think this is a key element 
here. How do people perceive risk individually? How do we perceive risk as institutions? 
How do we collectively decide what we will accept?
Let me give you a little bit of insight from my own experiences. I will start with a 
program from seven or eight years ago where I was fortunate to be the manager of the Lunar 
Prospector mission. In December 1997, just days before the launch, we had to make some 
very tough assessments of the risk. There was a single-string spacecraft, ﬁ rst use of a new 
launchpad, the maiden ﬂ ight of a new launch vehicle, although it was a design based on 
some proven ﬂ eet ballistic missile motors. There was a very tight budget schedule, and a 
relatively young team, although with some key experienced people at the top. So, why did 
we go for launch? Why did we accept that risk?
Well, we had a strong test program, solid teaming with effective communication and 
some very experienced key managers, open channels during the design and development 
process, and lots of insight from a “graybeard” committee that provided us with truly 
effective comments. In the end, the deciding factors amounted to a considerable degree 
of trust and the determination that we had done everything possible to ensure mission 
success. So, we launched. That mission was successful, and that data is now being used as 
we plan a return to the Moon in the not-too-distant future.
Another example is from the restructuring of the Mars program. In April and June 
2000, we had to decide whether to take the risk of going back to Mars for an opportunity 
2that was just 38 months away. Would we not only send an orbiter, but would we send a 
lander? We had three opportunities there: do nothing, send an orbiter, and send a lander. 
Why did we take the risk of doing the most ambitious one?
Well, it was an outstanding launch opportunity. We had solid heritage from the 
Pathﬁ nder Mission. We had a fully developed payload, and we had a robust entry, descent 
and landing scheme that was well understood. We put two rovers into the mission to balance 
the risk against random failures, and I think, as you will hear later on in this meeting from 
Steve Squyres, having 2 rovers had an unanticipated beneﬁ t of providing a rich panoply of 
hardware from which to reduce other types of risks. But, in the end, the reason we took that 
risk was because it was the right thing to do. A strategic plan brought us back to the surface 
of Mars and gained the kind of information that is now changing the textbooks, changing 
the way that we look at the Red Planet.
Finally, let’s look at the issue of human spaceﬂ ight risk. I was honored to be the sole 
NASA representative on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. It was one of the most 
difﬁ cult assignments that I have ever had in my career. In that entire seven months, we never 
lost sight once of the nine lives that were lost, the seven astronauts and the two searchers, 
the two helicopter pilots. Clearly, we take substantial risk when we put humans on the top 
of a rocket and leave Earth’s gravity well. How do we adequately mitigate that risk? From 
Columbia, we learned some tough lessons. We learned we need to develop a culture of safety 
for the long haul. We need clear communication, clear organization, adequate resources, 
rigorous and sound engineering principles, and a program systems engineering approach 
that addresses the entire effort, that addresses all the analysis that we need. 
We also need to effectively learn to encourage alternative points of view. If we do all 
of these things, can we eliminate risk, especially for human spaceﬂ ight? I think not. Will we 
ﬁ nd a balance of well-mitigated risk and a powerful level of acceptable risk? I, for one, think 
so. What will that balance be? That’s what we have come together to discuss today. 
Scott Hubbard, Director, NASA Ames Research Center
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There is no historic analogue, I think, to a gathering like this. 
Certainly, no records exist of people living in Lisbon 500 years ago attending a candlelight 
symposium featuring Amerigo Vespucci or Vasco da Gama or Ferdinand Magellan. So, this is 
an opportunity given by modern technology and the ease of transportation to pull together 
this really extraordinary group of folks who’ve experienced the full extent and breadth 
of exploration and the risks attendant thereto. Such a gathering was important for the 
purpose of parsing this larger question of risk and return on the exploration ventures we are 
about. I am particularly grateful to John Grunsfeld, who has really provided the intellectual 
horsepower behind this kind of effort to think about these questions in a structured way, 
and to Keith Cowing, two very disparate kinds of folks, but folks who share the passion and 
desire for exploration and an understanding of the attendant risk to it. So, to Keith and to 
John, I am most grateful for that extraordinary nudge that you all provided in pulling this 
together and providing the structure of the meeting.
We are gathered here, appropriately, in a place like Monterey, at the edge of a great 
ocean, to discuss exploration in all of it facets of extreme environments here on Earth and 
in space. Indeed, this historic location is steeped in a history of exploration. The ventures of 
Sean O’Keefe
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4so many people to explore and to establish the site of civilization that we see in 
this marvelous area here around Monterey is testimonial to that. What we enjoy 
each day in this community, and understand about exploration and its benefits, 
are here and evident each day. Certainly this evening we will have an opportunity 
to see that more specifically at the aquarium.
I want to provoke some thought and reflection about a central question 
which we’re discussing here in these two and a half days. Why do we take 
such risks to explore? As humans, what is it about us that really wants to 
understand that which is on the other side of the horizon, that which is on the 
other side of the ridge? In doing so, there are periods of our human history in 
which the acceptance of those risks have resulted in great gains and, in other 
cases a mere footnote, because it ended in a way that was less than fulfilling. 
In each case, there was always a contribution to that human desire to want to 
know and understand. How we assess those risks and deal with the challenges 
of exploration is the central question we are about in this two and a half days, 
and I am most grateful to all of you for accepting the invitation to participate 
in this kind of debate and discussion of how we may structure this question, 
not only in a public but also in a specific way. I am certain we will have a lively 
discussion of where you draw the line between the benefits of exploration and 
the inherent risks, especially as technology changes, and as we learn more about 
the environments in which we explore. 
Now, this is in part about NASA participation, to be sure, but it is mostly 
about those of us from NASA having the opportunity to learn from so many 
others who are engaged in the broader exploration agenda of the central questions 
we pose.
I am most grateful to see the Apollo, Shuttle, and Space Station veterans 
who have gathered here with us to share their thoughts.  Indeed, I think it will be 
historic in and of itself to learn so much from them. All of them have dared to sit 
in a spaceship at one point (and in several cases, like Jerry Ross, seven different 
times), to sit on the top of the spaceship with millions of pounds of explosive 
fuel, prepared to put their lives on the line in order to advance that cause of 
exploration and discovery. Now I asked Jerry, why you do this, and he said, “Well, 
because it’s an opportunity to do so,” and he would easily sign up for an eighth 
flight this afternoon, I’m sure. As a matter of fact, I don’t think he would wait 
until noon to sign up for an opportunity.
To some, it may seem that NASA has made space travel routine. Let there 
be no mistake: I think we all fully appreciate and understand that space flight 
and exploration is still a very risky proposition. Despite our efforts to eliminate 
that risk, there will always be an attendant risk to such a venture. And, as a 
result, here in attendance are NASA scientists, engineers, and managers whose 
job it is to have constant vigilance about that risk. And in that regard, I view 
myself as included in that requirement for constant diligence to assure that risk 
is mitigated as much as we can. 
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OPENING PHOTO: 
An artist’s concept of future exploration 
missions: Two kilometers above the lava 
ﬂ ows of Mars’s Tharsis Bulge region, 
a geologist collects samples from the 
eastern cliff at the base of Olympus Mons, 
the solar system’s largest known shield 
volcano. 
(NASA Image # S95-01566. Courtesy of 
John Frassanito and Associates)
5From the discussions that will take place here, I hope we will gain a greater 
appreciation of our responsibility as a public organization to take on bold and 
risky ventures, and to learn from those who have accepted private ventures and 
other approaches to how we explore risk. We want to know how to frame that 
discussion and debate, and evaluate that risk in a different way.
But, again, it is also a requirement that we do that in a diligent manner that 
minimizes and mitigates, to the maximum extent we can, what that risk may be, 
that we understand what risk is as much as possible and, in some cases, accept 
it relative to the returns we think are feasible. That’s the price of admission of 
what we do each and every time we’re engaged in any exploration venture, be it of 
human spaceflight or robotic probes. It is always measured in the public domain 
and in the public eye relative to what our expectations are to that return. Indeed, 
NASA is an agency that has been defined over the course of its 46 years by great, 
great triumph and unbelievably deep tragedy, and we’ve learned from both ends 
of that spectrum. It’s a consistent set of themes. It is, indeed, the singular aspect 
of what has described this agency throughout the course of its four decades.
We have purposely expanded the list of invitees, and we are very grateful 
to the folks who have accepted to be a part of this. We want to gain an added 
perspective from the people engaged in exploration of the Earth’s most extreme 
environments, and learn what they can bring to the question of why we explore 
in the face of danger. What is it about that act of exploration that makes it so 
appealing? And so important? And so much of an acceptance of human desire to 
want to understand and know that which we don’t? 
Within the NASA family, we have great respect for all who put their 
lives on the line: Not just to seek thrills, but, rather, to gain knowledge, wisdom, 
and experience that will benefit all humanity. All of those assembled here have 
a unique and exciting story to tell about what drives us to explore, whether 
engaged in it directly or specifically involved in supporting its effort, all with the 
same objective. 
All of those stories, I have no doubt, we’ll hear at this meeting. Also, we’ll 
learn from the experiences of how folks work to minimize and mitigate the risk, 
and learn where the fine line is between responsible and imprudent risk. Where is 
”
WHY DO WE TAKE SUCH RISKS TO EXPLORE? AS HUMANS, WHAT IS IT ABOUT US 
THAT REALLY WANTS TO UNDERSTAND THAT WHICH IS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF 
THE HORIZON, THAT WHICH IS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RIDGE?“
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to these kinds of circumstances, in many cases and in many circumstances, 
the events of nature will provide a set of risks that must be responded to, and 
challenges independent of whatever control we might have over it. 
Our colleagues at the Kennedy Space Center, after their second hurricane in 
the span of a few weeks, are dealing with just that set of challenges, of risks that 
they are working through. And because of their extraordinary diligence, having 
survived two unbelievable events of what are natural disasters in their own right, 
nonetheless, have survived those experiences with all the Shuttle orbiters intact, 
all the space station hardware in great condition, and no loss of life, no injuries. 
It’s an extraordinary testimonial to the amazing diligence of Jim Kennedy, the 
director of the Kennedy Space Center, and what the Kennedy team has done to 
ride out this set of natural disasters. 
I was down at the Kennedy Space Center with Bill Readdy a week ago, 
and the poetic kind of discrimination with which nature provides us a set of 
challenges on risk were evident to us. I got an opportunity to see the Vertical 
Assembly Building, which is the dominant structure on the skyline of the 
Kennedy Space Center that all recognize, and you could literally tell which way 
the wind was blowing when Hurricane Frances blew in. Three of the four sides 
of the Vehicle Assembly Building were in relatively good shape. On one side of 
it, though, better than a thousand panels were blown off. Several of those panels 
have also departed as a result of the latest hurricane that just came through. As a 
consequence of striking some of the buildings in the area, ripping off big chunks 
of roof, all manner of consequence and destruction that occurred as a result of 
that, all of which was mitigated in some way, shape, or form. And yet, the irony 
is that right next to the Thermal Protection Building, where a portion of the roof 
blew off next to the Vehicle Assembly Building, there was a pressure-treated 
lumber gazebo without a scratch.
Nature discriminates very profoundly, and why it does, we don’t understand. 
It certainly is a case that reminds all of us, even in such a simple example as that 
one, that despite our best efforts, there are unknowns that will always rise up in any 
of these circumstances, in any case of exploration, for which the only defense we 
have is diligence and the hope that we have mitigated against it as well as we can.
We’re living in an era of great potential, one in which the exploration of 
the solar system and of the Earth’s most extreme environments will boost the 
opportunities we have to become a smarter, safer, healthier, and more intelligent 
world. Certainly, we’re more informed about the neighborhood we live in, a 
neighborhood defined as this little, bitty solar system around this little, puny 
star in a gigantic galaxy that is part of a massive universe. We are just on the 
cusp of understanding what our role is in that broader case, and it’s only been in 
the last 40 years that we have come to understand it in ways that are really quite 
profound. I’m confident that if we do this right, we’ll be amazed by the rapid pace 
of progress our future exploration activities will bring about.
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exploration. When we evaluate and determine as individuals, or collections 
of people and nations, to forsake those exploration opportunities, it has 
consequences. In the 15th century, China had the opportunity to be the world’s 
foremost maritime power and, indeed, possessed that capability. The Chinese 
ruling class, nonetheless, decided that the sponsorship of the fleet was an 
indulgence. History, in the course of the several centuries thereafter for that 
culture, is certainly a function of those choices that were made.
Certainly, we have the same opportunity in this country to make similar 
kinds of choices. In the 1875 time frame, the director of the Patent Office advised 
the President of the United States that it was a good time to close down the 
Patent Office, because everything that needed to be invented had been. Had 
the President of the United States accepted that wizened sage’s advice at the 
time, imagine where we’d be! Yet, that was based on a calculated understanding 
of what folks thought was the potential of new inventions. It wasn’t reached 
whimsically, it was reached by those who really believed that we had already 
incurred an enormous evolution of change of technology, revolution in industrial 
affairs, and, as a consequence, we were on a roll, and anything beyond that was 
going to be simply derivatives of the same. 
In the last century, we’ve seen an explosion of growth in the exploration of 
seas, remote regions of the Earth, and, indeed, space. All of which, arguably, might 
not have happened had that original set of recommendations been followed.
It is no accident that NASA’s founding occurred some 46 years ago this 
very week, in the same decade that Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay first 
stood on our planet’s highest peak, and that Jacques Cousteau used the good ship 
Calypso to conduct his epic voyages of undersea exploration. As explorers, we all 
share that common bond. 
We dare to dream grand dreams, and, in the process of doing so, assume 
tremendous risk, some of it beyond the scope of our knowledge of the time in 
which those dreams are assumed and accepted. We do so for what we know to be 
great purposes. We also, in the depths of those tragedies that occur, grieve when 
our brethren are lost in the cause of exploration. Indeed, part of the impetus for 
this symposium was brought about in debates that occurred in the aftermath 
of the Columbia tragedy. It was a tough report that the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board released. It told us an awful lot about the technical problems 
that led to it, the engineering challenges that we did not understand, and, as a 
result, paid an ultimate price with nine people—the seven members of the crew 
as well as two engaged in the recovery of Columbia after its destruction. We 
learned that that is a horrendous price—again.
But it also brought about, as a consequence of debate, a discussion about 
how we contributed to that tragedy, and a broader public debate about a renewal 
of the purpose of why we explore. And that debate has gone on in a broader 
public policy sense. The year after that horrific tragedy, it nonetheless was an 
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we explore and what the strategy and path ahead should be in pursuit of that 
human desire to understand.
In the process, it also raised a series of questions that we have the 
opportunity here, over this couple of days, to at least debate how they should 
be framed. We have, I think, as a consequence of the strategies the President has 
levied, and the direction that he has provided to us at NASA for exploration, a 
better understanding now of exactly how to pursue those exploration goals. And 
it’s laid out in a series of objectives and programs to achieve it, and a stepping-
stone approach, and a whole range of different ways in which we’re going to 
achieve that task.
But communicating the why of this venture has just begun as a public 
debate in the last few months. Again, this is an extraordinary moment in time, 
in which there has been a renewal of that spirit of discovery and exploration. In 
part, it must then engage in this broader public dialogue, because we are, after all, 
a public organization for which there is trust that is rendered to us by the public 
for our acceptance of these kinds of challenges. And that trust is fragile, and at 
each of the intervals in which we have seen either those great triumphs or great 
tragedies, it has been tested.
So understanding the why, and being able to communicate that in a way 
that’s effective, is part of what this discussion is all about. And while participating 
in the panel discussions, I would ask that each of us pose the following kinds 
of questions: How do we integrate the risk calculation with the benefits to be 
derived? What’s the return? How do we communicate that as well?
Because it’s apparent, when tragedies occur, what the depth of the risk 
was that was accepted, and then, therefore, not responded to effectively. But 
understanding what the benefits were to be derived sometimes gets lost in the 
translation, so how do we integrate that better? And that’s on a personal as 
well as a societal level. There are any number of colleagues here, and those 
who’ve elected and chosen to participate in this venture, who can articulate 
this on a personal level. But, also, how we translate that in a broader societal 
context, I think, is very important, why we’ve accepted those risks, for what 
potential gain.
Also, ask the question: How do we regularly remind ourselves of the risk, 
and is that really important? Is it something we really need to focus on, and to 
what level of depth and degree? Certainly, being accepting of it or dismissive 
of it is not one of the options, but what is the appropriate balance? Also, pose 
the question: How do we avoid complacency? It is human nature, it is part of 
our human makeup, that what we see repetitively we begin to accept as normal? 
If you’ve never seen it before, it suddenly becomes a remarkable circumstance, 
something which you respond to because you’ve never seen it before. And, yet, it 
may be far less significant as risk than what you see every single day, yet, because 
we see it so regularly, we accept it. 
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that there is a risk attendant to driving an automobile, flying in a commercial 
airplane? These are things we understand as being part of that, either intuitively 
or intellectually, and have recognized that despite the fact that lots and lots 
of folks every single year die in horrific automobile accidents, we accept that, 
as humans, because of the transportation and opportunities it provides, the 
facilitation of discourse and communication between and among each other, 
and the means to get from here to there. What is it about it that makes that an 
accepted level of risk? 
And, yet, in the act of exploration, when the tragedies occur, what is it that 
makes that either intolerable or why we question it? And again, the root of this 
may yet well be grounded in how well we understand the benefit that we think we 
gained as a consequence of the activity and the effect of accepting that risk.
Also, for those who are involved in wider-ranging sets of exploration 
opportunities, what is it about the risk that you accept that’s different than 
that which NASA accepts in what we do, and what is similar? How do you parse 
between both and determine what we can learn from this about that? And, I 
guess, the ultimate question: What can we learn from each other by how to 
frame this question differently and, indeed, communicate it more effectively as 
an opportunity for great gain? 
Over the course of human history every major advance has occurred because 
of the temerity on the part of human beings to want to understand and to explore 
and to do something that has not been tried or has been tried so irregularly as 
to have no pattern to it. If you think of every major advance in the course of our 
existence it has been attributed to that characteristic of us as human beings.
This week we have an opportunity to learn from each other’s experience 
so that we can go forward boldly into the unknown, informed by a responsible 
sense of how we communicate in a way that conveys the reasons why it is or is 
not accepted as an appropriate level of risk. We are resolved at NASA to better 
communicate with the public about why it’s necessary to take those risks, and 
why it is inherent in the way we, as human beings, conduct our lives in a way 
that would give meaning and purpose to this larger exploration agenda. At its 
“ ”
. . . WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN FROM EACH OTHER’S EXPERIENCE 
SO THAT WE CAN GO FORWARD BOLDLY INTO THE UNKNOWN, INFORMED BY A 
RESPONSIBLE SENSE OF HOW WE COMMUNICATE IN A WAY THAT CONVEYS THE 
REASONS WHY IT IS OR IS NOT ACCEPTED AS AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF RISK.
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core the answer is best summarized by a comment President Bush made in 
Houston just days after the Columbia tragedy, that this cause of exploration is 
not an option we choose, it is a desire written in the human heart. And when we 
can confront that, even on both ends of the equation—in its great triumph as 
well as in its depths of tragedy—and we’re reminded why we’re driven to this, 
what is it we can do responsibly as public servants, for those of us at NASA and 
in the broader community of explorers represented here, to communicate that 
more effectively?
I thank you all for your participation, and I look forward to sharing with 
all of you the spirit of exploration and discovery that I think is certainly evident 
in this group by so many people who have elected to spend their time to engage 
in these important questions. The manner in which we have framed this over 
these couple of days will bring those kinds of questions to bear in ways that, as 
we move forward in this next step of exploration, to return to flight, to complete 
the International Space Station, to develop through Project Constellation an 
opportunity to explore beyond Earth’s orbit, all of this may be the beginnings 
again of an opportunity to frame that discussion and debate, not only among 
ourselves, but in the broader public, in ways that highlight those purposes of 
exploration, and why we engage in the risks and accept them, knowingly, for the 
purposes for which NASA began.     ■
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Captain Lovell was selected as an astronaut by NASA in September 1962. He served as Command 
Module pilot and navigator on the epic six-day journey of Apollo 8, man’s maiden voyage to the Moon. 
On that ﬂ ight, Lovell and fellow crewmen, Frank Borman and William A. Anders, became the ﬁ rst humans 
to leave the Earth’s gravitational inﬂ uence. He was spacecraft commander of the Apollo 13 ﬂ ight, 
11-17 April 1970, and became the ﬁ rst man to journey twice to the Moon. Captain Lovell held the record 
for time in space with a total of 715 hours and 5 minutes until surpassed by the Skylab ﬂ ights.
Race to the Moon
James Lovell
Former NASA Astronaut and President, Lovell Communications
I’m an ancient mariner here and I see a lot more modern 
astronauts who have done a lot more than I have ever done. But I think the previous 
speakers have really set the scene for this discussion of how we perceive risk. Now, I 
would like to expand this concept of risk as it pertains to spaceflight, and, of course, Apollo 
13. But before I do, let me digress and tell several personal stories familiar to me of how I 
think risk is perceived.
The first story takes place long before we had NASA astronauts. After World War 
II, Wernher von Braun came over from Germany, and he and his team went out to White 
Sands, New Mexico with a bunch of dilapidated V-2 rockets. Their job was to fire those 
rockets up into the upper atmosphere and, with the proper sensors, determine maybe what 
the stratosphere was like—the flow, the elements, and things like that. 
    But von Braun was a very farseeing individual. He knew that someday man would 
go into space, and he would piggyback on these rockets some experiments that would 
determine, or help to determine, if man could survive in the environment of zero gravity. 
He would put small animals in the nose cone of these rockets and put a camera at the apex. 
And, then, as the rocket got up to the top of its apogee and started to come down, before 
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it reached terminal velocity, he would photograph their reaction to see how they 
would react in zero gravity. 
Now, my story takes place out there at White Sands. One beautiful, blue 
day, out on the launch pad, is this dilapidated old V-2 rocket—gaseous oxygen 
just streaming out from the vent. Inside the nose cone there are two mice 
strapped tightly to their couches. This one mouse looks a little worried. His tail 
is twitching back and forth, and perspiration is coming out on his whiskers. He 
looks at his companion and says, “You know, I’m getting scared. The rocket could 
blow up! The parachute could fail to open! A mouse could get killed doing this 
kind of work!” And his companion, who had made about three flights before, 
said, “It beats hell out of cancer research!” So, in this particular case, this mouse 
figured that risk was the lesser of two evils.
Now, I’m going to tell you another personal story about this idea of risk. I’ll 
go forward quite a bit to Gemini 7, Frank Borman and I are on a two-week mission—
the purpose was to find out if man could live in space for two weeks, the maximum 
time to go to the Moon. And here is a case where, because of the newness of the 
situation, that risk was way overblown. The Gemini spacecraft proved to be a fairly 
decent vehicle; Gemini 3, 4, 5, and 6 were pretty good. But in those days, NASA and 
the doctors and the hierarchy—management—put the astronauts in the spacecraft 
and got them to keep their suits on all the time to fly these missions. For the first 
couple of missions—three and a half hours or even one day—that’s fine. But, as 
time went on, those suits got to be more uncomfortable all the time, you know, 
oxygen flowing through the body, drying up the body pretty badly. 
So by the time Gemini 7 came around, a two-week mission, we were 
determined that we were going to get out of our suits. We had a special suit but 
it was still bulky and uncomfortable. So we took off—and the first thing we then 
wanted to do was get out of the suits. We found out that the spacecraft’s integrity 
was there. Nothing was leaking. Everything was fine. Management said, “No. 
No—stay in those suits.” We said, “But everything is going fine here.” Finally, out 
of desperation, I had unzipped my suit and I had snuck out of it (or almost), and I 
was out of my suit in everything but name. Poor Borman was still in his suit, and 
I could see he was getting more tired and difficult. And, finally, after about three 
and a half or four days, we finally got permission to get out of the suits. 
So, here’s a case where the risk was overkill. I mean, we knew the spacecraft 
was good. We knew the best way to fly was in our underwear, not the suits. And 
now, of course, as you and I see on TV, on the shuttle flights they’re in shorts and 
T-shirts, so that’s the way that goes. 
And then the third little story I want to tell you about risk is one that 
you all know, but I think it’s a classic. And it was the Apollo 8 flight. Apollo 8 
was going to be an Earth orbital mission—around the Earth to test the Lunar 
Module and Command Module before we’d ever commit those two vehicles 
to go to the Moon. And as you know, two things happened in the summer of 
’68. Number one, Grumman Aircraft finally bit the bullet and said, “Hey, we’re 
not going to get this Lunar Module ready before 1969.” And then again, we had 
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intelligence information that the Soviets were going to put a man around the 
Moon, a circumnavigation flight around the Moon, before the end of 1968—in 
fact, in the late fall of 1968.
And, as a matter of fact, we know now, talking to them and with everything 
in the open, that they were very serious about it. Their N-1 big lunar rocket was 
a failure, but their Proton and Zond probably could have done the job. And, so, I 
think in the fall or summer of ’68, they sent Zond 5 around the Moon with small 
animals. I think the reentry was so steep that the animals died, but it was a test 
that they were doing to see if they could put two cosmonauts around the Moon. 
They sent another spacecraft—Zond 6 Proton went around the Moon again. And 
while that flight was not a complete success, it had the possibilities of success.
And here’s where the change took place. In the Soviet Union, the hierarchy—
the management—was arguing: “Is the risk worth the reward of beating the 
Americans at least to get two guys around the Moon, or should we send another 
unmanned or animal-bound flight around the Moon before we commit to the 
people?” Leonov and Makarov, the two cosmonauts, were all set to go. They were 
arguing: “Let’s go.” Other people said no. 
And while they were hesitating—while they were vacillating back and 
forth—a bold decision was made in this country, in the fact that the Lunar 
Module was not ready, but Apollo 7 showed that the Command Service Module 
could last for 11 days. And so, the decision was made to send Apollo 8 around the 
Moon and to look for landing sites and things like that.
So here was a case where we analyzed the risk and we thought that the 
reward—the achievement and the ability to continue the Apollo program for 
landing—was well worth it. 
So, let me first state that everything in life involves a degree of risk—
and I think I’ve mentioned that before—from the moment we are born until 
we die. And the risk can involve physical, financial, or emotional factors. You 
know, the Hollywood stuntman has to weigh the reward for his efforts to the 
risk he faces. The investor faces a risk of financial gain or loss. And, certainly, 
when we get married, the emotional risk is there for a happy marriage or a quick 
divorce. Therefore, when we have control of our destinies, such as an active space 
program, we must analyze the reward we achieve for the risk involved and the 
action we must take to minimize that risk.
“ ”
SO HERE WAS A CASE WHERE WE ANALYZED THE RISK AND WE THOUGHT 
THAT THE REWARD—THE ACHIEVEMENT AND THE ABILITY TO CONTINUE 
THE APOLLO PROGRAM FOR LANDING—WAS WELL WORTH IT. 
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In the space program—at least the one I knew—we approached the risk 
factor in many ways. First, the contractors, of course, set standards for maximum 
reliability—99 percent, if possible. And they used the concept of redundancy, 
you know—one of this or two of this or three of that. In case one failed, we had 
backups. Every effort was made to simplify space system design. One example: 
In the Lunar Module propulsion system, pressure-fed fuel systems were used 
instead of the more complicated pump systems. We incorporated escape systems. 
Our design of the trajectory to the Moon—the first part—would be a free-return 
course. That meant if the spacecraft’s main engines failed in its inflight test, the 
spacecraft would be on a course that would take it to the Moon—and the Moon’s 
gravity would aim it back towards the Earth. And by using only the spacecraft’s 
attitude rockets, it could safely land back here on Earth. Thus, an added safety 
factor was given to the mission.
Of course, the intense systems training by the Mission Control team and 
astronauts was essential—including an analysis of possible failure modes and 
training to recover from them. Now, this training pointed out the limits on 
efforts to reduce risk in an Apollo mission. We only trained for single-point 
failures. Had we tried to train and develop recovering techniques for all possible 
combinations of failures—well, we’d still be at Cape Canaveral waiting for the 
first takeoff. And therein lies the problem between risk and reward. 
I guess the best way to visualize this, at least from my point of view, is 
to picture a simple X/Y graph—a plot. Let’s say that at the top of the Y, the 
ordinate at the top, is a factor up there saying “maximum risk.” And then as we 
gradually go down the Y ordinate, the risk decreases all the way down until we 
get down to the juncture of the Y and the X graph—and there, theoretically, is 
zero risk. On the X axis, we put all those factors that we might be able to make in 
terms of cost—those factors that we can put into a spacecraft that would reduce 
risk—high reliability, redundancy, extra safety equipment that would cover any 
failures, true training, et cetera.
I kind of think that as we plot the graph going down, that the risk 
would decrease very rapidly until we got to some point where it would start to 
flatten out and keep parallel, never getting down to zero risk. As a matter of fact, 
I also think that had we continued to go out, adding additional redundancies, 
adding other equipment to handle other failures that might occur, and giving 
the crews more intense training, more procedures that they had to follow in 
case there are certain things that go wrong, that the risk factor would actually 
start to go back up again. Therefore, there’s got to be a point whereby we can 
develop a system that we minimize the risk but without going overboard, 
because eventually you’ll compromise the spacecraft’s ability to complete its 
assigned mission. 
Now, I think we did a fairly decent job in weighing the acceptable risks 
with effort to reduce risk in the Apollo program. The first six Apollo missions 
proved that. On Apollo 11, Mission Control quickly resolved the landing radar 
problem. The brilliant analysis by John Aaron saved the Apollo 12 mission after 
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a lightning strike on takeoff. And so, by Apollo 13, Mission Control people and 
spacecraft crews were confident that they could handle any situation. There 
was, however, a wild card in our assumptions, and it surfaced on 13. Now Apollo 
13 was the third lunar landing mission and strictly, I think, the first scientific 
flight. It was targeted to land in the hills surrounding a crater called Fra Mauro. 
The scientists thought the lunar material there would be different from that in 
Apollo 11 or 12 and, of course, we thought the surface there would tell us about 
the interior of the Moon. 
The launch occurred on April 11, 1970, at 13:13 Central Standard Time. 
Perhaps the spacecraft number and the time was sort of a premonition of the 
events to come. During launch phase, our first crisis occurred. The center engine 
on the booster’s second stage shut down two minutes early due to a “pogo effect” 
or extreme oscillation on its structure. Now, this pogo effect was noticed in one 
of the booster’s unmanned flights. 
To reduce the risk in this area, an engine shut-down device was added 
to prevent the engine from going divergent and disintegrating. In addition, the 
booster was slightly overbuilt to allow a one-engine failure. Here was an example 
of added safety features to reduce the risk of a flight. Our initial trajectory to the 
Moon was that free-return course that I mentioned. But at 30 hours after launch, 
we changed our flight path to what we call the hybrid course. Now this was 
necessary to provide the proper visibility for a safe landing in Fra Mauro. And 
here is where we traded the reduced risk of a safe return home for the guarantee 
of a good visibility. Should our spacecraft engine fail now, our closest point of 
approach to the Earth on our return would be about 2,500 miles out. Much too 
far out for a safe capture by the Earth’s atmosphere. 
We didn’t worry about it. Fourth flight—second time to the Moon—and I 
was getting complacent. 
The explosion took place two days and 200,000 miles from Earth, resulting 
in the loss of all the oxygen, electrical power, and propulsion of the Command 
Service Module. At this point, the flight of Apollo 13 changed from another 
thrilling space adventure to a classic case of crisis management. It was here, too, 
that other factors came into play to reduce the risk involved in spaceflight. 
These are the attributes, or human characteristics, of a well-trained 
Mission Control team: good leadership—not just at the top—but throughout 
the organization, leadership that develops teamwork among all those involved, 
including contractors; use of initiative to find solutions to problems never 
contemplated or trained for; the ability to focus and persevere to find the right 
solution for each crisis; and, of course, a team that was well motivated to get 
the job done. Now, these are the ingredients that turned Apollo 13 from an 
almost certain disaster into a successful recovery. Mission Control and the flight 
crew worked together to configure the Lunar Module into a lifeboat. The crew 
successfully transferred the controls to the Lunar Module just as the Command 
Module died. Procedures were developed to use the Lunar Module landing engine 
to put the spacecraft back on a free-returning course. 
RISK AND EXPLORATION:  EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS        JAMES LOVELL   RACE TO THE MOON
16
Let me digress a little bit on this. There is something that I had learned 
in the space program, based on what I am about to say, that I took with me 
from the public sector into the private sector: Always expect the unexpected. 
When everything is going right—when everything looks rosy, when nothing is 
wrong—it’s always nice to look ahead to see if there are symptoms coming down 
that maybe are pending for a possible crisis. 
When I started to maneuver—now remember, I have two spacecraft mated 
together and I’m controlling from the Lunar Module, and remember, also, that 
I spent many, many hours in simulators learning how to fly a Lunar Module. 
But when I put an input in to make a certain change of attitude, the spacecraft 
didn’t respond that way. I couldn’t figure out why. If I wanted to go down, it 
went up. If I went left, it went right. I mean, after all these hours! Well, then it 
dawned on me. I had a 60,000 pound dead mass attached to the Lunar Module , 
An interior view of the Apollo 13 Lunar Module and the “mailbox,” the jerry-rigged arrangement the Apollo 13 astronauts 
built to use the Command Module lithium hydroxide canisters to purge carbon dioxide from the Lunar Module. 
(NASA Image # AS13-62-8929)
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the Command Service Module, which, of course, we needed to get back into the 
atmosphere. The Lunar Module had never been designed to be maneuvered with 
the Command Service Module attached. We had to quickly figure out how an 
input would give me the right output to get to the proper attitude to make that 
burn to get back on the free-returning course. 
Now, again, it was discovered that the crew was being poisoned by their 
own exhalations. The round canisters in the Lunar Module to remove the carbon 
dioxide were becoming saturated. In the dead Command Module there were 
plenty of unused, square canisters. 
Using their initiative, the crew systems division thought up a way to use 
tape, plastic, cardboard, and an old sock to adapt a square canister to the Lunar 
Module. This removed the over-abundance of CO2 in the Lunar Module and, of 
course, prevented the poisoning of the crew. And, so, there was another little 
incident in system design. Why we had square canisters in the Command Module 
and round canisters in the Lunar Module, I will never know to this day. 
Throughout the return home, the risk of disaster decreased and the odds 
became more positive as each crisis was analyzed and a solution developed. When 
it became apparent that the spacecraft would miss the narrow return corridor for 
a safe landing, a procedure was used that was developed as a last ditch measure 
for Apollo 8. I was on that flight as a navigator, so I happened to know about it. 
Using the Earth’s terminator as a guide, a seat-of-the-pants manual maneuver 
was accomplished to put the spacecraft back on proper course. Again, proper 
training, including an analysis of how to make course changes after experiencing 
navigational failure, saved the day. 
If, in the development of the Apollo program, we carefully balanced the risk 
versus the reward of a lunar landing by incorporating such factors as extreme 
reliability, redundancy, simplification, and intense training to reduce the risk, then 
what happened on 13? Apollo 7 through 12 succeeded in doing their missions, and 
the problems they encountered were easily solved by Mission Control working 
with their crews. 
The answer is human error. It’s a virus that can be embedded in the best laid 
plans. Those of you familiar with the causes of aircraft accidents will understand 
that most accidents are caused by a series of events that overcome the pilot 
and/or the aircraft. Such was the case with Apollo 13. The first event occurred 
about eight years before Apollo 13 took off. NASA ordered all Apollo contractors 
to make their electrical systems compatible with the 65 volt DC power available 
at the Kennedy Space Center—even though the spacecraft were designed to fly 
with a 28-volt DC power system. That would simplify the testing at KSC. The 
contractors complied with this request with one exception. A thermostat, part 
of the heater system inside the oxygen tanks, was not exchanged for one that 
could handle the high voltage. The job of the thermostat was to protect the tank 
from overheating. When the temperature rose to about 80 degrees Fahrenheit, 
the contacts would open, shutting off the heater power. At 65-volts DC power, 
however, the contacts could be welded shut, thus bypassing this safety feature. 
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All tanks on Apollo 7 through 12 had this anomaly, but none experienced the 
sufficient heater operation during testing to damage their thermostats. 
A second incident occurred during the oxygen tank manufacture. A tank, 
designated for Apollo 10, was dropped at the factory. It was retested for flight 
qualification, but, because of the lost time, it was reassigned to Apollo 13. 
Several weeks before the launch of 13, the third incident took place. 
With the booster, the spacecraft all assembled on the launch pad, a countdown 
demonstration test was performed, making sure that all the components were 
ready for launch. The test was successful, but after the test, the ground crew 
could not remove the liquid oxygen from one of the spacecraft tanks. A review 
of the history of the tank revealed the damage incident at the factory. Studying 
the design of the tank indicated that, although the tank performed perfectly for 
all inflight operations, the fall could have impaired the ground crew’s ability to 
remove the oxygen after a ground test. 
To replace the tank would slip the launch by a month, and so the decision 
was made to use the tank’s heater system to remove the oxygen by boiling it off. 
The procedure was successful, but as the level of the liquid oxygen decreased, the 
temperature rose. At 80 degrees, the contacts of the thermostat started to open 
to shut off the power. The high voltage welded them shut, and the thermostat, 
instead of shutting off the power, became a conduit to keep the heater system 
on. We know now that the temperature rose to about 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit, 
severely damaging the heater system. The problem was not detected. When the 
tank was filled with liquid oxygen, it was a bomb ready to go off. It exploded two 
days later, 200,000 miles from Earth, when we turned on the heater system. 
I might digress another little bit here because, in all this discussion of 
risk, there is a factor that’s called fate, luck, or something like that. This was 
the third time we turned on the heater system; nothing happened the first two 
times. If something happened the first time we turned on the heater system and 
that explosion occurred, we would never have had enough electrical power to get 
all the way around the Moon and get back home again, as we had already put the 
velocity on to go to the Moon. 
If it did not explode when it did, but waited until we turned on the heater 
system later, once we were in lunar orbit or when the Lunar Module was on the 
surface, we would never have had enough fuel in the Lunar Module to either get 
out of lunar orbit, or get enough to get back home again. 
“ ”
 . . . IF YOU’RE GOING TO HAVE AN ACCIDENT ON THE WAY TO THE MOON, 
OUR RESEARCH SHOWS BE SURE YOU HAVE IT 200,000 MILES OUT.
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So, if you’re going to have an accident on the way to the Moon, our research 
shows be sure you have it 200,000 miles out.
I asked Gene Kranz, who was the lead flight director, what lessons he 
learned from Apollo 13 that could be applied to the Mission Control team—and 
maybe all of NASA. Here are some of his comments: Develop the chemistry of a 
winner. The mind-set for success must be embedded in the values and culture of 
the organization. Be positive. Be optimistic. Do the right thing the first time. 
A second comment that he made: articulate a common vision that 
focuses your energies on your objective; team focus to accomplish the mission, 
whether it is in crisis mode or whether it’s the entire organization. This 
was outlined by the President just recently. We must focus our energies on 
accomplishing that mission.
The third thing he mentioned: teamwork provides the multidisciplinary 
capability to deal with complex and fast-moving problems. We can say many 
brains are better than one. Get the team together. Think up the solution. And, I 
kind of think, when I look back now on our Apollo program, that this was pretty 
common throughout our entire NASA organization. We had good leadership at 
Headquarters. Marshall did the booster. Goddard did the network. Johnson did 
the spacecraft and the crew training. Kennedy did the launch and the integration 
of the whole thing. So, we had a pretty good team. 
Fourth, Kranz says: build momentum quickly. This allows rapid response 
to limit problem growth. I think what he means there is that a quick response 
will give an insight to head off future problems that might be the result of an 
original problem.
He also says: be flexible. Solutions often lie outside the box. The idea there 
was the carbon dioxide incident on 13. 
And then he says also: don’t get distracted, and don’t let your team get 
distracted. For Apollo 13, on that particular flight, when I was waiting for the 
information to come up to re-energize to get the Command Module back in 
operation again, there was delay after delay, and I thought that they were going 
to set up more information to find out what went wrong and give us more things 
to do than just get the spacecraft ready. I didn’t want the crew down there at 
Mission Control to be distracted. I needed those basic procedures to get the 
Command Module going again. 
He then says: overwhelm the problem. Use every available asset. As soon 
as you have one, call in everybody who has any idea of what may be happening, 
almost like verbal popcorn, but then you can winnow out what is good and what 
is not good. 
Finally, his idea is: keep the poise. Let your words and actions convince your 
team that you are controlling events. Good leadership. You saw the movie. Gene 
Kranz, like Ed Harris when the whole Control Center is talking about finding out 
what went wrong when they found out about the explosion, says, “Stop guessing. 
Stop guessing. Let’s work the problem.”
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In our approach to accomplish the President’s directive of revisiting the 
Moon and on to Mars, we must accept a certain amount of risk and realize that 
unforeseen events are always present. The strategy of spacecraft development 
and mission design is to minimize the risk without compromising the goal. 
Whenever you are involved in an operation that handles thousands of pounds of 
high explosives, reaches extreme velocities, operates in a vacuum environment 
under zero gravity, and then encounters tremendously high temperatures on 
return, you are, if I can borrow the title from one of Tom Cruise’s old movies, in 
a “risky business.” The people involved in that business and those who monitor, 
critique, and investigate the results, should recognize that fact. 
To be completely risk-averse is never to take off. 
We should be aware that sometime in the future, we will again hear 
those words: “Houston, we have a problem,” and I hope we’ll be prepared to 
meet the challenge. Or, if I can steal the words from Gene Kranz, “failure is not 
an option”.      ■
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Behavioral Scientist and Vice President and Principal Scientist, Anacapa Sciences, Inc.
Bold Endeavors: 
Lessons from Polar and Space Exploration
It is an understatement to say that it is a pleasure to be here today 
to talk to you about some of my research. The concept of risk is something with which we 
all are familiar. Every decision that we make from the most trivial to the most important is 
attended by some sort of evaluation and consideration of the costs and the benefits, and the 
likelihood of a successful outcome. 
Expedition risk is of a different order. And humans are not particularly good at 
estimating risk. The research shows that we have a tendency to underestimate risk over 
which we have some control, and to overrate risk over which we have no control. That’s 
why we take the risk of driving on the highways, where presently there are 1.5 fatalities 
per 100 million miles traveled—incidentally that’s down from 5.5 fatalities per 100 million 
miles traveled in 1966. You were four times more likely to die in a traffic crash 30 years ago 
than you are now, and there are nearly twice the number of automobiles and vehicle miles 
traveled. We’ve done a lot to reduce risk in certain areas. 
But why do nations and individuals explore? I have here just a partial list. Trade 
routes, looking for new resources, in some cases national prestige, and, of course, science.
Individuals explore sometimes to satisfy a need for achievement, to do something special, 
Jack Stuster’s work for NASA has included a study of Space Shuttle refurbishing procedures and studies 
of conditions on Earth that are analogous to space missions, including an analysis of diaries maintained 
by the leaders and physicians at French remote duty stations in the Antarctic and on small islands 
in the South Indian Ocean. He has developed design and procedural recommendations to enhance 
the habitability of the International Space Station, future spacecraft, and planetary facilities. Stuster 
completed a study of Antarctic winter-over experiences, expeditions, and voyages of discovery, which 
are documented in his book Bold Endeavors: Lessons From Polar and Space Exploration, published in 
1996 by the Naval Institute Press.
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many times out of curiosity, including scientific curiosity, and I truly believe 
that some people explore because they need to accept risk. Life just isn’t enough 
without taking some chances. However, taking calculated chances is far different 
than being rash. 
Every bold endeavor that I’ve read about was accompanied by naysayers, 
people who predicted that the expedition would result in disaster. It’s archetypal 
that Columbus had difficulty finding the financing for his planned expedition. 
It wasn’t because people believed the world was flat. By 1492 all learned people 
knew that the world was a sphere. The circumference of the Earth had been 
calculated by the Greeks, and then again later, and accurately, 400 years B.C. or 
so, and again later, but the later estimate was off by a large factor. 
Columbus believed that he would reach Japan after traveling about 3,200 
miles west. He was right. He did make landfall 33 days after leaving Spain. But 
had he known that it was really 10,000 miles to Japan, and that a continent or 
two interrupted his voyage, he might not have taken that risk. He did maintain 
two journals, one for his own use, and one for the crew that showed they were 
making far greater progress than they actually were—a way for him to minimize 
his personal risk on board. 
There are many justifications for exploration. One of my favorites is from 
Fridtjof Nansen, a Norwegian explorer, that might seem appropriate in this age 
when people complain about spending money on space. I mean—the critics say we 
should spend it here—as if the money were actually taken into space and thrown 
out of the spacecraft. But Nansen, who was a scientist as well as an explorer, 
wrote that “people perhaps still exist who believe that it is of no importance 
to explore the unknown regions. This, of course, shows ignorance. The history 
of the human race is a continual struggle from darkness toward light.” I think 
that’s beautiful. “It is therefore to no purpose to discuss the use of knowledge. 
Man wants to know, and when he ceases to do so, he is no longer man.” I think 
that says it all. And also, Nansen was an early supporter of women’s suffrage, so 
please don’t judge him by his 19th century usage of the term ‘man.’ 
Roald Amundsen was a little more blunt in saying that “Little minds only 
have room for thoughts of bread and butter.” But I will talk more about both 
“ ”
THE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN RACE IS A CONTINUAL STRUGGLE FROM DARK-
NESS TOWARD LIGHT.” I THINK THAT’S BEAUTIFUL. “IT IS THEREFORE TO NO 
PURPOSE TO DISCUSS THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE. MAN WANTS TO KNOW, 
AND WHEN HE CEASES TO DO SO, HE IS NO LONGER MAN.
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Nansen and Amundsen in a few minutes. There are many things I want to talk 
about that I’m sure I’m going to forget, so forgive me for that. 
Robert Falcon Scott wrote, after his first expedition to Antarctica, about 
how ill-prepared they were. “Not a single article of the outfit had been tested, 
and amid the general ignorance that prevailed, the lack of system was painfully 
apparent in everything.” Robert Falcon Scott gave great advice about things, but 
he didn’t really take his own advice. In his final hours, having reached the South 
Pole in 1912, only to find that Roald Amundsen had been there 30 days earlier, 
and on the trip back, laying in his tent with comrades who had perished beside 
him, he wrote in his journal that “We took risks, we knew that we took them. 
Things came out against us, and therefore, we have no cause for complaint.” 
Scott was unlucky also. They perished only 8 miles from the supply 
depot that had been prepared for them. They just couldn’t get to it in the 
storm—1912 had been an unusually stormy year in Antarctica. Under other 
conditions, they might have made it to the depot and come home to write an 
account of their expedition. 
Apsley Cherry-Garrard, who was also a member of Scott’s expeditions, 
wrote that “the members of this expedition believed that it was worthwhile to 
discover new land and new life, to reach the South Pole of the Earth, to make 
elaborate meteorological and magnetic observations and so forth. They were 
prepared to suffer great hardships, and some of them died for their beliefs.” 
They should have been more prepared. Others were. Scott used Manchurian 
ponies, which didn’t really cut it in the snow, nor had they ever tested the tractors 
they took to Antarctica. There was a certain hubris involved. Amundsen used 
dog sleds. The British would not use dogs or skis. It wasn’t British. They were 
going to slog it out. 
Most of my work has involved the risks associated with the psychological, 
behavioral, and human aspects of isolation and confinement. I use the following 
analogy to help people get a handle on what it would really be like to be on an 
expedition to Mars. Imagine living in a motor home with five other people for 
three years. You’re driving around the country, and you really can’t get out for 
about a year, and then, when you go outside, it’s for very brief periods, and you 
have to wear spacesuits, and you come back, and then you spend another year or so 
driving around with those same five people. You’ve already heard every story that 
they’ve ever told. The days blend one into another. The condition becomes mind-
numbing, and the tiniest, tiniest things get on your nerves. It is characteristic 
of all conditions of isolation and confinement that trivial issues are exaggerated 
way out of proportion. Everyone who I’ve interviewed about this talks about how 
they would have an incredible argument at an Antarctic research station over a fax 
transmission or something, and blow up, and then an hour later wonder: “What 
the heck happened? What was that all about?” It is a universal occurrence.
One of the other universals of isolation and confinement is the strange 
relationships that occur with your Mission Control, with your headquarters, 
wherever it is located—in Antarctica, it might be Port Hueneme, or it might 
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be the Johnson Space Center or elsewhere. But the remote crew always gets the 
impression that “They really don’t understand the conditions under which we’re 
operating. We’re trying to get a job done here and they’re not responding fast 
enough.” Or, “They’re giving us too much to do.” It always happens. And, you 
know, I used to think that it was just endemic to isolation and confinement, 
but I think it’s a structural condition. Even the field offices of a corporation, a 
small one or a large one, or perhaps the research centers of a major government 
agency might feel these same sorts of tension. It is just a natural phenomenon 
that occurs. If you’re prepared for it, you can somehow reduce the risk.
Anyway, an expedition to Mars would be a lot like this metaphor that I’ve 
described for you.  The first research that I conducted for NASA was conducted for 
the Ames Research Center. In 1982 they took a chance on this anthropologist who 
was working in the field of human factors to study conditions on Earth that are 
analogous to what we expected for future space crews. I studied conditions such as 
offshore oil platforms, commercial research vessels, fishing vessels, fleet ballistic 
missile submarines, saturation divers, and so forth, and came up with 100 or so 
design recommendations. It’s my understanding that a couple of them actually 
made it to the final design of the International Space Station, for which I’m grateful. 
I would like to know which ones they are. Personal sleeping quarters I don’t think 
has made it, and that was one of the most important recommendations. 
More recently, I’ve conducted research through the Johnson Space 
Center concerning longer-duration missions, one year to three years. The only 
analogues available for such a long mission are previous expeditions. And, of 
course, I included our experience with Skylab, and there is much of relevance 
from Skylab.
NASA has a tradition of trying to learn from the past, and in many cases 
is successful. However, I remember reading in one of the industry publications 
that: “One of the great lessons from the NASA experience on board Mir was that 
you really shouldn’t hard-schedule everything. You should have this task list 
that you put things on. And then the crew can go and take from that task list 
as necessary. Isn’t that a wonderful thing?” I thought: My gosh, that was the 
principle behavioral finding from Skylab. Didn’t anybody read those wonderful 
lessons learned reports from Skylab? 
So, I wrote a letter to the editor, and I probably angered a whole lot of 
people in doing so, but there is a lot that we can learn from the past, including 
our own more recent past. 
I’ve found that expeditions, and polar winter-over experiences in particular, 
resemble in many ways what we can reasonably expect for future space crews. 
Chronologically, the earliest of the expeditions that I studied was Columbus’s 
first voyage of discovery. And although it was only 33 days out to the New 
World and seven months total, there really is a lot to learn from that experience. 
For example, he had strong-willed subordinates who questioned his authority 
regularly. One of them [Pinzon, commander of the Pinta] left the expedition in 
search of gold to the north, leaving the two principal vessels. 
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And it’s probably not well known that on Christmas Day, 1492, the Santa 
Maria went ashore and was broken up. The reason was the crew had partied the 
night before, celebrating Christmas Eve, and left the watch to a cabin boy who 
didn’t know what to do when the ship slipped its anchor. No one was killed 
during the process, but it left Columbus with only one hull. 
Columbus believed in triple redundancy long before it was a NASA policy, 
and he probably would not have left Europe with fewer than three hulls, and 
certainly would not have returned. Oddly, in one of those incredible coincidences 
that occurs that I’ve read about in the history of exploration, Pinzon rounds the 
bend of this little island—this tiny island where the crew was trying to decide 
what to do. Would they be able to rebuild and make a small craft out of the 
remnants of the Santa Maria? And then Pinzon shows up. They were able to 
return home, but in the two smallest of the three craft.
Redundancy is an important method for reducing risk and increasing 
reliability. There are other methods: overbuilding—you build the valve to 
withstand 150 percent of what you expect it to withstand; graceful degradation, so 
that you have time to do something about it; and maintainability. When you have 
a human crew, you should really take advantage of the crew for maintainability. 
One of my favorite explorers is the French explorer, Jules-Sébastien-
César Dumont d’Urville. Early in his career, he was on the island of Milos when 
people approached him about a statue that was hidden in a cave. He saw it and 
wanted it for France, so they dragged it down to the ship, breaking off two arms 
in the process. It’s what we know as the Venus de Milo. Later in his career, he 
commanded two expeditions to the Pacific and to Antarctica. He was one of the 
first to see the mainland of Antarctica, which he named Adelie Land for his wife, 
whom he rarely saw. He also named the linguistic groups of the Pacific with 
the names that we use today—Polynesian, Melanesian, Micronesian. He was an 
exceptional leader. At a time when expeditions—naval ships, in particular—were 
commanded autocratically, he was a kind and generous captain. He dressed as 
the crew did, which perplexed the British any time they met, because they didn’t 
understand. They didn’t believe he was truly the captain when he was wearing a 
straw hat and an open shirt. He was a realistic man. 
On his second expedition, he was required to leave Marseilles carrying 
plants to the South Pacific. I don’t know exactly what the plants were, but he had 
lots and lots of plants. At first, he objected to it because they were in pots and 
all over the ship, including in his cabin. And, after a week at sea, he wrote in his 
journal that this was a wonderful addition to an expedition and, if he had his way 
with things, every French ship that left port would be accompanied by plenty of 
foliage and greenery inside. I think that that’s not too dissimilar from some of 
the comments that we’ve heard from space crews loving to spend time with the 
growing experiments on board. 
The French had discovered early on something that was very painfully 
learned elsewhere, and that is, that there’s often conflict among subgroups in 
an isolated and confined situation, and there were a lot of problems with the 
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civilian scientists and the military crew. The scientists were outside of the 
command structure and it was always a problem, which led to the demise of some 
expeditions, or contributed to it, at least. So the French would take bright Naval 
officers and train them to be botanists or natural philosophers and artists. 
It’s particularly appropriate that we talk a little bit about the Lewis and 
Clark expedition in this year of the bicentennial. And there is much to learn, 
even though there are great differences. It was all outdoors, for one thing, and not 
in a confined environment, except when they were in winter quarters in Oregon 
where it was raining all the time. One of the things that we can learn from the 
Lewis and Clark expedition is to establish a spirit of the expedition. Thomas 
Jefferson named it the “Corps of Discovery”—a brilliant thing to do. I was very 
pleased in 1999 when I visited the Astronaut Office at Johnson Space Center and 
saw a sign that read,” Expedition Corps.” I asked, “What is this?” Andy Thomas 
responded, “Well, it’s for the people who are planning to go to the International 
Space Station and beyond.” I said, “It’s a stroke of brilliance.” You have people 
already using the mind-set that this is an expedition. It’s going to be a long 
time—it’s not a test flight, it’s really an expedition. It’s my understanding that 
Michael Foale is responsible for doing that.  [Foale replied that astronaut Ken 
Bowersox (also in the audience) was responsible for the use of the term]. Well, 
it was a stroke of brilliance and should be congratulated. It’s a wonderful idea. It 
helps people get in the mind-set for an expedition. 
There were 40 explorers with Lewis and Clark. By the way, only one 
member of the expedition perished in the entire three years, and he died of a 
burst appendix, we believe, based on a description of the incident. Any one of 
you who ever had acute appendicitis would probably agree with me that you’d 
want to have that out before you go. Now, the physicians tell me that that’s not 
necessary, but, from my experience, I wouldn’t want to have that condition a long 
way from home. The Lewis and Clark Expedition was 28 months long, about the 
same as an expedition to Mars might be. 
Lewis and Clark and their company met many native peoples along the 
way. That probably won’t happen on a mission to Mars, although some people are 
hoping for it, I’m sure. But one thing that they did was to describe everything in 
their journals. Captain Clark and Captain Lewis were meticulous journal keepers. 
I thought it might be interesting to find out what exactly they were doing 
on the 27th of September 1804—200 years ago today. I was amazed. It was the 
most pivotal period of the Lewis and Clark expedition. Two days ago, they were 
on the Missouri River, and they reached a tributary near what is now Pierre, South 
Dakota. They had finally encountered the Teton Sioux, who they had heard were 
going to be hostile to them. Indeed, it was a three-day period of intense hostility. 
They had learned through interpreters—through other Native Americans—that 
the Sioux intended to prevent them from going any farther and to steal all their 
stuff. The two preceding days were just incredibly tense. 
On the 27th, they were trying to leave the village, and the little boat that was 
taking them out to the larger keel boat had lost its anchor and was having trouble 
RISK AND EXPLORATION:  EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS        JACK STUSTER   BOLD ENDEAVORS
27
maintaining its position. The little boat came out and parted the remaining cable, 
and there was a lot of hollering to get the people to their oars and so forth, and 
that alarmed Black Buffalo on shore, so he called all 200 of his warriors out to the 
shore. Lewis and Clark believed for sure that this was going to be the showdown. 
They went to stations—Clark went to the bow and manned the swivel gun, a 
little two-inch cannon loaded with shot. They had something like 20 men with 
blunderbusses loaded with shot trained on the main body of the group. They 
had a technological edge here. They would have wiped out 40 or 60 of the Teton 
Sioux, but there’s another 200 of them in arrow shot, and they could keep an 
arrow in flight at all times, and it’s a long time to reload the weapons on board 
the keel boat. 
There was this standoff for we don’t know how long, but it appears to 
be quite a while, with Clark in the bow shouting, the interpreter, who really 
didn’t speak Teton Sioux, trying to convey to Black Buffalo to control his people 
because there were warriors who were coming into the water, who were grabbing 
hold of the mast of the little boat to keep it ashore. They thought for sure that 
this was the incident that they had been fearing. What Clark didn’t realize was 
that his people obeyed him because it was a military organization. The Teton 
Sioux were only recently a tribal organization. It was a group of bands that came 
together when the resources permitted. Black Buffalo’s control over the 200 or 
so was based on his charisma—only a quarter of them were related to him and 
had some obligation to obey him. But Clark took a risk that if he held his ground 
and didn’t fire, it would be resolved peacefully. And the decision paid off. Finally, 
Black Buffalo pulled on the arm of one of the guys and apparently told him to 
back away, and the Corps of Discovery was permitted to go. 
Of course, the Sioux dogged them all along the way, trying to get them 
to come ashore or to take them on board, which Lewis and Clark didn’t do. I’d 
just like to read a sentence or two from the journal entry for this day 200 years 
ago. “We were on our Guard all night. The misfortune of the loss of our Anchor 
obliged us to lie under a falling bank, much exposed to the accomplishment 
of their hostile intentions . . . Our Bowman, who could speak Maha, informed 
us in the night that the Maha prisoners informed him we were to be stopped. 
We showed as little signs of this Knowledge of their intentions as possible. All 
prepared on board for anything that might happen. We kept a Strong guard all 
“ ”
ONE OF THE THINGS THAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THE LEWIS AND CLARK 
EXPEDITION IS TO ESTABLISH A SPIRIT OF THE EXPEDITION . . . IT HELPS 
PEOPLE GET IN THE MINDSET FOR AN EXPEDITION. 
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night, no Sleep. Captain Clark, 27 September 1804.” Just south of the Mandan 
villages is where this all occurred 200 years ago today. 
The lessons applicable to the future? The importance of good leadership. 
Previous studies found that good leadership is actually more important than 
good habitability. Plan everything. Have a sense of cooperation and perseverance. 
To the extent possible, live off the land. Now, you won’t be able to hunt buffalo 
on Mars, but you will be able to use the resources on Mars in the same manner to 
extend your reach. And, of course, develop a spirit of the expedition, symbolized 
by the Corps of Discovery. 
 Another expedition that everyone knows about is the voyage of the Beagle. 
It was really a British surveying expedition, the purpose of which was to chart 
the coastline of South America. Captain Robert Fitzroy was—I can’t think of a 
polite word to use—a very stern and narrow-minded person. He at first didn’t 
want the volunteer naturalist, Charles Darwin, on board, because he didn’t like 
the look of his nose. And then later, off of the coast of Argentina, Darwin had an 
argument with Fitzroy and almost abandoned ship, because Fitzroy thought that 
slavery was a noble institution and had a lot going for it and Darwin thought it 
was disgusting. And, so, at their next port, Darwin spent several weeks on shore 
until he cooled off. 
Darwin wrote in his journal about the crowded conditions on board a 
research vessel. So many chronometers and so many people packed into small 
space. It was a very difficult journey for him. Darwin, after this five-year voyage 
and returning to England, lived to be a very old man. But he never again set foot 
on a boat, never again left England. 
One of the most relevant expeditions is the Belgian Antarctic expedition 
of 1898–1899. It’s relevant not just because it was the first expedition to winter 
over in Antarctica, the first expedition to really have science as its true objective 
in Antarctica, but because it was a multinational crew, cosmopolitan, and, in 
this regard, truly modern. It included Norwegians, Romanians, and, of course, 
Belgians. They had the very best of all French food, and one American, Frederick 
Cook, the ship’s physician. 
What happened on board the Belgica is well-documented. The crew gradually 
slipped into a malaise that was paralyzing to some of them. One man died because 
of what Cook thought was the effects of the isolation and confinement. One man 
developed a temporary deafness. Another man developed a temporary blindness. 
One man, each night, would find a place below deck where he could hide and 
sleep, because he thought people were going to kill him. Roald Amundsen served 
his apprenticeship as an explorer as mate on the Belgica, and later wrote, “Insanity 
and disease stalked the decks of the Belgica that winter.” He credited Frederick 
Cook with saving the expedition from certain psychological collapse. 
Cook saw what was happening, and he thought that there was this heavy 
psychological component, but he also thought something was missing from their 
diet. This was before vitamins had been discovered, but he figured there was 
something missing. He tried to get the men to eat fresh penguin meat, but it 
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tasted too fishy for many of the men. So, for those who were the most afflicted 
by this malaise, he would have them stand with nothing on except an overcoat 
exposing their naked skin to the glow of the ship’s stove. He called it the baking 
treatment. They’d stand there for as long as they could each day, taking turns 
doing this. Whether it had some effect on them, or maybe it was a placebo effect, 
it did have the effect of helping the crew get through this very difficult period. 
Cook also thought that exercise would help, so he required the crew to take walks 
on the ice, but this devolved into a circular path around the ship that became 
known as the “madhouse promenade.” 
It was a dismal time, and it appeared when the spring came that they were 
not going to be able to release themselves from Antarctic’s icy embrace. They 
worked very hard with ice saws and explosives and finally did break free, because 
they knew that they couldn’t survive another year. 
This is not to say that people haven’t survived isolation and confinement 
before; many have. There were often several hundred whaling ships locked in the 
ice at any given time in the north during the 19th century. It is well known that 
during the height of the Cold War, there were 10,000 American submariners, at 
any given moment, at sea, in isolation and confinement. 
Regarding the Australasian-Antarctic Expedition and Douglas Mawson, 
I formerly neglected the Australian contribution to exploration until my dear 
friend, Desmond Lugg, showed me that it was just a characteristic American 
narrow-mindedness to focus on certain things and disregard the rest. I rectified 
that situation by reading as much as I could about this expedition and about 
Mawson. There is a tremendous wealth of information that we can extrapolate 
from Mawson’s experience. For one, personnel selection is important, and, for 
another, weather influences everything. It’ll interrupt your plans. It will break 
equipment and keep you from doing things that you want to do. If you don’t think 
that’s relevant to the future, ask Michael Foale, who had on several occasions to 
retreat to the hardened portion of the International Space Station when there 
were solar events, solar weather. Also, on Mars, there will be similar solar events 
and solar particle events and also dust storms. Dust storms on the planet Mars 
can envelope the entire planet, and that would affect an expedition. 
Roald Amundsen was the most successful of all explorers; he always made 
it to his destination. First to the Northwest Passage. First to the South Pole. In 
1923 he was on two Dornier flying boats to fly over the North Pole. One of them 
developed problems and had to land. It crash-landed. The other one landed. They 
spent two weeks on the ice, leveling with wooden spoons an airfield for them to 
take off. Amundsen structured every moment of every day. The hours of work, the 
hours of eating, the hours of sleep, the hours for talking, for smoking, everything. 
He was in charge, and he made himself known to be in charge and organized 
everything. When they returned to Norway two weeks later, of course everyone 
thought he had died in the ice, and it was a wonderful welcome. Amundsen later 
perished in the North while looking for Umberto Nobile, a guy who he devoted 
his biography to criticizing. I work in the field of human factors, and I’m grateful 
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to Roald Amundsen for his wonderful statement, “The human factor is three-
quarters of any expedition.” 
Ernest Shackleton is probably the best known of all the explorers. There 
are movies about him, books about him, and seminars at corporations to impart 
the style of leadership that he had developed. His recruiting ad from a London 
newspaper read, “Men wanted for hazardous journey. Small wages, bitter cold, 
long months of complete darkness, constant danger, safe return doubtful. Honor 
and recognition in case of success.” Now, this might 
have been a personnel selection measure on his part, 
because I truly believe he thought he was going to 
return, but he wanted to make sure that everyone who 
embarked with him would be aware of the risks. 
Shackleton had very clever ways of selecting 
people not so much on their technical expertise, but 
on how well they got along with their colleagues. He 
would ask them impertinent questions, and if they 
responded defensively, that might not be the kind of 
person that you really want in your tent eight months 
into a bad situation. But if they were humorous 
about it or philosophical about it, the person might 
be okay. Although Shackleton never made it to any of 
his destinations, he never lost a man. On the British 
trans-Antarctic expedition, the Endurance was locked 
in the ice, and [the] crew spent months on board, 
and then several months in a camp next to the ship 
as it was sinking. Then they moved to a camp that 
was on an ice floe that was as large as they could see, 
but, gradually, as the winter ended, the ice floe was 
breaking up around them. It was a mile across. Then 
it was several hundred yards across. Then it was 100 
yards across. They had been practicing their egress 
to the boats. They had saved lots of equipment and 
three cutters from the ship. They had everything in 
the boats and they had practiced many, many times to escape the floe. It started 
to break up beneath them. It actually broke up right in the middle of the camp. 
Shackleton dramatically rescued one of his crew members from the ocean, pulling 
him onto the ice, and they departed. Then, they spent a week in these open boats 
in the worst sailing conditions on the planet, before they made it to a tiny rock 
called Elephant Island, where they made it ashore. 
Shackleton knew that they could not survive there very long, so he selected 
five men to accompany him on the most arduous and dangerous open-boat 
voyage probably ever undertaken, to get to a whaling station on South Georgia 
Island. He took some of the people with him because he needed their skills, but 
he took some of the five people with him because he didn’t want to leave them 
Ernest Shackleton. (Source: Shackleton, E.H. The Heart of 
the Antarctic, Volume I, 1909. p.234.) 
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there. They were the malcontents that might have made things really bad for the 
folks who were going to be confined to the huts they made from the overturned 
cutters on Elephant Island. He eventually made it to safety. They made five rescue 
attempts, finally getting to Elephant Island with a borrowed tug from the country 
of Chile. It is a wonderful story. 
I want to talk just for a moment about Richard Byrd, because he’s American 
and one of the few of the American polar explorers that I consider relevant. 
On his 1934 expedition, Byrd built Advance Base, a 9 by 13 foot hut that was 
transported 100 miles from Little America and buried in the snow. It was going 
to be his experiment in isolation and confinement. Originally, he intended to 
have two people live there, but wrote later that he didn’t want to subject anyone 
else to the risk. He considered the primary source of risk to be the psychological 
risk of being alone in complete darkness. Well, he really shouldn’t have done 
this, because he almost killed himself three different ways. He fell and injured 
his shoulder even before the party that had delivered him had departed. He was 
continuously poisoning himself from the exhaust from the gasoline generator 
and from the fumes from a poorly vented stove. He almost froze to death when 
he locked himself out of the cabin in a storm—that was poor human factors 
preparation, the latch on the door. 
But the crew at Little America knew that something was wrong several weeks 
into this experiment when his Morse code transmissions were the equivalent of 
slurred. They mounted three different rescue missions before they got to him, 
and he was in terrible shape. He survived to write one of the most eloquent 
accounts of life in isolation and confinement at its worst in the book Alone, in 
1938. “Time was no longer like a river running, but a deep still pool,” he wrote. He 
also said that “a man who lives alone lives the life of a wolf.” That is, his manners 
left him, which is something that happens in isolation and confinement
The Norwegian Polar Expedition is one of my favorites and the expedition 
from which we can derive the most benefit. Fridtjof Nansen would have had a 
wonderful career in modern times, either as a rock musician or an actor. But he 
was a scientist. He was one of the founders of the modern theory of neurology. 
He was one of the popularizers of skiing as a sport. He had skied across Norway 
from Bergen to Oslo. Skiing was not a sport at the time, it was something rural 
people did to get around. 
It is difficult for us to appreciate what the world was like during the closing 
years of the 19th century. We take for granted a communications network and 
travel abilities that allow us to reach anywhere in the world. But in 1893, there 
were still many unknown regions and many unanswered questions of the natural 
world, and the most compelling was, “what is at the North Pole?” Is it land? Is 
it ice? Is it open ocean? There were fanciful predictions. And many people had 
perished trying to find out. 
Nansen had a plan. There was some evidence that the polar ice pack moved 
across the top of the world from east to west. So he thought: if a ship were built 
properly, it could be locked in the ice on purpose, and then you could allow nature 
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to carry you across the top of the world. He had a plan for a ship which he called 
the Fram. “Fram” means “onward” in Norwegian, and it was his personal motto. 
He approached the Norwegian government with this plan and received a grant. 
He had to go back, not unlike modern expeditions, because of cost overruns for 
building in an additional margin of safety. 
During a time when crews were separated—with the “men,” or crew, sleeping 
before the mast in the forecastle, and the officers and scientists in the main 
cabin—Nansen designed the Fram so that all staterooms opened onto the saloon, 
or the main area, a perhaps characteristically egalitarian, Norwegian approach. 
It was a very stratified society, but he did this to encourage comradeship and 
facilitate habitability. Nansen tested everything beforehand. There were spinoffs 
from his expedition. Polar travelers still use the Nansen Cooker, because it 
extracts the last calorie of energy from fuel. 
The Norwegian Polar Expedition provided a model for all future explorers. 
The Fram sailed up the coast of Norway, across Siberia, and at a point closer to 
Alaska than Norway, headed into the pack ice on purpose. The ship was built 
with a rounded bottom and a recessed keel. Every fitting could be removed so 
ice could not get a purchase on this ship. When the ice encroached, and the 
pressures increased on the hull, the ship rose up out of the ice and remained 
cradled in that manner as she drifted across the top of the world. The theory was 
proved, and when it appeared they would get no farther north, Nansen selected 
one man, Hjalmar Johansen, to accompany him on a dash to the pole. 
After many weeks, they found that they were only making a mile a day. So, 
at the closest that anyone had reached to the North Pole at that time, they turned 
back. They had no hope of regaining the Fram. They made it to Franz Josef Land 
where they were caught by an early winter. 
Nansen knew that the secret was to keep people busy with meaningful 
work, and, of course, to be especially careful about the food. Norwegians are 
not afraid of the cold. They say there is no such thing as bad weather, only bad 
clothing. And he also knew that it was important to keep people entertained. 
The crew looked for every opportunity to celebrate. After awhile, they actually 
went into their almanac to find other countries’ holidays to celebrate. Special 
celebrations break the monotony and help motivate a crew. 
Nansen and Johansen built a 6 by 10 foot hut out of stones and walrus 
hides. Their entire world was illuminated during that Arctic winter by the pale 
glow of a blubber lamp. They had nothing to do. They slept sometimes as many 
as 20 hours out of the 24, in the same sleeping bag, because it was the most 
efficient way to conserve heat. But they never resorted at any time during their 
nine months to any sort of conflict or harsh words. This was the first thing that 
the press asked them when they got back. How did you survive?
They burst from their hut in the spring and performed every task that 
was required of them expertly, despite the mind-numbing sameness of the nine 
months that they had endured in isolation and confinement. They couldn’t clean 
themselves. They had no towels. They didn’t have a change of clothes. They 
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would take their knives to scrape the soot that came from the blubber lamp that 
heated their food and illuminated their hut. They would scrape the blubber off 
and back into their lamps, recycling the fuel. It was incredible. Their dreams were 
filled with clean clothes and Turkish baths. 
Nansen and Johansen came upon a British expedition within a month 
after leaving their hut, and they stayed there for another month or so until that 
expedition’s relief ship came. The day that they stepped foot on Norwegian soil, 
the Fram broke loose from the Arctic pack ice on the other side of the world, then 
made its way back. The crew was united and sailed together around Norway and 
up Christiana fjord to what is now Oslo. They were greeted as if they had just 
returned from another planet. It’s hard for us to imagine what it was like 110 years 
ago, but the similarities to the feelings that we would have are certainly there. 
This artist, explorer, neurologist, oceanographer, champion skier, and 
founder of Norway was instrumental in the League of Nations. He received the 
Nobel Peace Prize for saving hundreds of thousands of lives from the Armenian 
situation, and also helped with a famine. The new Soviet Union after World 
War I wouldn’t recognize the Red Cross. Nansen was respected throughout the 
area for his experiences, and organized a relief effort, when he found that there 
was a famine underway, while helping to repatriate prisoners of war. Presently, 
there are people in Eastern Europe who hold what is called a Nansen passport for 
displaced persons. His legacy is wonderful. 
There is much to learn from the past that is applicable to the future. I have 
a lot to say about that, but I am out of time. The main themes to emerge from my 
research are: Certain problems are highly predictable, but they can be mitigated 
by taking the proper precautions. One of the most important findings is that 
humans can endure almost anything. 
My work has focused on the behavioral and human factors issues, and I 
performed a content analysis of diaries that were maintained by the leaders and 
physicians at French remote duty stations on tiny islands in the south Indian Ocean 
and at the Dumont d’Urville station in Antarctica. Engineers have been asking 
the behavioral sciences for many years, “What’s the most important behavioral 
issue? Is it privacy and personal space? Is it sleep? Is it group interaction? What 
is it?” Psychologists and others would say, “Well, group interaction.” “Well, how 
much more important?” “We don’t know.” 
I used content analysis to help answer the engineers’ questions. The 
method is based on the assumption that the more someone writes about a topic, 
the more important it is to that person. I found that group interaction received 
almost twice the number of category assignments as any other category. The 
study resulted in the first rank ordering of behavioral issues based on quantitative 
data. I also found a decline in morale during the third quarter of an expedition; 
whether it is a 5-month mission or a 12-month mission, there is a drop, in effect. 
Initially, I thought, isn’t this an interesting and useful discovery. Then I started 
to realize that it applies to almost everything. Think of a semester in college: 
you’re only three-fourths of the way done and there is all that work yet to do, and 
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I’ve only got three weeks remaining. I think it applies to many situations in addition 
to isolation and confinement. 
There are some specific lessons. One of them is to design for redundancy, as 
NASA does so well, and also for maintainability. There is no substitute for having 
Captain Lovell on board to take duct tape and fabricate a solution to a problem. One 
should expect casualties. Don’t consider it out of the question. Also understand 
that weather will affect everything. The conditions will be different, but most of the 
problems that will confront future explorers will be the same problems that were 
confronted in the past. It won’t be the gasoline-powered generator or the poorly 
vented stove that Byrd encountered, but some other similar situation. 
We have embarked on a new age of discovery already, and there is much more 
in store for us—wonderful things. 
One of my favorite quotes is from Arthur C. Clarke, who is one of the most 
prescient people on the planet. He invented the PDA for 2001: A Space Odyssey. He 
invented the communications satellite, as we all know. His words inspire me. Every 
time there is a visible pass of the International Space Station over my house, I am 
out on my roof watching it. “Every age has its dreams, its symbols of romance. Past 
generations were moved by the graceful power of the great windjammers, by the 
distant whistle of locomotives pounding through the night, by the caravans leaving 
on the Golden Road to Samarkand, by quinqueremes of Nineveh from distant Ophir 
. . . Our grandchildren will likewise have their inspiration—among the equatorial 
stars. They will be able to look up at the night sky and watch the stately procession 
of the Ports of Earth—the strange new harbors where the ships of space make their 
planetfalls and their departures.”
I could find lots and lots of quotes about taking risks. There are hardly any 
about not taking risks, which might be telling. Of course, we heard earlier about 
Admiral Zheng, whose armada of more than 300 ships in the early part of the 15th 
Century sailed from China all the way to Africa. The flagship of his armada was 
more than 300 feet long. Compare that to state of the art 1492 [European] naval 
technology. What would history have been like had the Emperor not had all the 
ships burned and made it a capital offense to build a ship with more than two masts? 
We might all be speaking Chinese now. I’m not sure. It’s important, sometimes very 
important, to take risks, because the costs of not taking them can be greater than 
taking them. 
I want to end on a more cheerful note. My favorite philosopher, Mark Twain, 
commented on more than the weather in San Francisco in the summertime. He also 
said “Twenty years from now you will be more disappointed by the things you didn’t 
do than by the ones that you did do. So throw off the bowlines. Sail away from the 
safe harbor. Catch the trade winds in your sails. Explore. Dream. Discover.”      ■
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MILES O’BRIEN: We have a little bit of time left, and I just wanted to open it up. Raise your 
hand if you have a question. 
QUESTION: The question I have for both Jim Lovell and Jack Stuster is: It seems to me one 
of the key differences between the explorations which you have studied so much and space 
exploration is something that you touched upon, that is, the relationship between the leader 
on site and the team at Mission Control. That, to me, seems to be a big difference between 
the polar missions where the leadership of one person on the ice meant everything and 
space missions which, ultimately, like it or not, will be second-guessed. What is the best 
way, as NASA plans missions of great length, to work that out so you don’t end up with a 
Skylab mutiny-type situation?
JAMES LOVELL: Well, let me answer that question in this manner. In the early days of our 
space exploration, as many of our audience knows, the people who designed the work to 
be done on the spacecraft, sitting back at a desk and thinking of what to do, often had an 
overabundance of things to do until you got into the spacecraft. When you were actually 
working in zero gravity and you had the ability to adapt to that zero gravity, you were 
overburdened with things to do at the beginning. So, the people on the ground have to 
realize what the conditions are in the spacecraft to be able to accomplish the tasks that you 
give the crew. In the early days, this was a lot of times not thought about until the crews 
sort of rebelled and went back to the controllers or mission planners and said, “Look. Here’s 
what we can do, and here’s how we have to stretch out the agenda.” 
JACK STUSTER: You’re right. The early explorers, of course, had no way of communicating 
with their base of operations. And, even when it became possible, some didn’t take advantage. 
For example, Shackleton could have had a [radio] transmitter on board the Endurance—he 
chose not to, because he didn’t want to have that connection.  And I’ve discussed this issue 
with Claude Bachelard of the French polar program, and if he had his way, he wouldn’t have 
much communication at all with home, only the most necessary things, because of the 
potential for problems. In that list that I mentioned very briefly of the behavioral issues, 
number one is group interactions. Number two was outside communications. And most 
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of it had a negative valence to it. So communications is definitely an issue, but 
NASA is doing an awful lot in that regard. 
The Life Sciences folks at NASA Headquarters have sponsored a great deal 
of research just on this very issue of communications between on-orbit crew 
and Mission Control. I watch every morning NASA TV, and the relationship 
that Mission Control folks have with the International Space Station crew is 
wonderful. It just seems terrific, and it goes both ways. The crew learns how 
to deal with Mission Control, and Mission Control learns to be sensitive to the 
special issues of the crew as well. 
MILES O’BRIEN:  Of course, on Mars you’d have a 40-minute roundtrip for 
communication. That would probably complicate things a little bit. It would be 
more like e-mail. 
QUESTION: I just recently downloaded the Saturn I user manual that the Skylab 
guys referred to, and it says the specification for reliability on the Saturn 1B 
system was only 0.88. Now, with the Shuttle and how we’ve gone towards the 
all nines or five nines (.99999), where do we look at the boundary of reliability, 
which you were talking about in your discussion? 
JAMES LOVELL: Well, it’s tough to answer that. I think a general assumption 
that whenever we design any component, whether it’s a booster, a spacecraft, or 
a segment of something, we try to get the greatest reliability. We try to man-rate 
the system so that we can have reliability on the system that we’re going to use. 
Now, I don’t exactly know what all the percentages are of the various items that 
we’ve used over the years. But I would assume that in our present operation, 
and in the future work on some of the new vehicles that we’ll design, that is 
one of the greatest concerns and greatest pushes that we will try to do, is to get 
the greatest reliability. And we do that again, as both of us talked about, with 
redundancy, and the reliability of the components themselves. And we learn a 
lot, by the way, by past experience. I didn’t mention that, but Apollo 14 took off 
with a lot of things changed to it based on the potential that 13 had. They looked 
at all sorts of things before they launched Apollo 14, in about a nine-month cycle 
before they could relaunch it. 
QUESTION: I think there is a critical point, that is, evaluation of risk could be 
approached objectively by a variety of techniques, and you can try your damnedest 
to reduce that. But at some point someone has to make a decision—.88 or .89, 
who makes the decision and on what basis do they make the decision? Is it 
subjective, objective, a democratic vote? How do you do that? 
JAMES LOVELL: I’ll answer again. The decision is made on, what is the reward? 
I’ve mentioned that critical thing on Apollo 8. The Americans thought, our NASA 
folks thought, that the reward during Apollo 8 was well worth the risk, whereas 
the Soviets thought that maybe they should send another unmanned spacecraft 
before risking a new cosmonaut. And, so, you had to look at the reward. If the 
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reward is tremendous, then we have to accept a tremendous risk that is involved 
with it. Like any other risk factor, if you invest a lot of money in something, 
you have to think that that’s well worth the risk to invest that money to get the 
reward back. And it’s the same way with almost any operation that we do. That’s 
the way I look at it. 
MILES O’BRIEN: Jack, just to follow up on that, to what extent did the polar 
explorers get specific about the risk? Or was it just all a gut feel? 
JACK STUSTER: It wasn’t a mathematical exercise, that’s for sure. It was highly 
subjective. But it is a personal equation, and some people are willing to accept 
more risk than others, and it all depends on what the potential benefit is. If the 
potential benefit is great, then we were justified in taking a greater risk. 
MILES O’BRIEN: Would Shackleton and Amundsen have been good astronauts?
JACK STUSTER: I think so. They would have been good mission managers, because 
they attended to every detail. For them, there was very little risk, because they had 
already attended to every detail, unlike others who didn’t. But, if you attend to every 
detail, if you had planned for every possible contingency that you can think of that 
might occur, reasonably, there’s a certain confidence in your ability. It’s not really 
taking a risk. The risk is something out of the ordinary, the weather, something that 
might come up that you can’t really count on. And then, you compartmentalize it, 
and it’s okay to deal with it.
MILES O’BRIEN: Any other questions out there? Yes, go ahead.
QUESTION: My question is, how do you evaluate the reward? And, just as an 
example, think of Cortez and Pizarro, they would have thought that their 
expeditions to the New World were accomplishing great benefits for Spain, but 
we see them as genocidal, wiping out great cultures. How can there possibly be 
an objective measure of reward or benefit? 
JACK STUSTER: Well, I think if we encounter other living beings of some sort, or 
some other entity, that would be a parallel. But, if it’s a matter of science, then you 
measure the actual importance of your discovery, and it becomes, again, a subjective 
thing. I think astrophysicists and astronomers might be more inclined to take 
greater risks than geologists to rescue the Hubble [Space Telescope]. I think it is a 
personal equation. Am I wrong? Well, what I mean is, if the outcome is important 
to the individual or to a discipline, then those people are likely to take greater risks. 
But no one wants to make a rash move, however motivated, however wonderful the 
benefit might be. He wants to make sure that everything has been covered that can 
be beforehand, to minimize the risk. But the very nature of exploration makes it 
almost impossible to predict what you will get in the way of benefit. 
MILES O’BRIEN: The very nature of exploration makes it impossible to predict 
what you will retrieve.
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QUESTION: Miles, this may be as much for you as the panelists. We have an 
interesting juxtaposition of risk taking this week. Burt Rutan is getting ready to 
fly on Wednesday morning. And he would argue that he has carefully balanced 
the risk/reward ratio, and he is very proud that he’s never lost a test pilot. And 
he clearly thinks the risk is worthwhile. But NASA is often held to a different 
standard, because it’s the government somehow making that decision, rather 
than an individual. Government has facilitated Rutan’s flight, and has clearly 
said that if he wants to do that himself, he can. But how does the government 
take that similar risk? Does it get harder and harder to do? 
MILES O’BRIEN: Yeah, is the bar set higher because you’re a government entity? 
I think that’s true. If Burt Rutan, as a private entity funded by Paul Allen, wants 
to do this, I think the level of acceptance that people have over the consequences 
of that, whatever it may be, I think it’s greater. And I don’t have an easy answer 
for how a government agency can accept that same level of risk. But, the other 
side of it is, you have all these smart people in this room, and a lot of resources 
that you can bring to bear to try to minimize that risk even more. I mean, Rutan 
has done what he has done so far for around 20 million dollars. And what is that? 
That’s a NASA study, right? A few NASA studies. [Laughter] But, nevertheless, it 
is pennies on the dollar compared to the amount of cost and amount of resources 
that NASA has. So, I think that maybe that allows you to accept and create risk 
with more safety. 
JAMES LOVELL: Let me answer that if I could, because I think the classic example 
was, President Kennedy got up in 1961 and, in his speech, he said we plan to land 
a man on the Moon and bring him back from space before the end of the decade. 
Now, we had just put Alan Shepard up two weeks before, in the suborbital flight, 
had not yet put anybody up in Earth orbit, much less thought about sending 
anyone to the Moon. So, he saw that this was a risk, because of the position that 
the country was then in, we were behind the Soviets at that time in technology, 
and they were doing all these things. And he had to get a position where he 
thought he could make a bold move. So, he, as the President, represented the 
government, represented the people, thought that we could do that particular 
job. It was a huge risk. If we failed, what would be the situation? He took it upon 
himself as the leader to put us in that position. 
JACK STUSTER: Burt Rutan is reducing risk, it’s my understanding, to win the X 
Prize. It is the weight equivalent of three people. There is only the one person and 
then the weight equivalent of two people that are going up. So, he has reduced the 
exposure to risk by taking the weight equivalent. 
MILES O’BRIEN: I’m trying to get one of those seats. 
JACK STUSTER: I know. [Laughter]
MILES O’BRIEN: And there would be no shortage of volunteers, either. 
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QUESTION: After the Apollo I fire, the Nation grieved. The spacecraft was fixed, 
and it flew in a very short period of time. After your mission, there was a similar 
sort of thing. There wasn’t a lot of discussion. There was some, but not a lot, of 
asking, “Why are we doing this?” There seemed to be a compelling thing drawing 
us out there. Flash forward to the Challenger. There was a lot of hand wringing. 
It took a lot longer than people thought to fly again. Flash forward to Columbia. 
Although something came from this in a space policy, it still seems to be so 
much more difficult to get back to what seemed to be so natural in the ’60s. For 
either of you, have we lost something since then? Is there something that can be 
regained? Is there a magic phrase or something you can do that can bring that 
back, or were we just lucky at that time?
JAMES LOVELL: Well, I think you have to look at the accidents in the context of 
which they occurred. With the Apollo I fire, there were problems because we did 
not really understand the use of sixteen pounds per square inch oxygen in ground 
tests, which we learned very belatedly. The program, at the time in which that fire 
occurred, was one of intense competition. It was intense prestige in this country. It 
was one that wanted to be continued to go on to completion. After the Apollo, as 
we all know, nationally it was sort of like a ship without a rudder for a while. We 
had various stages of the Space Station. We tried to figure out what to do. What I 
first recall is we were going to build a space station, a shuttle, and a transportation 
device all at one time. We found we couldn’t do that. I think that a loss today, a 
Challenger or Columbia, as compared to a loss during an intense period, is entirely 
different. We watch these spaceflights take off on television with seven people 
involved. It  is an instant tragedy when we see something like that happen. Actually, 
I lost more friends testing airplanes until the Challenger accident occurred. We took 
that loss. As you, Jack or Miles, mentioned, sometimes you become accustomed to 
certain risks. In test flying, we become accustomed to someone buying the farm 
occasionally, and we didn’t think more about that. We try to learn what happened, 
and then we try to change the system and to improve the system so it won’t happen 
again. Now there are major tragedies. If we lose something, it is a major tragedy 
because it represents part of our country. 
MILES O’BRIEN: Jack, what was the media response after Scott’s team perished? 
Was there a call never to go back to the Poles?
JACK STUSTER: I don’t know. I’m not sure what the media response was. There 
was a great deal of finger pointing and probably a lot of similar response. It didn’t 
stop the progress of exploration
MILES O’BRIEN: People weren’t calling for the end of that exploration 
necessarily?
JACK STUSTER: No. As a matter of fact, it was ennobled. The heroic death of 
Scott and his polar party wasn’t acknowledged. There wasn’t the inquiry, let me 
put it that way, that resulted in the detailed list of changes that must be made 
for the next one. 
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MILES O’BRIEN: Question?
QUESTION: In putting together a team for a high risk mission, what relative 
emphasis should be put on, on the one hand, technical knowledge/training, and, 
on the other, personal qualities, like resourcefulness and the ability to control an 
out-of-control situation? 
JACK STUSTER: Does it involve isolation and confinement? A small group? 
Isolated and confined? Technical performance? You will find that people who 
are technically competent might be called upon to perform their expertise only 
occasionally, whereas if they are living in isolation and confinement, they are 
always interacting with each other. So, the skill you should really select for under 
those circumstances is getting along with each other, and then ensuring that 
it’s the case by demonstrating it, rather than as a test, by simulations or past 
performance. Of all the principles of the behavioral sciences, ranking them in order 
of validity, the best predictor of future performance is past performance. You find 
people who have been successful cooperators in the past, and you have a better 
chance that they would succeed. If you are going to go to Mars, 13 Norwegians 
with some seafaring experience would be good. Just don’t pack the blubber lamp, 
right? It would be a bad thing. 
If I could return to the question, the question was, what is the relationship of risk 
and benefit? NASA is compelled to justify the activity. Often it is the spinoffs—
Teflon and so forth. There has been one that I have hoped for a long time. Long 
duration space exploration will result in bone demineralization. It could be the 
show stopper. The bones become brittle in the same manner that elderly people’s 
bones become brittle, to the extent that it could be dangerous to the explorers, 
either when they make their planetfall or, certainly, when they return. There are a 
lot of very smart people financed by NASA who have been looking into this issue 
to develop a countermeasure. There are people who take the mechanical approach 
of stressing the bones to trick the osteoblasts and osteoclasts into leaving the 
bones alone, and so forth. I have been hopeful that a solution would come. I have 
just learned that if this pans out, it will be the most monumental spinoff that 
NASA has ever come up with, and, certainly, will justify all previous research and 
all future expeditions and research, and that is a countermeasure in the form of 
a pill to bone demineralization. Everyone has an elderly relative, a grandmother, 
a mother, who fell and broke her hip and either succumbed as a consequence or 
the quality of her life was changed. All of us look forward to a future where we 
will live in fear of falling and breaking a hip. This countermeasure successfully 
developed by NASA will change all of that and would be, as I said, worth all of the 
effort that went before and will occur in the future. 
MILES O’BRIEN: Sounds like a story to me. [Laughter]
JAMES LOVELL: Jack, you’re not suggesting we send John Glenn up again, are 
you? [Laughter]
MILES O’BRIEN: Okay. That’s all the time we have. Great panel.     ■
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Dale Andersen has made almost 1,000 dives beneath the thick ice of lakes and oceans. He helped 
develop a number of techniques needed to explore the lakes of the McMurdo Dry Valleys, including 
both human and robotic exploration (using the ﬁ rst remotely operated vehicle—ROV—in the Antarctic). 
In 1991–92, as a member of the Exobiology Implementation Team under the auspices of the U.S./Soviet 
Joint Working Group for Space Biology and Medicine, he led the U.S. ﬁ eld team on a six-month joint 
U.S./Soviet expedition to the Bunger Hills, Antarctica. Currently, Andersen (along with Wayne Pollard at 
McGill University and others) has been studying perennial springs and ice-covered lakes in the Canadian 
High Arctic.
Dale Andersen
Astrobiologist, Antarctic/Arctic Researcher, SETI Institute
I’m going to talk about my experiences in both the 
Antarctic and in the Arctic, and I’ll focus more on the Antarctic; right now it’s a little 
bit more exciting. 
We started back in the late ’70s, working at some of the lakes that are in the dry 
valleys. And this is one of the largest ice-free regions that exist there. There is a series of 
lakes with very, very thick ice cover, and nobody had ever probed these lake before, and 
looked at them in depth, other than just taking some drills and popping small holes in them, 
and taking a soda straw approach. We wanted to look at them in a little different fashion. 
As I started thinking about this symposium, I started categorizing the kinds of risks 
that we were involved with over this period of time. And for us it really came down to 
mission risk, the success of our expedition in general, and personal risk, which I divide into 
transportation to and from the research site. 
We usually take large ski aircraft to get down to McMurdo Sound, and then to get up 
north we use Twin Otters. And then to get into our remote ﬁ eld sites, we’ll take helicopters, 
or, in some cases, on some of the expeditions we’ve taken Soviet icebreakers around the 
Hunting Microbial Communities 
in Dry Antarctic Valley Lakes
44
continent, and then taken helicopters inland and have been dropped off. We 
don’t have much control over what happens during those times. We’re there for 
the ride and, hopefully, we make it. And obviously sometimes the weather and 
the conditions can get pretty bad along those lines as well. 
Then, we actually live and work in these remote environments. We have to 
learn how to do both of those things—we have to learn how to live effectively. 
That takes quite a bit of effort, if you’re going to spend lengthy periods of time 
in these remote settings. 
And, then, it’s not just living, but you also have to accomplish some work. 
Developing the skills that require you to do that work is also something that 
we’ve had to overcome over the years. And then there is also the scientiﬁ c 
credibility from a personal standpoint. We can put all the effort into going to 
these regions to do the studies, and if we get there, and the weather is too bad, or 
if the equipment doesn’t work, or we’ve forgotten something really important, 
it’s just too bad. And, then, we come back with nothing but our hands in our 
pockets, and say, well, we had some good times. And, then, the program managers 
yell at us and don’t give us any more money.  The ultimate currency would be 
scientiﬁ c publications. And if you don’t get those scientiﬁ c publications, then 
you don’t get to go back down and do that kind of work again. 
And, then, there is the family setting. It’s always difﬁ cult to be away for 
these long periods of time, especially when you are in a hostile environment. 
Your family doesn’t know from a day-to-day perspective if you are just wandering 
around in the snow or if you’re drowning underwater or whatever is going on. So 
that’s one of those long arms that’s always reaching out to you. 
Over time, we’ve really had poor communication. And it’s something that 
has only changed in the last ﬁ ve or six years. Now we can pretty much have global 
communication on an instantaneous basis. It used to be that we just didn’t have 
any; it took weeks for something to get through. 
Then there’s risk to others, or assigned risk. If I’m a leader on an expedition, 
and I can send people out to do work, my level of risk assessment is different 
than what I would expect for somebody else, depending on their level of training 
or what their experience is. 
OPENING PHOTO: 
Scott Tyler (UNR) and Bob Wharton 
(Idaho State) pull Dale Andersen from 
the water at Lake Hoare, Taylor 
Valley, Antarctica. 
(Image copyright Dale Andersen)
“ ”
NOW WHY DID WE GO TO THESE PLACES?  WE DID HAVE SOME OF THE PROGRAM 
MANAGERS WHO WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROJECT TELL US . . . THAT WE WERE 
JUST GOING TO FIND A BUNCH OF ROCKS, AND THAT WE’D WASTED EVERYBODY’S 
TIME AND MONEY. WHAT WE FOUND WAS A REALLY LUSH, LUXURIANT, MICROBIAL 
ECOSYSTEM THAT HAD NEVER BEEN SEEN BEFORE.
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For a program manager, that perspective might be completely different. 
It’s different if they’ve never been in a ﬁ eld situation similar to that, or if they 
have any kind of mountaineering or diving experience, or some other kind of 
experience that they understand personal risk from that standpoint. But it’s 
valuable to have experienced people in those positions.
Again, there are different kinds of transportation risks that I’ve been 
involved with: large aircraft, large icebreakers, even Hägglund track vehicles that 
we can take across the ice shelves among the continental ice, and helicopters. 
All of those have different types of risk associated with them. And then in some 
cases, like the Hägglund track vehicles, we drive those personally, so then we have 
to be able to understand how to drive a vehicle like that, keep it out of crevasses, 
and understand what to do when it breaks down, which it invariably will. 
In the dry valleys, a lot of the ice is not in the valley itself. You have the 
continental ice ﬂ owing through, and you have a barrier that essentially keeps 
a lot of this from going into the valley. The evaporation highly exceeds the 
precipitation, so it’s quite dry. But some of the small features in between the 
glaciers are actually lakes. One example is Lake Hoare, where we spent quite a 
bit of time studying the lake ecosystem itself. Now these lakes are permanently 
covered in ice, and the ice thickness ranges from about 3 to 4 meters up to 6 
meters. In earlier years, about the only way people studied these lakes was 
to go out and drill a small hole through it, and then take water samples and take 
some other measurements. But nobody ever really asked the question, what’s 
going on at the bottom? Because most people thought the light levels were so low 
that there wouldn’t be anything on the bottom.
Well, a few years later, we decided to open these lakes up with 
a bigger hole so that we could go down and look. I guess, for some 
reason, we weren’t smart enough, or at that time underwater cameras 
were still a hassle to get a hold of, and it was just as easy to put us in 
the water as it was to take a little camera and drop it down the hole. 
But that wouldn’t have had nearly the fun factor, either, I guess. 
We developed a system that allowed us to melt holes through 
this thick ice. Essentially, we take a copper coil and just put hot 
antifreeze solution through it, let it melt down the ice. You can see 
that we can move in and out of that ice cover, as we’re melting it. 
It’s like a tunnel, of course, a water tunnel. Then we suit up and we 
jump in. Originally, we started out in wet suits and double hose 
regulators, which is kind of ancient history. Over the years, that was 
obviously not the best solution, because you’ve got to deal with a 
really cold wet suit once you get out of it. If it’s minus 30, it’s not 
too comfortable to take a wet suit off in those conditions. You can 
see that we’re on tether, because once you go in, you’ve got one way 
in and one way out. 
Now why did we go to these places? That to me was the 
biggest payoff. We did have some of the program managers who were 
A dive hole being “cut” through the ice at 
Lake Hoare, Taylor Valley, Antarctica. 
(Image copyright Dale Andersen)
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associated with the project tell us, just before we were getting ready to go in for the 
ﬁ rst time, that we were just going to ﬁ nd a bunch of rocks, and that we’d wasted 
everybody’s time and money. What we found was a really lush, luxuriant, microbial 
ecosystem that had never been seen before. And as it turns out, these tunnels that 
we make through the ice are just like tunnels back through time, 600 million years 
to 3.5 billion years ago. This gives us a glimpse of early Earth, and, perhaps, of 
early Mars. If lakes existed on Mars, they would possibly have been ice-covered, 
and possibly have microbial communities similar to what we see in the dry valley. 
These kinds of microbial mass communities are very, very proliﬁ c. 
Our work there is very dependent upon the training that we received. We 
have to be very safe. We’re diving in extremely remote areas where we don’t have 
the opportunity—at least, at that time, in this particular area, we didn’t have the 
opportunity—to get back to a recompression chamber. The closest one would 
have been in New Zealand, and that’s, of course, after a helicopter possibly came 
out, and picked you up, and dragged you back to McMurdo, and put you on a C-
141 Starlifter back to New Zealand. 
When we were in other situations, we didn’t have that option at all. The 
nearest chamber was probably several months away. And we worked everywhere 
from about 40 meters up to the water columns. We have to be very, very careful 
about the dives that we go on, and the kind of diving that we’re doing. That one 
tether that takes you back to the surface is so very important. So it’s kind of like 
“follow the light.” But it’s actually very fun diving. It’s very exciting to go into 
these lakes. 
We also started a program a number of years ago. Because we can only go so 
far out on our leash underwater, we really are restricted to the amount of material 
we can see. So we started a telepresence project where we started using remotely 
operated vehicles—actually Sylvia Earle loaned us the ﬁ rst ROV [Remotely Operated 
Vehicle] that was used down in the Antarctic in one of these lakes. A lot of the 
algorithms that we used for one of our ROVs was actually utilized later on the Mars 
Pathﬁ nder. Some of guys in the Intelligent Mechanisms Group at Ames worked 
very closely with us on that. Anyway, that was a very good means of getting out and 
away from that dive hole, and getting into working with other communities. We 
also had to learn to operate this kind of equipment in those environments. 
Now we just don’t follow the microbial communities underwater. We also 
follow them wherever we can ﬁ nd them. That includes on top of the glaciers. We 
then have to pick up ice climbing skills and some general mountaineering skills 
when we want to go up into the alpine areas. So, it’s a real skill mix to work in 
these kinds of regions. 
In 1991–1992, I had the opportunity, along with Jim Rice who is here in 
the audience and Peter Dorn who is in Chicago, Illinois, to go to the Bunger 
Hills, another ice-free area in the Antarctic, with the Soviets. That was a joint 
expedition between our two space programs through the Space Medicine and 
Biology Working Group, and it was part of the Exobiology Implementation Team 
that allowed us to get together with their exobiologists. 
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Three of us joined eight Russians. We traveled for two months around the 
Antarctic continent by icebreaker. We got dropped off by helicopter for the next 
four-and-a-half months in extremely remote settings with quite a few cultural 
and language barriers. To be honest, the expedition took place at the very last 
minute because of the way programmatics worked and the way permissions go, 
and because the dialogue between the Soviets and the U.S. at the time was kind 
of slow. We didn’t ﬁ nd out that we were actually going until four weeks before 
we left, so we had to buy everything, ship everything, and get everything down 
to South America. Hopefully, it was all there when we got there. We actually 
didn’t open up our boxes until we, literally, got to the Bunger Hills and the last 
helicopter left. It was a pretty quaint setting. We spent some time in some of the 
huts that they had there, but we also spent quite a few months sleeping in tents 
on the ground in the rocks. There was a great deal of wind. This is an area that 
is prone to katabatics. 
So we had quite a few difﬁ culties while we were there, but we also had 
to accomplish some work. All in all, it was a very successful mission, both 
scientiﬁ cally and culturally. It was culturally enriching to all of us, and it showed, 
at that time, even though it wasn’t a space project per se, the two space programs 
were working closely together in an isolated, Mars-analogue environment. 
More recently I have shifted poles, and we are now working in the Canadian 
high arctic. The setting is not altogether that different. It is very glaciated. 
There are large Alpine glaciers and outlet glaciers, along with large ice sheets. 
We’re studying a series of perennial springs in this region. These are the highest 
latitude perennial springs in the world, along with those over in Svalbard. This is 
a great Mars analogue. There may have been springs on Mars coming up through 
thick, continuous permafrost. This is where we would go to see these. Again, 
this is a very remote setting to which we take Twin Otters and helicopters, are 
dropped off and left for a few weeks or months. It’s a little shorter logistics train 
up to the Arctic, so we can get back and forth much easier. Nevertheless, while 
we’re there, we are actually a little more isolated, at times, than we are in the 
McMurdo dry valley area.     ■
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High-Altitude Mountaineering
Ed Viesturs is America’s leading high altitude mountaineer, having climbed many of the world’s most 
challenging summits, including ascending Mount Everest ﬁ ve times. He holds this record with one 
other person. Viesturs is the only American and one of ﬁ ve people to climb the six highest peaks in the 
world—all without supplemental oxygen. He is currently on a quest to climb all 14 of the world’s highest 
mountains (above 8,000 meters) without the use of supplemental oxygen. He has successfully climbed 12 
to date.
I’ve been climbing now for 27 years, and, hopefully, I’ve done 
it the right way. I started by climbing small peaks and then aspired to climb higher and higher 
peaks. As I was going higher, I eventually realized that what I liked about mountaineering 
was the extreme challenge and how difﬁ cult it was and, also, the beauty of climbing these 
mountains without oxygen—the pure way, the hard way. I had probably a difﬁ cult start, 
though, in my career, being raised in the great mountaineering state of Illinois. But it was in 
high school that I was reading adventure books: Amundsen, Scott, Endurance, and books like 
that. I came across a story written in 1950—Annapurna, and it details the ﬁ rst ascent of an 
8,000-meter peak. There are fourteen 8,000-meter peaks in the world, roughly 26,000 feet 
and above. In 1950, a French team climbed this peak called Annapurna. They succeeded, and 
it is a very amazing story. It inspired me to start climbing mountains. 
The ﬁ rst thing I had to do, obviously, was to get out of Illinois, and I chose to move to 
Seattle. My other goal in life was to become a veterinarian, so I studied veterinary medicine 
in the Seattle area. I started climbing voraciously and learned from people who were very 
experienced, very conservative, and willing to teach me their craft. Eventually, I landed a 
Ed Viesturs
American High-Altitude Mountaineer
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job guiding on Mount Rainier, 14,400 feet, which I have now climbed 192 times. 
Most of those times were as a guide. 
I truly believe that my safety and success in the Himalayas is because of 
my guiding experience, because, as a guide you always have rather inexperienced 
clients in tow. You are responsible for them. You always have to be evaluating 
risk and always asking yourself, if this happens, how do I get out of that? So you 
are always trying to think ahead, or, at least, not waiting until something were to 
happen. I truly think this has helped me a lot in the Himalayas. 
As I was guiding and climbing higher and higher peaks, I started dreaming 
big. Obviously, the highest peak you can dream of is Mount Everest at 29,035 
feet. I thought that if one day I had the chance to go there, it would be an amazing 
thing. On the summit there is one-third the amount of oxygen that there is here 
at sea level. To date, almost 2,000 people have stood on the summit of Mount 
Everest. The kind of clothing that we wear is very lightweight. It’s very technical. 
The boots are thermoplastic. There is foam insulation. The fabrics we use are 
single-layer GORE-TEX®, breathable, waterproof, and these products insulate 
us, but we still have to move to create body heat. We don’t have any internal heat 
source other than our bodies. Basically, these products do not help us climb the 
mountain, but they make it safer. We climb faster and more efﬁ ciently. 
Most people that climb Everest—I’d say 95 to 98 percent of the people 
that climb Everest—use supplemental oxygen. Even with supplemental oxygen, 
it is very difﬁ cult to climb this mountain, because the oxygen is mixing with 
ambient air, and you are only really reducing your relative altitude a couple 
thousand feet. It is still very difﬁ cult, but I decided long ago that if I ever had 
the chance to go to Everest, or one of the other 8,000-meter peaks, I would not 
use oxygen to climb these mountains. I thought it would be more interesting 
to challenge myself and to see if maybe I could get to the summit, rather than 
guaranteeing myself getting to the summit. So, that is a rule that I made long ago 
and something I’ve lived by. 
I had my ﬁ rst chance to go to Mount Everest in 1987. We were climbing the 
North Face. With my partner, Eric Simonson, we were part of a large team of about 
10 climbers, and it takes 2 months of climbing, setting up a series of 4 camps, and 
carrying loads to just get into position to go to the summit. In the end, if you can 
get one or two people from that team to the summit, then that is teamwork, and 
that’s a success. So, Eric and I were making the ﬁ nal dash to hopefully get to the 
summit. I was climbing without oxygen the last 300 vertical feet of the summit 
ridge to the top of the world. It was kind of late in the day, and the weather was 
changing. Eric, rather conservative, as am I—we were looking at the top, thinking 
that we could probably get ourselves to the summit, but we probably wouldn’t get 
ourselves down. For both of us, that seemed to be a huge decision-making factor. 
I have always felt that climbing has to be a round trip, right? 
But a lot of people lose sight of that. They see this goal that’s two hours 
away and they’ve spent years of preparing and training and months of climbing, 
and when it gets to that close of a distance, they’re willing to throw caution to 
OPENING PHOTO: 
This image featuring Mt. Everest and 
Makalu was taken by an Expedition 8 
crewmember on the International Space 
Station (ISS). 
(NASA Image # ISS008-E-13304)
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the wind simply to get to the summit and then, hopefully, they’ll get down. And 
a lot of those people, unfortunately, never make it back down. For me, the risk is 
too great—I don’t want to die going to the summit of the world. So we walked 
away—300 feet from the top. And it’s something I thought about every single 
day for three more years. 
Two years later, in 1989, I climbed the third highest peak in the world, 
Kangchenjunga. We climbed by a very steep and difﬁ cult route—this is the 
technical climbing that we had at 24,000 feet. Very strong team, rather good 
conditions, and in the end, we reached the summit of Kangchenjunga at 28,200 
feet on a very, very pleasant day. And if the weather’s good, and you have time, 
you can stay for about an hour on the summit. If the weather’s bad, three minutes, 
take some photos, and down you go. We stayed for an hour. Looking 80 miles to 
the west, you could see three more peaks in the distance. And the one closest 
to the center, the large one, is Everest. And even though I was there standing on 
Kangchenjunga, I was longing to be back on Everest to ﬁ nish that last 300 feet. 
A year later, I did go back to Everest. And—we were making the ﬁ nal ascent, 
300 feet away from the summit once again. Climbing without oxygen at these 
altitudes, you go very, very slowly. You take a step and you breathe 15 times. You 
take another step and you breathe 15 times. And then you think about taking 
another step, and you breathe 15 times. 
But after 12 hours of continuous climbing from the high camp at 27,000 
feet, I then, ﬁ nally, stood on the summit of the world. And to me, this was the 
most amazing point of my career—to be on the top of the world. I’ve always told 
people this is the closest you can get to outer space without actually leaving the 
ground. This was an amazing moment for me.
The following year, I went to K2—the second highest peak in the world—
and by all means, much more difﬁ cult to climb than Everest. It’s steeper, the 
weather is worse, and only 200 people to date have climbed K2. And I went there 
with my great friend from Seattle, Scott Fisher. 
At 26,000 feet was our last camp before we made the ﬁ nal dash to the 
summit. The shelters and tents weigh about ﬁ ve pounds. On K2, the higher you 
go, the steeper it gets and the more dangerous it gets. And that’s where you really, 
“ ”
I HAVE ALWAYS FELT THAT CLIMBING HAS TO BE A ROUND TRIP, RIGHT?  BUT A 
LOT OF PEOPLE LOSE SIGHT OF THAT. THEY SEE THIS GOAL THAT’S TWO HOURS 
AWAY AND THEY’VE SPENT YEARS OF PREPARING AND TRAINING AND MONTHS OF 
CLIMBING, AND . . . THEY’RE WILLING TO THROW CAUTION TO THE WIND. 
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really have to be careful, and that’s where a lot of accidents occur, because people 
are so focused on just getting themselves to the top, they’re not even aware of the 
weather, their surroundings, and the conditions. And that’s something that you 
really have to evaluate every step of the way.  And, luckily, we climbed it on the 
ﬁ rst attempt. And once you climb K2, you never think of going back. 
I also met that year on K2 another great friend, Rob Hall from New Zealand. 
We became great friends and did many climbs throughout the world. We climbed 
Everest together several times as well as Lhotse, Everest’s neighbor. Lhotse 
is the fourth highest peak in the world. And what we started to do was to do 
tandem climbing where we would go and climb Everest over a two-month period, 
acclimatize our bodies, and then, quickly, in succession, climb another 8,000-
meter peak in just three days. And so we could utilize our acclimatization. 
Tragically, though, both Scott and Rob died in 1996 on Mt. Everest during 
the tragic storm of May 10th. I was there with my wife. I was the climbing leader for 
the Everest IMAX ﬁ lm. My wife, Paula, was our base camp leader. Our expedition 
leader, and the director of the ﬁ lm, was David Breashears. Very experienced 
climber, very detail-oriented, and an amazing leader to have on this climb, where 
you had a very difﬁ cult task in taking a 42-pound camera to the summit, doing 
what other climbers were doing but also schlepping this giant microwave-sized 
piece of metal to the summit as well. And after six weeks of climbing, we were in 
position to go to the summit. We were going to go on May 9th—this was a day 
ahead of everyone. We evaluated the weather conditions. The weather patterns 
weren’t what we were hoping they would be and we decided to go down. Our 
friends, led by Rob and Scott, made the decision to continue on to the summit 
on May 10th and then, sadly, the storm occurred, and on that day eight people 
died—two of them my great friends. There was nothing we could do. 
We couldn’t climb up to them fast enough; we couldn’t get a helicopter 
to get up to them. And that’s the thing about mountaineering. It’s one of 
the places on the planet where rescue is literally impossible, unless you send 
humans to go do the rescuing. There are no machines and there’s no other way 
to get these people. 
Part of the reason, I think, that the tragedy occurred is that people were 
swayed by the group decisions that were made. It was almost like, if six people 
are going, then ten people are going, then twelve people are going. You know, 
there’s comfort—there’s psychological comfort—in groups with larger numbers. 
And I think people would say, “Well, they’re going, so I’m going to go.” And then 
they kind of just kept pulling each other up higher and higher late in the day as 
the storm was brewing. We helped with the rescue. We quit ﬁ lming and stopped 
what we were doing in relation to our own objectives. We helped bring some 
people down and then, after that, we managed to pick up the pieces, and we 
went back up the mountain two weeks later. Not in spite of what happened, but, 
I think, to show the world that you can climb these mountains and live to talk 
about it. If you ﬁ nd the right conditions, and if you wait with patience for the 
proper weather, you can climb these mountains and live to talk about it. The 
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summit is only half the trip, and the most important half of the climb is, in my 
opinion, the descent. 
I’ve gone on to climb more. I’m on a quest to climb the 14 8,000-meter 
peaks in the world without supplemental oxygen. And over the last 15 years, I’ve 
managed to climb 13 of them. I have one more to go, which is called Annapurna, 
the mountain that got me into all of this. So maybe it’s poetic that it happens to 
be the last mountain on the list.     ■
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Exploring the Deep Underground
Penelope J. Boston
Director of Cave and Karst Studies, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology
I’ve been trying to get to Mars ever since I was a little kid. And 
my solution to this over the last decade or so is, really, to go down instead of go out. And 
that may be as close to going to another planet as I ever get. After we published a paper with 
Chris McKay suggesting that life on Mars would be underground, we were looking for ways 
to study the sub-surface. And, of course, the most immediate and obvious thing was the 
new information we were getting from drill holes. People were beginning to drill, through 
the Department of Energy project, and trying to look at deep subsurface microbiology. We 
discovered that caves were there and that maybe they would be cheaper to get into. And so, 
after the early part of my career working in extreme environments on the surface, I decided 
to try caving. The ﬁ rst cave I ever caved was Lechuguilla Cave in New Mexico, which is a 
notoriously difﬁ cult cave. And all I thought at the time was, “Am I going to live to get out of 
this? I just have to live to get out of this cave.” 
But after the pain sort of faded, I realized that it was an amazing environment, that I’d 
never done anything in any place that was so potentially fascinating for the kinds of exotic 
microbiology that I was interested in as an astrobiologist. And so I realized that I could do 
Penelope Boston’s areas of research include cave geomicrobiology, microbial life in highly mineralized 
environments, and unique or characteristic biominerals and biosignature detection. In addition, she 
is involved in astrobiology and the search for life beyond Earth. At New Mexico Tech she is creating a 
new program, Cave and Karst Studies, in conjunction with the founding of the National Cave and Karst 
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two things. One is, I could learn how to cave safely and I could go to these places. 
And I could then refocus my work to essentially tap into an entire area of biology 
and mineralogy, and the way they overlap on our planet, that had not been studied 
before. This is a new ﬁ eld, really, in terms of what we’ve been doing on Earth. And 
then it was immediately applicable, of course, to the situation of life beyond the 
planet. 
And, so, most of my research now is focused in one type of cave or another. 
We tend to pick them for their speciﬁ c chemical properties, so we’re looking for 
caves that have poisonous atmospheres, that are very hot, that are very cold, that 
are very extreme in some sense, so that we can look at the limits to life on this 
planet and learn from that what may be adaptive strategies of life for other bodies 
in the solar system and, perhaps, someday beyond. So really, to write a ﬁ eld guide 
to unknown organisms is part of our mandate. 
I’m studying the caves that we are looking at as I’m building on the work of 
other cave scientists in the world. There are a number of really clear lessons that 
we’re learning. These amazing environments show us that caves are really not 
rare. If you have only ever been in caves as an occasional tourist in a show cave, 
you may think that caves are a rare phenomena, but really, there are a tremendous 
number of sub-surface voids on Earth of all different kinds. They aren’t just in 
calcium carbonate-type environments, which are the ones that we often come 
in contact with, but they really occur in every major rock type. And this is an 
important lesson for trying to apply our knowledge of Earth caves to other bodies 
in the solar system. 
There are many, many ways to make caves. And, so, one of the areas of active 
research that we’re engaged in is, really, a set of thought experiments about how 
you can look at the basic physics and chemistry of environments and try to imagine 
ways that subsurface voids on other bodies could be formed. And, so, we’re working 
that end of the theoretical spectrum of imagining caves on other planets. 
The type of cave that we absolutely know exists elsewhere in the solar 
system are what are known as lava tubes, and these are a natural outgrowth of 
ﬂ ood-basalt type, quiet, ﬂ owing lava eruptions. And these things are essentially 
rivulets that freeze on the outside. The rock on the outside freezes. It’s a very good 
insulator, and then it allows the interior to remain molten and lava continues to 
ﬂ ow through. Eventually, when the eruption stops, these empty out and you have 
these beautiful tubes, and so that’s a very different class of cave from the kinds of 
dissolution-dominated caves that we often think of.
Certainly, it was known and recognized by Ron Greeley and other colleagues, 
even in the Apollo era, that a lot of structures that they were seeing on the moon 
were lava tubes, or unroofed sinuous rills, which is like a lava tube without its 
top. As we get ever better imaging of the planet Mars, we have seen that there are 
lava tubes scattered widely over the planet, and these are quite easy to pick out. 
Olympus Mons has this little pit crater or little pit collapse feature, a string-of-
beads kind of appearance. This is a direct analogue to the way we ﬁ nd these sorts 
of things on Earth. 
OPENING PHOTO: 
Penny Boston prepares to rappel into 
the entrance of the immense Lechuguilla 
Cave, New Mexico. 
(Image copyright Val Hildreth-Werker)
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One of the interesting things that’s been attributed to the fact that the 
gravity on Mars is much lower is the fact that the lava tubes scale accordingly. 
So not only does Mars have enormous examples of volcanism, but it has big lava 
tubes. The biggest lava tube on Earth is about 90 kilometers long, in Hawaii. 
That’s the record-holder on Earth. But, typically, when you look at these features 
on Mars, they’re hundreds of kilometers long. And the diameters are equally 
great, so they’re on average 3 to 10 times the size of the average diameter of a 
tube on Earth. So these things are truly enormous.
Not only those places, but when we look at the radar imaging data from the 
Venus missions, you can see that there are tube-like structures associated even 
with those weird-looking types of volcanic features that you ﬁ nd on Venus. And, 
then, even Io, which is such a cooking little moon out there with its tremendous 
sulfur component, seems to have what is clear evidence of lava tubes. And my 
dream is that somebody will get a really good image of one that’s made out of 
entirely molten sulfur. 
So these are fabulous features. These are places—at least on the Moon and 
Mars, although I wouldn’t recommend astronauts going directly to Io or Venus—
that can actually be exploited as human habitat. We just ﬁ nished a Phase 1 and 
Phase 2 study over the last four years for NIAC, which is the NASA Institute 
for Advanced Concepts, looking at the far-future conceptual development, and 
looking at ways to discover the likely enabling technologies that we would need 
to make these actually useable for structures for astronauts and bases on the 
Moon and Mars in the future.
So, I’m not going to talk about all the different kinds of caves because 
that would be a several-hour lecture in and of itself. But one of the points 
that I think I want to really press home is that cave environments are typically 
radically different from the surface. Pictures taken in Saudi Arabia by the very 
well-known caving team of John and Suzy Pinch have shown that, even in these 
very hot, blasted sand deserts, when you get into very large bell-shaped caves, 
there are divable pools. And the air in these caves is near saturated humidity. So 
it’s a complete change from the overlying environment, even in caves that are 
not sealed. And, so, it’s just the barrier of above and below that provides this 
radically different environment. And this is a big message for astrobiology, that 
just what might be dominating on the surface of a planet is not necessarily the 
key to where you actually have to go to look for the life. 
“ ”
IN A LOT OF THESE SUBTERRANEAN WORLDS, WE REALLY ARE THE 
ALIENS, AND THIS IS AN IMAGINATION-STRETCHING EXPERIENCE.
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Cave environments obviously have no sunlight, so this means that any 
organisms living within them have to make their living elsewhere, either by 
detrital organic material washing in or, in the case of a lot of the organisms we’re 
studying, they’re essentially rock eaters. These guys are disaggregating the parent 
rock using things like the metabolic product, the organic acids that they give off, 
and, then, other organisms come along within these little microcommunities, 
and they oxidize the metals in the rock. And this is how they get the energy to 
run their entire ecosystem. 
They’re very high-humidity environments. In contrast to the surface, 
they’re very thermally stable, so even a cave with a big, gaping, open entrance still 
remains very, very thermally consistent on the interior. New transfer is usually 
very, very low, with some exceptions. They’re very rich mineral environments. 
And then there’s no conventional weather, so it very much is a very different 
planet in the near-crustal caves than it is on the surface.
And the result of all these tremendously different conditions is that 
caves are unique mineral factories. There are vast numbers of unique mineral 
formations that are found in caves. Huge catalogues of them have been seen and 
the explanations for the occurrence of these is very much in its infancy. One of 
the things that we are working on extensively is which of these types of mineral 
formation processes are actually biogenic, and it turns out that there are a lot of 
them—perhaps even most of them in caves have a biogenic component.
So the organisms that are actually contributing to what’s going on in 
caves are not simply passive observers or users of the environment. They are 
mineralogically interactive. They are changing the caves. They are actually 
interacting with the bedrock and they are guiding, and in some cases controlling, 
the kinds of mineral deposits that are left. A lot of these organisms are novel, and 
I would venture to say that the bulk of the organisms that we ﬁ nd are actually 
Small white patches are actinomycete bacterial colonies growing on cave walls and precipitating 
the mineral calcite in Ft. Stanton Cave, New Mexico. (Image copyright Kevin Glover)
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novel. They’re not known to science. And, so, from one little cave puddle to the 
next, perhaps we have 80 percent novel organisms that we look at by molecular 
phylogenetic techniques. So these are truly evolutionarily, self-contained 
environments, and many of them are actually physically isolated from the surface, 
and, in that sense, they really are miniature planetary systems within our own 
crustal environment.
Not only do the caves house this amazing array of organisms that we’re 
just beginning to understand and study, but also they’re wonderful preservation 
environments. So if you are looking for biosignatures, then the subsurface in 
caves is the place to look. Not only do the organisms live there, but they very often 
self-lithify. They’re engaged in self-fossilization while they’re actually alive. So-
called U-loops from Lechugia Cave look very organic. They are entirely rock now, 
but we have been studying their living counterparts in modern caves, and these 
are clearly the fossilized remains of microbial mats that were inhabiting this cave 
probably on the order of four to six million years ago when this cave was actively 
forming. We can also expose the fossils in this kind of material by acid etching.
In a lot of these subterranean worlds, we really are the aliens, and this is 
an imagination-stretching experience. It’s the kind of thing where it would be 
lovely if we could take a lot of program managers into this kind of environment, 
because, really, it’s the kind of thing where just reading about it doesn’t make as 
much of an impact as if you were actually doing it. 
Cueva de Villa Luz is one of the most amazing caves that we’re studying. It’s 
a sulfuric acid-saturated cave in Tabasco, Mexico. Gases from the nearby volcano, 
El Chico, now actually come into this cave and make it an extremely poisonous 
environment within which to work—tremendous amounts of hydrogen sulﬁ de, 
carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, even aldehydes, and various other noxious 
things. And so we require complete protection from that environment.
The message here is that this cave is the most biologically-rich cave of any 
that we’ve ever seen, and it’s because of these poisonous gases. These poisonous 
gases are not poisonous to the organisms that are living there; it’s home sweet 
home. And this is the message. We’re not looking at extreme environments just 
to look at extremes where organisms are just barely hanging on. We’re looking 
at them to look for organisms for which that is the comfortable environment, 
because those are representative of what we may ﬁ nd as the average conditions 
on other bodies.
So we’re trying to write the ﬁ eld guide to unknown life, and this is a really 
tough thing to do. But the place that I’ve been in my career where this makes the 
most sense to me is in these kinds of protected and evolutionarily-sequestered 
environments. A lot of the material we look at doesn’t even look alive. We’ve 
seen white muddy-looking stuff on the walls—that’s living mud. That material 
is made out of cells and ﬁ laments that coat themselves with calcite mineral. And 
they’re actively producing this material in caves all over the world. Tiny white 
dots on the walls are organisms that are busy dissolving the salt in a lava tube 
and making their living there. So, even though something may not look alive, 
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and although sometimes we have to work very hard to show that it’s alive, all of 
these environments contain amazing life forms that are busy also leaving traces 
of themselves. 
One of the other aspects of doing the kind of cave work that we do is also 
giving us operational experience that is very valuable to future life detection 
missions, whether they be robotic or, ultimately, crewed teams in the future. And 
that is that we are operating in extreme environments that are hazardous, with 
an indigenous, sensitive, alien biology. In this case, the alien biology is on our 
own planet, but, nevertheless, it’s very different from our surface environment, 
and we have to take all the precautions that one would imagine in order to avoid 
contaminating it while, at the same time, managing not to kill ourselves off while 
working in very difﬁ cult conditions. And so, it is an analogue for operating with 
life-detection constraints, including even the aspect of working with various 
collaborators at MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] and JPL [Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory] and NASA-Langley on robotics that can get us into some 
of these kinds of environments. 
So the caves are out there. I know that as time goes on and we explore 
the rest of the planets in the solar system, we’ll ﬁ nd better and better ways of 
actually detecting caves besides the lava tubes. We’ll ﬁ nd ways to get into them. 
We’ll ﬁ nd ways to drill into them—which will be a lot easier than just sinking a 
core right down into solid rock—and they will have amazing structures, amazing 
minerals, and, perhaps, even amazing life as we explore them.     ■
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Highest Lakes
Nathalie Cabrol is a planetary geologist at NASA Ames Research Center, since 1994, and a SETI Institute 
principal investigator, since 1998. Her research focuses on aqueous environments favorable to life on 
Mars, exploration (robotic and human), and the study of terrestrial analogues. Her education includes a 
master and doctorate degree in planetary geology (1986 and 1991 respectively), both obtained at the 
Sorbonne University in Paris.
Nathalie enjoys climbing and hiking. She also practices free diving (diving without oxygen tanks). She 
holds an (unofﬁ cial) women’s world record for the highest free dive, performed in 2003 in the Licancabur 
summit lake. Both her passion for mountaineering and diving are combined in her scientiﬁ c research for 
the limits of life on Earth.
Nathalie Cabrol
Planetary Geologist, NASA Ames Research Center, SETI Institute 
I am a planetary geologist, so I am revolving between Earth and 
heaven, and part of heaven is Mars. As such, I am very privileged and, also very proud, to be 
part of Mars Exploration Rover science team, which is proving a lot in terms of exploration. 
And, as a member of the science team, with my colleagues, we are taking intellectual risks. 
We have been working for several years to select landing sites, and we tried to match the 
landing sites to the objectives of the Mars Exploration Rover mission. We were very happy 
to see that, indeed, in many cases we have been able to reach our objectives. 
But, although it’s an intellectual risk, it’s also a risk for the assets and for the time 
that has been put into preparing these missions. There is no human life involved in that part 
of it, but still, you want to make sure that you are doing your job properly. And to do that, 
you have to do your homework.  I would volunteer right away to go to Mars. People here, like 
Mr. Lovell and [Harrison] Jack Schmitt and others, made me dream as a little girl, and I knew 
that whatever I was doing with my life, it would involve NASA, planets, and exploration. But 
still, you have to make sure that the concept you are pushing forward is as close as possible 
to reality. And to do that, we had to do a lot of planetary geology here on Earth and to try to 
ﬁ nd the best analogue we can. 
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I am interested in lakes. I am interested in past aqueous environments on 
Mars and their habitability potential—whether those are the best place for life, 
whether life ever appeared on Mars—these are my drivers as a scientist. And 
to try to understand that, I am exploring high lakes. Why explore high lakes? 
Because the higher you go on Earth, the earlier you go back in time. On Mars, 
basically, you will be going into a core environment temperature that is really low 
and you are going into a thinner atmosphere and you try to understand what is 
happening over there. And, so, we are exploring those high lakes. We have been 
starting in the Andes with volcanic lakes. 
And our goal is astrobiology, but as we were going, our exploration kind of 
caught up with us, and we discovered a brand new avenue of research. And this 
involved physiology and medicine—and I’ll talk a little bit more about that—and, 
of course, education and public outreach. 
Well, why go high? As I said, these are the best analogues to Martian lakes 
and we want to understand the limits of life. And why do we want to do that? 
Because right now, the Mars exploration rover mission has proven beyond doubt 
that Mars was a habitable planet for the type of life we know here on Earth. But 
that does not mean that there was life there; habitability and actual life being two 
different things. 
So, going back to these high lakes is for us to understand: Is life possible 
in analogous conditions to those on Mars? So we are going up there, and we are 
trying to start with crater lakes in the Andes, and we’ll try to move on to the 
Himalayas, because as the lakes in the Andes are slowly receding now because 
of the climate change, by the same token, on the other side of the planet in the 
Himalayas, large glaciers are now melting and they are creating new lakes that are 
probably higher than those of the Andes. This is, for us, a place to really stop and 
witness the ecosystems forming: How life gets there and develops, et cetera. So 
this is really something that’s fascinating. 
And we started with the Andes and, well, you have to imagine, about two 
years ago, myself entering the ofﬁ ce of my branch chief at Ames and saying, “Hi, 
Chief. I think I have this very bright idea. I would like to climb a 20,000-foot 
volcano, named Licancabur, at the boundary of Chile and Bolivia. By the way, 
it’s not extinct. And there is a lake on top, and I want to dive on that lake. Of 
course, it’s almost freezing temperature, but I forgot to tell you something, I am 
a free diver. I am not using oxygen. Can you help me with Code Q [NASA Safety 
Ofﬁ ce]. He actually did, and this is how we started the Licancabur adventure. 
We were talking this morning about risk and payoff. It has been the most 
rewarding experience of my entire life so far. We were blessed by the fact that 
nobody in our crew was hurt, nobody was really in signiﬁ cant trouble. You will 
wake up lousy at that altitude, because this is the kind of thing that happens, but 
nobody got actually sick from mountain sickness. But we had to work with Code 
Q for six months. And among the people who advised us on this trip was Peter 
Hackett, and Peter was one of the other guys climbing Everest without oxygen. 
So we took this very seriously. 
OPENING PHOTO: 
Setting up camp for the Licancabur 
expedition. (Copyright: 2003 Licancabur 
Expedition, NASA ARC/SETI Institute.
Image by Gregory Kovacs.) 
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But, in the meantime, as is part of exploration, you open one door and many, 
many others open as you are walking. And so we started climbing Licancabur, 
trying to determine if there was life up there, and as the title of our project was 
“Exploring the Limits of Life in the Highest Lakes on Earth,” I had never imagined 
that that could be testing our own limits. And not only were we writing the 
experiment, but we became part of the experiment. And this became fascinating. 
We know how analogous these places are to ancient Mars. The pressure is 
the same. The temperature is the same. UV radiation—well, according to models, 
we shouldn’t be very far off on this one. It’s a very arid environment, yet the 
caldera is right next to it. We’re in a volcanic environment with variable thermal 
input, and if we have questions about life on Mars, when we go to these lakes, we 
discover that life is thriving over there. 
And so, to us, that was very, very encouraging. Because this opens doors 
and potential for the study and the search for life on Mars. And going up there 
normally would help us to understand better from the standpoint of the biology, 
but it helps us, also, to prepare for a future mission on Mars, because we have a 
better idea of the type of instruments, of the type of exploration strategy, what 
we would be able to prepare, and giving heads up to management. And this is 
very important, too. 
Our summit camp was around 19,500 feet, and we could look down to 
two evaporation lakes, Laguna Verde and Laguna Blanca. These two lagunas are 
lakes which were really perennial lakes 15,000 years ago during the last glacial 
maximum. And since then, because of climate change, they have been evaporating. 
And we used those two lakes, which are at 14,000 feet, as an acclimatization area. 
And we are studying them. 
Once again, we stumbled into the unexpected, which is the sense of 
exploration. And as we were just hoping to spend a little time there, to prepare 
for the ascent, then we started discovering that we had more analogy with Mars 
than we had bargained for. Everyday at about eleven o’clock, because this is a thin 
atmosphere and because you have big gradients of temperature due to the high 
volcano, you will have huge dust devils roaming around those lakes, and they will 
engulf your tents and your refuge. And you better not be in the middle of it. So that 
also tells us about human exploration, that there are things you must be aware of. 
“ ”
AND WITNESSING MY FATHER’S LAST DAYS IN THE CONDITION HE WAS IN, AND 
THE DIFFICULTY HE HAD BREATHING, I SAID THAT THE ONLY RISK I COULD TAKE 
WOULD BE TO HAVE ONE MORE PERSON TO SUFFER THAT THING.
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But what we also stumbled into were stromatolites [fossilized algae 
colonies, some of the oldest and continually surviving life forms on Earth]. And 
the ﬁ eld we stumbled into is 150 square kilometers. And these are on the paleo 
shore of this larger lake I talked about, Laguna Verde, Laguna Blanca—15,000 
years ago this was one lake. And these are fed by hydrothermal springs. And 
we discovered those stromatolites. When we examined those structures, we 
discovered that they were biogenic. This means that we had blue and green algae 
forming then, and we know that these microorganisms are the ones that existed 
on planet Earth. And you have to go back to archaea [single-celled organisms, 
among the earliest forms of life on Earth] to see this kind of creature. 
So we were on the shores of lakes that are very much analogous to what 
we are seeing on Mars, and, all of a sudden, we ﬁ nd those primitive terrestrial 
organisms just colonizing everywhere they can. So that’s the cherry on top of 
the cake. We were not expecting that. We are hoping to develop this aspect, 
because, obviously, this is going to tell us a lot about the potential of these kinds 
of lakes. 
Laguna Verde is three times saltier than seawater. I learned this the hard 
way when I tried to dive in it. Eleven pounds of lead would take me to the bottom 
without any problem. It was an interesting experience, an interesting dive. So 
they are stromatolite-like colonies. Because what I didn’t mention is that we 
have all these fossil stromatolites that colonized the paleo shore of this lake. But, 
even better, there are still stromatolites forming today. And this is a very rare 
occurrence on Earth these days. We are walking on them—literally on the ﬂ oor, 
and there is better news than that. I just received three weeks ago some analysis 
from the lab, and this is a dead ringer for [an existing species], the chemistry is 
the same exactly. 
Our goal was the top of the volcano. And not only do you want to dive on 
top of this volcano, but you have to get there. We have to make sure that nobody 
is suffering from hypoxia, from any type of problem. We don’t want to climb 
too fast, because we don’t want to be anoxic at the summit. And, so, what we do 
is that we stop at night at 18,000 feet, at the only ﬂ at place we can ﬁ nd on that 
volcano. Basically, this is a 12 meter by 4 meter kind of ﬂ at, and we are jamming 
our four or ﬁ ve tents on that, with an 800-meter drop nearby. I didn’t mention 
that to Code Q before we went there. But the slope is about a 40–45 degree 
slope, on very unstable material. We can’t stabilize it, and the only thing we can 
hope for is that there will not be an earthquake that night. 
So once we are there, we spend one night there for acclimatization, and 
once we are on top, the scenery is quite something. The lake itself is a receding 
lake now, about the size of a football ﬁ eld. And the paleo shore marks the level of 
the lake in the ’50s. That also tells us something: those lakes are disappearing. 
It is really time for us to understand what is going on there, because they will be 
lost forever in a few years. 
So when we went there, of course, we wanted to dive. We have several 
objectives when we are doing this. The ﬁ rst one is to characterize the habitat and 
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microorganisms and ecosystem that are there. And most of the summit lake, like 
Laguna Blanca or Laguna Verde, is a very shallow lake, which means that also the 
UV radiation—the microorganisms are going to be affected by that. 
The other thing that we are doing is to do physiological research. At Ames, 
we have the astrobionics group, which is developing the “sea pods”. These are 
monitors that keep track of the team. You are monitoring your blood oxygen 
saturation, you are monitoring your heart beat and apnea during sleep, because 
this is happening when you are in the mountains. But the thing we wanted to do 
here was a little different. 
I am a free diver. I never dive with oxygen tanks, because I ﬁ nd them heavy 
and cumbersome. At 20,000 feet I had to convince many people that it was a 
good idea to hold my breath. But, basically, people in good health at this altitude 
will be at about 65 percent oxygen saturation in their blood. And their heart is 
pumping at around 135 beats per minute. 
We wanted to understand what was going on with the oxygen saturation 
by doing the free diving. There are things we cannot do at sea level, because your 
blood is always saturated in oxygen at sea level. And if something happens to this 
saturation and heart beat system, you will see it at this altitude. 
I also had another motivation—the very overarching objective is that, as 
an organism, your body is going to produce, one way or another, more oxygen, 
and we need to understand that. Because we have many people in this world who 
are dying from lung and heart diseases. And helping those people breathe better, 
or maybe ﬁ nd a solution that will help them, that is something that is really 
important to us. I took this point home because my father passed away from 
massive heart failure a few months before the expedition. And witnessing my 
father’s last days in the condition he was in, and the difﬁ culty he had breathing, 
Camp near one of the highest lakes on Earth. (Copyright: 2003 Licancabur Expedition, NASA 
ARC/SETI Institute. Image by Gregory Kovacs.)
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I said that the only risk I could take would be to have one more person to suffer 
that thing. 
So, this is where, in my mind, there is no question about the risk entailed. If 
some people wonder why we are exploring, I tell you I know why I’m exploring. 
So, we actually monitored the free dive. And we realized that people can 
be very well with a heart beat of 39 beats per minute—this is how low my heart 
went when I was diving there—and getting out at 20,000 feet of that kind of 
water, which is at 40 degrees, with a blood oxygen saturation at 93 percent. 
Something is producing oxygen in our body. Something remembers that we are 
aquatic mammals. We need to understand what it is. Nature gave me two good 
lungs (actually, Stanford is looking for the third one) and a good heart, and I want 
to take advantage of that to help make headway, to ﬁ nd solutions for one of the 
most horrendous killers in our society. 
So, this is one of the aspects of why it is worth taking risks. On the other 
hand, on the NASA-related objective, these physiological monitors tell you 
everything that you want to know about a crew’s health status. It was really 
important for us to show that this was working, and we actually did some live 
transmission of our vitals directly to Ames and Stanford while we were there. 
That was the ﬁ rst time this was done. That was one of the co-aspects. The other 
aspect, going back to astrobiology and microorganisms, is that we are actually 
now in a position to know those microenvironments a lot better. 
In the past two years, we have also been involved in pinpointing some 
interesting effects of the UV radiation. For example, diatoms are experiencing 
mutation and malformation due to UV radiation. We want to understand this 
because it tells us something. There are, apparently, mutations that we need to 
understand better, if it is a mutation toward extinction or if it is a mutation 
toward evolution. It is really important in a world where you have high UV 
impact, such as Mars would have been in the past. The other aspect of it is that 
we are living in a world where UV impact is becoming more and more of an issue. 
We have trouble with the ozone layer, and if these little creatures over there are 
developing sunscreen and a UV-resistance strategy, we need to learn about it, 
because that will help the general public. 
“ ”
IT IS HARD TO THINK THAT EXPLORATION CAN BE DONE WITHOUT TAKING RISK . . . 
THAT, ULTIMATELY, EXPLORATION CAN BE DONE WITHOUT LOSING PEOPLE ONE WAY 
OR ANOTHER. EVEN IF THIS HAPPENS, WE HAVE TO MAKE SURE THAT WE HAVE DONE 
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MITIGATE THE RISK AND TO PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING.
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Sometimes we have interesting encounters. One of a diatoms [planktonic 
unicellular algae] we found was thought to be extinct a long time ago. Well, it’s 
thriving in Laguna Verde, thank you. It is having lots of success. It is still there. 
In another case, we found a diatom that was known to exist only in the Baltic 
Sea. Don’t ask me how it ended up here, but it is there and thriving. Maybe the 
conditions of salinity and cold are very close to the Baltic Sea. 
So we are learning a lot. Stromatolites were the ﬁ rst creatures on Earth, 
and they are still there. They are evolving and they are telling us about our past. 
If we are able to decipher what they are telling us, we will know better about our 
origins and, maybe, possible origins of life on other planets, because those lakes 
are very similar to that of Mars. 
To go back to what many of the previous speakers talked about, managing 
risk and people, there is, obviously, a physical responsibility. You have catastrophic 
risk, of course. There is nothing we can do about the volcano exploding on us if 
we are there when this happens. Everything else we can manage. 
I would say that the state of mind I would go with when I leave the U.S. 
and go to Bolivia would be to say that, as much as I can prevent it, nobody will 
get hurt on my watch. I am always working on this, and I have to manage a very 
diverse group of people. This group of people ranges from young people, students, 
to people who are senior scientists to people who speak different languages. 
Last year in my team I had Hungarians. I had Chileans and Bolivians. I am 
French. I had American people and Spaniards. That makes for good jokes when 
we are trying to translate one thing to another. We have to make sure that the 
safety things will get through all the time. My personal standpoint here is that 
risk is deﬁ nitely inherent to exploration, and it is necessary for discovery. And I 
will go a step farther. I say this is also the essence of survival. If we want to do it, 
we need to explore. We need to explore new ground. 
I guess we have to share an ultimate responsibility, as Dale and Penny were 
mentioning. You have a team with you. You are responsible for them, and you 
have to have answers. The main thing is that you have to be accountable and 
responsible for all that. It is hard to think that exploration can be done without 
taking risk. It is hard for me to think that, ultimately, exploration can be done 
without losing people one way or another. Even if this happens, we have to make 
sure that we have done everything possible to mitigate the risk and to prevent it 
from happening, as much as possible.     ■
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I’ve come from a rather unusual background in that I 
came up through engineering school wanting to be an astronaut, but had the good fortune of 
discovering that there were remaining places to be explored here on Earth in the meantime. 
As a teenager, I watched a couple of these guys who talked here this morning walk on the 
Moon. They were my heroes, and it was the U.S. space program that was directly responsible 
for my going out and getting a Ph.D. in engineering and wanting to work in space. In the 
process of trying to get into the Astronaut Corps at various times, I have also had the 
privilege of being involved with a large number of expeditionary projects dealing with things 
that go down into the Earth as opposed to things that go up. I added it up a little while ago. 
Over the last 26 years, I’ve spent 7 1⁄2 years in the ﬁ eld  on expeditions, of which 353 days 
were below 1,000 meters deep underground, based from subterranean camps. So, I’m either 
a troglodyte or somebody who’s looking for planetary exploration and hasn’t been able to 
get off this pile of rock yet. 
What I am going to do here this afternoon is to rapidly take you to three of the most 
remote places that humans have ever reached inside this planet. This is serious business. 
It is more serious, in my opinion, than high altitude mountaineering, because of the 
William Stone led the exploration of Sistema Cheve (-1484 meters), (-1475 meters), and Cueva Charco 
(-1286 meters), among many other deep caves around the world. These Mexican caves represent the 
three deepest systems in the Western Hemisphere and currently the 8th, 9th, and 21st deepest natural 
abysses in the world respectively.  During the past 33 years, Bill has organized and led 47 expeditions 
and has spent seven years in the ﬁ eld on exploration projects. He holds 11 patents and patents-pending 
and is the inventor of numerous other exploration-related tools. He is presently leading the three-year 
DEPTHX project for NASA to develop and ﬁ eld-test a prototype robot for the postulated Europa lander 
third stage, the “hydrobot” that autonomously maps the subsurface ocean of Europa.
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multidisciplinary nature and the remoteness. I don’t consider expeditionary deep 
caving as something you do for excitement.  You do it because it’s an opportunity 
to explore one of the last true frontiers on this planet. The classic distinction on 
this subject came from arctic explorer Vilhjalmar Steffanson, who once spent 
ﬁ ve years working solo north of the Arctic Circle. Interviewed about this one 
time, the reporter asked [Steffanson], “Well, you’re an adventurer, aren’t you?” 
He said, “Son, adventure is what happens when exploration goes wrong.” 
I have had that motto emblazoned upon my heart in letters of gold ever 
since. You do not get Brownie points for having your name on a tombstone. You 
have to come back.  With that in mind, I have actually taken a lot of cues from 
how NASA trains its astronauts when preparing for, and stafﬁ ng, expeditions. In 
the subterranean world, where we are about to go, it is a gloves-off environment. 
The exploration front is now getting to the stage where it is so remote and so 
difﬁ cult to reach that no matter what technology we have at our disposal, and 
no matter how Olympically-trained and ﬁ t the people are who are involved with 
it, we still get stopped. Every time you go for four or ﬁ ve months in the ﬁ eld, if 
you’re lucky, you’re a kilometer or two deeper into the planet. I am going to try 
to give you an idea here just what this world is like. I’m going to show here what 
would be the equivalent of summitting Everest and K2, but it’s all going to be in 
one continuous trip proceeding down, in order to give you a sequential feel for 
the logistics and remoteness. 
Rising out of the southeastern area of southern Mexico is the Huautla 
plateau. It jumps straight up about 2,100 meters. The top of it is cratered with 
gigantic sinkholes. The water that rains on this area for 500 square kilometers 
all goes internally and, in the process of doing that, it creates some pretty 
substantially-sized voids. 
About 50 kilometers away to the south and a kilometer higher in elevation 
is Cueva Cheve. This was only discovered in 1986. This underscores the still 
unknown extent of this last frontier: Cueva Cheve was not even known to the 
modern world until 1986—just 18 years ago. The endeavors we’re talking about 
require a lot of technology, starting off with the fact that you’re going down. You 
don’t just walk down that depth. There are three kilometers of specialized rope 
that are used to rig over 107 drops and traverses going down into this cave. 
“ ”
INTERVIEWED ABOUT THIS ONE TIME, THE REPORTER ASKED [STEFFANSON], 
“WELL, YOU’RE AN ADVENTURER, AREN’T YOU?” HE SAID, “SON, ADVENTURE IS 
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN EXPLORATION GOES WRONG.”
OPENING PHOTO: 
An artist’s rendering of the hydrobot, 
a self-propelled submersible that could 
be used to explore beneath the surface 
of the ice-covered ocean on Europa, 
one of Jupiter’s moons.
(Source: http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/
technology/images_videos/iv_pages/
p48326.html.)
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Typical vertical drops on some of these things can reach distances of 160 
meters straight down. That would be about one and a half times the height of the 
Vehicle Assembly Building, for those who are here from Kennedy Space Center. 
A lot of times they’re a little bit shorter, but they almost always have water 
accompanying them. The deeper you go, the more water you collect. The tributaries 
each add a little bit in until, ﬁ nally, you’re dealing with quite a serious ﬂ ow. You’re 
rigging lines on the walls to keep out of that, usually. This is life on rope. You’re 
usually carrying around a 25-kilogram pack, which has the supplies that you’re 
bringing. This is very much an inverse variant to the siege tactics that you see 
used on high altitude mountains where you’re building Camp 1, Camp 2, Camp 
3, and you start off with a pyramid of 50 people. Sometimes, we’ve had as many 
as 150, but 50 is a typical number for a trip for four to ﬁ ve months. That works 
out to be a good number to work with—you have depth of personnel to handle 
emergencies in situ.  We’ve generally considered that a team of 12 to 18 is about the 
minimum you would want for safety and skill redundancy. And the further down 
you go, you’re adding more tributaries until, ﬁ nally, you’re into rivers by the time 
you get to about the −800-meter level. This would be a little over a half a mile 
deep in English units. I know nobody around here works in English units . . . except 
when you’re designing planetary craft going to Mars. [Laughter] 
One of the things that we’ve had to deal with is the fact that we are constantly 
running up against the limits of human endurance. Typically, if you go on a marathon 
exploration trip, you can stay up for 24, 28, maybe 30 hours, and, after that, if 
you come back to base camp on the surface, you’re out of commission for two to 
three days while you’re recovering. You can’t do that underground, because even 
when you are resting—say at an underground camp—you are consuming supplies, 
which are ﬁ nite and paid for at great price of effort. If you want to move efﬁ ciently, 
your people have to be roughly 16 hours from anywhere that they have to go. And, 
so, we begin to establish a series of camps. I want to dispel the notion that a lot 
of people have that these places are claustrophobic. In reality, many chambers and 
tunnels in southern Mexico—owing to the signiﬁ cant tropical yearly rainfall—are 
so big you can’t even see the ceilings or the walls. It really is like being on the dark 
side of the Moon. These are team endeavors. None of your specialized personnel—
divers, climbers, surveyors—get to the “front” without riding on the sweat of a 
substantial support team. Like high altitude mountaineers, cavers frequently refer 
to such support crew staff as “sherpas.”
Again, when I think of an expedition—and this is a sticking point with me 
and it may be with others—there are a couple of holy words in the vocabulary 
of true explorers. And one of those is the term “expedition.” To me, this is an 
endeavor of 20 or more people being out in the ﬁ eld for four-plus months. That’s 
a serious distinction. Anything short of that is what I would refer to as a recon 
mission. And, so, in the case I’m discussing here, you’re on site for four or ﬁ ve 
months, and people are working daily. It is not uncommon during the early stages 
of an expedition for the lead rigging team to get caught between known camps, 
and, so, setting a bivouac is something you plan for as you move in. Generally, it 
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is for logistics reasons that you don’t get as far as you would like—for example, 
you might not have been able to carry enough rope to continue rigging.  
Well, the reinforcement crew comes in the next day with another 
kilometer of rope and off you go. And then that support crew retreats to the 
previous camp behind them and the rigging team presses onward. And so it 
goes on down, until you are now roughly four days traveling distance from the 
nearest entrance. So, when you get to a place like this, you begin to think about 
the fact that you’re pretty remote, and there really isn’t going to be any rescue, 
except from the people who are with you, particularly if it’s something that 
requires urgent response. If you can get a person back to a camp and stabilize 
a broken leg or something like that, you can always send out for assistance. 
But there are places where even that is not possible, particularly when working 
beyond ﬂ ooded, underwater tunnels.
The most remote place that we’ve been so far is at the current limit of 
exploration in Cueva Cheve. When you get down to a distance of approximately 
8 1/2 kilometers inside and at a depth of −1,360 meters, you’re moving through river 
canyons, and you keep thinking that, well, this is just going to keep going down 
like this. But the problem is that caves are always quirky in terms of geology. All it 
takes is a slight counterfold in the limestone strata, and that river that was boiling 
is now static, placid, and leading you into tunnels that are completely waterﬁ lled 
to the roof for substantial distances, before they usually rise back up into air-ﬁ lled 
sections of cave. They used to refer to these places as terminal siphons. In fact, 
that’s the name of a rock band I’m in, so you’ll hear us touring someday.
So, you get down to a place like this and here you are, you’re roughly 1,360 
meters vertically down and 8 kilometers in. Everything down here is paid for 
preciously by the people who transported this down. You’re living on ropes for 
days to get this here, so you have to be very careful about what you bring. At this 
point, those in the lead—in this case, trained cave divers—have this enormous 
pressure on them to perform. And I’m sure that everybody who’s ﬂ own on a 
rocket knows this same feeling. Here’s 50 or 100 people who have given of their 
time, of their lives, of their sweat for four months. That’s not counting, by 
the way, in the case of many of these, that we have spent two to four months 
rehearsing with those same teams over the preceding one or two years. When 
you get to these places where the tunnels are full of water, now you’re into 
another level of discipline where you have to be aware of the fact that, number 
one, you’re going to be using portable life equipment—what astronauts refer to 
as PLSS [Portable Life Support System] units for EVA [extravehicular activity]. 
And that’s the way I think of this. I think of this as EVA. And when you do that, 
you have to be thinking a couple of things. Number one is that anything can go 
wrong at any time, and so the best way to deal with this is to believe that this 
place is actively out to get you. When you think that way, you start making 
checklists ahead of time. In fact, we have them all laminated on waterproof 
paper. Not only before you go in, but after you come back out. It’s the equivalent 
of pre-ﬂ ight and postﬂ ight checklists. 
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But there’s more to this. I’m going to say one thing here, and then I’ll 
come back to another side of it. We’ve been talking about issues for reducing 
risk, one of them being making our equipment “bombproof.” That’s a bit tough 
when you look at the places that you have to go through to get these items 
or the equipment that these people have down here. And the other issue is 
redundancy. But before I get to that, there’s this whole issue of peer pressure 
that is on you. You have to be ready at any second on one of these things that, 
if you get 50 feet inside this underwater tunnel and you don’t like how you feel, 
you abort. That’s a cardinal rule. 
Somebody was asking me recently how many people do I know on 
expeditions that have died? And I really never thought much about it until I 
started adding it up.  Over the last 18 years, I’ve lost 16 good friends. People that 
I’ve climbed with, worked with on expeditions, people who were very qualiﬁ ed. 
The reason they’re not here right now is because they went a little too far—they 
didn’t abort when they should have, they didn’t stop and say, "Wait a minute. 
There’s a stack of things that are going wrong here." Nothing ever happens in 
one blow. Jim Lovell pointed that out this morning. But a string of little events 
occurs—you start going down there and you get tired. You get tired and you 
say, “Ah, I don’t need to have this extra little piece of safety line here.” And, “Oh, 
well, I don’t need to check this other piece of equipment I have for descending 
a rope.” Pretty soon, things start to add up, and you don’t have that safety 
on there and when you sit down, one of those carabiners is unlocked and it 
comes unclipped, and there you are with 25 kilos hanging below you, and you’re 
hanging on the rope by one hand. You know, that kind of stuff happens. So, you 
have to get religious in your discipline about how you deal with the technology. 
This is high technology exploration that’s going on down here. More serious 
than a typical EVA mission outside the Shuttle. 
The Portable Life Support System we use is all fully-closed-cycle equipment. 
There is no air in this system. It’s all helium-oxygen running at about 6,000-psi 
in carbon-carbon tanks. The range on this particular rig is about eight hours and 
“ ”
SOMETIMES WHEN YOU GET TO THESE LOCATIONS, THERE IS NO DRY LAND, 
AND SO YOU’RE LIVING IN HAMMOCKS STRUNG FROM ROCK BOLTS ABOVE THE 
WATER AND HOPING THAT YOU’RE HIGH ENOUGH THAT, IN CASE THERE’S A 
FLOOD, YOU’RE NOT GOING TO GET WASHED AWAY. THAT’S THE WORLD YOU 
LIVE IN WHEN YOU’RE DOWN THERE.
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depth-independent. We developed this particular PLSS because we didn’t know 
how far we were going to have to explore underwater. Sometimes when you get 
to these locations, there is no dry land, and so you’re living in hammocks strung 
from rock bolts above the water and hoping that you’re high enough that, in case 
there’s a ﬂ ood, you’re not going to get washed away. That’s the world you live in 
when you’re down there. 
In the bottom of this system you’re doing 600 meters—that’s roughly a 
half a mile—of diving, starting at the −1360 meter level. When we got to the 
other side, we established a camp. We were over there for a week and explored 
another three-and-a-half kilometers beyond the underwater section. These 
places represent the frontier right now. No one has been able to organize an 
expedition since to go further. In the case of Huautla, it has been 10 years since 
anyone visited that location; in Cheve, it was 2003, and it’s unlikely that a return 
there will be ﬁ elded before 2007, although we do have that one in the planning 
stages already. Neither of these places are ﬁ nished. They are beckoning. They 
are wide open. And, yet, we can’t get the tactical logistics together or the team, 
because those people all have to be not only vertical trained, they have to be 
comfortable with where they are in a remote environment, and they have to be 
able to dive at the same time as well as climb. You start putting all these things 
together, all these various task loadings, and, pretty soon, the ﬁ lters get pretty 
serious. There are not many people in the world who have all these skills.
This is the kind of thing that we are going to have to think about. Who 
are you going to put on the Moon? What kind of expeditionary-qualiﬁ ed people 
are you going to put on the Moon? Are you going to live together for a year up 
there? I mean, the psychological aspects are one thing, but the multidisciplinary 
training is going to be phenomenal. 
If you get away from this logistical problem that we have of getting stuff 
down to −1,500 meters underground, and you can bring things in on tractor trailers, 
the whole ball game changes. One of the great natural wonders of the world, just 
south of Tallahassee, Florida, is a place called Wakulla Springs. Up until 1987, it 
was basically unexplored. You could look at the entrance from glass-bottomed 
boats, but nobody had seen much more than 100 meters inside on scuba. And 
we had an opportunity to go there with National Geographic in ’87. But it was 
in ’99 that things really got high tech. This project was a good example of how 
exploration need drove equipment development. Many pieces of technology we 
used did not exist prior to 1999. We built all this–a ﬂ oating, saturation diving, 
recovery system; 20-kilometer-range propulsion vehicles; dual-redundant, 
closed-cycle PLSS backpacks; and 3-D, automated mapping systems—on a two-
year schedule, once we got the go-ahead from National Geographic and corporate 
patrons. We had a dual closed-cycle PLSS; six onboard computers running this 
thing; twin head-up displays; 18-hours range. There is no EVA system in use by 
NASA that would meet this standard, and I’ll tell you why. When we get down 
there, we’re going to be doing missions to distances of about 4 1/2 kilometers 
from the entrance at 100 meters underwater depth. When you’re out there, you 
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are two and a half hours one-way travel time from the nearest egress point. By 
comparison, if you’re on a Shuttle mission or a station mission right now, and 
you have a problem with your suit, whether it’s an Orlan or an ILC Dover suit, 
you’ve got roughly 10 to 15 minutes, maybe 30 minutes in open circuit mode at 
best, to get back to the hatch. Here you don’t have that luxury. You are two and a 
half hours out, and you’ve got to ﬁ gure out how you can do it. 
It’s important to point out that everybody here was in a situation where, 
no matter where they were on that trajectory, they had an abort scenario. The 
maximum mission duration by pre-agreement among the teams was 10 kilometers 
penetration. And you had a factor of four to one safety margin to get yourself 
back. Everybody who was doing these would rehearse each mission beforehand 
for upwards of 12 hours (in the spring basin), and have people come in and tell 
them, for example, that all of their vehicles were dead, they had to transfer and 
get towed out by one of their partners. And then you’d tell them, for example, 
that half of their life support system was gone and they’d have to continue out 
on that. So you’re continuously rehearsing all the various abort scenarios. In that 
sense, it’s no different than training for a space mission. But here, we explicitly 
included abort capability for every phase of the mission. That isn’t true of space 
ﬂ ight currently.
A typical mission is all about collection of information about what the 
frontier is. If you’re an explorer, you should be out there trying to collect that 
data, just like Steffanson said, and get back safely with it. 
We built for this project a gadget—known as the “Digital Wall Mapper”—
with a very high-grade, inertial guidance unit, phased array sonar, and about 
eight computers. And it’s imaging the wall as you drive through, to build a 
three-dimensional map of the aquifer. The person in back is the safety diver. 
Their job is to make sure that when this person is driving this monstrosity, that 
if they do something wrong, they’re going to come up and help them out. 
Typically, we would have a support crew follow people in to a depth of 
about 80 meters. Perhaps 150 meters into the cave the crew is running on helium-
oxygen, and they’ll have 18 hours supply down there. The people on top have got 
the biggest sport diving cylinders in the business, and they’re dumping out about 
a thousand dollars worth of helium-oxygen on that support mission just because 
of the fact that they’re wasting it away, breathing it into the water column. 
And then off you go for approximately the next ﬁ ve and a half hours, with a 
typical run down here to 100 meters depth, and then you’re back. Now you can’t 
come straight out, as somebody like Mike Gernhardt or anybody will tell you who 
has done EVA. You have a decompression issue, a very serious one. In fact when 
you’re ﬁ ve hours down at 100 meters, you’re almost saturated. At 60 meters 
down, we had a string of closed circuit cameras following people out. They had 
ﬂ ashcards so they could tell if everything was OK, or they needed supplies from 
down there. 
When they reached a certain stage—the completion of their 30-meter 
decompression stop—six support divers would drop out of the sky, like something 
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out of a James Bond movie, and come down and take away their closed-cycle unit, 
give them a regulator, and let them switch up into a pressurized, personnel transfer 
capsule. They would then be transferred up to the top and into what we call a 
mini-saturation system, where they would spend the next 12 hours. Total mission 
duration, about 22 to 24 hours. We did this everyday for three days, took a day 
off for maintenance, and then did it again, for three months while we were down 
there. No issues with safety on that entire project with any of the mission crews. 
Ten million data points were gathered on this trip to build the world’s ﬁ rst 
three-dimensional cave map. So, in our case it’s not only a desire to be out on the 
frontier, but it’s also about bringing the data back home.     ■
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I’ve been freelance writing for 25 years, mostly about adventure, 
exploration, spinoffs to archeology and history. But before that, I was a serious climber for 
about 20 years, from age 17 to 37. I didn’t climb high altitude peaks like Ed, but specialized 
in technically difﬁ cult peaks in Alaska. And I still climb, although pretty pitifully. 
But for me, the most critical question of my life had to do with the fact that by the 
age of 22, I had been a ﬁ rsthand witness to three fatal accidents to partners. It began with 
my ﬁ rst partner in high school, Dave Lee, who, only four months after we started climbing, 
was killed on the ﬁ rst Flatiron above Boulder. It was not a very hard route, but when we got 
a rope snagged and had to unrope, he climbed down solo to retrieve it. He slipped and fell 
700 feet, with me watching. 
Three years later, I was the ﬁ rst person on the scene when two guys fell out of Pinnacle 
Gully in Mt. Washington, one of whom was actually in training to be an astronaut. We 
tried to resuscitate them to no avail, and then had to haul their bodies down to Pinkham 
Notch. And then, just three months after that, on my hardest Alaskan expedition to Mt. 
Huntington, after all four of us had reached the summit, on the descent, Ed Burns, the 
youngest of the four of us, a 20-year-old sophomore in college, inexplicably fell, had a 
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rappel come loose. And we were descending in the middle of the night, we could 
just barely see in the Alaska twilight. And without my knowing, even today, what 
happened, the rappel fell, and he simply fell away from me 4,000 feet, and we 
never could even look for his body. 
The question to me now is, why did I keep climbing after these terrible 
experiences? At the time, I didn’t even really examine it. I mean, I came close to 
quitting, but I didn’t really examine why I kept climbing. I think if somebody had 
asked me, I would have said, “Well, wouldn’t their deaths be even more pointless 
if I quit climbing?” 
So, when I tailed off climbing and got interested in writing about other 
climbers, including Ed, I got much more interested in this whole question of risk, 
motivation, and the risk-reward payoff. And, in 1980, I wrote an essay called 
“Moments of Doubt,” an apologia for doing something as crazy and risky and 
useless as climbing. 
My favorite climbing autobiography is Lionel Terray’s Conquistadors of the 
Useless, because it is an awkward, but telling, phrase. And just this year, I’ve 
ﬁ nished a memoir about my climbing in which I actually come to the opposite 
conclusion, that maybe it wasn’t worth the risk. And what changed my thinking 
about this was that I had always thought about risk in terms of the question, 
basically sort of a solipsistic, selﬁ sh question, does the reward I get for making a 
ﬁ rst ascent make up for the risk and the tragedy of someone dying? And it took 
me 35 years to realize that that was just a completely self-centered and, therefore, 
sort of stupid question. 
And one of the things I did a few years ago was to go back and recontact 
Dave’s brother and sister, the only surviving members of his family. Forty years 
after the accident, and I had never communicated with 
them. And I found that his sister, in particular, was still in 
a rage with me over that accident, and that she lived with 
it every day of her life. We spent the most intense seven 
hours straight in Seattle on a park bench talking about it, 
and trying to untangle her feelings about it. And I ﬁ nally 
realized that the question of, is it worth the risk, is not one 
you can really just apply to yourself. It really does involve 
family, the larger society, and humankind, ultimately. 
I guess if I still had to come up with a rationale for 
climbing mountains, it would not be anything to do with 
the thrill of it versus the penalties, but, rather, whether the 
very endeavor has something inspirational about it that 
lasts. And I think by analogy with Scott and Shackleton and 
Amundsen in the Antarctic, they justiﬁ ed their expeditions 
in the name of science, just as I think NASA is continually 
doing. And Scott, when he died, had 30 pounds of rocks 
on his ﬂ esh, geological samples. He tossed away everything extraneous, but he 
somehow thought the 30 pounds of rocks were worth bringing back. Apsley 
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The Fram under sail. (Amundsen, Roald. The South Pole, 
Volume I, p. 170.) 
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Cherry-Gerrard’s worst journey in the world was to gather penguin eggs in the 
middle of winter from Cape Crozier, and under the misapprehension of the now 
exploded theory that ontology recapitulates phylogeny, penguins being the most 
primitive birds in the world, their embryos would tell us all about early human 
evolution. It’s complete bunk. He performed the worst journey in the world 
to gather three penguin eggs. But we don’t remember Scott, Shackleton, and 
Amundsen for their science, we remember for their example of daring adventure 
and exploration and going where no one else had ever been. To me that was the 
ﬁ rst, and is still the most exciting, part of exploration, to go where no one else 
had ever been. The only rationale for it is if it inspires other people. Ed Viesturs 
clearly inspires other people. I have been at talks he has given where the groupies 
have just gathered all around him. They want more than autographs. Is he a rock 
star celebrity? No, but there clearly is something that touches the human spirit 
and, as corny as Bush’s line is, “the desire written in the human heart” really does 
have to do with risk and exploration.
One last note, a curiosity from the Renaissance. We’re taught, on and off, 
about the Renaissance, but someone calculated that on a typical Renaissance 
voyage to the New World, sailors stood a one in three chance of not surviving. 
And that makes Everest look like a piece of cake. It makes Bill Stone’s stuff even 
look safer. And the collectors of the narrative of the voyages write often about 
the adventurers, but the adventurers were not the sailors, they were the guys that 
put up the money. The real adventure was taken by the ﬁ nanciers who backed the 
expedition. The sailors were just expendable work hands. All of this needs to be 
put in a historical and multicultural perspective.     ■
“ ”
I GUESS IF I STILL HAD TO COME UP WITH A RATIONALE FOR CLIMBING 
MOUNTAINS, IT WOULD NOT BE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE THRILL OF IT 
VERSUS THE PENALTIES, BUT, RATHER, WHETHER THE VERY ENDEAVOR HAS 
SOMETHING INSPIRATIONAL ABOUT IT THAT LASTS. 
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Discussion
CHRIS MCKAY: Okay, what I’d like to do now is to go to open discussion. Keep in mind 
what you heard, and keep in mind the questions that would be relevant to NASA, in terms 
of sending humans to explore. Points that David made—is it pointless to send humans, 
especially now with technology advancing and, people argue, we could send machines. 
And it ties to these questions that David raised. And what I would like to do is have some 
audience participation and discussion. You can ask questions of anyone you want, or you 
can make a short statement. 
QUESTION: Darlene Lim, NASA Ames Research Center, and my question is for Bill Stone. 
I wanted to ﬁ nd out what some of the advantages were that you presented, to say it would 
be more advantageous to send humans into the aquifer and do the mapping that you outline 
versus sending in submersibles? 
BILL STONE: That’s a fantastic setup. There might be one or two others in this audience 
with similar background, but I think I’ve found myself in a unique position in having spent 
about a decade of my life designing spacecraft and another decade designing robots, and 
now robotic spacecraft.  During “CFT,” or “copious free time,” we do some work underground. 
The answer to your question goes like this, and I’ll try to put it to you as succinctly as I can. 
There are places where robots are entirely logical to be used ﬁ rst, and I classify those in two 
situations.  First, places that are lethal to humans, and second, places which are currently 
too remote to get to send people to with our primitive propulsion technology systems. So 
you send robots in those situations. 
Everything else, in my opinion, is best done with people. Now, at some point, you 
do have to draw the line in the sand to say this is too risky. As I said when I was looking 
over that list of departed friends—no different from Jim Lovell citing off a list of test 
pilots he has known—these are dangerous environments. The reason we are still here 
is because we knew where to draw the line in the sand. Even if we do that, there is still 
unquantiﬁ able risk, so the game is to say, all right, you want to be out there in person. 
Probably everybody in this room wants to be out there in person. Do I want to be here today? 
To be honest, I’d rather be at Shackleton Crater on the Moon right now, for a couple of 
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years with a dozen good, qualiﬁ ed people.  I’d be happier there than I am here 
or at work. Being on the frontier is what I live for. That’s where people like 
Ed Viesturs live. If you don’t understand that, you need to go on an expedition 
somewhere remote. Maybe you’ll like it, maybe you won’t, but among the people I 
work with, you can tell right off the ones that are concerned about where they are 
. . . you see it in their eyes when they get to someplace like Camp 3 or Camp 4.
In fact, people that I’ve worked with for years on expeditions have a name 
for it. They stole it from Jacques Cousteau: it’s called “rapture of the deep.” You 
can tell because their eyes are getting wider, and they’re sitting there at those 
camps going, “I need to be concerned about getting out of here,” rather than 
focusing on the job at hand, which is pushing the exploration frontier. The people 
you ﬁ nd that have a bigger smile on their face the deeper you go, those are the 
people you want, those are the ones you want out there with you at the frontier. 
Now, to go back to your question directly, why do this in person? Because it is the 
most stimulating thing that you will ever experience in your life. I have had the 
privilege of being where no one has been before many times. It is difﬁ cult to put 
into words to those who have not experienced it just how moving that feeling is. 
If I had to capture a 20-second image on ﬁ lm that depicted that event and 
what its importance is personally to anybody who does it, it would be [from] 
the ﬁ lm Apollo 13 that Jim Lovell made with Ron Howard, where they show the 
image of ﬂ ying by the Moon and the astronauts thinking, “I could be down there, 
lifting that rock up and looking at it in my hand.” That’s what drives us on. If you 
look at what we do in our normal lives, it pales in comparison.
CHRIS MCKAY: Bill just made a very good case for human exploration. I think 
we want to hear a countercase, so somebody in the audience think of a good case 
for why the space program should just be robotic, why we shouldn’t risk human 
life. If there’s no one in the audience who can state that case, we don’t have a 
well-selected audience. Somebody come up with the counterpoint, the argument 
(so we can pillory them) why robots are sufﬁ cient. With that enticement, we’ll 
go to the question here.
STEVE COOK: Steve Cook, NASA Marshall. I won’t take that question, but I will 
say, ﬁ rst off, I think there’s a gold mine of analogies here that are applicable to 
exploration that we need to capitalize upon as a country, to sell and sustain a 
vision that I don’t think we’re doing as well as we could today. With all of the 
experiences you’ve been having, a lot of these are ﬁ rsts with me and I’ve been 
with NASA for several years. Question now with risk, with respect to Ed Viesturs 
and to Bill Stone. Ed, you talked about making the decision to hold back—you had 
the camera crew, this would have been a perfect time to go; your friends did not. 
I’d like you to talk a little bit about the criteria you used versus what you think or 
know that they used. Why did they go forward versus why did you stay?
ED VIESTURS: When we go to Everest, we spend six or eight weeks preparing 
for that ﬁ nal day. That’s carrying loads, building camps, acclimatizing. And then 
the idea is that sometime in May, historically, we know that there’s going to be 
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a window of favorable weather that would allow us to do that ﬁ nal 3,000-foot 
climb. So the whole preparation leads to that. Once you’re ready, then you have to 
take into account everything that you see around you. The weather patterns—now 
we can get good weather forecasting. In those days, it was just kind of starting to 
work, but we would have to base our judgment and what we were thinking about 
doing on what we were seeing, what we were feeling; our gut instinct has a big 
role in how I make my decision—you know, what am I seeing and how has that 
played a role in what I’ve done in the past. And we made a group decision—David 
Breashears, who’d climbed Everest twice, I’d climbed it four times by then—
as a group, we all felt that the weather patterns that we were seeing were not 
historically what we were waiting to go to the summit with. So we made the 
call based on that and, also, just the fact that it didn’t feel right. And I think Bill 
mentioned that, I think the reason a lot of us are alive today is because we know 
when those red ﬂ ags are popping up, that we have to listen to our instincts. If we 
discover later that we made the wrong decision and the weather was good, well, 
big deal. We erred on the side of safety and being conservative. 
Our friends, they had this date in their mind, and that was May 10th. And, 
a lot of times, climbers do that. Come hell or high water, they will just go for 
the summit on that particular date—because it’s auspicious or whatever. And 
I’ve always said, ultimately, the mountain decides when you can go up, and you 
have to listen to what the mountain is telling you. There are signals, and you 
can’t blindly, stubbornly go up, because we all know that Mother Nature is much 
stronger than we are. They did start on a good day—it was perfect. And had they 
turned around in enough time, they would have escaped the storm, which came 
late in the day, which is something that we saw developing every single day the 
past two weeks previously. But, again, they got so close to the top, they pushed 
further and further and further away. That umbilical cord of safety got stretched 
and ﬁ nally broke. And I can’t second-guess the decisions that they made. I 
wasn’t up there. I can evaluate what they did. I can say that I wouldn’t have 
made decisions the way they made them, but, again, as Bill said, there wasn’t one 
decision that was wrong, it was a multitude of little problems, and then the straw 
that broke the camel’s back was the storm, and then people died.
CHRIS MCKAY: Ed, I’d like to ask you a question. Do you have a personal short 
answer to the question of why you climb mountains?
ED VIESTURS: I’m a stubborn person, I like challenging projects and, for me, 
climbing is the most difﬁ cult physical and mental thing I can think of doing—
especially without oxygen. And I know I have to train, prepare, think about what 
I’m doing, to be successful at it. And there’s a huge struggle to get to those 
altitudes without oxygen. And so many things can go wrong, and when you 
succeed, and when you ﬁ nally are standing on the summit of Everest, it’s an 
amazing feeling. And it’s something I can’t ﬁ nd anywhere else, and, so, I’ve 
become addicted to it.
CHRIS MCKAY: Would you classify what you do as exploration?
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ED VIESTURS: I explore myself. And I think that’s the interesting part. I think, 
also, you can be in the middle of the desert, you can be down in the ocean, if you 
get in trouble, somebody can come and get you. Up there, you’re on your own. If 
you make a mistake, you have to get yourself out of it. And it’s a very rare feeling. 
As normal, sea-level, landlubbing people, we don’t get that feeling of isolation 
where we think about every single step and every single move that we make, 
[that] there can be consequences because of those. And that’s an interesting 
thing that I feel up there.
CHRIS MCKAY: Thanks. We have a question here.
QUESTION: Dennis Wingo, Skycorp, Incorporated. And this is for Neil, Ed, and 
you, Chris. I see a commonality between what you do on the mountain, what 
you do underground, and what you do in the Arctic. And the commonality is a 
staged approach, abort modes—you don’t do everything in one big, fell swoop. 
And it seems that in the space arena that we try to do that, whether it’s a manned 
system or whether it’s un-manned. But especially in the manned, because there’s 
a religious argument (I call it) going on now at NASA: Do we build a heavy lift 
launch vehicle, or do we use the assets that we have to go back to the Moon and 
on to Mars? It seems that with the assets that we have now, and that we [will] 
have in the near term, we could use your staged approach to go to the Moon and 
go to Mars.
ED VIESTURS: Yeah, for us staging is critical, because we have to not only 
put supplies at various camps, but it’s also the process of acclimatization. So, 
you need to take the time to go at various altitudes, and then come down to 
recuperate, and then, slowly, work to a higher altitude. It’s kind of a necessity 
in both aspects, acclimatizing and, also, then, getting your gear in place. Once 
acclimatized, though, I’ve developed a system now where we’ll go very quickly 
and—like you said, in that big launch vehicle we’ll carry everything that we 
need, and, in three days we’ll do what normally takes two months. We’ll climb, 
moving everything with us, and then go to the summit. That’s riskier, but it’s 
also faster, because you’re spending less time in a dangerous environment. So, 
I think the trade-off is worth it. I’d rather climb faster, without the series of 
camps behind me, but I need to do that initially to acclimatize.
CHRIS MCKAY: Bill, you want to give us the downward view of the same thing?
BILL STONE: It’s no more risky than being a test pilot, in my opinion.
CHRIS MCKAY: And your point?
BILL STONE: No, I mean, you can control the risks. There’s one thing that you 
can’t control, but you can prepare for, and that’s the weather. And we’re going to 
have that kind of phenomenology wherever we go, whether it’s a big storm that 
comes in on Everest or whether it’s a hurricane that dumps ten inches of rain 
over the plateau and you get a 10-meter-high rise in the water wherever you’re 
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at. I have friends who have bolted their way 30 meters up a canyon wall in New 
Guinea as the water rose behind them. They hung from rock bolts for 32 hours 
waiting for it to go down. They were prepared, you know. Yes, they were in a 
dangerous place, but they had their act together. 
Let me extend this to space, because I have actually put a lot of thought 
into this. I’ve designed space systems. I’ve designed reaction control thrusters. 
Things like that. One of the things that apparently has been misunderstood here 
is that we did have complete control over the situations where we were—even 
the weather.  All of our camps were selected to be above the water. The way 
the ropes were rigged—all of that stuff was of very high reliability. Further, we 
trained everyone on the team to know when to replace things, if they discovered 
that a line was fraying, for example. And there were depots of spare rigging tackle 
situated at various locations along the way for just such emergencies. We even 
had ways to get out if a rope broke—equipment for scaling overhung domes. We 
had all these things covered. 
Now, if you switch to trying to think about what are you going to do if 
you’re trying to get to the Moon—which is the next logical target for us to get 
back to here, and prove that we can live off this planet—the ﬁ rst thing you’ve got 
to say is, all right, how are you going to get to low earth orbit (LEO)? And there 
are only so many ways that we can do that right now. 
You’ve now seen what I do. If you were to say to me, “Would you ﬂ y the 
Shuttle?” or something like that, then I’d have to say, “I have to think very carefully 
about that,” because it does not meet my criteria for having an abort mode at any 
point in the trajectory. You didn’t pay me to come out here to give you sweet talk, 
so I’m going to talk to you straight. The last time we had a launch vehicle that met 
those criteria is when these [Apollo] gentlemen were ﬂ ying. Why on Earth have 
we not done that now? That’s just my personal impression. If I was going to try to 
put something up there, we’d probably be using ELVs with abort modes to get us 
out to LEO. Beyond that, you’re into the issue of how survivable are your vehicles? 
You need to be thinking in terms of propulsion, life support, and everything else. 
You guys are great at this. NASA is a technological gem on this planet. But, 
unfortunately, you don’t have any true “expedicionarios” here, as we say down 
in Mexico—true expeditionary people who think, “Two years from now we’re 
going to run an expedition to the Moon.” And then go do it. The way NASA 
thinks these days is, “We can develop these technologies and, maybe, 15 to 20 
years from now we’ll be back on the Moon.” That’s too late. That’s too late. You’ve 
got to get there now and learn from the frontier, just the way we’ve been doing 
underground here on Earth. Those places you’ve seen today were unexplored 12 
years ago—completely unknown. We built the technology to go there. Given the 
enormous resources at NASA, there is no reason that we can’t be back on the 
Moon within ﬁ ve to seven years, max. 
QUESTIONER: If the Moon is where you want to go.
BILL STONE: There you go!
86
RISK AND EXPLORATION:  EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS        
DALE ANDERSEN: I want to go back to your question about staging, which was 
doing things in steps. I think a lot of the issue there is knowing what the stages 
ought to be. I remember once getting a lot of ﬂ ack—we were going to the Antarctic 
to do diving under the ice. I put in travel orders to go to Key West—that was our 
staging spot. We were going to do training for ice diving in Key West. 
Now, maybe you could argue that was a good place to go to stage the 
Antarctic, or maybe you could argue that it wasn’t necessary. So, when we plan 
anything, any expedition, I like to think: What is our goal? What are we really 
trying to do? What’s the driver at the long end? And, then, what do we have to 
do to get there? If you look at the way Apollo worked, as I understand it, it was 
very much that way—as we heard this morning. You want to go to the Moon, 
so you need to develop docking, you need to demonstrate that you can stay in 
a spacecraft, and so on. Take something like Gemini—it was a requirements-
driven program: If you want to go to the Moon, you’re going to have to do 
this ﬁ rst. It wasn’t: Let’s do Gemini and see where it leads, or some nebulous 
concept that, somehow, if we develop these things, a mission to the Moon will 
miraculously appear from the pieces. 
And, I think, as we think ahead to an exploration program, we have to do 
the same thing: Where do we really want to go, and, then, what are the pieces that 
lead us there? And I think that’s also what Bill was saying. So your question is a 
very good one, and I think exploration on Earth, and people that plan expeditions 
on Earth—the logic that they approach can be applied, but the answer is not so 
easy to come by.
CHRIS MCKAY: Okay. Maybe someone can address my challenge to pick up the 
case for robots, but probably not you!
QUESTION: Well, maybe I will! I’m from Goddard Space Flight Center, a scientist-
type as opposed to a program manager, which seems to have been commented 
upon today. 
CHRIS MCKAY: Derisively, I might add!
QUESTION: It seems to me that over the years NASA has been very ambivalent 
about people in space and science. Back in the ’60s, getting people up there seemed 
to be something done for its own sake. Putting somebody on the Moon was done 
for its own sake. Then, in the ’70s and up to maybe the ’90s, we started getting 
into a mode where we were trying to be sold on the fact that people had to be there 
to do the science better. And it never appeared to me that that was the case—that 
it was a selling job to justify getting people in space, for the most part. 
And I guess my question now is: do you think that the public, Congress, 
and the media are ready to do real people in space as opposed to trying to do the 
science with robotics? My personal feeling is much of the science could be done 
better with robotics, but we’re not going in that direction right now. 
CHRIS MCKAY: Okay. That’s a good start to the case for robots. And I think we 
need to put that case out there as part of the complete discussion, because one 
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answer to the risks is, don’t send people. You avoid the risks. If we go back to 
Dale’s categorization of risks—mission risk, personal risk, and team risk—what 
you eliminate is the personal risk and team risk by not sending people. Certainly, 
when Steve Squyres did the MER mission, there was risk. But no one’s life was 
at stake on Mars—it was just a programmatic risk, a science risk. The worst case 
that could happen was that Steve would have wasted seven years of his life and 
no publications would have come out of it. Steve might have felt that that was a 
disaster, but no one would have gotten killed over it. 
So, I think the case where we think about risk—we can’t just assume that 
means that humans are in the loop by deﬁ nition and, therefore, we ﬁ gure out 
how to deal with the risk with humans. We have to step back once and say: are 
humans even an essential part of the program, of the loop, or do we try to do 
science by robotics?
So, now we’ve made the case for robots. Let’s let the panel and the audience 
react to that case. David is going to add to that. We’ve got a momentum going here!
DAVID ROBERTS: No, I actually would strongly believe that robots are the answer. 
And I think it’s probably my father’s inﬂ uence, because he told me years ago, as an 
astronomer, that there’s no way we’re ever going to get very far in human terms 
in space, so the future is going to be robotic. And I found the Mars rover landings 
more gripping than the original Moon landings, human-equipped Moon landings. 
And I would say that the Hubble Telescope was far more important and exciting 
to me than any manned travel in space. 
And I think that, for the ﬁ rst time in history, maybe we can actually make the 
emotional and psychological investment in machine discovery—as we’re also doing 
in the deep sea—in lieu of the conquistador going out there and doing it himself. 
CHRIS MCKAY: Okay. Penny, I’m hoping you’ll take the contrary view!
PENNY BOSTON: You know I am!
CHRIS MCKAY: What a surprise! 
PENNY BOSTON: I think that there is no dichotomy between robotic and 
human exploration. I think much ado is made out of that. They’re obviously context-
dependent. There are strong reasons why we’re interested in human exploration 
beyond simply the scientiﬁ c function. And I disagree that now, or any time in the 
near future, or even the mid-term future, we can design a robotic instrument that can 
have the capabilities of the tremendous ﬂ exibility that a ﬁ eld scientist can have.
However, that being said, I am a great fan of robotics missions. I love robots—
I wish I had whole ﬂ eets of them myself. I’m trying to get MIT [Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology] and JPL [Jet Propulsion Laboratory] to build whole ﬂ eets 
of them—because they’re a tool. They’re not a viable life form at this point. At 
this point, it’s not as if we’re going to send robots or people. They are obviously 
complementary to the whole scientiﬁ c process. But science is, fundamentally, a 
human enterprise, and the value of science is, fundamentally, to us as humans. 
88
RISK AND EXPLORATION:  EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS        
And, so, therefore, cutting us entirely out of the loop, I think, is inexcusable.
And, so, wherever in the solar system we can send people, where it makes 
sense and where people can signiﬁ cantly contribute—and one of the things 
that they have to contribute is that perception of the human experience of 
exploration—then I think that we should endeavor to do that, and save the 
robots to be our helpers and to go places where we can’t go, to go ﬁ rst. And 
even on Earth, where we’re exploring certain caves where we have tiny channels 
that we can’t get into, even microrobotic devices there would greatly enrich our 
scientiﬁ c exploration.
CHRIS MCKAY: Well said. Dale, and then Nathalie, can respond to the same 
question, and then we’ll take a question here from the woman in black, and then 
Jim Garvin. Dale?
DALE ANDERSEN: Brieﬂ y, I was just going to actually completely agree. I think 
it’s a mix; it’s not an either/or case. When robotics are required they should do 
the job, and when people have the capability to go to those places, people should 
be in the loop.
I’ve used both robotics and going there myself, and I have to admit, I’ve 
been underwater with robotics, for example, while people at Ames have been 
diving with me virtually via that robotic device. That’s a great way to share your 
experience in a remote location with a greater population. But it’s not an either/
or thing; it’s just the right tool for the right place at the right time.
CHRIS MCKAY: Nathalie, could you add a little to that? And then we’ll go back 
to general questions.
NATHALIE CABROL: I’m supporting both Dale’s and Penny’s views, because I’ve 
been putting together in the ﬁ eld an astronaut and a robot. And neither are always 
best, but they complement each other. And for exploring a planet, the human 
being will bring in his immediate background and an understanding of what’s 
around him, which a robot cannot do now and will not be able to do in a long time. 
But, by the same token, the robot does not care too much about the environment. 
Is it cold, is it hot, is there lots of UV radiation? If there is an opportunity, they 
just don’t care, they can last a long time at the surface. Together, they are almost 
an invincible team, but I would go a little step farther than that. I would say 
that, no matter what we think about it, exploration is within our genes. This is 
where part of evolution is right there in us. We wouldn’t be here if we wouldn’t 
have been taking risks and going from one place to another and exploring diverse 
habitats. And another planet is just the next frontier for us; there will be farther 
frontiers than that. 
QUESTION: I’m Becky Ramsey, I’m from NASA Headquarters, and I have to say 
that regarding human versus robot, I have to come down on the human side, 
because I want to go. Yeah, and that actually leads into an issue I want to raise. I 
want to touch on something that we talked about earlier this morning, and that’s 
individual versus government exploration. To bring up the example from this 
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morning, Burt Rutan is ready to launch in just a couple of days here. What he’s 
done is private ﬁ nancing, small group, hand-picked people. And that seems to be 
very similar to what you all do, whether it’s individual or privately ﬁ nanced or 
government ﬁ nanced, even if it’s a direct NASA project. What you do seems to 
be very small—one person, ﬁ ve people, even a hundred and ﬁ fty people—when 
you compare that to my colleague and I who work in the same building and have 
not met before today. That’s very different. You know everybody on your team, 
and you’re getting a lot further out there than we are. Is there something to be 
said for that—can we do this? Can government do this, can an agency like NASA 
do, in space, what you have managed to do here on Earth? Or do we need to ﬁ nd a 
different way and look at smaller, more team-focused models to do this? 
CHRIS MCKAY: That’s a really good question, and when we look beyond Earth 
orbit to distant destinations like Mars, the question becomes more pressing, 
because those teams have to be, by light-travel time requirements, more and 
more autonomous, and less dependent on remote control from Mission Control. 
Anybody want to address that, comment on that? Penny and Bill, think of an 
answer, too. 
PENNY BOSTON: Okay, I’m thinking real hard, that’s a really serious question 
people are wrestling with. The kinds of expeditionary things that we do are very 
small compared to a full-on mission to another planet. Therefore, the sheer 
number of people involved is so large in order to pull off a mission like that. In 
some ways, I’m not entirely sure that a lot of our experience in these smaller units 
is directly applicable. Because, by force, you have to involve so many more people, 
and the level of planning complexity far exceeds anything that any of us do. 
So, the question is, can you do that in a governmental environment? Well, 
I think NASA is doing it in a governmental environment. And I don’t see why, 
fundamentally, that transition from the kinds of missions that we’re doing now 
can’t be applied to also incorporate serious, meaningful, human exploration, plus 
an ongoing program. I don’t see that it’s not possible, with the caveat that, for 
certain applications, perhaps small companies are better, for certain limited things. 
Burt Rutan is also not doing NASA. He is not doing NASA in a can, basically. He 
is doing a very different scale of things than NASA has to worry about.
CHRIS MCKAY: Okay, I’m going to skip Bill’s answer, because I think Penny hit the 
nail on the head, so we’re going on to the next question, which is Jim Garvin.
QUESTION: Well, thanks Chris. I’m Jim Garvin, NASA Headquarters, Moon-
Mars. I wanted to comment, and then address, an issue to the panel and everyone 
about the robot/human dichotomy, because I don’t think it is one, and I think 
we have to pay attention to the great observations you all made. Because, in our 
history of space exploration, it was the robots that did the reconnaissance, the 
advance planning, and let the humans, like the great courageous heroes today, 
do the work. And I would submit to you that it was the humans back on Earth, 
and Apollo 17 and the others, continuing the work of the robotic spacecraft. So 
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it’s that partnership that’s important. And in many of the cases you’ve talked 
about, robotic reconnaissance wasn’t needed to open the frontier. The humans 
could do that on the ﬂ y. 
I would dare say I wouldn’t want any of you brave people to go to the 
surface of Venus for the ﬁ rst time. It’s probably better for our robot friends to 
do that. And today, as we think about Mars, I would submit that we’re learning 
through the rovers that Steve [Squyres] will talk about. And what we’re planning 
in the future is the reconnaissance necessary to go to those sweet spots on 
Mars. So then the humans become important onsite to do that kind of work. 
And I always marvel, if we think about this dichotomy, humans and robotics 
work together when we look at the samples brought back from the Moon from 
the Apollo mission. These multikilograms, each one itself a mini-universe for 
robotics and people to work together with here, to understand that world on the 
Moon. Imagine that anywhere we go, whether it be on Earth or beyond. 
So, I look at it as the reconnaissance that’s important, and today, a lot of 
that reconnaissance is better done on Mars, on the Moon, on Venus, way out 
where the origins of the universe are, by the machine. The question is, here 
on Earth, how can we amplify your experiences in these unique environments 
to better train us to use that reconnaissance to make the tactical decision to 
put humans on site, because we need to because it’s in our gene pool, or it’s 
necessary; it makes us better samplers. That’s the question that I think this risk 
conference is treating, and I think, at times, that unfortunately comes down to 
the ugly words “programmatic cost.” Where is the timing of that beneﬁ t?
CHRIS MCKAY: Okay, good comment. Let’s go to Keith for another comment or 
a question.
QUESTION: Keith Cowing, NASA Watch.com: Okay, you were trying to pick a 
food ﬁ ght a few minutes ago, and I love a food ﬁ ght.
An artist’s rendering of crewmembers setting up equipment during a Mars polar exploration. 
(NASA Image # JSC-2004-E-18861)
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CHRIS MCKAY: I’m trying to claim my role as moderator to stir the conversation.
KEITH COWING: Well, in that case, I’ll take that on.
CHRIS MCKAY: You can always ﬁ re the moderator, you know.
KEITH COWING: Whether it’s robots or humans, in essence, it comes down to us 
going out there, whether we do it ﬁ rst or second or in tandem, and I guess one 
observation to make, to throw a little raw meat into this argument, is it’s all about 
what we as a culture are looking to do. When is the last time somebody threw a 
ticker tape parade for a robot for doing something in space? When’s the last time 
we all cried at a national funeral when a robot didn’t work? Just an observation. 
CHRIS MCKAY: Let’s go to Donna Roberts, since I skipped her in the sequence. 
Sorry, Donna, you had your hand up a while ago, and then we’ll come back to 
you, Steve.
QUESTION: I’m Donna Roberts, of the University of California San Francisco 
Medical Center, and my question is, with humans and extreme environments, 
where safety is utmost, and pushing physical capabilities, what is necessary for 
medicine? Should it be a ﬁ rst aid kit, should it be medicine, should doctors be 
there, what kind of diagnostic and therapeutic capabilities should we have?
CHRIS MCKAY: Can we get some quick answer? Penny, Bill, we’ll let you answer 
this one. 
BILL STONE:  You just got me ﬁ red up. If you asked me to go plan an expedition 
to Shackleton Crater or something, who would you take? And I’ve thought about 
this, the answer is, number one, you bet, you’re going to have a physician. He/she 
also would probably be cotrained in dentistry. You may have to have a back-up to 
that person, as well, who is perhaps cotrained in something else. We try to have a 
physician on every project that I have ever run. It’s just too good a capability to have 
at base camp, whether they’re out in front or not. It’s one of those contingency 
things you have to think about when you’re talking about long-duration projects. 
OK, if you’re at a place where you’re only an hour and a half away in orbit before 
you can drop back in—like you are right now at the space station—it’s not such a 
critical thing, provided you have on-demand reentry. You’re not going to have that 
on the Moon. So, yeah, you will have to have physicians out there, no question 
about it. The question is, what other skills should they have? And if I had to pick 
two, I would say emergency room experience and dentistry. The other surgical 
disciplines can be actually done through telesupport from the ground, as long 
as the individual on the expedition has basic surgery skills, as most ER types 
have. You can go on from there with all the other skills as well. My estimates for 
a sustainable lunar base exploratory mission run from 12 to 18 individuals, not 
unlike the minimum critical mass we currently use on deep caving expeditions.
CHRIS MCKAY: Isn’t that something—you go to Mars so you can visit the 
dentist. That’s why we need to send humans. Robots don’t need dentists. We 
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have a question here, and then we’ll get to Steve. If you can pass the mike to Steve 
Squyres. A question here?
QUESTION: This is for Doctor Stone. Scott McGuinness, submariner, a student 
here [at the Naval Postgraduate School]. Doctor Stone, as a diver, I was looking 
at your videos, and you go deep into these caves, and you dive. U.S. Navy tables 
and the Haldanean model don’t take that into consideration. So, my question 
is, how did you mitigate the risk of decompression illness (DCI), and how can 
that compare to the risk of radiation and all that for astronauts going to Mars? 
It seems like one of NASA’s larger problems is how do we mitigate the radiation 
hazards of deep space. 
BILL STONE: Decompression is not a big issue for lunar and Mars missions, at 
least from my standpoint. Mike Gernhardt and I could probably debate this for 
another 8 to 10 hours. The answer to your question is, those life support devices 
that you saw there had triple parallel redundant decompression engines running 
in real time—that is, the algorithms were running in parallel on three separate 
processors at the same time, such that you were guaranteed a valid tissue tension 
even if two of the three processors shut down during a mission. The algorithms 
were written in accordance with what we had known to be conservative, and we 
drew a line that was about 15 percent more conservative above that. It took into 
account real-time oxygen concentration and then fed that through a head-up 
display. What that meant in terms of an operational situation is that when a 
yellow light would come on while you were in the middle of a dive, it would mean 
that you had to be considering what your decompression scenario was going to 
be like when you started to come back up. When we got to those stages, we would 
automatically boost the oxygen concentration, such that we were far in excess 
of what would be required for a conservative decompression, yet below central 
nervous system (CNS) toxicity limits. We have never had a bends hit on any of 
those deep caving projects, even though we’re diving at altitude. All of those 
PLSS units have triplex digital depth sensors that are also sensing atmospheric 
pressure at the altitude at which we were diving. That was all really taken care of 
pretty conservatively. 
As far as I understand it, and I don’t profess to be an expert at this, the 
issue of space radiation is really one of shielding and stochastic analysis of what 
the radiation environments are. You don’t want to be out there on the 11-year 
cycle at solar max. If I remember correctly, there were some analyses of deep space 
radiation loading that were done in the ’70s that indicate—and I can’t remember a 
speciﬁ c citation, maybe Jim knows—that between two of the Apollo ﬂ ights there 
was a solar anomaly of sufﬁ cient magnitude that if you had been ﬂ ying to the 
Moon during that time, there may have been some serious exposure issues. To 
me, dealing with deep space radiation exposure is actually something you can 
mitigate through a series of water barriers and things like that. I believe it’s 10 
centimeters of water that is sufﬁ cient to stop most of that. If you check through 
the right areas and within NASA, and probably JSC [Johnson Space Center] has 
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people in this, you’ll ﬁ nd the answers to those questions. They’ve been looked at 
thoroughly. I don’t consider that anything more than an engineering problem. 
CHRIS MCKAY: Steve Squyres. Introduce yourself. 
QUESTION: Steve Squyres, Cornell University. I want to return brieﬂ y to an 
issue that was raised earlier about how small organizations seem to be able to 
sometimes accomplish more. If you look at what somebody like Ed Viesturs does 
or what Bill Stone does, or if you look at a group like Burt Rutan and what they 
are accomplishing there, it’s easy to look at an organization like that and say, “Boy, 
they’re lean, they’re compact, they’re able to get the job done.” You then look at 
larger government agencies and you sense a difﬁ culty there. But I think there is 
a wonderful counterexample. The wonderful counterexample was what Jim Lovell 
talked about this morning. It was Apollo. 
You look at Apollo, and you look at Gemini, and you look at Mercury, 
you look at what was accomplished in those days, and it [NASA] was a huge 
organization. It was in some ways bigger than the NASA of today. Yet, they got 
things done. 
When I look at that, what strikes me is that there was a common thread 
through those organizations, and that is that they knew exactly what it was 
they were trying to do. The level-one requirement for Apollo was stated in one 
sentence by the President. When Ed goes up a mountain, he knows what his 
level-one requirements are. It is very, very clearly stated. If you have a common 
goal that is clearly understood by everybody in your organization, I don’t think it 
matters how big the organization is. 
CHRIS MCKAY: Good point, Steve. We have ﬁ ve minutes left. We have time for 
two questions.
EUGENE RODDENBERRY: Hi. My name is Eugene Roddenberry. My father 
actually created Star Trek and, working in the industry, I have met a lot of 
people who have been inspired by the show. It’s completely different to work 
in entertainment, but the people who have been inspired have inspired me to 
look around the world and meet individuals like yourselves. I think you guys 
have shown that humanity is able to overcome adversities. And the fact that that 
inspires other scientists and other people in the ﬁ eld to reach for the stars or 
down to the depths of the ocean—I think it goes beyond that. You guys inspire 
fans who have disabilities to overcome those disabilities, people who are in 
relationships, people who have everyday risks that they need to take. I think 
the fact that they see that humanity can take these huge leaps—these steps 
beyond—is important. It is very impressive. I just wanted to say thank you to 
everyone. It’s very exciting. 
CHRIS MCKAY: Thanks for your comments. The next time you send a message 
to your Dad, thank him for me. I was one of those Trekkies that got inspired 
to seek out new worlds and all that stuff from watching the show. It’s the only 
television I watched. Larry?
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LARRY LEMKE: Larry Lemke, NASA Ames. I would like to actually follow up 
on Steve’s comment, and some others on this whole question of how do you 
take the lesson from small-scale exploration and put it into a bigger context. 
I agree with Steve. I actually don’t think that size of the organization per se is 
the issue. If you look at the participants on the panel, one of the sort of obvious 
characteristics that they share is that, not only do they plan the expeditions, 
they do the expeditions. I am reminded of that comment that there’s nothing 
like the prospect of being hanged in the morning to concentrate your efforts. If 
you look at the way NASA typically plans a large human exploration project, it is 
sort of notable that the people who are making the decisions very often do not 
really have to experience the personal consequences of those decisions. I think if 
that were to change, then the results might change as well. 
CHRIS MCKAY: So, you’re saying we should send a NASA administrator to Mars? 
Is that a way of interpreting what you said? 
LARRY LEMKE: Or have the NASA administrator to actually design the vehicle. 
Get the opportunity to ﬂ y in what you design. 
CHRIS MCKAY: We actually have a few more minutes. 
QUESTION: Bruce McCandless, two Shuttle ﬂ ights [astronaut]. We get back to 
the human versus robot trade-off. Currently, when you are looking at a Mars 
mission, you’re looking at speed of light transit times, round trip up to 40 minutes. 
So, obviously, it’s gonna be hours when you get out to the vicinity of Jupiter 
and Saturn. The thing that seems to be missing is the reﬁ ned decision-making 
ability, the ability to adapt to unforeseen situations, to recognize something that 
you haven’t been programmed to recognize. I assume that, eventually, computer 
science will advance to the point where we can send androids. I wonder if anyone 
would like to comment on the speed of light transit time as a factor in trading 
off between humans and robots. 
CHRIS MCKAY: That’s a good point. Maybe I ought to add to that question, how 
will that inﬂ uence the autonomy of an expedition on Mars versus the autonomy 
of, say, a Shuttle or a station where there is virtually no delay—see them as being 
more autonomous or not. Does anybody want to approach that? Penny? Dale? 
PENNY BOSTON: Yes. I think that it’s a return to some of this historical 
stuff that Jack Stuster was talking about this morning: the fact that those 
expeditions, before there was the kind of instantaneous communication that 
we all have, were able to operate and do what they needed to do. We seem to 
somehow believe now that we cannot do that any more. I think that a different 
kind of planning within NASA perhaps will be necessary to take us back to 
some elements of that kind of self-contained expedition.     ■
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John Chatterton spent more than twenty years working as a commercial diver and as a boat captain. 
His passion, however, has been researching and diving shipwrecks. In 1991, his discovery, and then 
subsequent identiﬁ cation of the German submarine U-869, in 230 feet of salt water (fsw) off the coast of 
New Jersey has been the subject of several television documentaries and now a bestselling book by Robert 
Kurson, Shadow Divers. His diving credits include more than 150 dives to the passenger liner Andrea 
Doria (250 fsw), the ﬁ rst trimix-breathing expedition to the RMS Lusitania in Ireland (300 fsw), and the ﬁ rst 
rebreather dive to the HMHS Britannic in Greece (400 fsw). John has worked on numerous projects for 
television and is currently hosting the television series, Deep Sea Detectives, on the History Channel.
John Chatterton
Professional Diver
I have a fantastic job working for the History Channel. I travel around 
the world, I get to talk to some very interesting people, I get to talk about history, and I get 
to dive shipwrecks. This winter, I think I am going to be in France, Scotland, Croatia, the 
Dominican Republic, and the South Paciﬁ c. And when I’m not addressing an audience full 
of astronauts, I say I have the best job in the world. 
Prior to my working for television, I spent more than 20 years working as a commercial 
diver, largely in and around New York City, where I worked on everything from nuclear 
reactors to bridges to pipelines—wherever the work was. That was my day job. Before I even 
got involved in commercial diving, I was diving shipwrecks for recreation. I was attracted by 
the history, and I was attracted by the challenge that wreck diving afforded me.  
There is a big difference between commercial diving and scuba diving. In commercial 
diving, the diver is a cog in the machine. He is part of a bigger team. When it comes to 
scuba diving, you are everything. You are your own dive planner and your own dive support. 
You are your own dive rescue. There is a certain freedom, and, of course, that’s linked with 
responsibility. Eventually, as I acquired more and more experience, I started diving deeper and 
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98
more challenging wrecks. I found myself going deep inside wrecks like the Andrea 
Doria. The goal of these dives was just to go where other men had not yet been. 
In 1991, Captain Bill Nagle got a set of coordinates from a ﬁ sherman 60 
miles off the New Jersey coast in what we were told was about 200 feet of water. 
We put together a trip to the site, we went out there, and what we found was a 
wreck in 230 feet of water. It was a submarine, later identiﬁ ed as the German 
U-boat U-869. It was a submarine that no one was aware of, where it was, or 
that it existed. No government, no navy, no historian, no expert could tell us 
which submarine this was. What an irresistible mystery. It afforded the divers 
who discovered it the opportunity to rewrite a page of history. We thought at the 
time that it was going to be a matter of a day or two—on the next dive we would 
be identifying this submarine. Of course, that didn’t happen. It took six years to 
positively identify it. 
In retrospect, looking at our plan, we broke it down into three divisions: 
economics, operations, and psychology. Economically, we had no ﬁ nancial 
assistance. We had no support. We had no budget. Essentially, I was going to 
have to do it on my lunch money. That meant that we were going to dive the 
wreck to try and identify it the way we had been diving it—as scuba divers. It’s a 
minimalist approach, and it is extremely risky. It’s dangerous. Operationally, what 
was our plan? Well, there were certain legalities that needed to be addressed, 
dealing with the German government. We then had to do research. Of course, 
research is what fueled our dive plan. What was there on the wreck site that we 
could recover that would positively identify the wreck? 
The teamwork that we used was indirect. In other words, we would work 
with one another on research, we would work with one another on planning and 
coordinating, and that kind of thing. However, you can see that in an environment 
like this one, to put two or three divers in there is counterproductive to making 
the dive safer. Because of the silt, because of the very tight spaces in there, and 
because of the entanglements, you couldn’t get in there with more than one 
person at a time. Speciﬁ cally, the risks that we were facing relative to the diving 
were decompression sickness, the possibility of oxygen toxicity, and equipment 
malfunctions or failures.  When we started diving the wreck, we were diving it on 
air, and we quickly converted to tri-mix with nitrox and oxygen decompression. 
We had to use redundant systems for primary systems. We also had to be very 
conscious of health problems. If you faint out in front of this building, they are 
going to call an ambulance, and they are going to come and get you and take you 
over to the hospital. If you have a medical problem deep on a wreck, you’re going 
to have a difﬁ cult time surviving. 
On the wreck itself, it’s dark. There are entanglements everywhere. You can 
see there are hanging wires and that sort of thing. There are ﬁ shing nets. There 
is also the possibility of entrapment, of a loose piece of wreckage collapsing onto 
the diver. That happened to at least two divers, me being one of them. I’m the only 
one that survived. You can get lost, either inside the wreck or outside the wreck. 
OPENING PHOTO: 
Inside the Aquarius research habitat, 
a curious astronaut, Clayton C. Anderson, 
smiles as he is greeted by an equally 
curious school of marine ﬁ sh peering 
through the habitat viewing port in waters 
off the Florida Keys.  
(NASA Image # JSC-2003-E-45587)
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And, then, there’s the possibility of panic. The thing that panic does in a 
very stressful situation is, all of a sudden, your decisions and your actions are not 
logical. They are not in your own best interest. My goal in this dive was to ﬁ nd 
a small pad on those hatches at 12 o’clock, which we knew existed. The problem 
was [that] it was made from white metal that completely [had] corroded away. 
Psychologically, this is an extremely intimidating environment. Aside from 
the fact that 58 German sailors lost their lives inside this submarine, a total of 
three divers lost their lives diving the wreck while I was working there.  
So, you have changing conditions. You are diving by yourself. You also have 
to consider how obsessed you are, how driven you are. Is this affecting your good 
judgment? We talked about this yesterday on the panel: when do you abort the 
mission? You have to be able to do that while you still can. 
Six years later, I brought out a tag that positively identiﬁ ed the wreck as U-
869. The CBS program NOVA did a two-hour documentary on it. The people that 
I worked with on that documentary later introduced me to the History Channel 
where I now work. Robert Kurson saw the documentary and wrote the book 
Shadow Divers: The True Adventure of Two Americans Who Risked Everything to 
Solve One of the Last Mysteries of World War II. Now Twentieth Century Fox has 
bought the rights to the book, and Bill Boyles, the man who wrote the screenplay 
for Apollo 13, is working on the screenplay as we speak. 
Why go through all this? My ex-wife used to ask me that all the time. And 
I didn’t have a snappy answer like George Mallory. It has to do with challenge. It 
has to do with perseverance. It has to do with who we are, not just as individuals, 
but, really, as a culture. Exploration is very much who we are, and we really have 
two choices. We either continue on a path of exploration, or we just quit. Not 
everybody is comfortable with quitting. Certainly explorers aren’t. As an added 
beneﬁ t, I am going to close with this letter. I get letters like this occasionally. This 
one came last Friday. 
“My name is Anka Hartung. My grandfather was Mr. Eric Poltey. He was 
the machinist [obergefreiter] on the submarine U-boat 869. As fate might have 
it, my family and I saw by chance your ﬁ lm about the submarine U-869. We are 
totally moved that we now ﬁ nally know where our grandfather lies. You and your 
“ ”
WHY GO THROUGH ALL THIS? MY EX-WIFE USED TO ASK ME THAT ALL THE 
TIME. AND I DIDN’T HAVE A SNAPPY ANSWER LIKE GEORGE MALLORY. IT HAS 
TO DO WITH CHALLENGE. IT HAS TO DO WITH PERSEVERANCE. IT HAS TO DO 
WITH WHO WE ARE, NOT JUST AS INDIVIDUALS, BUT, REALLY, AS A CULTURE. 
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team have done an awful lot for the families of the lost men. Three people died 
and you yourself have often risked your life in order to bring certainty and peace 
into our lives. My grandmother is unfortunately no longer alive to share these 
feelings with us. You and your team have done so very much for Eric Poltey’s 
relatives, and we sincerely thank you from the bottom of our hearts.”      ■
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Thanks to all you explorers out there for coming to talk 
about the wet part of the universe. This conference, of course, is dedicated to the concept 
of risk. And maybe there’s an underlying message about why expose real live human beings 
to certain obvious dangers when you could—and maybe should—send a machine? Well, 
I love machines. I mean, I have had a hand in building quite a lot of them, developing and 
using hundreds of variations on the theme of little machines that operate remotely, as well 
as those that take a few real, live people inside. And when a job is right, I do believe that it’s 
obvious—you know, pick up a robot, send it, and enjoy it, such as when you’re exploring 
deep under the ice in the Antarctic or in the high Arctic. Send a robot ﬁ rst to check out 
what’s down there, before you go look for yourself up close and personal. I whole-heartedly 
endorse the concept of using whatever tool does the job, but I think I share with maybe 
everybody in this room the belief that there’s nothing like being there, right? If you can 
actually get there, why not? 
But what about the risk? I’m asked about that quite a lot. You know, why do you do the 
things that you do? Aren’t you scared? Aren’t you concerned? I mean, you have a family; don’t 
Deep Ocean Exploration
Sylvia Earle is an oceanographer, marine botanist, ecologist, and writer. A pioneering aquanaut and 
marine explorer, Earle made her ﬁ rst scuba dive at age 17. She has since set the women’s depth record 
for solo diving (1,000 meters/3,281 feet) and logged more than 6,000 diving hours—feats that garnered 
her the moniker “Her Deepness.” The author of ﬁ ve books and numerous scientiﬁ c and popular articles, 
Earle tirelessly calls for the preservation and exploration of the world’s marine ecosystems.
Sylvia Earle
Founder and Chair, Deep Ocean Exploration and Research, Inc.
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they object to the idea of you going down underwater? It’s dangerous! My answer 
is usually the same. The most dangerous thing I do almost every day of my life is to 
get into an automobile, get on the highway, and move along at reasonably moderate 
speed, and I face trafﬁ c coming the other direction, and the only thing that keeps 
me from banging into that trafﬁ c is a painted line down the middle of the road and 
a mutual desire—I hope it’s mutual—to live. That’s really dangerous. 
I think about explorers of the past and what they would think of this 
conference. I mean, we are so obsessed with safety these days, so obsessed with 
risk. Can you imagine what OSHA would say about Christopher Columbus, 
or about the Challenger [oceanographic] expedition in 1872 as they made their 
preparations to go for four years around the world, going places where nobody 
had been, exploring deep parts of the ocean? Imagine what they would say about 
William Beebe with his little bathysphere and Otis Barton, the engineer [who 
created the bathysphere]. And if you’ve seen any of the ﬁ lms—and I have—of 
their operations, anybody associated with OSHA would have heart attacks just 
watching. No hardhats! No hard shoes, running around barefoot on the deck with 
this heavy equipment being slung around. Who would have insured Beebe or 
his machine back in the 1930s? There’s something that’s happening to us as a 
species as we become risk-averse. 
But I share with Anne Morrow Lindbergh some thoughts about risk. She 
and her husband Charles paved the way for the ﬁ rst ﬂ ights across the North Pole, 
looking for ways to establish new commercial air ﬂ ight routes back in the 1930s. 
And when asked by a reporter as they set off for their ﬁ rst ﬂ ight across the North 
Pole—north to the Orient—the reporter asked her, “Can’t you even say that you 
think it’s an especially dangerous trip?” And she said, “I’m sorry, I really don’t 
have anything to say. After all, we want to go. What more is there to say?” And 
that’s it. You know, as explorers, like little kids, we want to know what’s around 
the next corner, what’s under the next rock, what’s over the next horizon, what’s 
in the deep, what’s beyond the next star—or starﬁ sh. 
Danger is the silent partner of exploration, no doubt about it. But just try 
to avoid risk in everything you do.  I have a home in Florida—that’s risky! I have a 
home here in California—think of the earthquakes—that’s pretty risky. I live in this 
day and age. I walk in the streets of Washington, DC at night! That’s really risky. 
When it comes to the ocean, I want to go. I want to have access, not just 
to the highest reaches of this planet. In fact, since the ﬁ rst ascent to the top of 
Mount Everest half a century ago, more than 2,000 people have been to the top of 
Mount Everest—literally the top of the world. It will soon be half a century since 
the ﬁ rst successful trip to the deepest part of the ocean. That was the Everest of 
the ocean, 11 kilometers down—7 miles—the bottom of the Marianas Trench, 
not too far from the coast of the Philippines. That was nine years before the ﬁ rst 
footprints were on the Moon—1960 when that took place—13 years after Thor 
Heyerdahl’s expedition across the Paciﬁ c with a balsa wood raft. Again, OSHA 
would not have approved. At a depth of seven miles, two men looked out of the 
port of the little machine, the bathyscaphe Trieste, at a depth of seven miles and 
OPENING PHOTO: 
Dr. Sylvia Earle prepares to dive in a JIM 
suit.  (Image ID: nur07563, OAR/National 
Undersea Research Program (NURP))
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a pressure of 16,000 pounds per square inch, in that eternal darkness of the deep 
sea, except for bioluminescent creatures, which are virtually everywhere in the 
ocean. They saw eyes looking back. It was a ﬂ ounder-like ﬁ sh. And everybody 
joked, of course, it had to be a ﬂ ounder-like ﬁ sh, a ﬂ at ﬁ sh, with 16,000 pounds 
of pressure per square inch. 
But there you are. For about half an hour, almost half a century ago, they 
had a glimpse of the deepest part of the ocean. Nobody’s been back since. How 
can this be? Presently there are four vehicles that exist that can take people to 
just over half the ocean’s depth—the two Russian Mir subs, the French Nautile, 
the Japanese Shinkai 6500. The Japanese tethered robot Kaiko did get some 
observations a few times in the deepest part of the sea in the last decade, but it 
was lost at sea last year. They conﬁ rmed, however, the existence of abundant and 
diverse life at the deepest part of the sea, and soon, Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution will have, with support from our taxpayer funds, a tethered robot that 
will, again, go to the deepest sea. But it will take a few years. China is building 
a 7,000-meter manned sub, and the United States is getting back into the deep 
sub game when that workhorse of all subs, the Alvin, will be replaced in the next 
few years with a 6,500-meter sub. 
Well, I say, why only 6,500, why 7,000 meters when we’re looking at an 
ocean that is 11,000 meters deep? I want to go to the deepest part of the ocean. I 
mean, who doesn’t? Why wouldn’t you want to go? But I’m told, you know, we’ve 
got access with a 6,500-meter or even a 7,000-meter sub to about 98 percent of 
the ocean. So, it’s only 2 percent, why worry about that? Well, it’s 2 percent—it’s 
an area about the size of the United States and an area about the size of Australia 
or China, and we’ll just write that off. And it’s a unique high-pressure realm. 
Remember, 16,000 pounds per square inch of pressure. Where else on the planet 
are you going to ﬁ nd forms of life that can survive in a realm like that? It’s a place 
where basic ocean processes are taking place as well, the bottom of the deep 
trenches where the crust of the ocean is diving under the continental plates. 
Well, I’ve conveyed my concerns about the powers that be that are stopping 
at 6,500 to 7,000 meters. I say, “Lewis and Clark didn’t stop at the Rockies and 
say, ‘That’s good enough. Why bother going all the way to the coast?’ Sir Edmund 
“ ”
YOU KNOW, AS EXPLORERS, LIKE LITTLE KIDS, WE WANT TO KNOW WHAT’S 
AROUND THE NEXT CORNER, WHAT’S UNDER THE NEXT ROCK, WHAT’S OVER 
THE NEXT HORIZON, WHAT’S IN THE DEEP, WHAT’S BEYOND THE NEXT STAR—OR 
STARFISH. DANGER IS THE SILENT PARTNER OF EXPLORATION . . .
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Hillary and Norgay Tenzing didn’t stop 98 percent of the way up to the top of 
Mount Everest, and we didn’t travel 98 percent of the way to the Moon and turn 
around and say, “That’s good enough.” Or to Mars. You know, we actually have 
sent probes and landed on Mars, and someday we will get back to the deepest 
part of the sea. And, frankly, I don’t know what’s stopping us. Unless there’s a 
certain resistance called risk. 
I, like Anne Lindbergh, like many of you here, I suppose, really do want 
to go. And here’s the thing. I’m far more concerned about not taking the risks 
involved with exploration than risks that are involved with doing what we are 
doing. I mean, suppose we just get ultrasafe and stay in bed—that’s risky too. 
As an ocean scientist, as chief scientist of NOAA back in the early ’90s, they 
started calling me the “Sturgeon General” because I expressed concern about 
what was happening to the planet. This is, after all, our life support system. 
And, as any astronaut will tell you, you learn everything you can about your 
life support system, and then you do everything you can to take care of your 
life support system. And we haven’t learned a great deal yet about our own life 
support system. This blue planet—less than 5 percent of the ocean has been 
seen, let alone explored. And I don’t think the risks are really worth talking about 
when you consider the gains and the risks of not taking whatever modest risks 
there are out there. 
I am concerned about the health of this planet—our life support system—
starting with the Earth’s blue heart, the ocean. I think of the ocean as the engine 
that drives climate and weather, regulates temperature, generates most of the 
oxygen, and absorbs much of the carbon dioxide. 
It’s home for 97 percent of life on Earth, and 
that’s not surprising considering that that’s where 
97 percent of the water on Earth is. As Chris 
McKay—one of my great heroes—says, “Water is 
the single non-negotiable thing that life requires.” 
Huh! There it is. 
In the past half century, we’ve learned more 
about the ocean than during all preceding human 
history, but it’s not good enough—there’s so much 
more that we need to know. And, at the same time 
that we’ve learned more, we’ve lost more. In the 
last half century—the last half century!—90 
percent of the big ﬁ sh in the ocean have been 
extracted. Ninety percent! Think of it. Half the 
coral reefs are either gone or they’re in really a 
sharp state of decline. Kelp forests from Tasmania 
to Alaska are not in the same good health that 
they were 50 years ago. They, too, are in a state of decline. I hope you enjoyed 
that tasty bit of halibut that you had last night—those of you who consumed 
Exploring in the deep with a JIM suit.  (Image ID: nur07562, National Under-
search Research Program (NURP) Collection Photographer: W. Busch)
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it—because they’re among the big ﬁ sh—along with tuna, sharks, swordﬁ sh, 
grouper, snapper, California rockﬁ sh—that have plummeted in my lifetime, in 
your lifetime, because we are so good at extracting things from our life support 
system before we even understand how it works. 
So think about what the risks will be of not taking the relatively small risks 
involved in exploration today. The chemistry of the planet is changing. What does 
that mean to the little critters that are out there? Especially the microbes that 
really dominate the way this planet works? Won’t take much to set off a whole 
new suite of events based on the changes in chemistry that are taking place now. 
Our security as a species is at risk for our reluctance at not taking the relatively 
small risks involved with what some regard as cutting-edge exploration. As never 
before, we really do have a chance to get out there and make a difference—and 
maybe as never again. I want to show you now something to cause you to dream 
with me about what the potential is. Why aren’t we out there in the ocean? Why 
aren’t there ﬂ eets of little submarines like there are ﬂ eets of aircraft up in the 
sky? There is a little one-person sub called “Deep Worker”, built up in Canada. 
There are, I think, about ﬁ fteen or sixteen of them in operation now around 
the world. For ﬁ ve years as the explorer-in-residence—what a cool title!—at the 
National Geographic Society, I had the chance to engage more than a hundred 
people—scientists, teachers, administrators, paper-pushers, economists—to 
learn how to drive those little subs. They’re so simple to learn how to drive that 
even a scientist can do it.
And we did it, looking at the coastline of the United States, focusing on the 
small but promising counterpart to the national parks on land—marine sanctuaries. 
There are a few. It amounts to less than one percent of our coastal waters, but, 
nonetheless, we’ve made a start toward protecting our life support system 
around this country. By getting into one of these little subs—one atmosphere, no 
decompression—we could go as much as two thousand feet. It’s a start toward the 
ultimate 35,800 feet—the deepest part of the ocean, 7 miles. Why shouldn’t we 
invest in ﬂ eets of little subs that can take anybody who wants to go for whatever 
reason? Whether you want to write poetry or whether you want to write a business 
plan or whether you’re an explorer interested in science, this is the major part of 
our planet. It’s blue! It’s water. And it’s largely still inaccessible. 
“ ”
THIS BLUE PLANET—LESS THAN 5 PERCENT OF THE OCEAN HAS BEEN SEEN, 
LET ALONE EXPLORED. AND I DON’T THINK THE RISKS ARE REALLY WORTH 
TALKING ABOUT WHEN YOU CONSIDER THE GAINS AND THE RISKS OF NOT 
TAKING WHATEVER MODEST RISKS THERE ARE OUT THERE.
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I was among the ﬁ rst in this country, back in the early 1950s, to enjoy 
using one of the ﬁ rst aqualungs that ﬁ rst came into the country. I salute Jacques 
Cousteau almost every day for giving me a passport into the ocean, and I love 
the concept of being able to ﬂ y freely in the sea as a diver. And that’s what these 
little subs do, too. As a diver, all by yourself, people say, “Aren’t you afraid all 
by yourself?” Well, again, what else do we do all by ourselves? I love subs of all 
sorts: 1 person, 2 person, 6 person, 30 person, or passenger subs that take people 
out into the sea at least down to 50 meters or so these days. What is stopping 
us from gaining access to anywhere in the ocean we want to go? Anytime we 
want to go? We need to understand what’s out there, what’s down there. This is 
a moment in time—a crossroads in time—when we know that our life support 
system is in trouble. This part of the solar system is changing, this blue planet, 
this Earth. With all due respect to our goal of going elsewhere in the solar system 
to set up housekeeping—and I love the idea of going to Mars, I’d love to be able 
to go myself and come back—the fact is that, look as far as we might, the Earth is 
the place that, for the foreseeable future, we have got to come to grips with and 
take care of it. That’s really what is at risk: our future.     ■ 
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Ocean Futures
Jean-Michel Cousteau
President, Ocean Futures Society
As an explorer, environmentalist, educator, and ﬁ lm producer for more than four decades, Jean-Michel 
Cousteau has used his vast experiences to communicate to people of all nations and generations his 
love and concern for our water planet. The son of ocean explorer Jacques Cousteau, Jean-Michel 
spent much of his life with his family exploring the world’s oceans aboard Calypso and Alcyone. After 
his parents’ deaths in the 1990s, Jean-Michel founded Ocean Futures Society in 1999 to carry on this 
pioneering work. Responding to his father’s call to “carry forward the ﬂ ame of his faith,” Jean-Michel’s 
Ocean Futures Society, a nonproﬁ t marine conservation and education organization, serves as a “voice 
for the ocean” by fostering a conservation ethic, conducting research, and developing marine education 
programs. Jean-Michel has produced over 70 ﬁ lms and been awarded the Emmy, the Peabody Award, 
the 7 d’Or—the French equivalent of the Emmy, and the Cable Ace Award. 
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great privilege and honor to be here, and very 
humbling, knowing who is here in this audience. And many of you I’ve had the opportunity 
to meet, and I have a lot of respect for what you do. 
The symposium’s invitation states that NASA was created to pioneer the future. I 
will always remember the difﬁ cult times of trying to sell television programs with some of 
the networks in the United States. The people who were putting up millions of dollars were 
asking my father, “So, Captain, what do you expect to ﬁ nd?” And his answer to those people 
who were about to make major commitments was, “If I knew, I wouldn’t go.” 
This extraordinary desire to see what’s on the other side of the hill is what has animated 
all of us. This cannot be done if we do not have a commitment to preserve and protect the 
resources of the present. It is a dream as old as consciousness to explore the stars, so we 
must continue to explore, but with an equal commitment to protect the quality of life on 
Earth, which we are not doing. It will do no good to send people into space or underwater if 
it becomes an escape from intolerable conditions here at home. That being said, as famous 
a pioneer underwater as my father was, and his team, they took risks they didn’t even know 
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existed, compelled by the adventure of what they were seeing for the ﬁ rst time. 
They took those risks because they were inspired by the importance of the 
realm they had entered, just as space explorers were, are now, and will always 
continue to be. Having seen the world underwater, my father then dedicated his 
life to protecting it. He also came to appreciate that everything is connected, and, 
thus, he became concerned about the water systems of the planet, the land, the 
atmosphere, and the quality of life for people. 
I think NASA is in the same position relative to its view of life on Earth 
from space. When my father pushed me overboard at the age of seven, I had a 
tank on my back and, in those days, children did not argue with their parents, 
so I’ve been a scuba diver ever since. Some of my earliest views were formed in 
the middle of the night, when my father would wake me and my brother out of a 
sound sleep to stand on the terrace in our south-of-France home to look at the 
sky, full of stars, planets, and the Moon. We were learning about nature ﬁ rsthand. 
Jacques Cousteau was a dreamer, full of excitement to explore outer space when 
it was only the subject of science ﬁ ction at the time. Fifty-nine years ago, he 
pushed me overboard. 
I think my father and his team were willing to take great risks, risks they 
realized they couldn’t even describe or predict, because ﬁ rst, looking up at the 
stars and then into the oceanic abyss, they knew the greater risk was ignorance. 
This is as true today. Our invitation also asks, “Why are sacriﬁ ces made in the 
name of exploration more notable than the losses incurred in the course of 
everyday life?” I think it is the nature of our species to focus on drama. We don’t 
accept short-term, immediate, dramatic risks, but long-term, slow, less dramatic 
yet more important risks we ignore—i.e., species lost, pollution, and reducing 
the habitability of the planet for life. We get excited about lives lost from short-
term, dramatic events, but are oblivious to thousands of people losing lives from 
the demise of the environmental system that provides them with income, food, 
and a quality of life. 
For example, in the U.S., it is estimated that the amount of oil runoff ﬂ owing 
from urban pavements into the oceans creates the equivalent of an Exxon Valdez
every eight months, as reported by the Pew Ocean Commission. Yet, not a word 
reaches the masses, and even if it did, there would be little outcry. Even the fact 
that six thousand children die every day from lack of access to clear water creates 
OPENING PHOTO: 
The Bahamas viewed from space. 
(NASA Image Number ISS007-E-8916)
“ ”
THE PEOPLE WHO WERE PUTTING UP MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WERE ASKING MY FATHER, 
“SO, CAPTAIN, WHAT DO YOU EXPECT TO FIND?” AND HIS ANSWER TO THOSE PEOPLE WHO 
WERE ABOUT TO MAKE MAJOR COMMITMENTS WAS, “IF I KNEW, I WOULDN’T GO.”
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no outrage. We seem to accept, even ignore, these pernicious risks. I think it is 
the duty of those of us privileged with the ability to explore to point out both the 
dramatic and the mundane, but certainly more signiﬁ cant, events. 
So, how can we look with vision and commitment into the future of space 
travel? I think we have to do it by mounting rearview mirrors on our spacecraft. 
By that, I mean that, while moving farther into space, we simultaneously take 
the opportunity to include equipment that will continue to monitor with greater 
sophistication the state of the Earth. Basically, we cannot fulﬁ ll our dream of 
exploration in outer space or inner space if home base is unlivable. NASA is 
powerfully positioned to create what I call the Global Ocean Network, which at 
our Ocean Futures Society we have started working on in a conceptual phase, 
whereby it would be a way to constantly monitor from space with an array of 
vessel buoys, habited buoys, drifting buoys, whatnot, both bringing the dramatic 
events and long-term trends in the planet’s water system. As Sylvia just said, it 
is our life support system. 
This is nothing new. I have a report right here, given to me a 
few days ago, from a 1971 meeting of my father at NASA Headquarters 
with Dr. Wernher von Braun and NASA ofﬁ cials. My father presented 
the case for a global monitoring system “to monitor the primary 
production of life in the ocean and to monitor the deterioration of life 
in the ocean resulting from human activities and from natural forces…” 
His dream was for NASA to launch satellites to monitor sophisticated 
ocean sensors. Much has been done in this direction, but now it needs 
to be part of every endeavor. We need to take an aggressive marketing 
and public relations approach to selling the future and the risk to the 
public, something we’ve not done well. We need to engage them in 
realistically assessing risk and prioritizing issues. We need to motivate 
and mobilize them to take personal action and political action to 
ensure we have an acceptable future for our children. The future based 
on the direction we are [currently] headed is unacceptable. 
NASA is in an unprecedented position to participate in necessary 
new directions. Infusing future space exploration with stewardship 
of our planet, we will accomplish two things that have to do with 
risk: We will have upped the ante in terms of what we can gain by 
risking human life to further our knowledge, and we will have shown 
our regard for that human life by protecting it in the only place we 
know it to exist. There will always be brave men and women willing 
to risk their lives for exploration in outer space and underwater. We 
need to dignify their courage, and possibly deaths, by making sure we are doing 
everything to protect not only their lives, but the life-giving system of the planet 
through their work as well. 
I’d like to tell you why we take risks. This incredible planet of ours, the 
only one with sufﬁ cient quantities of water that we know of to have the kind of 
sophisticated life like we have, has inspired a lot of people like my dad to pioneer. 
Jacques Cousteau, the French sea researcher, 
in 1973, addressing members of the press on his 
experiences during an Antarctic expedition with 
the oceanographic ship, Calypso. 
(NASA Image # 73-H-164)
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They didn’t know what they really were doing. They were very cautious. And most 
of them, anyway, stayed alive. But it was touch and feel. It was this unbelievable 
curiosity that animated them and opened the ocean world to millions of people. 
In South Africa, I was taught to dive and hang on to the back of the dorsal 
ﬁ n of a 14-foot great white shark. Was I taking risks? Very calculated risks, much 
less than when I cross Fifth Avenue in New York. But in the process, we’re making 
people understand that these animals are part of our system. 
Was I taking risks when I wanted for the ﬁ rst time to go down with a 
ship, sink with a ship, a Russian frigate that was made into a dive site? I always 
wondered, what happened in the minds of those people as they sank with 
their ships, the captains, the people in charge? A few months ago we were in 
the middle of the Paciﬁ c working on an island, Laysan, where nobody lives, and 
ﬁ nding  all our refuse. Fifty-two countries were represented there with probably 
tens of thousands of tons [of refuse] just lying there with ﬁ shing nets and debris. 
We are using our ocean, we’re using our own home, as a garbage can, a universal 
sewer. At some point nature will say, I can’t handle it anymore, and we are getting 
signs of that today. 
I believe that exploration and taking risks is what is going to change 
the face of the planet today. We have new equipment, free breathers, new ﬁ ns 
designed by imitating the ﬂ ip of an Orca, new lights, new submersibles, new 
communication systems which, as Sylvia just rightfully said, will allow us to 
explore not just the ﬁ ve percent we’ve explored, but a hundred percent. And 
that’s what’s going to make us do the right thing. Because how can we protect 
what we don’t understand? 
So this risk we’re taking is for the bettering of the quality of life for the 
human species on the planet. Those sharks we were diving with at 200 feet of 
depth, they don’t care. We do. We want them to stay there just like anything else. 
I will never forget the comparison that my dad made one day when he told 
me, “You know, the planet is like an airplane with wings. Every time you remove 
a rivet you are removing a species. At some point, it may just collapse.” We don’t 
want to go there. 
And the decisions that our brains, that our industries, and political 
representatives anywhere in the world will make will allow us to fulﬁ ll our dream 
and take calculated risks. And that, I believe, is what animates every one of us here. 
I have no job, I have a passion, and I will not retire until I’m switched off.     ■
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Exploration and the 
Risk-Reward Equation
Michael L. Gernhardt, Ph.D.
NASA Astronaut
Deﬁ ning and controlling risk in exploration operations is a 
tough and continuous challenge that requires the application of a range of methods from 
the qualitative to the quantitative, and, ultimately, to be successful, requires consistent 
application of informed good judgment. 
We’ve already heard a lot of very insightful themes from the previous speakers, and you’re 
going to hear some of them again from me, but possibly from a slightly different perspective. 
For my entire adult life I’ve been in relatively risky professions, starting out as a scuba diving 
instructor and boat captain in the Caribbean, where your job is basically to keep people from 
killing themselves, and you see it all, from people who sit on sea urchins and scream and spit 
out their regulator and their false teeth, and then go shooting to the surface, to people who go 
chasing after aggressive tiger sharks. So you learn to expect that anything can happen. 
After that, I worked as a commercial deep-sea diver doing subsea construction in the 
offshore oilﬁ eld, and then, later, as vice president of the world’s largest subsea contractor. 
Currently, I’m an astronaut, and involved in doing high-risk human research for space 
decompression procedures. 
NASA selected Michael Gernhardt as an astronaut in March 1992. His technical assignments have 
included development of nitrox diving to support training for the Hubble Space Telescope repair and a 
variety of Space Station extravehicular activity (EVA) developments; spacecraft communicator (CAPCOM) 
at Mission Control Center, Houston, during various Shuttle missions; and leading an international 
research team in developing a new exercise prebreathe protocol that improved the safety and efﬁ ciency 
of space walks from the International Space Station. Gernhardt presently serves as a member of 
the astronaut ofﬁ ce EVA branch and as principle investigator of the Prebreath Reduction Program 
and manager of Johnson Space Center’s Environmental Physiology Laboratory. A four ﬂ ight veteran, 
Gernhardt has logged over 43 days in space, including 4 spacewalks totaling 23 hours and 16 minutes. 
He was a mission specialist on STS-69 in 1995, STS-83 in 1997, STS-94 in 1997, and STS-104 in 2001. 
Gernhardt is assigned to the crew of STS-119. 
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As a professional, it’s important that you address the risk-reward equation. 
Basically, that equation states that the utility, or the degree of success, is equal 
to the probability of success times the reward, minus the probability of failure 
times the cost. As a professional, if you don’t balance this equation properly and 
end up most of the time with a really large, positive number, you’re either not 
going to live very long, or, if you’re in business and you’re killing your people, 
you’re not going to stay in business very long. 
Commercial diving is potentially a very dangerous business, but, in fact, 
it’s actually safer than many forms of nonprofessional scuba diving, because we 
understand that it’s risky and we plan for those risks. Some of the nonprofessionals 
tend to focus more on the reward component of this equation. It would be really 
neat to dive on this wreck or really great to go in this cave. And, unfortunately, 
they don’t understand the risk side until it’s too late. 
As individuals involved in these operations, it’s vitally important that you 
understand and accept the risks that you’re getting into. And it’s also important 
that the individuals have direct control of the risks through their own actions. 
Commercial deep-sea diving is potentially very dangerous. Some of the 
work that we do includes very complicated construction tasks that would 
be dangerous on dry land. An example is a hyperbaric welding job, where, in 
order to do code-quality structural repairs of offshore platforms, we actually 
have to weld in a dry environment, because in wet welding, the water quenches 
the weld so fast you get hydrogen embrittlement. So we have to design these 
multipiece habitats that we have to install around the tubular truss structure of 
the platform, install seals, dewater the habitat, and then go inside and weld in a 
dry environment. 
These are challenging operations at very high forces. A lot of time you’re 
working in current conditions, at close to maximum aerobic capacity.  These 
operations would be dangerous on dry land, but we do them at depths of up to 
1,000 feet, under extreme physiological stresses, working in a dynamic, harsh 
environment that is capable of radical changes over short time periods. And 
many times, you’re working in limited or zero visibility on the muddy bottom. 
And, so, you’ve got to realize that that’s risky, and plan and address those risks. 
In my mind, I divide risk into two categories. There’s what I would call the 
corporate or programmatically controlled risk, and these risks relate primarily to 
the design of the equipment, the degrees of redundancy, the reliability, things of 
that nature. An example is a saturation, helium-oxygen saturation, diving system. 
And if you’re not familiar with saturation diving, we use this method to increase the 
efﬁ ciency of the amount of bottom time we get for the amount of decompression 
time. If we were to work at 500 feet for 30 minutes, it would take over 24 hours to 
decompress. Once you stay on the bottom 24 hours or longer, the partial pressure 
of inert gas in your inspired breathing mixture comes to equilibrium with the 
tension of gas dissolved in your blood and tissues. Then your blood and tissues 
will not uptake any more inert gas, and it will take 5 days to decompress, whether 
you stay on the bottom for another minute or another month.
OPENING PHOTO: 
Equipped with SCUBA gear in waters 
off the Florida Keys, the NEEMO 5 crew 
members congregate near the viewing 
port of the Aquarius research habitat. 
(NASA Image # JSC-2003-E-45591)
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So, we actually live in these pressurized habitats on the deck of the vessel, 
breathing a helium-oxygen mixture. At 1,000 feet it’s less than one percent 
oxygen. Then we transfer under pressure into a diving bell, we make a seal on 
the bell, the bell is deployed overboard, and acts as an elevator to transport the 
diver to the subsea worksite. Then we lock out of the bell, do eight hours work, 
reenter the bell, and make a seal-return to the surface under pressure where we 
transfer into the living chamber on the deck of the vessel or platform. With a 
six-person crew, we do 24-hour-a-day operations. That results in about 20 hours 
of working bottom time per 24 hour-day. We spend a month under pressure, so 
the working-time to decompression-time ratio is about ﬁ ve, compared to the 
surface diving position where you’re less than point one. 
This is a very efﬁ cient form of diving; it’s very challenging with respect 
to the life support systems. Minor changes in the oxygen percentage can mean 
the difference between hypoxia and acute oxygen toxicity. Same kinds of limits 
on the carbon dioxide. Temperature and humidity are very sensitive at these 
extreme pressures and gas densities. A temperature swing of a few degrees, a few 
percentage points of relative humidity change, is the difference between comfort 
and discomfort. And larger swings than that are life and death. 
On top of that, we’re locking out, we’re working in an oilﬁ eld environment, 
where you can bring trace contaminants back into the habitat. So all this has 
to be accounted for ahead of time, and controlled, and if you do a good job at 
the corporate level, the equipment and procedures are safe, and you’re happy 
to go use it. On one of our diving support vessels, we actually have a 16-person 
saturation habitat built in below decks. It’s very much like a space station, with 
living quarters and node. There’s a thing called a moon pool, we deploy the 
bell through the bottom of the vessel. So we do all kinds of very challenging 
operations, including some very unique decompression procedures. 
I had the opportunity to work with a man named C. J. Lambertsen, who 
actually invented the oxygen rebreather, and is considered the founder of the 
Underwater Demolition Team (UDT). He actually worked for the OSS in World 
War II, and he was the medical director of the company I worked for, and I 
worked closely with him for almost 25 years now. Very wise guy, very smart, very 
intellectual, very good operator. And his attitude was always, what do we have to 
do? Now, how do we do it safely? And that’s the right question to ask. 
The other question is, what can we do safely? And if you ask that question, 
you don’t have the focus. I mean, there are a lot of things you can do safely. You 
can watch television, you can go bowling. Oops, no, you might hurt your back. So 
you see where that’s going. So it’s important to deﬁ ne what you want to do. Then 
you have clear focus, and you can address the risk and do it safely. If you don’t 
have a clear vision of what you are attempting to do, then its difﬁ cult to analyze 
and control the risks, and, ultimately, you can end up being less safe, even though 
you start with a more conservative attitude.
The other form of risk that I categorize is what I call the individual or 
team-controlled risk. And even though the company might provide you with 
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safe diving equipment and methods, we’re doing heavy-duty construction in a 
dynamic environment, and there are all sorts of risks that are directly in the 
control of the diver on the end of the hose and the topside team supporting 
him. One example is a platform repair we did off Peru. The platform was falling 
down, and we had to burn off the old parts of the platform, and then install 
these clamps and braces and, basically, rebuild the entire platform underwater. 
A lot of times, we’re working in two or three knot currents with heavy surge 
conditions. In order to rig the repair braces and install them underwater, you’ve 
got, sometimes, two crane lines and four air tugger lines that you have to direct 
in order to transfer the multiton brace into position at the underwater worksite. 
You’re down there in these heavy currents and surge with limited visibility and 
your life support umbilical [is] potentially in the middle of all of these crane and 
air tugger lines, and if don’t have good situational awareness, you can get your 
umbilical hose, hand, or arm in the middle of the trajectory of these swinging 
ﬂ anges and lose your arm, or your ﬁ ngers, or cut your umbilical hose. And, so, 
you have direct control over these risks. 
I don’t know how NASA’s safety would quantify this kind of operation. We 
typically approve things by testing or analysis. I don’t know what you test here, 
because every circumstance is different, impossible to quantify, and, generally, 
unrepeatable. And, so, these risks are very much in your control, and your skill, 
and the supervisor’s assessment of your capabilities, is the only level of control 
of these risks, along with very good planning and teamwork.
One of the observations that I’ve made is that to do this kind of stuff 
safely, you have to have the right attitude, you have to plan it, and you have to 
work with your team, your topside team, and the people controlling all these 
crane lines, and you have to go in with a good plan, and you have to be conﬁ dent 
and aggressive. 
And the people that I saw getting hurt were the people who had checked 
out a little bit. Their heart really wasn’t into it, and they wouldn’t attack the pre-
dive planning, and then they’d get in and they’d hesitate at the wrong moment, 
or something like that, and they would have the accident. 
And I think the same observation would be true for an organization. If 
you become so risk-averse that you indiscriminately apply your resources 
“ ”
SO IT’S IMPORTANT TO KEEP FOCUSED ON WHAT YOU’RE DOING, 
AND BE CONFIDENT AND AGGRESSIVE, AND UNDERSTAND THE 
RISKS AS BEST YOU CAN AND THEN GO DO IT. 
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to controlling trivial risk, then you don’t have those resources to apply to the 
important risks, and you lose your focus, and you really don’t accomplish that 
much, and, frankly, you’re probably not that much safer. So it’s important to keep 
focused on what you’re doing, and be conﬁ dent and aggressive, and understand 
the risks as best you can and then go do it. 
We heard a lot of interesting and eloquent quotes from explorers, and I 
have to tell you one of my favorite quotes was from my ﬁ rst Shuttle commander, 
a guy named Dave Walker. Dave is no longer with us, but he was a remarkable 
human being and a great team builder. He actually christened our crew as the 
“Dog Crew,” and he gave everybody a dog name. The only condition was you 
couldn’t like your dog name. So, being a rookie and a diver, I was Underdog. His 
call sign was Red Dog. Dave said to me, “You know, Underdog, it’s a ﬁ ne line 
between bleep and bleep hot.” I can’t say it exactly the way he said it. The bleep 
starts with an “S.” Dave had probably known both sides of that line, so he really 
understood that. It is a ﬁ ne line. It is a ﬁ ne line between being a cowboy and 
taking too many risks, and then, on the other side, being so risk averse that you 
don’t get anything done and you’re not as safe as you should be. 
Now, as far as the risk-reward equation and the commercial diving 
industry, we have to be safe or we don’t have a business. It is the right thing to 
do. You don’t calculate that we’re willing to lose this many people or anything 
like that. You do the very best you can to make things safe. You also make them 
cost effective and efﬁ cient. What we have done over the years is, we started out 
with the divers in a hands-on environment. We have slowly evolved the human 
back from the direct operational environment. Instead of divers having to go into 
saturation and incur all these physiological stresses, we had one-atmosphere 
dive suits. That was one step. We then stepped further back from that with the 
introduction of remote operated vehicles [ROVs]. I was in commercial diving in 
the late ’70s and early ’80s when these became widely used. It was pretty comical 
at ﬁ rst, because they were way oversold. The salesman would promise the oil 
companies that you could do all kinds of things. We actually ended up making 
a lot of money as divers rescuing these things when they failed or got fouled up 
on a structure. One of the key things that we learned is that it’s not so much 
the capabilities of the human or the robot; it’s both sides of the interface, which 
includes how you design the tasks to be compatible with the diver or the robot. 
The integration of both sides of this equation results in a work system versus 
just a diving suit or a robot. What we did was work with the oil companies to 
reengineer the subsea equipment so that we could work on it easily with ROVs. 
We ended up actually being able to produce as efﬁ cient work with these ROVs 
today as we could with divers in previous years. An example is what we call 
the bucket. We actually made the task so simple that the only task was to dock 
the ROV into this conical interface. We had different tooling packages inside 
that would do different things, ranging from small and large valve actuations 
to mating electrical and hydraulic connectors, but to the operator, the task was 
always the same, dock the ROV into the bucket. So you try to keep it simple. 
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When you keep things simple, it actually gives you more brain cells to apply to 
situation awareness to know how to stay out of trouble. We have actually evolved 
some of these concepts up to the Space Station, with the microconical interface. 
So, the message here is to keep the task and operation as simple as you can and, 
ultimately, that makes it safer, because you have more reserve capabilities and 
situational awareness to deal with the unexpected. When you plan an operation 
right at the limits of your capabilities, your safety margins go down.
People always ask me, “Was it more dangerous in commercial diving or the 
astronaut business?” I think the answer to that is that in the space business, 
getting to the work site is a lot more dangerous than riding the boat out and 
coming back. But in commercial diving, once you’re at the work site and dealing 
with all these dynamic forces and physiologic stresses, it is probably riskier than 
doing a spacewalk. 
One of the things I think will happen, though, as we evolve to planetary 
exploration is that instead of training for a whole year to do a spacewalk and having 
a whole ground team behind you, we’re going to be doing EVA [Extravehicular 
Activity] every day, with a plan that has been developed, at best, the day before and 
one that is likely to change many times during the course of the EVA. The balance 
of risk is going to shift between the corporately controlled risk on the redundancy 
of the vehicle to the personally controlled risk when you’re doing these EVA 
operations. We need to have people who can make good judgments and good 
decisions in a relatively unstructured and dynamic operational environment. 
I participated in one of the ﬁ rst NEEMO (NASA Extreme Environment 
Mission Operations), which is a program we have going with NOAA [National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]. The underwater habitat they have off 
the Keys is a great analogue. We actually lock out, do coral reef science, and spend 
nine hours a day in the water. They have remote way stations where you reﬁ ll 
your tanks. I have proposed that this is a great analogue to use to parameterize 
that operational space. How far away from the habitat are you? What are your 
consumables? How long will it take you to get back to the habitat, and how much 
air will you consume? You have to make all these real time decisions about when 
to reﬁ ll tanks, when to start and stop working, when to head back to the habitat, 
et cetera. The NOAA team has really tight ﬂ ight rules. If you come back to the 
habitat with less than 500 psi or one second beyond your ﬂ ight plan, you’re 
busted. You’re not going to dive anymore. It really builds good decision-making. 
They have done over 27,000 excursion dives with a perfect safety record. 
The notion would be to parameterize this operational space, and then ask 
yourself the question: If we’re going to work on the Moon and we want to explore 
a 200 kilometer radius, then what life support do we need? How fast do our 
transport vehicles need to go? Where should the way stations be? There is a lot 
that we can learn from land and subsea analogues that we should be applying to 
our mission design well before we set foot on the Moon or Mars.
I am going to transition quickly from subsea to space on the topic of 
decompression. I will also talk about the difference between qualitative and 
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quantitative risk control. We have to decompress in space because we work in 
low-pressure space suits, and we want the pressure to be as low as possible so 
that we have minimal forces and torques across the suits so we can work. We 
actually have to get rid of nitrogen much the same way a diver does. 
On the trials of the Shuttle decompression procedures that we have all used, 
we had 25 percent decompression sickness. You ask yourself, is that acceptable 
or not? It turns out there are some things about altitude DCS (decompression 
sickness) that are much different than diving. If you talk to the divers here, they 
will say you’ve got to have way less than ﬁ ve percent. In commercial diving, we had 
about 0.01 percent. Altitude decompression sickness 
is different, primarily because you pre-breathe the 
oxygen and  undersaturate your brain and spinal cord, 
so we don’t [have] nearly as many serious symptoms 
of DCS that we see in diving. 
When they did the Shuttle ground trials, 
they came up with 25 percent DCS, and they had a 
committee come in and they said, “Well, what do you 
think? Is this safe or not?” You can ﬁ nd anybody to say 
it’s safe or it’s unsafe. It turns out that we have not 
had any decompression sickness in ﬂ ight, probably 
because the ground model was not that accurate. I 
don’t have time to go into all those details, but the 
point is that it was the assessment of acceptable risk 
was very subjective.
When I started the pre-breathing production 
development for the procedure we are now using on 
the Space Station, I took a whole year with a large 
team to deﬁ ne what acceptable risk was. I pulled in 
the Navy and the Air Force, the ﬂ ight directors, who 
are great guys, who are really great at analyzing data 
and making decisions, the ﬂ ight surgeons, and the 
astronaut ofﬁ ce.  When we had the ﬁ rst meeting, I said, “Everybody in this room 
has an opinion about what acceptable DCS risk is. Recognize it is only your 
opinion.” We proceeded over the course of a year to pull in all the data we could, 
analyze the data, and when we extracted the last little bit of information out of 
that, we ﬁ nally made the decisions. 
There was a lot of talk yesterday about staging things. We actually staged 
into this. You couldn’t get a consensus right off the bat as to what acceptable 
DCS risk was, but I took the tack of saying, what’s the highest risk we could have 
and still build the Space Station? We had a policy that if you had Type I DCS on 
an EVA and it resolved, you could go EVA again in 72 hours. This was consistent 
with Navy and Air Force procedures. If you have the second Type I hit on this 
same mission, then you were out. If you had Type II, serious DCS, you were also 
out of the rotation. 
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Astronaut Michael L. Gernhardt, mission specialist, is pictured 
during the 16 September 1995 extravehicular activity (EVA) which 
was conducted in and around Space Shuttle Endeavour’s cargo bay.  
(NASA Image # STS69-714-046)
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We then did a Monte Carlo simulation of the entire Space Station assembly 
and maintenance model, applying this policy and subjecting it to the constraint 
that we be 95 percent conﬁ dent that we would always have two crew members to 
do an EVA. That deﬁ ned the uppermost risk we could have. We then looked at 
other factors and actually ended up picking a level of DCS risk of 15 percent at 
upper 95 percent conﬁ dence level, which, [as it] turns out, is below a threshold 
where there has ever been a report of Type II DCS in our database. We do these 
trials with human subjects. Subject safety is our number one priority. We have 
deﬁ ned very explicitly what the accept conditions are. Even though the research is 
difﬁ cult, it is pretty easy to make a decision, because we have prospectively deﬁ ned 
the acceptable risk criteria. You design the experiment, you do the trial, and, if it 
meets it, you’re great. If it doesn’t, you reject it and test the next protocol.
Some of these quantitative risk deﬁ nitions and control techniques would 
be applicable to other aspects of vehicle and mission safety design. Statistics 
are a good tool, to be used in conjunction with informed good judgment, not a 
replacement for it. It’s a ﬁ ne line that we will have to walk as we move forward 
with the next generation of exploration missions. We will need to understand and 
accept that they are risky, deﬁ ne clearly what we want to do, deﬁ ne and control 
the risks as well as we possibly can, and then go do the mission recognizing that 
we have done everything practical to control the risks, but that we will never 
totally eliminate them.     ■
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to Brea, California, where he studied physics at Fullerton College while working as a machinist and, 
later, a truck driver. The1984 sleeper hit, The Terminator, launched his directorial career. Since that time, 
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in Titanic’s 11 Academy Awards, including Cameron’s three Oscars for Best Picture, Best Direction, and 
Best Editing. In 1995, Cameron made 12 dives to the Titanic in preparation for his feature ﬁ lm. Cameron 
has made a total of 38 dives in the Mir submersibles. His most recent expedition to the hydrothermal 
vents is the subject of the IMAX ﬁ lm, Aliens of the Deep. 
James Cameron 
Writer/Director, Undersea Explorer
I am also honored to be part of this august panel, which includes 
two of my heroes from the undersea world, and some of the people I’m just meeting today. 
We live in an age when the land area of our planet has been explored, mapped, imaged, 
settled, and exploited for whatever it has to offer. It’s deﬁ nitional that what remains to be 
explored are the most remote, inaccessible, and inhospitable parts of our world, or places 
that are not a part of our world at all. This basically means that the easy stuff has been done, 
if you want to consider polar exploration and all the great pioneering work in the ocean the 
easy stuff. The hard stuff is in front of us, and it means we are now confronting even more 
hostile and extreme conditions and requiring more sophisticated technology and support 
systems in order to do our exploration. Correspondingly, we are facing more complex and 
subtle forms of risk than ever before. 
I have lived with risk for my entire professional career as an action ﬁ lm director. I 
regularly asked people, with a completely straight face, to set themselves on ﬁ re, to ﬂ ip their 
car over, to leap out of an exploding building, to ride on top of a tractor-trailer truck that’s 
on its side skidding, to ﬂ y a helicopter underneath an overpass with two feet of clearance on 
either side of the rotor tip, and even to ride a sinking ship down underwater. 
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In twenty years of directing stunts and action and pyrotechnic effects, I’ve 
never actually had a serious injury on the set. That is because of application of 
a fairly rigorous and disciplined process. It is not as institutionalized as it is 
with NASA, but it has its own special rigor. Before any major stunt, or gag as 
we call them, I would walk the set myself, looking at every piece of rigging and 
turning over every possibility in my head. At that moment on a shoot when all 
the lights and the cameras are set up, it is the culmination of months of planning, 
engineering, testing, and rigging. The industry’s leading experts up to that point 
have done it all. (I would just like to point out that the failure of the Genesis 
spacecraft was not due to the Hollywood stunt pilot. Of course, now we know 
that the science has been recovered, so it’s all good.) 
These experts have decades and decades of experience doing stunts, 
explosions, car gags, ﬁ re, and whatever it is that we might be doing. But still, 
even after every single one of these people has signed off, I walk the set. I just 
call a complete hold. I walk the set. I look at the rigging. I ask questions. I think 
about it: What if this happens? What if that happens? Even though we have been 
over it and over it, I call that last minute hold, and I walk the set. I’m looking for 
something which is something that I’ve over the years come to call the x-factor, 
some previously unseen detail or some exotic combination of variables which 
could cause the stunt to go horribly wrong. 
I guess my point here is that the personal touch is critical, and taking 
individual responsibility is critical, for everybody in the chain. Systems protocols 
and institutional checks and balances are important, and they add great robustness 
to risky operations. However, those very checks and balances can often inhibit 
individuals from speaking up or taking action because they make the assumption 
that someone else has approved it. Someone else is going to catch it. Someone 
else has responsibility, and they don’t catch it before it’s too late. 
[When] we made the movie Titanic, we began that production in a very 
unusual way. We actually dove to the wreck site of Titanic twelve times. It’s 
in 12,500 feet of water in the North Atlantic. We set ourselves some pretty 
ambitious goals. We were going to build a new camera system so that we could 
operate a 35mm movie camera outside the submersible, seeing ambient pressure 
at 5,500 psi. We were going to build new lighting equipment. We were even going 
to build our own remotely-operated vehicles so we could explore the Titanic
wreck internally. I had some experience as a project manager developing new 
technology for underwater ﬁ lming on the movie The Abyss, and that prepared me, 
to a certain extent, for the difﬁ culty of engineering this new equipment. Nothing 
prepared me for the chaos introduced when we took that whole circus to sea on 
a research ship. We weathered three hurricanes and multiple equipment failures, 
but we managed to prevail and get the images of the wreck. In that process, I got 
bitten by the deep ocean exploration bug. 
After the success of Titanic, the movie, I found myself less interested 
in Hollywood ﬁ lmmaking and more interested in the challenges of ocean 
photography and exploration. So, over the next few years, we developed new 
OPENING PHOTO: 
Part of the railing from the bow section of 
the Titanic. Courtesy of James Cameron.
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images and robotic exploration technology. Then I had to go out and raise the 
money by making ﬁ lms, in order to pay for it. So we wound up returning to the 
Titanic wreck site in 2001, because I ﬁ gured if I couldn’t raise money to go to the 
Titanic wreck I couldn’t raise money to do anything. We took our spanking new 
3-D digital imaging system to capture the coolest stereo images of the wreck that 
we could before it disintegrates, and we made a ﬁ lm called Ghosts of the Abyss, 
which was for the IMAX 3-D theaters. 
We also created two very tiny and advanced ROVs [Remotely Operated 
Vehicles] which could ﬂ y untethered inside the wreck. They were untethered in 
terms of a power umbilical, but they had a data tether, which was a spool of ﬁ ber 
optic, kind of like a wire-guided torpedo. We were able to explore the wreck, 
room by room and deck by deck. These were launched from the submersibles 
after we landed on the Titanic wreck, and they were ﬂ own inside the wreck by 
myself and two other pilots. With these bots, we were able to capture some pretty 
amazing images inside the wreck in spaces which could never have been seen by 
human eyes and which probably will never be seen directly by human eyes. We 
were able to reveal in the lights and video cameras of these tiny robots a kind of 
lost grandeur of Titanic, which still exists deep inside that wreck. 
For me, that was the greatest adventure imaginable. If I wasn’t hooked 
before, I was certainly hooked then. Of course, all the time I was very cognizant 
of the risks and, as the person heading the team, the expedition leader, so to 
speak, it was my responsibility. The buck stopped with me, so I was continuing 
to apply my lessons learned from my underwater motion picture ﬁ lmmaking 
experience, to this new realm. Of course, we had a lot of problems, and we 
had equipment failures, and we got hit by another three hurricanes. Then the 
September 11th attacks cut short our expedition. It was certainly a bizarre and 
ironic experience to be, literally, down at the bottom of the ocean, at the site 
of the deﬁ ning disaster of the ﬁ rst part of the 20th century, while probably the 
deﬁ ning disaster of the ﬁ rst part of the 21st century was taking place over our 
heads without our knowledge. 
Having made 24 dives at this point by the end of the second expedition 
to explore the Titanic, I am now pretty continuously mindful of the lessons of 
Titanic as I continue with other exploration projects and any projects involving 
“ ”
TITANIC HAS A VALUE AS A KIND OF PARABLE. THE LESSONS 
LEARNED ARE STILL VALUABLE FOR US IN OUR CONTINUING 
EXPLORATION OF THE SEA AND OF SPACE. 
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risk of any kind. The lessons learned from the sinking of Titanic caused sweeping 
reform of the maritime safety code in its time. But in the abstract, Titanic has 
a value as a kind of parable. The lessons learned are still valuable for us in our 
continuing exploration of the sea and of space. 
Titanic was sunk primarily by institutional momentum. Just as the inertia 
of the ship was too great for the crew to be able to turn it in time to avoid hitting 
the iceberg, the inertia of their methodology was at least equally responsible for 
the collision. It was the policy of sea captains at that time to maintain full speed 
until they’d spotted the ice and then slow down only when it became absolutely 
necessary. This was for economic reasons, reasons of straight commerce. This 
was simply how it was done. 
The Titanic’s captain was due to retire after this one last prestigious 
voyage, after a long and unblemished career. He was captaining on the maiden 
voyage of the largest vessel ever created. His lifetime of experience taught him 
that on a crystal clear night, in a ﬂ at calm ocean, he was safe maintaining full 
speed, despite the Marconi-gram sitting in his pocket warning of a huge ice ﬁ eld 
ahead. With a warning to the ofﬁ cer of the watch to be extra vigilant, he went to 
sleep as the ship barreled on toward its fate. Now, was this arrogance or hubris, 
as many have said? I don’t think so, not really. It was simply business as usual. 
These new ships didn’t handle like the previous ones. They took longer to stop 
or to turn. So, everything he knew was actually wrong in that exact circumstance. 
The old operating methods didn’t really apply. The conditions had changed, but 
the methods hadn’t kept up. It also required an unlikely combination of elements 
to create the disaster. It was a typical cascade failure where you had a number of 
things in series, all of which had to happen in that unique combination. The ﬂ at 
calm of the ocean meant that no swells were breaking against the icebergs, which 
reduced the ability of the lookouts to see the icebergs in the dark. The general 
mistake made by the crew was to underestimate the perversity of the ocean, even 
when it seemed at its most benign. 
There are a few interesting parallels between the sinking of the Titanic and the 
loss of the Columbia Space Shuttle and her crew. In both cases, there were unheeded 
“ ”
THERE ARE A FEW INTERESTING PARALLELS BETWEEN THE SINKING OF THE TITANIC AND 
THE LOSS OF THE COLUMBIA SPACE SHUTTLE AND HER CREW. IN BOTH CASES, THERE 
WERE UNHEEDED WARNINGS. IN BOTH CASES, THE WARNINGS WERE DISMISSED, NOT OUT 
OF NEGLIGENCE, BUT FOR REASONS THAT MADE SENSE BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE AND 
INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY AT THAT MOMENT.
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warnings. In both cases, the warnings were dismissed, not out of negligence, but 
for reasons that made sense based on the experience and institutional memory at 
that moment. In the case of Titanic, the crew was well aware, because of wireless 
messages, that the ice lay ahead, but it was because it was the way it was always 
done that they proceeded at full speed toward the ice ﬁ eld. 
With Columbia it was known from many past missions that the foam 
could separate from the external tank and possibly strike the orbiter, but that 
problem had been analyzed twenty years earlier and dismissed as a serious threat 
to mission safety. When foam was observed possibly striking Columbia during 
the launch, some engineers were concerned. But because this was the way we’ve 
always done it, the warnings didn’t propagate up the chain of command with 
enough force to change the outcome. So cultural momentum and institutional 
memory had worked against Columbia just as they had worked against Titanic. 
Another parallel is that in both accidents an unlikely series of events were 
required to cause catastrophe. With Titanic, it was the unlikely event of the very 
ﬁ rst iceberg that they spotted, the very ﬁ rst one out of a huge ﬁ eld of ice, happening 
to be exactly in the track of the ship. This was occurring on a night without the 
slightest swell activity to assist in spotting the berg in time. And all of this was 
happening to a new, large class of ship whose crew was inexperienced in managing 
it in fast turns and sudden stops. With Columbia, it took the foam strike incident, 
but then compounded it by the fact that this was one of the very few missions in 
recent years that did not go to the ISS [International Space Station]. Had it been a 
mission to the Space Station, it is likely that the Station crew would have seen the 
large hole in the leading edge of the wing during the operations. Then the station 
could have provided safe haven for the Columbia crew while everybody scrambled 
to launch a second orbiter to bring them all home safely. 
So the vanishingly small possibility of a foam strike event actually damaging 
a ﬂ ight-critical component was coupled with the statistically low probability of 
a non-ISS mission to create a disastrous outcome. These low-probability, high-
consequence events are the hardest to plan for and prevent, especially when it 
requires a number of low-probability events in combination in order to create 
a threatening scenario. Titanic teaches us to be constantly vigilant, to assume 
nothing about our methodology, to constantly ask the question “What are we 
doing wrong right now?” 
I’ve lived with the lessons of Titanic and they’ve informed my judgment on 
subsequent expedition projects. After our second expedition to Titanic, we looked for 
other projects with more and greater challenges, of course. The following spring we 
imaged the wreck of the Bismarck, which is 16,000 feet down in the North Atlantic. 
Then, we followed that up with stereo imaging at ﬁ ve hydrothermal vent sites along 
the mid-Atlantic ridge. We were pretty excited by the imaging results from that, 
and I decided to make a second IMAX 3-D ﬁ lm about the life surrounding that 
hydrothermal vents. It was my intention with this ﬁ lm to draw a kind of sea/space 
connection, on the basis of a kind of ocean analogue, where we would bring NASA 
experts in analogue missions and let them draw the parallels between undersea 
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operations with multiple vehicles deploying robotics. The submersibles would be 
like a Mars surface rover on a traverse being deployed from a habitat or a base camp 
for which the support ships or the surface ships were the analogues for that. But 
we were also drawing a connection between the types of life that existed in these 
chemosynthesis-based environments down at these hydrothermal vents with the 
kind of life that we might encounter in extraterrestrial hydrospheres; if we were to 
ﬁ nd subsurface water on Mars, if we were to ﬁ nd evidence of ancient life on Mars, 
it might have originated in hydrothermal communities. If Mars was once covered 
with water or had a lot more water, that water may very well have been under ice, it 
may have been denied the ability to photosynthesize, it may have had to live within 
a chemosynthesis-based environment. 
When we go to Europa, we may ﬁ nd evidence of life there, again, probably 
subsisting on a nonphotosynthesis basis. So we draw the sea/space connection 
in that ﬁ lm. I just thought I’d point that out since 
it’s a room full of space buffs and we’re an ocean 
panel—that there’s a message there. 
In the process of making this ﬁ lm, I’ve 
formed a partnership to buy and operate two deep 
rover submersibles, which are actually codesigned 
by Sylvia Earle. They have a depth rating of 1,000 
meters. They are wonderful subs. You sit inside an 
acrylic sphere and you feel like you’re in a kind of 
vacuole within the ocean where you have unlimited 
visibility. You feel much better contact with the 
environment than you do looking through the 
small port windows of a typical deep submersible. 
Now, previously, we’d been working with 
the Russian Academy of Sciences and with their 
Mir submersible operation, which is a two-sub 
operation. I had a pretty good understanding of 
the working systems of those subs and of how the 
submersibles were operated and how two subs are 
operated in tandem with each other in diving ops. But I was certainly in for a 
very rude awakening by just how difﬁ cult it is to operate a manned submersible 
system when you’re starting from scratch and when you’re the one in front of 
whom the buck stops. 
Now, we began by assembling a new team to operate and maintain the 
rovers and these were gathered from established submersible operations around 
the U.S. and Canada. The ﬁ rst task was to tear the subs down to their frames for 
ABS [American Bureau of Shipping] certiﬁ cation. Then we had to make all the 
modiﬁ cations to adapt our 3-D digital technology with the [pan and ﬁ ll] systems 
and our special lighting and all of that to the submersibles. That was certainly a 
daunting task. It took about six months, and we were barely re-certiﬁ ed in time 
for our ﬁ lming operations. 
DEEP ROVER, Deep Ocean Engineering’s one person sub, dives to 300 meters. 
(Image ID: nur07547, National Undersearch Research Program (NURP) Collection. 
Photographer: T. Kerby. Credit: OAR/National Undersea Research Program (NURP), 
University of Hawaii)
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So, we took our beautiful new subs to sea and met with the Russians out 
in the middle of the ocean, literally rendezvoused two ships in the middle of 
the ocean at the mid-Atlantic ridge. We dove them together in a joint diving 
operation with the Mir submersibles. This culminated with one dive where we 
actually had four subs rendezvous at the bottom in 870 meters of water at a site 
called “Lost City,” which is a low temperature hydrothermal vent structure, a very 
interesting place. 
This operation was very complex logistically because it involved the 
creation of new operational protocols for the launch and recovery of four subs 
in the same theater of operations at the same time. Tracking, communications, 
surface ship operations, the number of submersibles in the water made all these 
signiﬁ cantly more complicated. This had ramiﬁ cations through every kind of 
contingency you could imagine. It wasn’t just twice as complicated as operating 
two submersibles—it was some multiple. There was some square law at work 
there. Also, we were dealing with underwater communications, which, if any of 
you have done this, you know that such communications can be spotty at best, 
and we were dealing with them in Russian and English between four vehicles at 
the same time on the same frequency. 
So, we had to go through a pretty rigorous process of deﬁ ning our comms 
protocols before the fact. It was only because we had a good, long, healthy working 
relationship with the Russians that made that possible. I found that the principles 
of risk management and safety assurance that I learned as a ﬁ lm director were 
actually transferable to these new situations, at least at an abstract level, and 
certainly at a motivational level for myself, in terms of applying the same kind 
of energy and passion to the safety of the operation as to the aesthetic results 
of the ﬁ lm making. Now, obviously there’s a very extensive body of established 
procedure for submersible operations, and we studied that pretty rigorously, and 
we selected our team members accordingly on the basis of their experience with 
manned submersible ops. But it seemed like almost everything that we were 
doing was unprecedented, and it was often difﬁ cult to ﬁ nd any kind of existing 
guidelines in the literature. Often, we were making up our own protocols in terms 
of what the safe procedures were for the launch of multiple subs or the manner in 
which we could descend them together for imaging purposes—sometimes only 
a couple of meters apart, how we could operate them on the bottom (proximity 
operations), how our acoustic comms would work during the dive, how we would 
work on the bottom with four subs together and a deployed ROV in the same 
area—a tethered vehicle. 
We were able to pull on our experience from past dives, and we were able 
to anticipate and talk through in advance most of the contingencies that might 
arise on the dive. Because of the complexity of our dive ops, we always preceded 
each dive with a joint dive ops meeting between the Russian group and the 
American group. I call it the American group, but it was really a mixed group of 
people from Australia, Canada, and everything else. The Russians called us the 
“American group.” 
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We used models of the submersibles to talk through the maneuvers. The 
process there was very simple. Here is a model of your sub. You are the pilot of the 
sub. You move it. I will give you a voice command. You move that model the way 
you think what I am telling you to do should result in action. This worked very 
well. So, literally, it would be, “Hands off. Okay, I want you to do this. I want you 
to do that.” If they couldn’t visualize it on dry land where we could hear each other 
perfectly, then it certainly wasn’t going to be any better down at the bottom. Until 
we ﬁ gured out what message for voice communications was going to foul us up on 
the bottom, we wouldn’t go into the water. That was one technique. 
We had perfected that in doing our wreck dives where we had the wreck 
as the central focusing element for what we were doing. It got more complicated 
when we went to these vent sites, and we were unable to physically model the 
vent sites. We had, in some cases, good microbathymetry, and, at the very least, 
we had some decent site maps. We would use those as guides, and people would 
ﬂ y their models. We always knew in advance what we were trying to accomplish. 
This brieﬁ ng would then get synthesized into a dive plan document, which was 
distributed to all of the various crew members. You have to appreciate that we had 
two observers and a pilot in each Mir, so that’s six. We would have an observer 
and a pilot in each of the deep rovers, so an additional four. Ten people were 
all going in[to] the water, all having to know exactly what they were doing on a 
daily basis. An interesting lesson here was that the task loading from a planning 
standpoint became greater than the task load on the actual dive. In fact, I wound 
up getting most of my sleep during descent and ascent because I was spending 
the night working through the documentation for the dive the following day. The 
pace of operations was inappropriate to the scale of the logistics of what we were 
doing. That was the thing that emerged. 
Each crew member got a dive plan which was individually tailored to their 
vehicle in terms of the timeline and their activities—the individual objectives 
for each crew and the science activities as well. The science activities required a 
separate pre-dive meeting by the science group who would bring us their requests 
and recommendations for modiﬁ cations to the sampling equipment on the front 
of the subs. 
One of the things I would like to express here today is the idea that, regardless 
of how much you plan, you have to be willing to accept the idea of failure. I think 
that we are enthusiastic fans of exploration, probably everybody in the room, but 
failure is a part of exploration. It is absolutely woven into the fabric of the act of 
exploration. By deﬁ nition, exploration means you’re doing something that has 
never been done before. It is absurd to assume that activities without precedent 
can be done in complete safety. If only the remote and hostile environments are 
yet to be explored, then we are inherently pushing the limits of human endurance 
and technical adaptation every time we advance the boundary of what is known. 
It is absolutely important to use all of our accumulated knowledge to be 
as safe as possible. However, safety is not the most important thing. I know 
this sounds like heresy, but it is a truth that must be embraced in order to do 
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“ ”
. . . SAFETY IS NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING. I KNOW THIS SOUNDS 
LIKE HERESY, BUT IT IS A TRUTH THAT MUST BE EMBRACED IN ORDER TO 
DO EXPLORATION. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS TO ACTUALLY GO. 
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exploration. The most important thing is to actually go. Because if safety were 
the most important criterion, we would not go to Mars for 10,000 years, because 
only then could we assure absolute, 100 percent success. Historically the success 
of cultures and nations has been the result of their ability to balance risk and 
reward—to put it another way, caution and boldness. 
The problem with exploration is not the individual’s perception of risk; 
it’s the institutional, national, and political perception of risk. Astronauts are 
smart people—I know a few of them. Most of them are Ph.D.s in one thing or 
another—engineering, physics, medicine. They know that riding a pointy end of 
a metal object that is screaming through the atmosphere at 20 times the speed of 
a riﬂ e bullet, being propelled by one long continuous explosion is not quite the 
same as sitting at home in your Barcalounger. 
They understand the dangers. They get it. They have assessed the risk. 
But their personal dream, their vision—not for themselves, but for the entire 
human race—dwarfs that risk. They know the importance of what they are doing, 
because in their souls they are explorers. It’s not the astronauts who are going 
to hold up the progress of exploration. It’s the government that funds them, and 
the people that empower that government to act, who will set the limitations. 
Institutions gravitate inexorably toward a value system in which any risk becomes 
unacceptable, at which point exploration ceases. 
Now, we are lucky right now to be on a cusp with history where a 
presidential mandate has put NASA back on track with a renewed vision for 
exploration. NASA has reorganized around the guiding principle of exploration 
beyond Earth’s orbit. This is all very exciting, it is all very new, and it is deﬁ nitely 
happening. I believe it is a wise plan, and an affordable and achievable plan. 
But there is one huge challenge that still needs to be overcome, even if we 
deal with all of these short-term reorganization issues. We must overcome the 
fear of failure that may inhibit future leaders from allowing these missions to 
proceed. The challenge will be this: the only way to fail in landing humans on 
Mars is to actually go. If we study the problem, we build tools and systems and 
so on for the next 50 years, we can kind of jolly ourselves along that we are really, 
honest-to-God going to do it someday, that we’re still those clever Americans 
who put a man on the Moon back—when was that again?
That way we don’t put our self-image at risk. But the second the button 
gets pushed and we are really going, then we enter a much higher realm of risk. 
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“Failure is not an option” was a good credo for getting the Apollo 13 astronauts 
back home safely, but as a driving principle, it doesn’t really work. Failure must 
always be an option, or we stop being an exploring species. 
When I started our most recent expedition project, I called a big summit 
meeting of all the department heads. I stood in front of a white board and put up 
on the white board three slogans. The slogans were there: “Luck is not a factor,” 
“Hope is not a strategy,” “Fear is not an option.” Now, the ﬁ rst two were meant 
to convey my philosophy that to succeed in any complex task, it is essential to 
leave nothing to chance. You need to make your own luck by rigorous application 
of a robust process. You test everything in a very disciplined fashion, you don’t 
guess, you know the answer, you anticipate every negative condition that might 
possibly prevail. You assume it is going to happen. You have an A plan, a B plan, 
a C plan, and you assume that you’re going to be on the C plan by your second 
cup on coffee on morning one of the expedition, because that’s how it goes when 
you’re at sea. 
I wanted to scare them, and I wanted them to respect their adversary—not 
the ocean, but the real adversary: entropy, which, as you know, is the tendency of 
things to go from a state of organization to a state of chaos. 
The third slogan, “Fear is not an option,” was meant to inspire the boldness 
that actually sees you through these endeavors. It was the yin and the yang of the 
healthy paranoia which the ﬁ rst two slogans represented, because without a kind 
of faith, which is not in luck and not in passive hope, but in yourself and your 
team and in the greater meaning of what you’re setting out to do, you won’t ﬁ nd 
the strength to go through with it. 
So my message is, in whichever realm, be it going into space or going into 
the deep sea, you have to balance the yin and yang of caution and boldness, 
risk aversion and risk taking, fear and fearlessness. No great accomplishment 
takes place, whether it be a movie or a deep ocean expedition or a space mission, 
without a kind of dynamic equipoise between the two. Luck is not a factor. Hope 
is not a strategy. Fear is not an option.     ■
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Over the Edge of the World
Ferdinand Magellan took almost three years to circumnavigate 
the globe. In fact, he didn’t make it. He was killed in the middle. Jules Verne wrote about 
going around the world in 80 days. I am going to take you around the world in Magellan’s 
tracks in about 10 minutes, much more safely than Magellan did. In terms of risk and reward 
evaluation, keep in mind that, of the approximately 260 sailors in ﬁ ve very small ships that 
he took, leaving from Seville, Spain in 1519, only one ship with 18 sailors made it back three 
years later to Seville. One ship mutinied in the Strait of Magellan and returned early. Over 200 
hundred sailors died in this attempt to circumnavigate the globe. That was not exceptional.
In this era of exploration, in the 16th century, it was a different mind-set. The very 
rational and logical and useful tools for evaluating risks and rewards didn’t exist. The 
mind-set was closer to the medieval mind-set, even though this was the quintessential 
Renaissance exploration mission more than anything else. We can see, despite that mind-
set, modern tools and paradigms and approaches emerging. Nevertheless, people went with 
an expectation that if they succeeded, it would be God’s will, and if they failed, that was 
God’s will. That was Magellan’s inspiration for going, and that turned out to be, as you’ll 
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see when I get to the part about Magellan’s death, his undoing as well, despite his 
many crew members urging him to ignore what he felt was God’s will. 
His mission to circumnavigate the globe for the ﬁ rst time ever was not 
meant to be a scientiﬁ c one. That concept really didn’t exist. He was going for 
two reasons, and they were pretty basic reasons. One was for greed, and one was 
for glory. 
There were two superpowers in those days, one of the important analogies 
to the recent present, during the Cold War. Those superpowers were Spain and 
Portugal, and they were vying for control of the ocean. They were doing that 
because they were vying for control of the world economy, or the global economy, 
such as it was. The key to that economy in those days wasn’t oil, the way it is now; 
it was spices. We all say, “What’s the big deal about spices—cloves, cinnamon, 
nutmeg? Who cares? You can buy them in the supermarket.” In those days, cloves 
were the most valuable commodity on the face of the Earth. They were more 
precious, pound for pound, than gold. 
On his voyage, Magellan refused a number of opportunities to trade iron 
for gold on a pound for pound basis, because he wanted to save space on his ship 
for the cloves, which were more valuable. That one surviving small ship, less than 
90 feet in length, Victoria, that made it back to Seville laden with cloves, made 
enough money for the bankers who ﬁ nanced it and for King Charles, the Spanish 
banker, to make the whole expedition—which was, in human terms, a tremendous 
disaster—a huge commercial success. This inspired Spain to follow up ﬁ ve times, 
each time unsuccessfully, on Magellan’s vision of circumnavigating the globe. 
For me, researching this book, there are two approaches. One is the library. 
People often say, “Well, where did you go to research this book?” And I usually 
quickly deﬂ ate the balloon by saying, “To the library,” because that was the most 
important place. However, the library really isn’t enough. You really have to get 
out into the ﬁ eld. It always reminds me of when I was a kid and dropping those 
little paper Japanese ﬂ owers into water—just add water and they come to life. 
When you go to the Strait of Magellan or you go to Sanlucar de Barrameda, 
the port city in Spain from which Magellan’s ships left, you begin to see the scale 
and the scope of what it was like. When you walk across a life-size replica of one 
of Magellan’s ships and see how tiny it was and how primitive it was, you realize 
that what they were taking looks to us, on a temporary risk-reward evaluation 
basis, to be doomed to failure. But they didn’t think that in those days. They 
thought that God was going to be on their side. And I’ll try and explain a little 
bit to you why. 
So for me, this was mostly tourism, to go in Magellan’s tracks. Someday, to 
go in the tracks of Neil Armstrong or Jim Lovell will be mostly tourism. Not yet. 
And it [would have] seemed inconceivable 500 years ago that tourists would go 
through the Strait of Magellan the way I did, with a couple of friends with our 
cameras, walking over glaciers that [had] imperiled Magellan’s life and the lives 
of all his sailors. And the glory part of this was that they were going to bring 
Christianity and the glory of King Charles—who was all of 18 years old when 
OPENING PHOTO: 
The Strait of Magellan in winter viewed 
from NASA’s SeaWiFS satellite. 
(Source: http://visibleearth.nasa.gov. 
Search for 9251.)
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he commissioned Magellan to go on this voyage—around the world and spread 
those two goals far and wide as they went to claim the Spice Islands, which are 
in Indonesia, for Spain. Nobody really knew exactly where they were, and part 
of the expedition would be to ﬁ nd a shortcut, a fabled route somewhere through 
the South American landmasses to the Spice Islands. The exact size and shape of 
South America was not really known. Something was known about the eastern 
coast and that was all. They would cross what was known as the Paciﬁ c Gulf, 
considered to be a very small body of water. 
My book on Magellan actually began on Mars with my previous book, 
Voyage to Mars, which was about NASA’s robotic exploration of the red planet 
through four missions, from Pathﬁ nder through the ill-fated Mars Polar Lander. 
During that time, NASA scientists at Goddard and JPL [Jet Propulsion Laboratory] 
kept talking about precedents for their exploration of the universe. They kept 
talking about Columbus; we all know a lot about Columbus. They talked about 
Balboa. They talked about Vasco da Gama and they talked about Magellan. And, 
after about the tenth or maybe the twentieth time, the name Ferdinand Magellan 
was mentioned to me, a dim light bulb eventually illuminated in my mind, and I 
thought that might be a very interesting idea for a book. It might have a lot to say 
about our own current age of exploration of the solar system and the universe. 
Because after all, at the time that this man, Ferdinand Magellan, went around 
the world, the world was as mysterious to Europeans as the solar system and the 
universe is to us. 
Who was Magellan? First of all, he was a misﬁ t. If he was on this panel 
today, he probably would be the least popular member. He would be the one that 
everybody would be looking at and saying, “He looks like a fanatic. He looks 
like a weirdo.” He wouldn’t have that genial, easy-going manner and that self-
deprecatory humor that we admire in pilots and captains who are undertaking 
high-risk missions. From the little bit that we know from contemporary 
observation, he had a knack for being abrasive and for offending people. He 
defected from Portugal, because he couldn’t get backing from the king of Portugal, 
who personally disliked him, to Spain, where he really wasn’t a known quantity. 
He was preceded by a reputation as a daredevil, Portuguese soldier and a mariner, 
but he was an unknown quantity. And he quickly managed, through some sleight 
of hand, to get backing from the king of Spain and his backers, who were older 
and wiser, because they were desperate to beat Portugal to the Spice Islands, 
“ ”
SO FOR ME, THIS WAS MOSTLY TOURISM, TO GO IN MAGELLAN’S TRACKS. SOMEDAY, TO 
GO IN THE TRACKS OF NEIL ARMSTRONG OR JIM LOVELL WILL BE MOSTLY TOURISM.
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much as this country was desperate to beat the Soviet Union to the Moon during 
the height of the space race. 
Magellan was limited by his communication skills—he never learned 
Spanish well. He was very embarrassed by his heavy Portuguese accent. He 
usually communicated through very stiff documents. If he ever cracked a joke in 
his life, there was no record of it. 
But he was an obsessive personality and two things obsessed him. [One 
thing was] navigation, and he was a perfectionist in navigation. And as a 
Portuguese, he was aware of what was then the state-of-the-art of navigation 
and cartography in the world. Portuguese were like the Soviets in the space 
race, obsessively secretive about their cartography. If you published a book in 
Portugal that contained any map or information about Portuguese voyages, you 
were thrown into prison. And, of course, the book was destroyed. This was, of 
course, after the age of Gutenberg and [the publication of] Columbus’s books had 
been a very important way of disseminating information. In fact, Columbus was 
Magellan’s boyhood hero, and when Magellan read Columbus’ account of his ﬁ rst 
voyage to the new world, that inspired him to go even further than Columbus, the 
way some astronauts today are inspired by their childhood memories of watching 
John Glenn and other astronauts, and their exploits, on television. 
So Magellan, putting it mildly, was not a people person, but he was a 
brilliant navigator. He was also obsessed with one other element of his ﬂ eet 
of ﬁ ve ships, which were all leased and were all in bad condition: food. Most of 
the records that we have of that time—and they are voluminous—show that he 
was exceedingly careful about provisions and feeding the men what he thought 
would be the most effective diet. And tremendous thought and care was given 
to the kind of food, even though it was all horrible food, it was all salty. It was 
salt beef, it was salt cod, it was salt pork, there were olives. The only sweet thing 
was honey, which was taken along, and there was a tremendous amount of wine, 
which was the staple beverage. It was mixed with water, so it probably wasn’t 
very tasty. And the other staple element was hardtack, that was basically stale 
biscuits. It was a month old by the time it even got on the ships, and it gradually 
became wormy and rotten and soggy as the voyage went on. And even when it 
was soaked with the feces and urine of the rats which infested the ships, the 
sailors continued to eat it because there was nothing else to eat beyond their 
rations, except for the leather wrapping the masts of some of the ships. 
You may wonder why anybody would want to go on a voyage like this. In 
fact, most of the sailors came from the convict or semiconvict class and had no 
other hope for their survival in Spain but this voyage of escape from whatever 
their current problem was. Perhaps it was marital problems, perhaps it was debts, 
perhaps it was some crime that they had been accused of and this was their one 
escape. The ofﬁ cers were motivated often by greed because, after all, if they could 
bring or smuggle back some of these cloves, they would be set for life. Even a 
sack full would be enough for them to purchase a small house in the sailor’s 
suburb of Seville and live there comfortably for the rest of their lives. 
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Magellan went because he believed that he was going to discover a new world. 
He really was impelled by what we would call idealistic motives. Now, the king of 
Spain gave him tremendous latitude. He was given the ability to name continents 
and islands after himself, none of which he did; in fact, he turned out to be very 
self-effacing. The Strait of Magellan, for example, he named the Cape of the Feast 
of the 11,000 Virgins, which doesn’t really roll off the tongue that well, because that 
was the feast day on which he discovered it. So he was giving primarily religious 
names to places he discovered because he was a very devout individual.
His crewmembers came from at least ten countries. They spoke at least ten 
languages, and they didn’t get along. They consisted of a number of cabals, and 
the Spaniards didn’t talk to the Portuguese, who didn’t talk to the English, who 
didn’t talk to the Germans, who didn’t talk to the Norwegians, who didn’t talk to 
the Greeks. You may wonder how they communicated just to get ordinary sailing 
and nautical tasks done. They used an argot that was a Catalan slang that they all 
understood. But there was no easy rapport among these crewmembers, who would 
just as soon get into ﬁ ghts with each other as cooperate on their missions. 
I think it’s fair to say that Magellan, with his lack of so-called “people 
skills,” faced much greater obstacles from the individuals on board the ship 
and the people he encountered in their travels around the world than he did 
from natural obstacles. In fact, he learned to master most of the incredibly 
overwhelming natural obstacles, including terrible storms in traversing the Strait 
of Magellan, which is a nautical nightmare. But he never really knew how to 
handle people, except with the most brutal means imaginable, such as torture, in 
order to inspire and put dread in the men to follow him. 
The major player at that time was King Charles the V, the king of Spain and 
the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. The king of Spain was a Hapsburg king; 
you can tell that by that famous Hapsburg jaw in the portrait of him by Titian. 
And it was in the name of King Charles that Magellan went. Keep in mind King 
Charles was an 18-year-old boy; he was trying to grow a beard when he sent 
Magellan on this mission, and even when the survivors came back three years 
later, he was only 21 years old and widely mistrusted by everyone around him. 
The other major player in that era was Pope Leo X, who, as reﬂ ected in the 
portrait by Rafael, was a worried man. And if those Cardinals that are around 
him look like they are menacing him, it’s because, in those days, the Cardinals 
were routinely plotting to kill and poison and strangle each other, and there were 
constant plots against the life of the Pope. Nevertheless, Magellan went around 
the world constantly pledging his loyalty and his entire expedition to the greater 
glory of the Roman Catholic Church and bringing the Church enlightenment to 
people around the world. 
Magellan did not bring slaves or try to enslave people, which was a big 
difference between him and his boyhood hero Columbus. He did bring one 
personal slave with him, but when he found the so-called heathen in places, his 
ﬁ rst thought was not like Columbus’s, “Aha! There are so many people here we 
can enslave!” His ﬁ rst thought was, “Aha! There are so many people here that we 
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can baptize.” Also, the group aboard included men, women, and children. So this 
already marked a very important shift from the previous era of exploration. 
The maps they used at that time were worse than useless. The so-called 
“T&O map,” based on a literal interpretation of the Bible, shows the ocean circling 
the world, only three continents, Jerusalem at the top—it was absolutely useless 
for anything. And this was the way most people—although not scholars—looked 
at the world at the time [of] Magellan[’s travels]. This would be circa 1515. 
There was a state-of-the-art map that was based on the calculations of 
Ptolemy, the famous Greek-Egyptian mathematician whose mathematical 
compilations were rediscovered and published during the Renaissance. The map 
is a projection of the world as a sphere, based on his calculations. The one dramatic 
omission is the Paciﬁ c Ocean—9,000 miles! Had Magellan known that after he 
accomplished his greatest feat of navigating the Strait of Magellan, which is at 
the southernmost tip of South America, that he still had to cross the Paciﬁ c, he 
probably wouldn’t have gone and he probably wouldn’t have gotten backing from 
the Spanish crown or from the ﬁ nanciers who were expecting—like businessmen 
everywhere—a reward, a return on their investment. They were hoping for about 
14 percent, incidentally. So his maps were mostly useless. In fact, when he got 
to the Paciﬁ c Ocean, he was so exasperated with these kinds of maps and charts 
that he threw them overboard in a temper tantrum and said, “These maps are not 
to be trusted.” And from then on, he relied solely on his own charts. 
A map of his actual route gives you an idea of how it looked in the 
world as it actually was. And you can see his route as he leaves Seville and goes 
to the coast of South America following a well-worn path by that point, until he 
begins to work his way down to near the southernmost tip, looking for the Strait 
of Magellan, which he had promised his backers and the king of Spain he’d ﬁ nd 
or else. And, ﬁ nally, he did manage to ﬁ nd it. But from then on, for most of his 
route and for most of those three years, he was sailing through waters that were 
uncharted by European cartographers and so were unknown to him. 
We don’t have an image of his actual vessel. But we know it rides very high 
in the water. It’s dark brown or black because of the pitch, the tar covering the 
sides to keep it seaworthy. Depictions of ships of the time are shown surrounded 
by ﬂ ying ﬁ sh, which were a constant fact of life of some of the earlier parts of the 
voyage, and by some sort of sea monsters, which were believed to exist.
Some of the hazards that they believed to exist at that time were mermaids, 
considered to be a fact. Another was a magnetic island; if the ship sailed too 
close, the island would pull all the nails out of the ship, the planks would come 
apart, end of story. That was also considered to be scientiﬁ c, factual. Then there 
was the mythical continent of Terra Australis. Not until the 19th century was the 
existence of this continent, thought to somehow counterbalance the continents 
of the Northern Hemisphere, disproved. And, also, the water was thought to boil 
at the equator, because it would be so hot.
So, there were all sorts of imaginary hazards that Magellan and his sailors 
thought they were facing, which turned out not to be the case. However, they 
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were also facing real hazards that were in some ways even more dangerous. For 
example, scurvy. Scurvy was the radiation poisoning of its era. There was no 
known cure for scurvy. We now know that a teaspoon or less of Vitamin C taken 
a day, in orange juice, or many herbs, or even beer, or malt, is the magic bullet 
cure for scurvy. But Europeans didn’t know about that until 200 years after 
Magellan’s voyage, which was a complicated, fascinating medical story in itself. 
At that time, scurvy was a dread disease. It caused loosening of the teeth and 
mottled skin, and then, literally, the hard parts of your body, your bones, your 
teeth, your tendons, would come apart—your body literally falling apart. And 
over thirty sailors on Magellan’s crew succumbed to the deprivations of scurvy 
and a horrible death at sea because of this disease, which we now know is so 
simple to prevent. 
So, danger was everywhere, and again, prayer and a belief in the divine will 
was about the only protection that the men felt they had against it. 
One of the great false leads of the voyage was the Rio de la Plata, South 
America, which many of the men insisted was actually the Strait of Magellan. Of 
course, it’s many hundreds of miles north. When Magellan saw it was shallow 
and covered with silt, he ﬁ gured, just based on sheer instinct, that it wasn’t deep 
enough to somehow cut through the South American land mass, and come out 
the other side in the Paciﬁ c Ocean. And so he sailed around the bay, and kept 
going, and said, “This is not it.” The men didn’t agree, and they mutinied, and he 
responded to the mutiny by drawing and quartering some of the leaders, which 
Ferdinand Magellan’s route around the world (1519–22).  (©1996 MAGELLAN Geographix™)
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was a brutal procedure that involved removing their intestines while they were 
alive, burning them in front of them, and, eventually, decapitating them, putting 
their heads on a stake, and putting those stakes in the harbor where the ships were 
moored in order to enforce discipline. And that was how Magellan kept his men in 
line. It was a very, very different era from today, as I was saying at the outset. 
One of his chief discoveries, which was truly accidental, was the Magellanic 
Clouds. Now, as I mentioned before, this was not a scientiﬁ c mission. Not until the 
Age of Enlightenment and Captain Cook in the 18th century was the concept of a 
science mission really popular or prevalent. Nevertheless, Magellan brought with 
him a chronicler who had never been to sea named, Antonio Pigafetta, a funny name. 
But Pigafetta was a rather intelligent, very ambitious young Venetian diplomat who 
heard about Magellan’s voyage when he had gone to Seville, and he signed up for 
this mission. And most of the important things we know about it comes from the 
diary that Pigafetta kept on the voyage. He survived, and Magellan didn’t. 
These Magellanic Clouds, which were until about 10 years ago thought to be 
the galaxies closest to the earth, were simply described by Pigafetta as two “clouds 
of mist.” Period. They had really very little idea of what they were looking at, but 
he noticed everything. He also wrote down 30 different languages that Europeans 
didn’t know about, spoken by various preliterate tribes around the world, giving 
us our ﬁ rst lexicographies of all these languages. So he was an astronomer, an 
ethnographer, and an anthropologist. He also became, because he learned these 
languages, translator for this mission. Pigafetta turned out to be one of Magellan’s 
best hires, let’s put it that way. Especially because he survived. 
The Strait of Magellan itself is unchanged from 500 years ago. It’s basically 
a fjord. The water is very cold. If any of the sailors had fallen overboard, they 
would have survived six minutes at most. By the way, most of the sailors then 
didn’t know how to swim, and they had a terrible phobia about the water. 
Five hundred years later we walked across what our guides like to call a 
“cold beach.” There were Magellanic penguins, which were ubiquitous [and] 
which bailed Magellan’s sailors out of starvation time and again when they went 
through 500 years ago.
The way Magellan managed to navigate what was really a maritime maze—
not a straight watery path—was to have his men climb mountains, and look ahead 
and see, well, which way to go. What was a dead end, and what was going to take 
them to the Paciﬁ c during this 300-mile crossing? He also tasted the seawater. 
When it was salty, he knew he was near the Atlantic. When it got to be fresher, 
he ﬁ gured he must be getting to the middle of the strait. And when it turned salty 
again, he ﬁ gured he must be coming out to the Paciﬁ c, which was a misnomer, 
because the water there was even rougher than it had been in the Atlantic, where 
he had faced some terrible storms. 
Glaciers were noted by Pigafetta, and looked at by all the men, but they 
couldn’t ﬁ gure out why they were blue. Of course, they’re blue for the same reason 
that water is blue, because of the way the eye selectively absorbs scattered light. 
Magellan’s ﬂ eet was very lucky not to have been crushed in one of the glaciers. 
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Magellan very unwisely immersed himself in a tribal war when he reached 
the Philippine Islands. When he reached that archipelago, he was actually 
worshipped, literally, by the islanders there, whom he converted to Christianity 
in mass baptism, including men, women, and the children. Pigafetta calculated 
several thousand conversions. And Magellan got so caught up in this that he 
wanted to keep on doing it. Meanwhile, all his ofﬁ cers who had survived to this 
point said, basically, “You know, we’re on a commercial mission here. We have to 
get to the Spice Islands. You don’t know where they are. We’ve got to get there.” 
But Magellan said he wanted to stay.
There was one island leader we know by the name of Lapu-Lapu, who was 
in a war with all the other islands in the Philippines. He was the ruler of the 
island of Mactan. And he decided that since all the others were converting to 
this new and strange deity who was brought from afar in these gigantic black 
ships, he was going to do the opposite. So, he challenged Magellan to a battle. 
Magellan, as you might gather, was never one to back down from a ﬁ ght. And 
he said “Fine, we’ll undertake this battle.” He ﬁ gured he had gunpowder and 
weapons, guns on his side, which were very primitive and as likely to blow up 
as to ﬁ re correctly. But they did have crossbows, which were far more lethal, and 
they also had armor. Magellan ﬁ gured that armor would be impervious to blows 
from bamboo swords and that one of his soldiers would be able to defeat 50 or 
even 100 island warriors.
So Lapu-Lapu challenged him to a battle. Magellan decided that 60 men 
would be enough for him to handle whatever Lapu-Lapu threw at him. He waved 
off assistance from a local sultan who offered all of his soldiers and troops to 
Magellan in favor of Magellan’s support. He waved off offers of support from all 
his men. He told his ships to stay way back—he didn’t need to be covered by ﬁ re 
because God was going to protect him.
So, he undertook this amphibious landing early in the day on April 27, 
1521. His 60 men were met by 1,500 enraged soldiers with ﬁ re-hardened, poison-
tipped swords and with bamboo shields who charged into the water and eventually 
overwhelmed Magellan, once they ﬁ gured out who Magellan was—and he was 
rather conspicuous because of his plumed conquistador’s helmet. (Note to other 
explorers, don’t wear a conquistador’s helmet while ﬁ ghting the enemy!) They 
managed to throw spears at the exposed parts of his body, at his arms and his 
legs. Finally, they managed to knock his sword out of his right hand. When he 
stooped to pick it up from the water, he took another spear in his arm, disabling 
it. And then Lapu-Lapu’s soldiers closed in for the kill. And, essentially, they 
hacked Magellan to pieces right there in Mactan harbor, and there was nothing 
large enough left for even a proper burial. And that was the death, the very, very 
unnecessary death of perhaps the greatest explorer of the entire Renaissance era. 
His crew had seen this coming, because they had been aware of his growing 
recklessness, and they quickly elected two captains, Portuguese and Spanish, 
to continue the expedition all the way to the Spice Islands. And then, ﬁ nally, 
overcoming one disaster after another, one ship made it back. 
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By the way, the one ship that made it back was captained by a Basque 
mariner, Juan Sebastián Elcano. And in Spain this is known as the Elcano 
mission, rather than the Magellan mission, out of a nationalistic feeling, because 
Magellan was Portuguese and was viewed with so much suspicion by the Spanish 
authorities. 
So, as you can see, the idea of what exploring was like in those days was 
almost incomprehensible compared to what we’re used to today. And so our 
exploration of the solar system continues in that spirit, but with a tremendously 
different approach from what it was like then.     ■
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DAVID LONGNECKER: My name is David Longnecker, from the University of Pennsylvania, 
and I’m addressing my question to Mike Gernhardt. I was intrigued by your calculation of 
acceptable risk for DCS (decompression sickness). As you know, the concept of acceptable 
risk is one that’s getting considerable play throughout NASA, as we look towards future 
exploration. Do you think it’s possible to apply such techniques and such mathematical 
approaches to broader risk categories, as we look for broader missions?
MICHAEL GERNHARDT: That’s a great question, and the answer is: absolutely, you can. 
There are limitations, obviously, to the data and to the statistics, and, ultimately, you will 
have to make judgments. I found that running this process, I started out with an uninformed 
group and my own notions of what acceptable risk were. And we ended up with an educated 
group and a speciﬁ c deﬁ nition and a consensus to move forward. So, I think the answer to 
that question is yes, a similar process could be run with return to ﬂ ight, using models that are 
out there for [foam-shedding] and MMOD (Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris) prospectively 
deﬁ ning what acceptable risk is for reentry. The only danger is that that should not be a 
substitute for good judgments. And I think if you look at that as one tool, a decision support 
tool, it could be very valuable in that regard. 
EUGENE RODDENBERRY: Hello. Eugene Roddenberry. Actually, I’ve got a question for Mr. 
Cousteau. I wonder if you could tell us about what your son is doing today and if he’s okay. 
From what I hear, speaking about risk, he’s taking some risk right now.
JEAN-MICHEL COUSTEAU: Well, I think he’s taking a very calculated risk. He, and some 
of the Hollywood people have helped him, built—that was a dream of his for a long time—a 
life-size great white shark in which he’s hiding. The structure of the great white, which can 
move on its own, is such that anything can attack it and he’s completely safe. What can go 
wrong is his life support system if he doesn’t do the right thing. So, it comes back to him. 
It’s not nature that’s the problem, it’s human.
His objective is to ﬁ nd himself in the middle of other great white sharks, perfectly 
protected, a lot better than I was when I was in South Africa. And he, from the inside, can 
see through the eyes of the shark, as can the cameras which are looking out through the 
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eyes, at what’s going on around it, and can kind of study the behavior of these 
sharks, which we know so very little about. So, from a scientiﬁ c point of view, 
hopefully, they will make some new discoveries as to the behavior of great whites 
by including less risk than if we were in cages or even scuba diving. So, I don’t 
think he’s taking a lot of risk, personally. Much less than other people have, and, 
hopefully, we will learn something. And that’s what he’s doing at the moment, 
as we speak. 
DAVID LAWRENCE: David Lawrence for Laurence Bergreen. Was going around 
the world the great challenge in 1519 that Magellan hoped to meet, or was it just 
to get the cloves and get home, and it was just accidental that his expedition 
continued to make the ﬁ rst circumnavigation?
LAURENCE BERGREEN: Yes, that’s a good question. The latter. It was almost 
incidental. He ﬁ gured that was the fastest way to get to the Spice Islands to bring 
home the spices and to avoid the time-honored overland route, which was much 
slower, far more expensive, and controlled by the Arabs. So, it was really what he 
felt was the expedient way to do it. The efﬁ cient way to do it.
GORDON OSINSKI: Gordon Osinski, from the University of Arizona and 
soon moving to the Canadian Space Agency. We’ve talked so much, so far, 
about the risk of exploration, and the title of the symposium, but until this 
morning, nothing about the risk of not exploring. I think John Chatterton said, 
“Exploration is who we are. We should continue on the path of exploration or 
quit.” And Sylvia Earle said, “Something is happening to us as a species.” There 
are people yesterday who thought, to continue evolving as a species we should 
explore, we have to explore.
I was moved by the reasons why we should explore the sea, and we’re looking 
to the stars. I was born a few years after man last walked on the Moon. I’ve been 
doing some teaching recently and I’m shocked, aghast, at how many people think 
we have not walked on the Moon, or actually, how many people think we have 
walked on Mars. So my question is: Is there a greater risk of not exploring than 
exploring? And maybe pose that to the whole panel and to everyone. 
JEAN-MICHEL COUSTEAU: I would just like to jump in by saying that we’ve 
done a very, very poor job of communicating the results of our exploration to the 
public. I mean, you’d be amazed to go in parts of the country and ﬁ nd out that 
people don’t know anything about what’s going on at NASA. And we have to see 
a communication resolution, that we are leaving at the moment and taking for 
granted. We have to ﬁ nd a way to get, particularly, young people to know what’s 
going on. And by doing so, we’re going to revive the excitement of exploration 
and stop, once and for all, this concept that everything has been done, and 
everything has been discovered, and there is nothing to do, and let’s go and have 
a drink. It’s very, very sad, and I see this more and more. But there are people 
who are starting to make a difference in that sense. So, we need to really tackle 
young people in schools.
OPENING PHOTO: 
Backdropped against the blue and white 
Earth 130 nautical miles below, astronaut 
Mark C. Lee tests the new Simpliﬁ ed Aid 
for EVA Rescue (SAFER) system. 
(NASA Image Number STS064-217-008).
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SYLVIA EARLE: If I could jump in on this. I was so dismayed by this cover story 
on a new magazine, I think it was U.S. News and World Report last spring, about 
the great age of exploration being over. That the great frontiers were during the 
time of Magellan and Columbus and all that. And yes, there’s much to be done 
out in space, but this planet is largely explored. I actually sat in an Explorer’s 
Club banquet one evening and listened to a spokesperson for space exploration 
talk about how the only frontiers left were up in the sky, until Kathy Sullivan 
kicked the speaker from under the table, and I got up and gave him a laser look 
from across the room. We’re talking Carl Sagan here. 
And he backtracked and said, “Oh, yes, most of the ocean has yet to really be 
explored.” And that’s the point, you know? If I were in charge, the administrator 
of an agency with the objective of looking at the solar system and surveying all 
the planets and all the things and even beyond, I’d say, “That blue one! That one 
there with all the water. That’s the one we really need to concentrate on because 
that’s where the action is!” If you’re looking for life, ﬁ nd the water. And we’ve 
got it. It’s here.
And my greatest fear is that we, with all of our technology and knowledge 
about how dependent we are on the natural systems that support us, we’re 
going to let the system degrade to the point where our species is going to be in 
trouble. We are in trouble! The thing is, we don’t appreciate it. I’m all for looking 
skyward and in every direction of exploration, but it bafﬂ es me why we aren’t 
really motivated to look inwards. To look at the ocean, to explore it, and to ﬁ nd a 
place for ourselves here within the natural systems that sustain us. And to apply 
this great technology that we have to really understand the magnitude of what we 
don’t know about the ocean, and put it to work for us, for our survival, for our 
well-being. This is the time.
In the next ten years, if we don’t really take action, we’re going to lose the 
chance with many of the species that we have taken for granted all our lives—
tuna, swordﬁ sh, and the like. It’s going to be gone! Coral reefs and all these other 
systems that are at risk right now. We have the capacity to turn things around. 
The real question is, are we going to use our knowledge in the spirit of exploration 
to do it? I mean, Goethe said, “It’s not enough just to know. You must act.” Well, 
we know. Do we have the capacity now to act? 
JOHN CHATTERTON: The spirit of exploration is certainly one thing. But 
exploring requires resources. It requires money. And right now, we’re very much 
satisﬁ ed with spending money on weapons of war, on SUVs, on things that are 
really counterproductive to our best interests. And, certainly, one of those things 
would be exploration. 
JAMES CAMERON: Well, I think that’s an excellent point, you know. I guess I 
tried to make it—probably crudely—that the type of exploration that remains 
to be done on our planet requires more advanced technology than previously. 
You could do a lot and put your names in the history books with a small ship—
which was state-of-the-art at the time—or some sled dogs and some true grit 
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and some luck. These days, none of those things are sufﬁ cient. You need large 
organizations like NASA or NOAA, Wood’s Hole [Oceanographic Institution] or 
MBARI [Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute] or some body like that to 
provide technology and support staff and engineering and so on, so it does boil 
down to a budget issue. 
Go back to Mike’s formula, you know? Cost is a factor, the likelihood of 
success is a factor. You run that equation. That applies to the ﬁ nancing [of] a 
movie, the funding of a deep-ocean expedition, or an entire research program that 
might deal with the deep. People look at it and say, “What’s the reward? What’s 
in it for me?” But there are new and interesting ways to ﬁ nance explorations 
that didn’t exist before. The deep ocean is revealing such vast biodiversity that 
whole new genomes are being revealed, and there are pharmaceutical companies 
that are interested in bioprospecting the deep ocean, which will allow them to 
create new drugs, new treatments, and so on. So there’s renewed interest in pure 
exploration, in a sense, and biosampling in realms that previously were being 
overlooked as not economically viable. 
So it’s just a question of being creative about how we create the funding 
paradigms. I’ve tried to do something a little bit unusual. In the past, ﬁ lmmakers 
have piggybacked on scientiﬁ c expeditions that were going anyway for reasons 
of the goals of their various parent institutions. We ﬂ ipped it around on our 
last ﬁ lm and got the money from the media sources, then went to the scientiﬁ c 
community and said, “Hey, we’re going out with submersibles to the hydrothermal 
vents in the East Paciﬁ c Rise and the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. Who wants to come 
along and take advantage of these assets that we’re marshaling out there for 
imaging purposes?” 
And interestingly, our best response was from the astrobiology community. 
We wound up taking researchers from Ames and Johnson Space Center and from 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory with us out there to—not to do analogue research, but 
to look at the biology of the deep vents and relate it to what they might ﬁ nd in 
the fossil record on Mars or other places in the solar system and beyond. So we 
were actually using media and entertainment funding to help with science and 
exploration. There are different ways to skin the cat, but I think the important 
thing is for everyone collectively to try to engender the passion for exploration 
in the next generation. 
And part of that is reminding them of the heroes of the past and keeping 
that image alive, and part of that is reminding them that there is so much of the 
world and of the universe that has yet to be explored. It is within our grasp, and 
it’s a real adventure that we can really have and really enjoy in our lifetimes, if we 
put our will toward doing that. 
SYLVIA EARLE: What is the cost of not exploring? That’s the real factor. 
ANDY PRESBY: My name is Andy Presby. I’m a student here at the school. When 
a person of my meager accomplishments attempts to suggest something that may 
be new to a group such as this, he must do so with a certain degree of humility. 
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I hope you will recognize the respect that I have for everyone in this room and 
everyone, particularly, at that table.  I think you guys are missing the point. 
I’ve heard a lot of talk over the last couple of days, and I’ve been a space nut 
since I was three years old and my daddy took me to see one of Mr. Roddenberry’s 
movies. However, we talk a lot about the scientiﬁ c beneﬁ t. We talk a lot about the 
personal exploratory beneﬁ t. For example, exploring Mount Everest. You then go 
and talk about the need to inspire the next generation of explorers, and I completely 
agree with you, Mr. Cameron, that that is absolutely required. You’ve talked about 
the cost. We talked yesterday about a goal, and typically, when I hear somebody in 
the space community talk about a goal, they mean a planet. They mean a body. I 
don’t think that’s the goal that will inspire that [next] generation of explorers. 
We have for the ﬁ rst time in human history come to recognize that, as you 
say, Mr. Lovell, we are living on a spacecraft, a giant spacecraft that we didn’t 
design and we don’t know how it works. Now we’re screwing around with the life 
support mechanisms. I work in submarines. I understand and fully appreciate the 
need to keep life support gear running, but I also understand the need to explore 
the environment around me and, perhaps, ﬁ nd alternative means through which 
the needs of—what is it now?—six and a half billion people who all want the 
American standard of living, which, if I am not mistaken, involves approximately 
two personal slaves worth of energy per year per person.
We live in an environment that’s ﬂ ooded with energy. Space is full of it. 
I hear folks talking about very narrow goals, and we’re talking about scientiﬁ c 
goals. We’re talking about exploratory goals and personal goals, and those are all 
important. Those are all immediate short-term goals, but I argue that, to inspire 
the next generation of explorers, you need to speak about long-term goals such as 
ﬁ nding ways to relieve the pressure that we place on our environment by looking 
at, and yes, it’s going to be expensive, sir, ways of moving resource production 
and other systems such as that off planet. 
I have a tremendous interest, and everyone sitting here in this row has a 
tremendous interest, in the sources of human conﬂ ict. The two sources of human 
conﬂ ict, as my friends have said, are the misunderstood “other,” close proximity 
to same, and lack of resources. Why don’t we speak about that?
DAVID HALPERN: Very well said by the next generation. 
JAMES CAMERON: I wholeheartedly agree that energy is probably going to be the 
source of conﬂ ict. It is currently the source of conﬂ ict. It is going to continue to be 
the source of conﬂ ict, and there may be energy sources revealed, whether it is mining 
helium-3 on the Moon, doing off-planet fusion production, creating antimatter on 
the back side of the Moon where the earth is shielded, or whatever you want to do. 
I think these are good ideas. I think that the issue of solving the problems with our 
life support system here—which is something I personally am passionate about 
but didn’t speak about today because, frankly, I knew my colleagues here would 
do it because I know them well—is a separate issue  from exploration. I think that 
there are aspects of exploration that are survival requirements. 
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When Sylvia talks about the risk of not exploring, it’s really the risk of 
not having the technical capability to explore. We build our muscles slowly to 
go out and do these things. We are still on an indeﬁ nite hold in low Earth orbit, 
building up the muscle to learn how to support human beings for long duration 
in order to be able to go further. We are relying on our robots now to be our 
precursors out there. We have to build up this capability, and, personally, I believe 
you do have to have goals to do that. You have to have a focusing element. It can’t 
just be an abstract thing: Let’s go out and solve our energy problems out in the 
universe. We won’t solve them at the Moon. We’ll solve them here, generating 
the technology that enables that exploration. 
In my mind, I uncouple the abstract goal of exploration, which is to satisfy 
the human soul—yearning, understanding, all those things—from the hard core 
nuts and bolts activity of exploration, which has always spawned so much in 
the way of economic enhancement of this country and of the other developed 
countries, because we put so much energy into the technology required to do 
these difﬁ cult and exotic things. We will develop an improved nuclear power 
system. We will develop fusion power. We will develop some of these things, and 
the control systems for same, in the course of trying to get to Mars or do these 
high energy things that we have to do in order to explore the solar system. Our 
understanding of distant stars from orbiting next-generation space telescopes 
and so on may be the key turning the latch of ﬁ guring out how to have an 
unlimited power supply here on Earth that will replace oil, and give us another 
different excuse in the future for going to war. Right now, our excuse is oil. 
SYLVIA EARLE: While we do look for alternatives to our current energy 
sources—and we should deﬁ nitely do that—meanwhile, we can make better use 
of what we’ve already got:  more efﬁ cient use of our current energy resources. 
It is not just in terms of oil, gas, and things of this nature; I mean in terms of 
food resources, too. Twenty million tons of wildlife extracted out of the ocean 
is simply thrown-away bycatch. More than 300 thousand marine mammals 
every year are destroyed in the process of catching ﬁ sh. We are seeing the ﬁ sh 
that we are taking just collapsing. You know we are too good at catching these 
things. We are hunter-gatherers, but we’re armed with new technologies that 
our predecessors could not imagine. So, we need to put on the brakes and think 
about more effective use of the resources that are here. We couldn’t support six 
billion people with wildlife from the land. Ed Wilson, Harvard biologist, says 
we’ve seen consumed “the large, the slow and the tasty from North America over 
10 thousand years”. It’s only taken us 50 years with our new technologies to do 
the same thing with the ocean. We are very close to losing some of the creatures 
that we have thought inﬁ nitely able to rebound no matter [how many] we 
extracted from the ocean. Exploration, in terms of ﬁ nding solutions to the very 
problem you have posed—how do we ﬁ nd the place for ourselves that is going 
to last, knowing that our numbers have increased three times in my lifetime, 
but the planet stays the same size? Our capacity to support us is currently being 
stretched. It’s not just oil and gas. It’s oxygen in the atmosphere. What are we 
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doing to that part of the world, the ocean, that is generating most of the oxygen, 
absorbing much of the carbon dioxide? We’re messing around with it. We need 
to know how it works. That means explore it, and then, take heed. Not just, yeah, 
we’ve got all this new information, but acting on what we are learning and doing 
it in a way that secures a place for ourselves so we can continue to explore as long 
as humankind survives. 
ANDY PRESBY: I don’t know if anybody else wants to comment, but I didn’t 
mean to focus speciﬁ cally on energy. It was an example, and one that we can all 
relate to. I don’t know if that helps anybody respond to my question. 
JIM GARVIN: Jim Garvin, NASA, Moon and Mars Chief Scientist. They’re our 
resources. I think the tenet I’m hearing in response to this great question is that 
we have to separate exploration, as a catalytic tool to make things better, from the 
applied end game of exploration that we can document in history, from Magellan’s 
search for cloves and in ﬁ nding ﬁ rst orbit of Earth. How do we measure that? One 
of [the] things we are asked all the time is, what is the yield from these catalytic 
things? Whether they be to inspire, what are they? We use lots of terms, and 
I think this audience would be wonderful to try come up with those metrics. 
This young man says inspiration isn’t enough. Okay. As we catalyze, what is? The 
one I always ﬁ nd easy, maybe because I’m simpleminded and not yet quantum-
computing, is IT. Information technology. Why are we doing it better in some 
places? Many reasons. Smart people. Maybe that’s an area we ought to look at as 
part of exploration to extend ourselves to think better and to use our resources 
better to better inspire.  Anyway, that’s my comment for the group.
JAMES CAMERON: I think there is an inspirational dividend to exploration. I 
think this is one of the primary reasons to do it. I think you have to ask yourself, 
why are the Chinese doing a space program that basically mirrors what we were 
doing thirty years ago? Why is it important to them now, as the fastest growing 
economy on the planet, to be doing it, to simply be reproducing an accomplishment 
that is already done? Because they know that the inspirational dividend within 
their own borders is going to be signiﬁ cant in inspiring kids to go into technical 
careers in math, engineering, and science. So, the value that they are getting out 
of it is much greater than what they are putting into it. They’ve done the math. 
They can’t win that race any more. 
I think we should ask ourselves, what are we losing by not exploring, in 
terms of the inspirational dividend to a younger generation? One of the biggest 
problems this country is going to be facing is the lack of “fresh outs” in engineering, 
math, and sciences in the next ten years or so. We’ve got some big problems to 
solve, and we’re too far down the path as a technological species to go back to the 
garden and try to pretend none of this ever happened. We’ve got to get ourselves 
out. We’ve got to think ourselves out of it as a technological species. We have to 
continue to build those tools and that capability. 
Certainly, with the vast amounts available for military procurement, you’ve 
got people working in math and science and so on making pretty good livings there. 
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Wouldn’t you rather have an alternative to that, though, in space exploration 
where we can focus our minds, improve our IT capability, improve our control 
over energy systems, and, by the way, understand long-term regenerative life 
support systems? If we’re going to go to Mars, the point is to stay there, not 
simply touch base and run back. We’re going to have to learn how to live there 
with very, very ﬁ nite resources. 
The more we learn about closed loop ecosystems, the more we need to 
know about the big, closed loop ecosystem that we live in, and vice versa.  One 
body of knowledge will feed the other. I think there is an awful lot to be gained 
societally for the investment that we are making in space exploration, and I would 
certainly like to see a proportionate amount spent on ocean exploration. I know 
Sylvia is enlightened in that she is one of the few people in the ocean community 
that doesn’t constantly complain about those billions that NASA gets. 
When they’re ﬁ ghting for tens of thousands or hundreds of thousand of 
dollars, she is enlightened enough to know that all knowledge improves us all and 
that exploration should be constantly going in both directions. I agree with that 
as well. I could talk for hours about the value of analogues, of ocean exploration, 
of space exploration . . . And how you could build muscle in both places . . .
JOHN CHATTERTON: The other thing is that exploration should not just inspire 
more exploration. Exploration should inspire additional exploration, but it should 
inspire us to think big, to work on problems like energy, to work on problems like 
the environment, to work on problems like population. Everything that we’ve got 
on our to do list as a species, we need to apply ourselves, if we’re going to ﬁ nd 
solutions. We don’t really have that much in the way of a choice. 
JIM PAWELCZYK: My name is Jim Pawelczyk and I’m at Penn State University. 
James Cameron, you mentioned in your talk that we’ve already picked the low-
hanging fruit with regard to exploration. All of you have spoken about inspiring 
the next generation of explorers. Do we need a different educational paradigm in 
order to make those things mesh? And if so, what do you think it looks like?
SYLVIA EARLE: I have three children and four grandsons. It disturbs me that 
we aren’t getting this generation coming along—the kids—actually out doing 
things in good, wild places. In fact, our safety mechanisms in schools dictate 
against it. You go to Hawaii, kids aren’t allowed to go get in the water as a part 
of their school activity—not above their ankles, anyway—because, you know, 
it’s not safe. So whatever it takes, whether it’s museums, aquariums, moms and 
dads, whoever, we need to take the responsibility for getting kids connected with 
the real world, the living world, the wild world. We’re missing it in the rather 
structured form of education as it is currently being conducted, not just in this 
country, but most of the rest of the world where education systems are—really, I 
mean, it’s important to learn the ABCs and the 1-2-3s, but we’ve also got to learn 
that we’re a part of this greater system, and that’s missing.
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PAUL SPUDIS: Yes, Paul Spudis, Applied Physics Lab. I want to thank Andy for 
stimulating a really good conversation here, because I think he’s nibbling around 
the edges of something. I’ve been listening to this for the last couple of days and 
I’ve heard a lot of interesting things. But I have two comments. First, in regard 
to this argument of spending money on weapons versus exploration, they’re 
actually complimentary and, in fact, historically, the exploration is something 
we let the military do during peacetime. And all the great explorations of the 
Paciﬁ c weren’t undertaken because they were interested in the natural history of 
Polynesia, they actually wanted good maps that they could use to retain British 
control of the seaways. 
The second point I want to make is that I think that we’ve nibbled around the 
edges of the issue of why we do exploration. And I think there’s three motivations 
to it, of which we’ve only discussed two. The ﬁ rst motivation was discussed 
yesterday, and that’s sort of the personal gratiﬁ cation. You know, because it’s 
there, I want to go, I’m curious, I want to know. The second motivation is societal 
and collective. It’s, we explore to get strategic information, to inform ourselves 
so that we can make better guesses on how to do something else, whether it’s to 
identify other resources or to develop a technology or something like that. But 
no one’s talked about the third motivation. And that is exploration as a prelude 
to settlement. We explore because we want to go live there. And one of the really 
interesting things that we got out of Apollo is an appreciation for the fact that, 
sooner or later, life on this planet is doomed. We know this because we know 
that impacts occur, and we know that in the past they’ve come darned close 
to nearly completely sterilizing the Earth—wiping out almost 95 percent of all 
living species. So, ultimately, someday, somehow, that’s going to happen here. 
And one of the big motivations, I think, for exploring space, is to create 
additional reservoirs of human culture, so that if Earth is destroyed, or the 
biosphere is destroyed, there will be, the human race will survive. Now, that’s 
a long-term thing, certainly isn’t a part of going to the Moon or going to Mars. 
But doing that by going to these places, we’re going to learn the skills we need to 
develop the ability to live off-planet. Does anyone have any comment on that?
PENNY BOSTON: Penny Boston, from New Mexico Tech. I’ve been thinking 
about another type of risk that we really haven’t addressed yesterday and today. 
And it’s really a risk to exploration. When I look at everybody here who’s doing 
exploration, we’re all relying more and more on ever greater degrees of technology. 
So that the point at which one can participate in this, the number of people 
becomes narrower and narrower. You have to be well-educated and you have to 
have access to resources. And I think back to the famous essay by C.P. Snow, in 
the middle of the last century, the two cultures where you see this increasing 
dichotomy between those who know and those who have, and those who do not 
know and do not have. And it seems that, unless we attend to that growing bridge 
in society, that ultimately threatens our future in terms of exploration. I see 
symptoms of that in these sort of vacuous reality shows that are on TV. As much 
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as we may denigrate them [the reality TV shows], what it seems to me to indicate 
is that the vast majority of people are feeling more and more uncomfortable with 
their excessively cloistered and safe lives, and that, perhaps, this need to acquire 
risk is general throughout the population, even though people like us manifest 
it maybe more obviously. And so, this potential danger to all of our enterprise, 
whether it be ocean or land or space, seems to me a festering element that we 
need to address.
JAMES CAMERON: I think that’s an excellent point. And my answer would relate 
to the previous question about education. You suggested that the problem is that 
the technology narrows the band of people that can actually participate. But, 
in fact, technology can also be an enabler for people everywhere to participate, 
through improvements in information technology. And, you know, theoretically, 
we’re all wired up to one big human nervous system. So, if we have an avatar, 
whether it’s robotic or human, out there somewhere at the bottom of the ocean or 
in space doing something that’s interesting, there’s no reason why we can’t all look 
over its shoulder and participate. But it requires a will on the part of the people 
budgeting that operation to make sure that they put in as a line item, not just 
outreach in the sense of, “We’re going to tell people what we’re doing and show 
them some images,” but participatory outreach in the sense that, “We’re going to 
let you look over their shoulders. We’re going to spend that extra two or three 
percent on a major mission to let people actually participate.” And I know that the 
recent activities on Mars have done an absolutely stellar job in doing that, if it can 
be judged by the number of hits to the NASA Web site—I think it’s up to 11 billion 
now or something like that. People are looking over the shoulder of those little 
rovers. And if we had human beings there right now doing microbiology—I know 
that’s your ﬁ eld—or whatever, if we should get so lucky as to ﬁ nd some evidence 
of that on Mars, people would be able to participate in that. So I think the solution 
is always going to be there as a technical solution. It’s a question of imagining it 
before the fact and incorporating it into what we’re doing.
SYLVIA EARLE: Just endorsing your observation about the need to have risk. It’s 
a kind of spice. Probably more valuable than cloves. 
DAVID HALPERN: With that parting comment, I think it seems appropriate to 
bring this session to an end. I’d like to thank Administrator Sean O’Keefe and 
Ames Director Scott Hubbard for the wonderful facilities that we’re in now. And 
I especially want to thank each of the panelists for their dedication and their 
wonderful comments and their inspiration for what we’ve been doing. And I’d 
like to thank, ﬁ nally, the audience for the wonderful questions and wonderful 
attentiveness. And with that, I have one more thing. Those of you who are from 
the East Coast probably have never lived through an earthquake, but you just had 
a 5.9 earthquake about 120 miles off the coast. So this here session is memorable 
in many ways. Thank you again.     ■
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In this symposium, we’ve heard from women and men exploring the earth, the seas, and 
the limits of human capability. We’ve discussed personal risk, programmatic risk, technical 
risk, survival of the species risk, and the most important of all, the risk of not exploring 
at all. We are compelled by some ancient instinct to push the limits, to go where humans 
can’t survive except for brief periods of time or with signiﬁ cant technical support. 
My name is John Grunsfeld. I’m the chief scientist of NASA. I’m an astronaut; I’ve 
had the privilege to ﬂ y four times in space. I’ve done ﬁ ve space walks, so in fact—along 
the lines of going to places where people can’t survive—I do, in fact, work in a vacuum, 
along with many of the others in this room. And it’s truly a privilege to have been able to 
be involved at the infancy of space exploration. In this session, we do turn to that ultimate 
challenge, our ﬁ rst steps off the home planet. We live in a truly remarkable time. 
As we speak here, as we’re comfortably sitting in this environment, Gennady 
Padalka, the commander on the International Space Station, and Mike Fincke, the chief 
science ofﬁ cer, are spending their 163rd day in space. (I may be off by a day.) For over three 
years, we’ve had 24/7–365 occupation of the International Space Station. The ultimate 
service, if you will. And I think that’s pretty remarkable. 
Spirit and opportunity are still alive on Mars; we’ll hear more about that. Cassini 
is at Saturn taking unbelievable images, things that we’ve never seen before, things 
that we certainly don’t understand. We have the Hubble Space Telescope, the Spitzer 
Telescope, and the Chandra X-ray Observatory astronomy facility—three of the four 
great observatories, all exploring space and discovering things that we couldn’t even 
imagine when these instruments were conceived. 
We now know that there are over a 100 planets around nearby stars, when a decade 
ago, we only knew about our own solar system. And, in spite of this tremendous growth 
of our knowledge of our home planet, the solar system, and the universe, it turns out 
from recent observations that we only know a tiny bit about what makes up our universe. 
Ninety-six percent of the universe is ﬁ lled with stuff and we don’t have a clue what it is. 
But I have to say, we’re a little bit arrogant. Because when I was a graduate student 
and a postdoc and a faculty member at Caltech, it was believed that we knew about most 
of the universe, the history of the universe, the Big Bang and inﬂ ation and expansion of 
the universe. And I thought that most of the great frontiers in physics had been solved and 
we were cleaning up the details. And, as you heard this morning on the sea, we talk about 
having explored to the ends of the Earth, but 96 percent is still unexplored. For most of the 
universe, we still don’t have a clue what makes it tick. We are really in the infancy in space 
exploration. Only 12 people have walked on the Moon, our closest planetary surface, and it’s 
time to leave the cradle. 
In all the preceding talks, the central theme has been risk—that’s what we’re here 
to talk about. One element that has been discussed, peripherally or centrally, is what I 
consider to be one of the central issues, which is teamwork. Space exploration sets a new 
extreme as a team activity. I think we can draw a parallel to Jim Lovell on Apollo 13, the 
152
N
A
SA
 Im
age/R
en
ee B
ouchard
ultimate team of folks 200,000 miles from planet Earth with a pretty terrible problem. 
And Mike Foale, as he described last night, on the Mir space station, an international 
team also with really tough times. And how the team in space and on planet Earth came 
together to solve those problems that led to the ultimate success of those missions, the 
safe return of the crew. 
For this session, we’ve assembled a team to continue this great discussion on 
risk. And I dare say we have, indeed, put together a team of stars. 
John Grunsfeld, NASA Chief Scientist and Astronaut
Harrison “Jack” Schmitt is a geologist, astronaut, and U.S. senator. He received a bachelor of science 
degree in science from the California Institute of Technology in 1957 and a doctorate of philosophy 
in geology from Harvard University in 1964. He was a member of the Apollo 17 mission in 1972 and, 
thereby, the ﬁ rst and only geologist to land on the Moon. Schmitt served from 1977 to 1983 as a United 
States Senator (Republican) representing New Mexico. Harrison is a founder and chairman of Interlune-
Intermars Initiative, Inc., an organization that advocates the private sector’s role in lunar exploration and 
developing lunar resources. He is chair emeritus of The Annapolis Center (risk assessment evaluation) 
and an adjunct professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, teaching “Resources from Space.” 
Harrison consults, speaks, and writes on policy issues of space and the science of the Moon.
Harrison “Jack” Schmitt
Former NASA Astronaut
One of the things that occurred to me that might be worth 
emphasizing, relative to other discussions that have already occurred, is a brief summary of 
the reward that came with whatever risk that was run—personal as well as national—with 
respect to the Apollo program. Certainly it was conceived in the context of the Cold War, 
and it succeeded spectacularly. And even some of the émigrés that I’ve had an opportunity to 
talk with say that it had a tremendous inﬂ uence on the conﬁ dence of the Soviet leadership 
relative to President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, in that they believed—maybe 
more so than many of the people in this country—that we would succeed, because we 
succeeded in Apollo where they had not. 
Secondly, the technology base that Apollo enhanced—I think you’re hard put to 
ﬁ nd any speciﬁ c item that it created, but it certainly enhanced the technology base. That 
technology base is available to us still today and has accelerated human progress in so many 
different ways and in so many different ﬁ elds. 
The cultural and societal legacy is often, I think, forgotten. It was a tremendous 
conﬁ dence-builder among the American people at the time. And, really, as we traveled the 
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world as ambassadors during the Apollo 17 postﬂ ight tour, it was a conﬁ dence 
builder for people all over the world. Now, whether we’ve lived up to the legacy 
of that conﬁ dence or not is another discussion, but nevertheless, these kinds of 
projects do have that kind of effect, in that, if we can go to the Moon, then we 
surely can do some other things. And the answer is that you can if you motivate 
young men and women to believe it’s the most important thing they’re going to 
do with their lives. If you can create that kind of motivation, indeed, you can do 
just about anything. 
And, ﬁ nally, from my perspective of actually having been on the Apollo 17 
mission, the scientiﬁ c legacy is just unfathomable. It is absolutely a magniﬁ cent 
legacy of Apollo and its precursors that they created our modern understanding 
of the origin and evolution of the Moon, a foundation that’s been built upon by 
some of you with the Clementine and Lunar Prospector missions. It’s something 
that now relates directly to further understanding of the terrestrial planets, not 
the least of which are the Earth and Mars. Imagine, once in a while, what it would 
be if we did not have that legacy of information about the Moon—what kind 
of thoughts you would be having on Mars based on the information currently 
coming in? So this, in a very brief way, I think 
illustrates why the reward was so fantastically 
important and so much worth the risk that a 
few people, and the Nation and managers and 
families, took in pursuit of that goal. 
What I would like to spend a little 
more time on today is thinking about the 
probability of success, which is the inverse 
handmaiden, if you will, as a measure of 
risk. A few years ago, in a paper that I’m sure 
nobody saw that I gave at one of the space 
conferences in Albuquerque, I tried to deal 
with the evaluation, in a semiquantitative way, 
of the various approaches that one might take 
to return to deep space, and, speciﬁ cally, to the 
Moon. As you might expect from my biases, the 
private sector approach won in that evaluation, 
but it was on the assumption that there are 
commercially viable lunar resources—namely, 
as was mentioned by James Cameron and 
stimulated by the young man here to my right, 
the possibility of lunar helium-3 fusion power 
as one of several potential sources of electrical 
power that we’re going to need over the next 
50 years and beyond. If you want the latest lay analysis of what the envelope of 
ﬁ nancial and technical success is for a lunar helium-3 initiative, I will recommend 
to you the October [2004] Popular Mechanics.
OPENING PHOTO: 
Astronaut Eugene A. Cernan (left) and 
scientist-astronaut Harrison H. “Jack” 
Schmitt aboard the Apollo 17 spacecraft 
during the Apollo program’s last lunar 
landing mission. 
(NASA Image # AS17-134-20426)
Scientist-astronaut Harrison H. “Jack” Schmitt collects lunar rake 
samples at Station 1 during the ﬁ rst Apollo 17 extravehicular activity 
(EVA-1) at the Taurus-Littrow landing site. 
(NASA Image # AS-17-163-24148)
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But, nonetheless, clean, low-cost energy is one way that we can solve 
many of the problems discussed this morning. It is clearly the challenge of this 
generation and subsequent generations as well. My own estimate is that in order 
to just provide four-ﬁ fths of the world’s population with the level of standard of 
living that we enjoy today, we’re looking at 10 to 11 times the amount of energy 
by 2050 that we consume today per capita. I’m not going to go into that any more 
deeply, but if someone is interested, I’m sure I could ﬁ nd the paper that would 
go into it more deeply. 
Well, ladies and gentlemen, risk is always with us, as has been made very 
clear by this outstanding symposium. And there are always going to be people 
around us, many of them in this room, that are willing to take the risks, whatever 
they might be, because we can conceive of the rewards. We’re human beings, and 
one of the great advantages we have as a species is we conceive of these kinds of 
things. In major technological-based endeavors, I have come to the conclusion, 
studying this over the last 20 or 30 years to some degree, that there really are 
three dominant, interrelated determinants for success. 
We were talking about the probability of success here, which is the inverse 
of risk. One is the size of the management reserve funding; second is the 
management experience and ﬂ exibility to carry out this great project; and third 
is a cadre, a reservoir, of motivated young men and women. 
Now, ﬁ rst let me address the size of the management reserve of funding. 
In Apollo, you all know the story—true or not, but it certainly worked out that 
way—of Jim Webb getting an estimate of what it was going to take to accomplish 
Apollo and then doubling it and doubling it again, and that was our management 
reserve. And we used all of it. We didn’t go over it, but we used all of it. And the 
reason a management reserve [is] so important is [that] it enables management, 
then, to deal with the unknown unknowns and with erroneous initial assumptions 
that might have been made about the approach to the problem. 
Apollo is a good example of where an adequate management reserve brought 
success. The Shuttle is an example, particularly in the early days, of where an 
inadequate management reserve caused signiﬁ cant problems. I happened to be 
in the Senate when Shuttle was headed for its ﬁ rst ﬂ ight, and in 1978 it was 
clear that Shuttle was not going to get to ﬁ rst ﬂ ight without a major inﬂ ux of 
funds. The Carter administration, at the time, was not willing to ﬁ ght for that 
“ ”
. . . OUR EXPERIENCE WITH APOLLO AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES INDICATE 
THAT YOU NEED TO HAVE MOTIVATING OBJECTIVES THAT ARE ABOUT 10 YEARS 
APART, PLUS OR MINUS A COUPLE OF YEARS. 
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supplemental budget. I think it was the ﬁ scal ’79 budget, if I remember correctly, 
that needed the supplemental. Until a good friend of ours named Hans Mark 
was able to push and persuade President Carter that the Shuttle was required for 
veriﬁ cation of the SALT II treaty, which Carter was very interested in, we were 
not going to get that supplemental. 
But, fortunately, Hans did persuade the President to do that and we suddenly 
had the White House helping us get the supplemental through a Democratic 
Congress. I might say that Hans had set that one up a little bit, because the payloads 
had been designed for the Shuttle and not for ELV [Expendable Launch Vehicle], 
so he had a pretty good argument. That does present, though, an ethical dilemma, 
and I don’t have an answer for this dilemma. It depends on what you believe the 
ultimate value and reward of the project in hand will be, in that, if you, in a legitimate 
analysis, know that you have inadequate funding and continue with inadequate 
management reserve to take on a new project, should you take it on? Maybe the 
Postgraduate school here could have a seminar or something on that subject and 
try to come up with an answer, but I really don’t have it. Because I think you can 
argue that the managers of NASA at the time felt that even if they realized they had 
an inadequate management reserve of funding, that if they didn’t go ahead with 
the Space Shuttle under the constraints that the Nixon administration established, 
that we would not have a manned space ﬂ ight program. So I’ll leave that dilemma 
with you, and maybe you can debate it over the next beer. 
Now the second thing, the management experience and ﬂ exibility, was 
certainly epitomized by the NASA management team in place between 1967 and, 
in particular, in 1968–72, when it really did crystallize and became a team that 
is to be envied, I think, by all of us. And it was critical to have that kind of team, 
based initially from the heritage of the NACA, the National Advisory Committee 
on Aeronautics, and added to by people like Sam Phillips and Bob Seamans and 
others, who came in and provided that really remarkable team that led us through 
to success, not only for the ﬁ rst landing, but, also, the success for Apollo as a 
whole. And, indeed, that team of managers, in particular Bob Gilruth, George Low, 
and Sam Phillips, made decisions well prior to Apollo 11 in order to optimize the 
Apollo system so that it could be used for scientiﬁ c exploration of the Moon. 
All you’d have to do is look at the decisions that were made. The lunar rover, the 
Block II Lunar Module, the advanced ALSEP [Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments 
Package] and, strangely enough, the agreement that we should begin to fully train 
the Apollo crew, beginning with Jim Lovell’s crew, in exploration geology. And the 
combination of all of that meant that we got that legacy I mentioned earlier of a 
remarkable scientiﬁ c return from Apollo. 
The third and maybe most important determinant for success is to have 
that reservoir of young men and women available to apply their stamina and their 
imagination to the project at hand. Jim Lovell did not mention it yesterday, but Gene 
Kranz, after the Apollo 13 crisis had been resolved, did an analysis of the average 
age of people in the Mission Control Center and it was 26 years old. And most of 
them had already been there for several years. And there was just no question that 
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you’ve got to have that kind of stamina, that kind of imagination and ﬂ exibility and 
willingness to work as teams, or you probably are not going to be successful. 
Now, having said that, I also feel that our experience with Apollo and 
subsequent activities indicate that you need to have motivating objectives that 
are about 10 years apart, plus or minus a couple of years. But that’s about what I 
think human evolution has given us in terms of our ability to concentrate for 16-
hour days, 8-day weeks for a long period of time in order to make sure that which 
is to be done happens. So, as we look to establishing a long-term capability for 
indeﬁ nite exploration of our solar system and, eventually beyond, I think we have 
to still think in terms of how we quantize that period into speciﬁ c objectives 
that each generation can identify with and accomplish. Now, with respect to 
public support and political support, I don’t think there’s any question that we 
in the United States believe and will continue to believe—and certainly NASA 
believes—that visibility and transparency are absolutely essential. 
If you’re going to have active and sustained political and explanatory 
support for efforts like we are about, you also need to have a White House 
deeply committed and involved at basically all levels. There is no substitute in 
the Congress for an active interest and activity from the White House. Whether 
it’s a Democratic or Republican-controlled Congress, you still have to have that. 
Otherwise, you just don’t get their attention very well. 
Now, on the private sector side of things, you need to have investor 
support. And to have investor support, the most important thing, of course, is to 
have competitive returns on investment. That is, competitive with other uses of 
capital. If you can do that, if you can show a path for that return on investment 
in a relatively short period of time, you have a predictable path for success. In 
fact, it’s more predictable than the government, and that’s why we’re going to 
concentrate on that right now. I know what the criteria for success are in a private 
initiative. I know what they are in a government initiative. But the ones in the 
private sector are much more predictable. Or you just need to have an angel out 
there with irrational exuberance. And we’re hoping to ﬁ nd one of those one of 
these days, and we’ll be on our way.     ■
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John asked me to be on the panel and talk a little bit about 
personal risk. How do you decide, from a very personal standpoint, what risks you’re willing 
to take? Speciﬁ cally, to talk about the thoughts that went through my head, when I agreed to 
be a crew member on Mir, in connection with personal risk. It’s a fact that a person is born 
and from the time you are born, you are taking risks. Every single person, every day of their 
life, is taking risks in one form or the other, and, as you go through life, you are learning 
to mitigate the risk. What risks you are willing to accept, what risks you are not willing to 
accept in such and such a case. Well, I’m not going to go back to the day I was born to talk 
about how I think I learned to accept risk, but I will go back to 1962 when I was 20 years 
old. I just had graduated from college, I was 20 years old, I had a passion to ﬂ y, and I had no 
job. As you can see, that didn’t correlate very well, but I knew that what I wanted more than 
anything in the world was an airplane that I could ﬂ y. 
So my father asked me what I was planning on doing, and I said I was going to buy an 
airplane. And he looked at me and he said, “You’ve never even bought a car yet! How do you 
even know how to buy an airplane?” And I said, “Father, don’t you worry! It’s airplanes we’re 
Mir Adventures
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talking about. Aviation.” And I said, “Everybody in aviation is absolutely honest, 
so don’t you worry. Nobody will sell me a bad airplane!” 
So I didn’t have to worry about how to go about buying an airplane or 
what to look for, et cetera. Well, I went out searching, and I found an airplane. 
Not a pretty airplane, but it was the only thing that I could get in the panhandle 
of Oklahoma, and, trust me, this is really true, it was sold to me by an aviation 
salesman with a glass eye. And he told me it was absolutely perfect and he would 
show me the logbook he had. It just had a brand new fabric job and so on. I 
bought the airplane, and the next month the airworthiness certiﬁ cate was taken 
away from it, so I was grounded. I thought my life was over. 
But life went on. And I did get a very, very valuable lesson. And the lesson 
I learned was that when you are involved in an activity, just because someone is 
involved in the same activity and maybe they’re using the same words, it doesn’t 
necessarily mean they have the same value system. And when you are working 
with a team, in the activities that you’re in, it’s very important to know that the 
people that you’re investing with have the same value system, and that when 
you’re talking about something, you’re talking about the same thing. 
The other lesson that I learned over the next few years, before I came to 
work at NASA, was I ﬂ ew that airplane and I ﬂ ew other airplanes for several 
thousand hours. I ﬂ ew from Alaska down to Central America, and there were 
always concerns about whether or not you’re going to have an accident. If you 
read aviation reports, it seems that most of the accidents were due, in one way or 
the other, to pilot error. And the biggest concern that I had was, okay, it’s okay if 
you crash, but I didn’t want it to ever be pilot error. 
So I didn’t want the obituaries to read, “Shannon was so stupid. Can you 
believe that she took off in that thunderstorm?” And, so, that sort of tempered 
the decisions that I made. And they are all hard decisions that you make while 
you’re ﬂ ying. Mainly, the hardest decision is not to ﬂ y. And I found that I had 
a very difﬁ cult time doing that, to say no, when I really wanted to go. But, like I 
said, over the years I learned how to do that. 
So I went to work for NASA. And I was very fortunate in working for NASA, 
because with the Shuttle ﬂ ights that I was fortunate to ﬂ y on, I found that there 
was a team that had the same values system. And one of the great beneﬁ ts of 
ﬂ ying and working for NASA was working with the people in Mission Control, 
working with the people at the Cape, because we were all part of a team, we were 
all working together for the same objective. 
So, then the day came when I was asked if I would like to be a crew member 
on Mir. And, of course, I would have said, you didn’t need to ask because I’ve 
been volunteering for years. But I said yes, and then a friend of mine went up to 
Mir before I did, on a ﬂ ight to bring Norm Thagard back. And my friend had not 
been back on earth more than two hours when the phone rang, and my friend said, 
“Shannon, don’t go.” And I said, “Oh? Don’t go where?” She said, “To Mir.” And I 
said, “But why?” And she said, “Because you will be living in a mine shaft for several 
months, and I just can’t picture you living there. So, take my advice, and don’t go.” 
OPENING PHOTO: 
Astronaut Shannon W. Lucid onboard 
the Space Shuttle Atlantis as she returns 
home from her six-month mission on Mir, 
the Russian space station. 
(NASA Image # S79-E-5388)
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“
. . . THE WAY I NEGATED THAT RISK WAS, I CHANGED THE PURPOSE OF 
THE FLIGHT IN MY HEAD . . .  I TOOK WHAT WAS A PERCEIVED RISK AND 
I CHANGED IT INTO WHAT I COULD HANDLE.
”
And so that was one input. Another input was, we trained in Star City in 
Russia, and the week before I was to go back to the United States for three weeks 
before I got on the Shuttle to go up to Mir, I was leaving a movie theater in Moscow 
which doubled as a church on Sunday morning. As I was leaving there, a lady came 
up to me who I didn’t know, and she said, “Are you the American woman that is 
going to go up on that tin can?” And I said, “What?” And she said, “I saw on the 
news. Are you really going to go up and be locked up in a tin can for months with 
two Russians?” And I thought, well, now, that’s a novel way of looking at it. It 
wasn’t quite the way I had been looking at it, and [it] made me think why did I 
really want to do this, because I really wanted to do it in the worst way. 
And there were several reasons. One reason was, because I had had several 
Shuttle ﬂ ights, and I enjoyed them very much. I really enjoyed ﬂ ying in space. 
And if you have a small piece of cake, a big one would be even better. So I ﬁ gured 
that, since I had enjoyed the short Shuttle ﬂ ights I had been on, I would really 
enjoy a longer duration space ﬂ ight. 
And the other reason why I really wanted to go was because I was curious. I 
was very curious to ﬁ nd out what it would be like to live and work in space for a 
long period of time. I was curious to see how the body would adapt. And I really 
wanted to experience that. 
And the other reason was, as a child I’d always wanted to be part of an 
expedition. I mean, I read all the books about expeditions and going off and 
exploring the different places on the Earth. And, in my mind, going for a period of 
time on a long duration spaceﬂ ight on the space station would be the equivalent 
of going on an expedition. Because I had written to National Geographic, I 
had written to everyone I could think of, to ﬁ nd out how you could get on an 
expedition. And it turns out that, basically, you had to know somebody who had 
some money. And since I didn’t know anyone, that option was closed. But this 
was a chance that I had to experience that. So, those were the reasons why I was 
so anxious and so eager to go and ﬂ y on the space station Mir. 
Now, while I was on Mir, there were other risk factors that came in. One 
of them came when I was talking to my daughter on the ham radio one day. 
Anything that I found out of any importance about the program always came 
to me via friends or family members or the ham radio or whatever. And then we 
heard from the program. And my daughter said, “Hey, Mom, guess what? You’re 
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not going to come home when you think you are. You’re going to be stuck up 
there for months.” And I said, “What? What are you talking about?” My daughter 
worked for a contractor that worked for NASA, so she was tied into the chain of 
gossip. And she said, “They’re having some kind of a problem, so don’t pack your 
bags yet, because you’re not coming home.” 
And the ﬁ rst time, as soon as I heard that, I thought, oh my goodness. Because 
I remembered back to meetings that we had had at JSC [Johnson Space Center], and 
we had had them for years before, talking about space station. They were the life 
science meetings about how you should plan a mission. And the gist of it was that 
you could only go in small increments. We had been in Skylab 90 days, 100 days, 
but we had to be very careful. We couldn’t exceed that. We had to have something 
like 10 to 20 missions before we could go beyond 90 days. And then we were going 
to go up to 100 days, and then we were going to go up more. One of these very small 
increments, getting up to where we could spend a longer period of time. 
So my ﬁ rst thought when my daughter told me that was [of] those 
meetings. And I thought, oh my goodness, in one fell swoop we’re going way 
beyond anything they discussed in those meetings. My second thought was, get 
real, Shannon, let’s use a little common sense here. Because there in Star City 
you’ve seen all these people walking around that have been in space for a lot 
longer than you’re going to be up there. And there is nothing wrong with them. 
And, so, common sense negated 
what might have been thought of as 
a perceived risk at that time. 
Now, another risk that I felt 
before I launched was that I wasn’t 
really sure what I was going to be doing 
when I got up on Mir. And I say that 
because we had the U.S. experiments 
that were coming up, the science. But 
we didn’t know when it was going to 
be there, because it was delayed. And 
no one was just real sure when it was 
going to get there. 
And the other thing [perceived 
risk] was due to the complexity of 
the program. I had never been able 
to go through the experiment that 
I was going to be doing end to end. 
So, thinking about it just before we 
launched, I thought, you know, I could be really being set up here, because if you 
go and you weren’t able to do the experiments, you look, professionally, sort of 
bad because you weren’t able to get your work done. 
But, then, the way I negated that risk was, I changed the purpose of the ﬂ ight 
in my head. I was not going up to do the science. I mean, that would have been nice, 
Backdropped against the waters of Cook Strait near New Zealand’s South Island, Russia’s Mir 
Space Station is seen from the aft ﬂ ight deck window of the Space Shuttle Atlantis. 
(NASA Image # STS76-713-036)
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but that wasn’t my personal primary purpose. I thought, the reason I’m going to go, 
and the reason I’m doing this ﬂ ight, is because I want to see what it’s like to have a 
long duration ﬂ ight, and I want to make sure that my crew mates and I get along and 
that we have a great ﬂ ight. And I thought, that I can handle. That’s not dependent 
on any payload coming up, or it’s not depending on having any procedures. 
So I took what was a perceived risk and I changed it into what I could 
handle. Now the next risk that I thought of was, well, people always ask, “Were 
you comfortable living up there on Mir? How did you sleep?” And the reason 
why I was comfortable living on Mir and went to sleep every night without 
any problem was because Soyuz was always attached. It gave you a great deal of 
comfort in your heart knowing that if a problem arose, if there was a ﬁ re, a rapid 
depressurization or anything, you had a way home. You had a lifeboat. You could 
get in the Soyuz and go home. And that you had an automatic abort mode and 
that gave you a tremendous feeling of comfort. 
Now, there was one other risk that arose, and that was, once we got in orbit, 
it turns out—and I didn’t know this ahead of time—the Russian cosmonauts 
were going to do EVAs [Extravehicular Activity]. I thought, that’s ﬁ ne, they’re 
going to go out and do EVAs, and I’m going to sit and watch them. 
Well, about a couple of hours before they went out to do their EVAs, and 
actually, they were already in their EVA underwear, the commander called me 
over and said, “Shannon, quick, come here, I’ve got to train you, because this is 
what you’re going to do while we’re out”. And I said, “What? I am going to be 
doing something?” And then he started rattling off in Russian these long lists of 
commands that I’m supposed to be putting into the solar panels to get them to 
move so the station will work properly. So, I’m losing my mind, so I say, “Whoa, 
whoa, wait, wait, wait a minute! You can’t have me doing this, because I haven’t 
been trained and I don’t know how to do this”. And he said, “Oh it’s easy.” And 
then he was rattling it off again. Then I said “Look, it may be easy for you, but 
I’m just an older American woman. So I need a little bit of help.” And I said “I 
need a procedure”. And he said, “Procedure? We don’t have any procedures.” And 
that was true, they didn’t work off procedures very much. And I said, “I repeat, 
I’m an American. We work off procedures. I have to have a procedure.” And then, 
because it was close to the EVA, he was getting a little tense, he sort of gave up. 
But then the engineer said, “Okay, I’ll help you.” So we sat there and we wrote out 
a list of the commands and procedures that I was to follow. And then we wrote 
out how I was supposed to know when it was time for me to do this. 
And I mention this because I did feel under a little bit of pressure, because 
I wanted to do the right thing. And I knew I was under pressure because I had a 
lot of sweat on the back of my neck about that time. But I took the perceived risk, 
or took what I felt was a risk, and changed it into something I thought I could 
handle. I changed it into a procedure. I forced the system into accommodating 
what I could handle. And so that’s how I handled those risks. 
So, from a personal standpoint, that’s how I looked at Mir and handled the 
risks that I saw. Then the big question that people always ask is, “Well, okay, 
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why do you want to ﬂ y in space? You have these risks, so why do you want to ﬂ y 
in space?” I know exactly why I want to ﬂ y in space. It’s sort of hard to put into 
words. That’s why I put this picture up there, because instead of a metaphor, it’s 
sort of like a “picturephor,” except it doesn’t really say it all. It’s a sunset.  And you 
say, “Okay, you want to ﬂ y in space because you want to see a sunset?” Yeah. It’s 
because you can look at the world in a new and a different way. You grow, and it’s 
a huge challenge. And one of the aspects that I really enjoyed about spaceﬂ ight is 
because you’re working with a team, you’re working with a marvelous team. 
Now, being actually in space, being the person that actually goes to ﬂ y, 
you’re the person that people see, and sort of the tip of the iceberg that sticks up. 
But it’s this huge team effort that does it, and being part of a team, it enlarges 
yourself, so that you’re bigger than yourself. And it’s all of that put together that 
is the reason why I want to ﬂ y in space. 
And a further reason is sort of the same reason why I really enjoyed working 
in a lab, back in the days when I used to be a scientist. You’d work in the lab and 
you’d work all hours, and then, ﬁ nally, one day it would happen where you had an 
idea; you had done the experiment, and then you looked at the data, you saw the 
data, and you thought, wow! This is something new. You had found a new way 
of looking at the universe. Then you write your paper, and no one else thinks it’s 
as marvelous as you thought. But, still, you had the feeling that you were able to 
ﬁ nd something new that hadn’t been seen before. You’d seen the world in a new 
way, and it’s sort of the same way when you can express in words in such a way 
that someone else can understand what you’re saying, because you put the word 
combination in a certain way so that you’d gotten the message across.  
And that is all part of the same reason of why you want to go into space, 
and why you want to explore. It’s because you are part of something that’s bigger 
than yourself, and you can get a feel for what it’s like to be really creative, and 
really see the world and experience the world in a new and marvelous way.     ■
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I’d like to share with you a very personal set of connected anecdotes to 
talk about the risk of exploration, in particular of Mars. We all explore in different ways and 
sometimes we don’t know that we’re exploring. I think in spirit we explore. In the 1960s, 
I didn’t know the risks I was taking as black disks were hurled at me at 100 miles an hour, 
and as, in the cacophony of the hockey game, I weighed those risks. And as a young child, 
I experienced those as well. But I think the message in all of exploration is learning, as one 
explores, to accommodate the risks, to recognize them, and to react. And, of course, being a 
hockey goaltender was good training for learning the heartbreaks of exploring Mars. 
So, I’d like to try to take you forward a number of years, and the exact date we can’t 
say. But the time when people and machines, women and men and machines, are able to 
explore Mars. And, in this case, I think the question is really not one of ifs, but really one of 
when the time is right, when those beneﬁ ts can be matched against the exploration risks. So 
I’m going to take you through some history to try to talk about that. 
I think we all learn to explore in different ways. Shannon gave us a wonderful story 
of exploring in space. My beginnings in this regard came trying to look for Mars on Earth 
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through the eyes of the Viking mission that I was lucky enough to be an intern for. 
And in doing so, I recognized that there are a lot of difﬁ cult-to-measure things 
that, in fact, pose risks to the science and understanding we’re trying to build. 
Earth as a training ground was one of the ways in my educational experience that 
I tried to accommodate risk. But I realized in doing so that there were things I 
couldn’t measure. I didn’t have the technology or the tools. Just as many of the 
explorers taught, I needed more tools to get more data. One way to obtain these 
data is to beneﬁ t from human spaceﬂ ight to make robotic measurements. 
I realized that the landscapes that we want to understand on Mars and on 
Earth needed to be measured with new scales, robotic scales rather than human. 
I was fortunate to beneﬁ t from human spaceﬂ ight carrying my experiment, the 
Shuttle Laser Altimeter (SLA), for the ﬁ rst time in the mid-1990s, to measure 
part of the Earth. This gave me the beneﬁ t of human exploration, the Shuttle 
program, carrying a robotic instrument. The ﬁ rst landfall that instrument made, 
so to speak, was, rather ironically the path right over Mauna Kea, the truly largest 
mountain on planet Earth considering the depths from which it rises from the 
ocean ﬂ oor. We were rather shocked, in fact, to realize that our ﬂ ight path allowed 
us to measure this 4,000-meter place that I had visited as a graduate student 
some ten years before to learn how to measure Mars. 
Now, in viewing human spaceﬂ ight to enable robotic experimentation, 
the same sort of reducing risk routine is important. The advantage of human 
spaceﬂ ight was that it was more akin to ﬂ ying an aircraft experiment than many 
of us in the remote sensory arena are experienced with. We had people on site 
to ﬁ x the problems. On our particular ﬂ ight, in one case, the switch that enabled 
the high-energy laser to make the measurements was, in fact, wired incorrectly. 
Human error, part of risk. So we had to command our crews, in this case, to ﬂ ip 
the switch off to turn the laser on, and we had a very simple procedure, one step. 
We were extremely good at it and had we not had that capability, we would not 
have been able to ﬂ y the experiment. 
Now, what did we learn? Well, we learned, as we did on Mars, that one 
of the big side beneﬁ ts of exploration in the face of risks is the serendipity of 
discovery from making new measurements. Yes, we measured the shape of the 
Earth at scales of a few feet from the Shuttle orbit. We told the Shuttle command 
we were actually giving them orbits within a few feet during ﬂ ight, which was 
quite compelling to them. But, we also managed to measure the heights of the 
vegetation, part of the dynamic carbon cycle of Earth. We had the capability to 
make measurements of Earth, which we’re now making from the ISAT satellite 
as part of the Earth Observing System, that would help tell us about the carbon 
cycle on our own planet as we got ready to carry this kind of instrument to Mars 
to help prepare for landings of vehicles like the rovers. 
So, my dream, as I became an explorer off the planet, was to map Mars 
in 3-D at the scales that humans and others would want to build. The science, 
of course, was to understand the history of the crust from the evolution of the 
planet, but also to bring Mars into closer focus, to allow us to make some of the 
OPENING PHOTO:
An artist’s vision of future exploration 
missions: Two kilometers above the lava 
ﬂ ows of Mars’s Tharsis Bulge region, a 
geologist collects samples from the 
eastern cliff at the base of Olympus Mons, 
the solar system’s largest known shield 
volcano. (NASA Image # S95-01566, cour-
tesy of John Frassanito and Associates)
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”
WILL THE RISKS BE ACCOMMODATED TO SEND HUMAN BEINGS? TODAY 
OUR ROVERS HAVE DRIVEN SPECTACULAR DISTANCES ON MARS AGAINST 
ALL ODDS. AND YET, IN 20 HOURS WE DROVE MANY TIMES FURTHER WITH A 
HUMAN SYSTEM. THOSE CHOICES ARE VERY IMPORTANT.
views that allow us to imagine going to places that are very complicated and 
unique. Without the topographic perspective, learning how to ﬂ y into that kind of 
environment, with robots and then with humans, would have been impossible. 
We’ve learned from the legacy of our forerunners, as we always do in 
exploration. I think it’s important to go back to the Moon, as we are. But it’s also 
important to go back in history to the Moon. Because the Surveyor Program, one 
of those antecedents built into Apollo, told us many things about the planet, and 
it was originally conceived as a risk mitigation step, not as a science mission. In 
the case of Surveyor, they were able to get to new places. 
Surveyor 7 took the only picture from the rim of a gigantic fresh crater 
on the Moon—Tycho. It gave us a new vantage point on the Moon. It helped us 
look to places we might like to send human beings and understand that great 
world. These robotic forerunners were the steps that allowed us to get the ﬁ rst 
successful landings on another world, in this case, on Mars. 
Viking collected 10,000 images from the surface, hundreds of spectra, 14 
experiments of the most grandiose nature in the 1970s. Viking’s ﬁ rst pictures 
were not beautiful vistas and landscapes; they were pictures of the feet of the 
vehicle. They were taken as part of a science contingency plan, the same kind of 
plan that we, in fact, asked Steve Squyres to implement in sending out his prize 
rover, Spirit, to Mars. And these pictures actually gave us science, the ﬁ rst views 
of the sort of ﬁ ngernail scale or hand scale of Mars. And they showed the fact 
that Mars dust was kicked up and ended about an hour after landing. So this was 
science. Viking took science to new extremes in searching for the ﬁ rst chemical 
antecedents of life and doing other experiments. It also took great pictures. And 
exploration is about mapping ourselves into a new vantage point. 
Now, some of these pictures were high risk. I remember vividly Jim Martin, 
the project manager, saying, “You’re not taking any sunrise pictures. It’s too cold. 
You’re not going to do that.” Well, we did. Scientists prevailed against all odds. 
We took that sunrise picture in an attempt to make Mars look the way our eyes 
would see it. Now, this was very controversial, but it’s the way science works. We 
were trying to understand the Mars that we would see if we were there. That’s 
part of exploration. 
“
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Mars has not always been easy. I could go on and on and talk about the 
graveyard of vehicles on Mars, from our great colleagues in the Soviet Union 
and our own Mars Observer, the great reconnaissance that we hung our program 
on in the 1980s. The failed Mars Polar Lander, a wonderful mission. The Beagle, 
that had the hopes of many to get to Mars. But out of these failures have come 
lessons—lessons that are the tough lessons of exploration; in this case, with 
robots before the people. 
One of the lessons is that the polar regions on Mars are important. So we’ve 
selected a mission called Phoenix, after a year and a half long Olympic-class 
competition, to go back to recover that science. Likewise, our Mars Global Surveyor, 
from the ashes of the Mars Observer, has been monitoring Mars and mapping it, 
enabling landings of vehicles like our rovers. It’s important to look at the legacy. 
We built the system for Global Surveyor to operate for one Mars year. That would 
have been about 9,000 orbits. Today we are over 26,000 orbits. So we were able to 
mitigate the risk and continue the exploration—just as the rovers are. 
So, I think it’s important to understand that we mitigate risks by 
trying new vantage points, to know better, to be more informed. Today, we’re 
building, constructing, innovating, and testing, at Lockheed Martin, the Mars 
Reconnaissance Orbiter—the ultimate reconnaissance step that will help pave 
the way for [the] future of Mars exploration. This is a complicated system; it’s 
the largest reconnaissance orbiter to go to Mars in our history. We launch it next 
summer. It’s the team of people that will help us mitigate those risks. 
Now, for a minute, I would like to get off Mars. And, yeah, I may be a 
Martian here, but I think it’s important to look at how exploration evolves. As 
we thought about the planet Venus in the late seventies, we had a vision for a 
complicated mission to map the planet and its atmosphere. Fifteen years later, 
that mission is realized in a different way. Thanks to technology, computer 
science, and information technology, the Magellan mission gave us higher 
resolution than we had imagined in the ’70s, done in a different way. It allowed 
us to couple what we were seeing from the surface of this hellish world where 
our Soviet colleagues had landed 12 times [1969–81], to the big picture. This is 
sort of inverse exploration. 
Now, the approach taken by our Soviet colleagues for their brief foray to 
the surface of the planet Venus, 450 degrees centigrade, was to use an approach 
”
THE LADDER TO THE MOON WAS BUILT. WE WENT MULTIPLE TIMES, 
LANDING SIX TIMES. THE SOVIETS WENT AND RETURNED WITH SAMPLES. 
MAYBE THAT SAME LADDER IS NEEDED FOR MARS.  “
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that was overdesigned to handle any environment. Overdesign the system to 
mitigate the risks of the unknown there. Surprisingly, they have not been back 
since their tremendous successes, which culminated with the Vega landings in 
1986. But Venus still offers us a lesson in exploration. 
I think the lessons from Mars are several. One is from our own proving 
ground here on Earth. Here and now, NASA is investing in programs to use Earth 
analogies, chemical process, laboratory scale analogies, to do science. Likewise 
with the Moon. The legacy of Harrison Schmitt and Jim Lovell and all those guys 
that went to the Moon and got those data, is that it is important to move ahead 
with the Moon as we start to learn about Mars. 
Now, I thought it would be instructive to talk for a minute about the 
differences between the cooperative robotic and human exploration. It’s 
important to remind you of a few facts. Facts are always good when we look at 
risk. One fact is what we did with the Apollo missions, which I would maintain 
were at least science enabling, however you choose to look at that. What we did 
was, we were able to interrogate the surface of another planet, even on foot with 
minimal tools, in an extremely short period of time. In two days, eight hours of 
being out on the lunar environment, we traveled two and a half kilometers. That’s 
a human scale of interrogation of another planet. We touched and collected 50 
pounds of rocks on the Apollo 12 mission to the Surveyor site. On Apollo 17, we 
upped the ante. In 20 hours of EVA we drove 36 kilometers.
Today, the pace of exploration is different. It’s not different in its yield; 
it’s different in its pace. The question of the timing is one of the important 
ones as we look at when will the time be right. Will 
the risks be accommodated to send human beings? 
Today our rovers have driven spectacular distances 
on Mars against all odds. And yet, in 20 hours we 
drove many times further with a human system. 
Those choices are very important. 
Today on Mars we’ve experienced many 
things. We’ve looked at small craters in new ways, 
with robotic assets. We’ve driven in and are living 
inside one and yet, we hunger for more. Some craters 
at the scale of large football ﬁ elds on Mars actually 
present tremendous exploration risk challenges. So 
big that during the Apollo era, the ﬂ ight rules did 
not allow the crew to venture into the fresh impact 
craters of the Moon. Yet today, we have roving capabilities on Mars that could 
enable that. So it’s that cooperative robotic and human exploration that’s so 
important. In my own case, I think visiting impact sites has helped train me 
intellectually to understand some of those on Mars. 
So, as we look at places to go, as we focus our attention on where the 
people and the machines need to go on Mars, we also need to learn from our 
experiences. One of the lessons of exploration is the risk of not exploring. Here 
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Artist’s drawing of astronauts setting up weather instruments 
on Mars. (Courtesy of John Frassanito and Associates)
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on planet Earth we have a template for understanding the record of cosmic 
collisions, but the Moon and Mars offer a better template. It’s the template of 
our history, and yet the opportunities for learning come both here and there. 
This is one of the learning factors in exploration. The risk of getting there—the 
trip, going to the places where the action is—can be mitigated by learning about 
places on Earth that can train us. Training is important. We’ve heard that again 
and again. Training with robots here on Earth, people, and then both on Mars. 
Finally, I want to relate a story that I think is part of what makes science 
and exploration exciting. Some of the things we are going for, whether they be 
supernovae or understanding Mars or aspects of our Earth, are ephemeral. They will 
be gone. The atmosphere of Pluto is an example we talk about often in science. 
I have been fortunate enough to visit a small volcanic island named Surtsey, 
born 40 years ago. It is already 25 percent gone. It may not survive this coming 
century, and, yet, it is a little microcosm of how the Earth responds to all the 
dynamic forces that shape landscapes on Earth. But it’s a training ground, too. 
On this little island operates one of the types of processes that may make the 
ubiquitous gullies and hillsides on Mars, and we can go visit the island in the 
same chemical environment as those rocks on Mars. The time-lapse photography 
has been sped up. Instead of at Mars scale, this is at Earth scale. We can go visit, 
and, in a period of years, we can watch it evolve, measure [it], and understand 
how to explore it. We can also learn from new vantage points. 
At NASA, it’s important to empower the community to competitively seek 
ways to see Mars in new ways. This last couple of years we had a competition 
for the ﬁ rst Mars scout. One of the missions proposed by Joel Levine and his 
team was to look at Mars from air, to get around more, to do the recon closer to 
the ground of the Martian system, including the trace gases, that would help us 
be better informed. Being better informed thanks to reconnaissance has always 
made a difference in exploration. 
So I think there is a set of converging pathways. The timing of the 
convergence will tell us when the risk can be accommodated to put people on 
site on Mars for the good of science. There are many pieces, and you can see 
them. We’re doing some of them now: reconnaissance, sample selection with 
our rovers, understanding the things we see on Earth. Just this summer, I should 
say austral summer, a ﬁ eld team collected a new Martian meteorite in the middle 
of the range of Antarctica: a piece of Mars sent by Mother Nature to inform us 
”
. . . IT’S REALLY IMPORTANT TO NOT WAIT TO WONDER. THAT’S WHAT EXPLORATION 
IS ABOUT. DON’T WAIT, BECAUSE IT’S IN THE GOING THAT YOU HAVE TO GO.”“
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about what we need to learn about. This collective approach is a way to reduce 
risk, and, by having a program that does so, we can learn. Where are we going with 
humans? Well, I hope it’s exploring at least, in part, in the name of science. 
I will ﬁ nish with two minor quick thoughts. One is that sometimes 
exploring is better captured in the eyes of the artists. Georgia O’Keefe, at the 
dawn of the space age, painted a great picture, The Ladder to the Moon, from her 
vantage point in New Mexico. I think it was Taos. It was kind of an interesting 
ﬂ ight approach to getting to the Moon that only a modernist could do. But, I 
think it is the epitome of the inspiration that allowed us to actually achieve that 
vision. The ladder to the Moon was built. We went multiple times, landing six 
times. The Soviets went and returned with samples. Maybe that same ladder is 
needed for Mars. 
So, as we have all said during this conference, it’s inspiring and, in fact, 
more than inspiring, catalyzing the youth to tell us how to go that’s important. I 
think perhaps all the vision we talk about is a powerful risk mitigation tool.
I will leave you with one last thought as best I can. I was giving a 
commencement address to Thomas Jefferson High School in Virginia this last 
June. The students were really empowered. They wanted to do space exploration. 
They cheered when they saw a NASA person show up. I was stunned. I thought 
there was a rock star somewhere, and I couldn’t imagine they were cheering for 
NASA. I thought, Wow! Here are ﬁ ve hundred of our best and brightest boys and 
girls wanting to do this. I stared at them, and, rarely for me, I was brought to a 
lack of words. I stopped a moment, then said, “You know, it’s really important to 
not wait to wonder. That’s what exploration is about. Don’t wait, because it’s in 
the going that you have to go.” So we mitigate the risks by going and not waiting 
intelligently, and that’s what we’re doing now in our Mars program.     ■
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I’m here today to talk about the Mars Exploration Rover 
(MER) mission, the mission of Spirit and Opportunity, and the risks that we took with 
that mission. I think by any standard, MER has to be looked at as one of the riskiest and 
one of the most complex robotic missions that NASA has ever undertaken, but it has been 
successful. We talked yesterday about mountaineering. Well, Spirit is now the ﬁ rst Martian 
robotic mountaineer, ascending the Columbia Hills. We talked this morning about oceans, 
and Opportunity is now exploring the remains of an ancient salty sea on Mars. Penny, 
I’m sorry, we haven’t found any caves yet. Caves are kind of scary places if you’re a solar-
powered rover. So, we’re probably going to stay away from those. 
I’m going to talk about the risks that we took to make that success happen. There 
is one point I have to make from the very outset. It is so obvious that I almost don’t need 
to say it, but it’s also so fundamental that I have to say it. That is, there is a very, very 
fundamental difference between our mission and most new missions we are talking about 
here. When our rockets lifted off from Cape Canaveral last summer, our lives were not on 
the line. Now, there were a few meetings at NASA Headquarters where I wasn’t quite so sure 
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research for which he is best known includes study of water on Mars and of a possible ocean on Jupiter’s 
moon Europa. He has participated in many missions of planetary exploration, including the Voyager 
mission to Jupiter and Saturn, the Magellan mission to Venus, the Mars Odyssey, Mars Express, and 
MRO missions to Mars, the NEAR mission to the asteroid Eros, and the Cassini mission to Saturn. 
Squyres has served as the Chairman of NASA’s Space Science Advisory Committee and as a member of 
the NASA Advisory Council.
174
about that, preceding launch! I almost feel like I don’t belong up here with people 
like Shannon and with [Harrison] Jack Schmitt, but I think that our experiences 
do have much to say about how one takes risks in spaceﬂ ight, including human 
spaceﬂ ight. There were many aspects of our mission that are in common with 
what goes on in human spaceﬂ ight. We had a very challenging schedule. We had 
a very daunting technical task. We had an enormously large and complicated 
team to pull it all off. Addressing and aggressively mitigating the risks that come 
with all of those things is something on which we spent an enormous amount of 
time, and I think some of our lessons there do carry over to the very demanding 
realm of human spaceﬂ ight. 
As Jim alluded to, our mission arose out of catastrophe. In 1998, NASA 
launched two missions to Mars. The Mars Polar Lander began its entry and 
descent sequence and was never heard from again. The most likely cause was 
determined to have been a single line of code that was missing that resulted, 
ultimately, probably, in the vehicle shutting off its motors about 40 meters above 
the ground and hitting the surface at about 50 miles per hour. Then, in reverse, 
the Mars Climate Orbiter was lost when a mix-up over English and metric units 
resulted in ﬂ ying the spacecraft into the atmosphere and burning it up. 
So, we were put in a position, which we all embraced from the start, of 
being involved in a mission that had to succeed. The credibility of a substantial 
portion of the Nation’s space program and some of the institutions involved was 
very much riding on our success or on our failure. We had to come up with ways 
to address that risk that were commensurate with the expectations that had been 
forced upon us by circumstances. 
As with any program, we addressed, and had to face, a wide variety of 
different kinds of risks. There was cost risk. There was programmatic risk. 
There were technology risks and environmental risks. There were operational 
and scheduling risks. I am going to address each of these brieﬂ y in turn. There 
were many things we did individually to mitigate each of those risks, but I 
think, almost above all, there was one thing we did from the start that addressed 
every single one of those risks. I alluded to this brieﬂ y in some remarks that I 
OPENING PHOTO: 
NASA dedicates Mars landmarks 
to Columbia crew.
(NASA Image # PIA05200)
This stunning image features the heat shield impact site of NASA’s Mars Exploration Rover Opportunity. 
(Source: http://photojournal.jpl.nasa.gov/catalog/PIA07327.)
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made yesterday. We knew what we were trying to do. We had a set of level-one 
requirements. They were negotiated with NASA Headquarters. They ﬁ t on a 
single piece of paper—two sides. They stated succinctly and clearly what the 
MER mission was expected to do. From the day that NASA said “go” to the day 
that we had a date on Pad 17A at Cape Canaveral was 34 months. We would not 
have made it had we not all had a clear, unambiguous, common understanding 
of what it was we were trying to accomplish. Those level-one requirements were 
our guide star. 
I lost a lot of sleep wondering whether or not we were going to make it, but 
I never once questioned what it was we were trying to accomplish. We never had 
an ounce of uncertainty in our minds. That was tremendously enabling, because 
every time we faced a decision we turned to those requirements Do we do this 
test? Do we not? Do we include this component? Do we not? Does it help us 
meet the level-one requirements? If so, yes. If no, it’s expendable. And it was that 
simple. I don’t care how big or how small the organization, how complex or how 
simple your task, I cannot overstate the importance of clear, unambiguous goal 
setting. It gives a crystalline clarity of purpose to your organization from top to 
bottom if everybody knows, with no ambiguity, what you are trying to achieve. 
That was fundamental to our success. 
I am going to go through those risks that I listed. 
Cost risks: When you get right down to it, our fundamental approach 
to cost risk was that, when we needed more money, NASA gave it to us. We 
originally costed the mission out at $688 million. We overran that by more than 
100 million bucks. The reasons for those overruns are interesting, and I will be 
glad to tell any of you about them. They fundamentally had to do with some 
in-going assumptions that turned out to be ﬂ awed. Twice over the course of 
the development, Firouz Naderi, the program manager at JPL [Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory], and Pete Theisinger, our very able project manager, and I had to get 
on a plane and go back east and tell them we needed 50 million dollars more. 
The ﬁ rst time we did it, we were ﬂ ogged. We then got our 50 million, and we 
promised never to come back again. 
How long was it, Jim? About six months later, we were on your doorstep 
again. We were really ﬂ ogged on that one. When it came right down to it, with 
so much on the line and so much at stake, the Agency was able to look at their 
priorities and say, “We have to make this work.” Never once over the entire 
course of the MER development did we not do something important, something 
”
SO, WE WERE PUT IN A POSITION, WHICH WE ALL EMBRACED FROM 
THE START, OF BEING INVOLVED IN A MISSION THAT HAD TO SUCCEED.“
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that was enabling of meeting our level-one requirements, because we didn’t 
have the money. It never happened, and that was because the Agency made the 
commitment to make sure it never happened. 
Programmatic risk: Programmatic risk means a lot of different things to 
a lot of people. I will deﬁ ne it rather narrowly to mean the way in which you 
interact with other programs over issues like personnel, facilities, and so forth. 
Our approach there, to be honest, was very much like our approach to cost risk. 
What we needed, we got. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory is an immensely talented, 
immensely capable organization, but their resources are not inﬁ nite. Whenever it 
came down to something critical—if we needed the right people, we got them. If 
we needed certain facilities, we got them. There just weren’t any questions asked. 
The team that was put together under Pete’s leadership at JPL was the best 
that the Jet Propulsion Laboratory had to offer. Lab management always gave us 
everything that we needed. You can’t do that for every project, obviously, but it 
is a matter of having your priorities straight. Your priorities were that MER had 
what MER needed, and what MER needed, MER got. There was a phrase around 
JPL that I heard about. Somebody would say, “I got MER’d”. That meant that their 
facility or their engineer or somebody had been stolen away by MER to go off and 
make sure we got to Mars okay. 
Technology risk: Our approach to technology risk is, basically, don’t take 
any. Our mission was assembled almost entirely from existing, tested, proven 
technology. Air bags have been used on Mars, parachutes have been used on Mars, 
aerogel had been used on Mars. The payload was ready to go. The entire mission 
was put together from existing, qualiﬁ ed, capable hardware. Our computer was a 
smoking hot machine in 1985, okay, but it was good enough to meet the job that 
was laid out in the level-one requirements, and so that was what we used. You 
can sometimes accomplish extraordinarily innovative things by taking all the 
existing technologies and combining them together in novel ways. And I think 
there may be a lesson there; I don’t think MER is the only opportunity out there 
for taking existing, proven, safe technologies and combining them together in 
ways that haven’t quite been attempted before. 
Environmental risks: This is a big one. There were many environments over 
the course of our ﬂ ight over which we had little or no control and for which we 
had to do our best to prepare ourselves. Launch was an environment that was, as 
a spacecraft team, outside of our control. That was risky. Landing was certainly 
risky. Unless you have a fully deterministic landing system when you land on 
Mars, I don’t care how much testing you do—you cannot build a perfectly safe 
Mars lander. You can build the best system you can, but you can always have one 
sharp pointy rock or one gust of wind that does you in, if you got unlucky that 
day at the landing site. 
And so our approach to environmental risk was absolutely the best one that 
you can take: we built two of everything. Two rockets, two landers, two rovers, 
two payloads, identical up and down the line, but we built two of everything. This 
is a risk mitigation technique that does not carry over, obviously, into the realm 
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of human spaceﬂ ight—you can’t say, well, let’s send two crews and maybe one 
of them will survive. 
But if you have a robotic mission that must succeed, if you don’t send two, 
you’re crazy, in my personal opinion. It worked very well for us. And I’ll also 
point out that it worked very well for the people who were involved in Mariner 
3 and 4—Mariner 4 being the ﬁ rst successful Mars ﬂ yby, Mariner 3 going in the 
drink. The same is true for Mariner 8 and 9—the ﬁ rst successful Mars orbiter, 
when Mariner 8 went in the drink. 
There’s another aspect of environmental risk, which I think was not 
adequately appreciated by most people, and that had to do with risk to the 
science. We were going into a fundamentally unknown scientiﬁ c environment. 
We did the best we could to select good landing sites, but we didn’t really know 
what to expect. And one of my greatest fears when we actually ﬁ rst proposed 
MER to NASA as a single rover mission was that we would choose badly, that 
Mars would fake us out, and we’d get down on the surface and the science that 
we were seeking just simply wouldn’t be there. If you had two rovers, and if you 
had a very diverse planet, as Mars is, you could send them to two very different 
sites, and maybe one of them is going to turn out to be the miracle site. 
Mars did fake us out, by the way. If you had told me ahead of time, “Steve, 
one of the rovers is going to land on volcanic rocks and one’s going to land on 
sedimentary rocks,” and you’d said, “ Gusev, Meridani” I would have said, “Yeah, 
sure. It’s got to be volcanic rocks at Meridani and sedimentary rock at Gusev.” 
It was the other way around. Mars completely faked us out. And the beauty 
of having that redundancy to mitigate that science risk is that if it really pays 
off and both vehicles get on the surface, you take advantage of that diversity 
to essentially double your science return, because you’re in two completely 
different environments. 
Operational risk: The chance that, when you try to do it, it’s not going to 
work. There’s no magic formula here, this one’s really straightforward. You do it 
with margin and testing. Now, it’s just down to block and tackling on this one. 
You build a lot of margin into your design and then you test and you test and you 
test and you test. And like I always say, you test it like you’re going to ﬂ y it, and 
you ﬂ y it just the way you tested it. And we did a hell of a lot of testing on MER. 
Our schedule was all about testing. Everything that we did was about testing. 
And in the end, those operational risks that we personally took paid off, 
and the margin in particular was very important. We put a lot of margin in the 
design—there’s margin tucked away in so many nooks and crannies in that design 
you can’t believe it. And it was that margin that made us comfortable signing up 
to a set of level-one requirements that says this vehicle will last for 90 Martian 
days on the surface. But if you’ve got that much margin in your pocket and a few 
things break your way, you might still be driving around on SOL 265, which is, I 
think, what today is. So margin pays off in big ways. 
Finally, schedule risk: This was the worst risk that we faced, by far. In a 
very real sense, the entire story of the development of the Mars Exploration 
STEVE SQUYRES    MARS EXPLORATION ROVERS
178
Rover program—the development of Spirit and Opportunity—is the story of an 
extraordinary group of people facing schedule risk. Like I said, NASA said, “Go, 
and you’ve got to be there on the pad in 34 months.” That was not enough time. 
It was not enough time. There were many things that we did to mitigate schedule 
risk—I cannot discuss them all. I will only mention two of them. 
One of them—this will sound paradoxical, but it is not, and if you take 
anything away from what I have to say today, please get this point. Our schedule 
risk was mitigated to a great extent by the fact that we were ﬂ ying two vehicles. 
That doesn’t sound like it makes sense. It should be easier to build one than to 
build two. Well, under certain circumstances, if you’re starved for people, starved 
for facilities, starved for money, then, yeah, that’s true. But if you’ve got the 
people, if you’ve got the facilities, and you’ve got the money, then it helps to 
be hardware rich. You have more pieces on your chessboard and it puts you in a 
stronger position. Just as one trivially simple example, there are many tests that 
you run on vehicles like this that only have to be run on one of your two vehicles. 
And if you’ve got the facilities and you’ve got the people, you run those two 
tests—not in series, but in parallel, and you take up schedule. And we did that 
again and again and again and again. 
And Matt Wallace, who was the manager of our ATLO—assembly test and 
launch operations—was a master. He was a hero of this mission and he played 
that game with those chess pieces with such intricacy and such skill that we 
made it, and I don’t think we would have made it to the pad if he’d had only one 
vehicle. I think we had to do it with two. 
The other way in which, I am somewhat ashamed to say, that we mitigated 
schedule risks is that we pushed an extraordinary group of people too hard. We 
pushed them beyond reasonable limits. It damaged people’s health. It damaged 
people’s relationships with their loved ones. We got away with it because we had 
an extraordinary group of people under an extraordinary group of circumstances, 
but that is not a sustainable approach to Mars exploration. You cannot go back to 
that well again and again. I do not believe that 34, 36, 38 months is enough time 
to do a robotic mission of that kind of complexity. I think you need 48, and I hope 
that lesson is one that is taken away from the MER mission. 
I’d like to ﬁ nish this on a slightly lighter note by telling you a story. We had 
a lot of discussion yesterday about humans versus robots. And as the robot guy 
here, I want to tell a story about the experience that I had that really taught me a 
lot about that particular topic. We were at ﬁ rst trying to ﬁ gure out how to use a 
set of rovers on Mars to really do scientiﬁ c exploration. The technology folks at 
JPL [Jet Propulsion Laboratory] built a wonderful little vehicle called FIDO. And 
FIDO was a great test rover—you could take it out in the ﬁ eld and you didn’t 
worry about getting a few scratches in the paint. 
We took it out to a place called Silver Lake in the Mojave Desert about 
1997. And we went out there and it was the ﬁ rst time I had ever been out in the 
ﬁ eld. So I went out there with my team—a bunch of really high-priced geologic 
talent—some serious ﬁ eld geologists. And we got the rover out there and, of 
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course, the rover breaks down. First time I’ve ever been out in the ﬁ eld, it’s dusty, 
it’s dirty, you know, the rover’s not working. So okay, what am I going to do with 
all these bored geologists I’ve got on my hands? So I said, “Look, let’s go on a 
geology walk. Let’s go on a little ﬁ eld trip.” So everybody got their boots and their 
rock hammers and their hand lenses and everything. And I picked up a notebook 
and a stopwatch. And we walked out to a nearby ridge where I knew there was 
some interesting geology exposed and we sat down—or rather I sat down—and 
they went off and they started geologizing. 
And I started timing them. You know, how long does it take for Andy Knoll 
to walk over to that rock? How long does it take Ray Albertson to pick that thing 
up and break it open with his rock hammer and look at it with a hand lens? And 
they were doing a lot of things that our rovers couldn’t do, but I focused on 
the things they were doing that our rovers could do. And, you know, I did it as 
quantitatively as I could—this was hardly a controlled experiment. And when I 
looked at the numbers afterwards, what I found was that what our magniﬁ cent 
robotic vehicles can do in an entire day on Mars, these guys could do in about 
30–45 seconds. 
We are very far away from being able to build robots—I’m not going to 
see it in my lifetime—that have anything like the capabilities that humans will 
have to explore, let alone to inspire. And when I hear people point to Spirit and 
Opportunity and say that these are examples of why we don’t need to send 
humans to Mars, I get very upset. Because that’s not even the right discussion to 
be having. We must send humans to Mars. We can’t do it soon enough for me. 
You know, I’m a robot guy. I mean, I love Spirit and Opportunity—and I use a 
word like “love” very advisedly when talking about a hunk of metal. 
But I love those machines. I miss them. I do. But they will never, ever have 
the capabilities that humans will have and I sure hope you send people soon.     ■
”
. . . WHEN I HEAR PEOPLE POINT TO SPIRIT AND OPPORTUNITY AND SAY THAT THESE 
ARE EXAMPLES OF WHY WE DON’T NEED TO SEND HUMANS TO MARS, I GET VERY 
UPSET. BECAUSE THAT’S NOT EVEN THE RIGHT DISCUSSION TO BE HAVING. WE 
MUST SEND HUMANS TO MARS. WE CAN’T DO IT SOON ENOUGH FOR ME.“
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James Webb Space Telescope Senior Project Scientist, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
I want to talk to you about the Cosmic Background Explorer 
(COBE) satellite and the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), to give you examples of two 
extraordinarily risky visions that I have worked on. One of them hasn’t been launched yet 
and one was launched some time ago. So the concentration is on the James Webb Telescope, 
which used to be called the Next Generation Space Telescope. We had a lot of Trekkies at 
Headquarters and they were very proud to name it the Next Generation Space Telescope. 
It was renamed after NASA Administrator James Webb. I didn’t know much about James 
Webb until I read a biography of him and he was in fact a remarkable person and it’s a 
tremendous honor for the telescope to have his name attached to it. If you want to know 
more about it, there’s a book called Powering Apollo. It is really very inspiring to read and 
also points out that he was really very interested in reducing risk by adopting and learning 
about new methods of management. 
And management, I think, is our biggest risk in many areas. Many people have spoken 
before about losing concentration on the risks that we face and panicking in the dive or 
whatever it might be. We have to sort of keep the same focus all the way up to top of the 
management chain, otherwise we get in trouble. 
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So, what do I think risks are? There are a lot of things that people call 
risks that aren’t, to my way of thinking. Some things are intrinsically chancy, 
you couldn’t possibly predict whether they would or would not happen. And we 
have done a lot of things to reduce those risks by working harder and harder on 
what you can control and predict. But, also, there are a lot of things that depend 
on who’s working on it, who’s thinking about it, who’s paying. And if you’re the 
management paying to reduce risks and you have another person breathing down 
on you saying, “If you spend any more money on that project, you’re out,” there 
are a lot of kinds of risk that people feel and take. 
So why should we take risks? Well, exploration and science are always about 
the unknown, and that’s intrinsically the nature of it. So that’s why we’re here. 
The ﬁ rst project that I did was a mission to measure the primordial cosmic 
microwave background radiation in a couple of different ways, and to look for the 
accumulated light of the ﬁ rst galaxies. And we did actually succeed in all of these 
objectives with the COBE satellite. This project was 
remarkably risky, considering when it was proposed and 
what it was like at the time. This was proposed in 1974. 
I organized a team six months out of graduate school to 
propose this mission, and when NASA decided to take 
us on as a serious study, they were taking a risk on us. 
But we did actually get associated with a truly wonderful 
engineering team at Goddard Space Flight Center and 
they produced this whole thing. It was an in-house 
project, which is not one of the more common ways that 
we do projects at NASA. But it was a wonderful thing for 
this project.
In 1974 people did not have computers on every 
desk. We did our ﬁ rst engineering drawings with pencils. 
And our calculators, our computers, were HP35s, and it 
was a miracle to have one. So people thought differently 
about risk because there was just too much you could 
never ﬁ gure out or calculate. You did not have a ﬁ nite-
element model of everything you wanted. You just 
said, “Well, I think that’ll probably work.” And sometimes you were right and 
sometimes you weren’t. 
So then there was testing. This went through two metamorphoses. COBE 
was proposed ﬁ rst as payload for a Delta rocket. Then NASA went and put all of 
its eggs in one basket with a lot of kick from Congress and said, “We’re killing all 
the expendable launch vehicles. We’re going to send everything up on Shuttles.” 
So this was redesigned to go on a Shuttle and it was a 10,000-pound spacecraft 
that had to go up from California. As far as I know, it was the only scientiﬁ c 
payload that was to have the Shuttle launch from California. 
Then the Challenger happened when we had more or less completed our 
design and were putting our spacecraft together. And it became pretty clear that 
OPENING PHOTO: 
An artist’s impression of the selected 
design for the JWST spacecraft. 
(Image copyright European Space 
Agency)
A map depicting the distribution of cosmic background radiation, as 
detected by the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE) spacecraft. 
(NASA Image # 90-HC-640)
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there was not going to be a Shuttle launch from California ever again, and it 
wasn’t just because the Shuttles were dangerous—there wasn’t enough trafﬁ c 
for the purpose.
So we had to rebuild it all. We had also about a 30-month schedule we had 
to meet to rebuild everything. Fortunately, we did have the instruments that were 
more or less complete. And the business end did not really have to change much. 
But everything below that did have to change, and it was all new mechanical and 
thermal structures. 
So our Deputy Project Manager took a risk. He started hunting around in 
the rest of the world for a foreign launch vehicle, and Headquarters informed him 
that he would lose some body parts if he kept on doing that, and that was a risk. 
Headquarters did, however, recognize that potentially this mission could be the 
ﬁ rst new science mission to go up after the Challenger. And so they said, “Well, 
if we could get you a Delta, could you ﬁ t?” So the answer was:  “Yeah, just barely.” 
And so the Delta was found. It had to be brought together from the spare parts 
left around in hangars elsewhere and pigeon droppings had eaten holes through 
the tanks in a few places. They were welded closed. So some of the stuff was a 
little bit of a risk.
But that was not the hard part. There were quite a few other kinds of 
risks in here. Of the business end, the scientiﬁ c instruments, two of them were 
located inside a helium cryostat, and we had almost no experience with operating 
anything at very low temperatures. Certainly, our space engineering team did not 
know much about it. We all learned a lot going through this project. 
Another really tough challenge that afﬂ icted us seriously in the early days 
was that our budget was always limited. We didn’t enjoy the virtue of being a top-
priority project. So there were quite a lot of things that we did that were probably 
wrong, but we just knew we couldn’t get the money to do the thing right. 
However, that did change after the Challenger. And, so, the management 
approach changed. Charlie Pellerin came around and said, “If there’s anybody on 
this project who knows any reason why this isn’t right, tell us now.” And he was 
pretty serious that we would have to tell him. He wanted to know the bad news, 
if there was any, because he needed to make sure this was going to turn out. So, 
I think this was an example that management attitude and our ability to raise 
funds to do the right thing were critically important to success. 
Anyway, the whole story as best I could tell it is recorded in a book called 
The Very First Light. It’s about ten years ago now, and it was written for a general 
“
. . . MY FIRST THING IS, IF IT’S NOT TESTED, IT WILL FAIL, AND 
THAT YOU PROBABLY WON’T BE ABLE TO FIX IT EITHER. 
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audience. People told me afterwards they were out of breath from reading it 
because there were so many hazards that we faced and recovered from; and I 
think that’s not unusual in the space business. 
But it was worth it. We showed the spectrum of the universe is a perfect 
blackbody spectrum for a temperature of 2.725 plus or minus .001 Kelvin, which 
in its earlier incarnation brought us a standing ovation when we showed it to the 
American Astronomical Society. The question of whether the Big Bang theory 
was correct at all was still a somewhat open issue when this was reported. And 
to produce such a perfect measurement was tremendous cause for a celebration. 
And all the critics ﬁ nally had to give up and agree that, well, maybe the Big Bang 
was really right. A map of the brightness of that background radiation over the 
entire sky was used to not only conﬁ rm the Big Bang story, but also to start in on 
the question of what’s the rest of the universe like? The map and the details tell 
us basically that it’s true—we’re only 4 percent of the total universe, the matter 
that we know about. There’s something like 20 percent more dark matter that 
still has attractive gravity. And we weren’t quite sure then, but we were beginning 
to get onto it, that there’s also a repulsion force that causes the acceleration of 
the universe. The universe is going faster and faster, and danged if I know what 
that’s about! A lot of people have guesses, none of which we can conﬁ rm as yet. 
So this is a very open subject. 
So these two results basically started up immense industries. There has 
already been a successor spacecraft for the measurement of the map and it’s 
done far better. There’s another one planned, and another one is hoped for after 
that. So we have made tremendous results out of this project, which seemed 
extremely risky technically.
Now, I want to go on to something that’s perhaps easier in a sense, but 
much more difﬁ cult in another, the James Webb Space Telescope. This mission 
is the scientiﬁ c successor to the Hubble Space Telescope, and it was conceived a 
long time ago, back in 1995, as the successor. And it’s a scientiﬁ c successor, but 
not a replacement. A lot of people are very concerned about what the future of 
Hubble is, and for anyone who cares, this is not a replacement. 
This is not doing what Hubble does. This is looking farther away into 
the very distant universe and looking deeper into the places where stars and 
planets are being made, and it’s much more challenging in a different way. To 
accomplish the objectives we need a much bigger telescope than Hubble. Well, 
how are you going to do that? Well, I’ll show you. It also needs to be very, very 
cold because we need to see infrared light. The most distant universe is red-
shifted, as it appears to us. The ultraviolet light that was emitted by those most 
distant things we want to see comes out in the infrared. And the visible light and 
other things come out in much longer infrared wavelengths. So we have to have a 
full telescope, and we are driven to a solution that happens in deep space. So we 
couldn’t ﬁ nd any way around it. We sure knew that it would be great if we could 
service this mission as the Hubble had been serviced. We could not ﬁ nd a design 
that would allow that.
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So we did negotiate a deal with the European and Canadian Space Agency 
and we did get the blessing of the National Academy of Sciences that this was the 
next big thing. It is a vision which strikes fear and trembling into the hearts of 
engineers, because the payload escapes from the Earth. It’s going to go a million 
miles away from the Earth and when it gets partway out there it’s going to deploy. 
And deployment in mechanical devices also terriﬁ ed many engineers. We’ve had 
a lot of trouble with mechanical things and they’re plenty right to be worried 
about it. It’s got its solar arrays to deploy, then a solar bafﬂ e, a heat shield, then 
graphite ﬁ ber poles, a little bit stouter than ﬁ shing poles but not a whole lot. The 
shield pops open and becomes ﬁ ve layers. The ﬁ ve-layer shield is a much better 
thermal shield. Then a support tower is erected and the secondary mirror comes 
out and deploys on its linkages. The gold-coated primary mirror there is made 
out of beryllium hexagons, but it’s coated with gold. And it deploys one wing of 
the hexagon, and now the other wing.
It’s a million miles away. It’s a million miles in the opposite direction from 
the Sun. There’s a point called the Lagrange point L2 where it’s a semi-stable 
orbit. And if you hovered around that spot, you could stay there with only a small 
nudge and move around the Sun with the Earth all year long. 
So that’s where we’re going. This is the thing that’s supposed to go there. 
And if you had asked us ten years ago if this was going to work, people would 
laugh at you and say, “Nah, you couldn’t do anything like that.” The company 
that’s building this for us is Northrop Grumman. It’s next to L.A. airport. And 
they tell us that they’ve actually deployed many, many things in space for other 
government agencies which they can’t tell us about! But there is a reason why 
this technology was much more mature than astronomers ever imagined.
So, anyway, there’s an awful lot of engineering risk in that thing. We 
had altogether twelve contracts to learn how to build the ultra-lightweight 
mirror that we need. The mirror is a chunk of beryllium, which is polished to 
the required accuracy. And we’ve proven that it will stay the right shape when 
it cools down. So this is a truly remarkable accomplishment. And, jeepers, it 
looks just like a mirror, doesn’t it? But it took years and years of cooperative 
technology and competition. 
Now, I want to show you the result as a formal tool that we use for analyzing 
risk. If we didn’t have a formal tool I’m convinced we could never get there, 
because the way that we did risk analysis for the COBE project was:  “Well, I 
think it’ll work or I think it won’t.” Now we have a very formal process. We 
have a giant risk database. Our risk manager is here if you want to ask her more 
questions about it. 
But we have engineers that ﬁ ll out forms and we have weekly meetings, 
and we keep track of every single thing that we’re worried about. And sometimes 
we retire it and sometimes we say, “Oh, it’s getting worse,” and we have to do 
something more vigorous about it. At least three of the top issues for us were 
questions about people—you know, can the agencies agree on something? So 
this is an example that’s very typical, that some of the hardest problems are 
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negotiations. And I just wanted to emphasize that we have a method for doing 
this, and never to forget what the problems are.
I wanted to share some of my observations of physical things with you. 
And this, I have to admit, started with my learning experiences in school. I had a 
thesis project which failed on its ﬁ rst ﬂ ight, and I learned a lot from that failure. 
And I know how we got into that mind-set that said, “Well, let’s ﬂ y it anyway.” 
We were tired, and we didn’t have any more money. However, this thing did not 
work for three different reasons and so I learned something.
So, my ﬁ rst thing is, if it’s not tested, it will fail, and that you probably 
won’t be able to ﬁ x it either. And sometimes if it is tested, it will fail anyway, but 
at least you’ll have a chance to ﬁ x it. But it will cost you. If you don’t have a spare 
part or a backup plan, it will deﬁ nitely fail. And if you only test it a little bit to see 
if it will do what it’s supposed to do, then it’ll do something else. So I’ve come 
to a similar conclusion to what Steve Squyres was recommending: You need lots 
of hardware around to work with, because things are going to go wrong and you 
need to be able to test out your idea on one thing while you’re ﬁ xing the other 
one. So you need to have a lot of smart people thinking a lot about really terrible 
things, things that could go wrong and might just go wrong, and not being too 
limited to thinking about the things that you only know you can ﬁ x. Things that 
have the highest consequence will often be things that you missed because, you 
know, “Oh, I can’t ﬁ x that.” So you need lots of external review and we do have 
lots of external review. And so that’s the number one thing. 
There’s another issue, about individual people. I don’t think that human 
beings as a group are particularly good at balancing lots of likelihood and 
consequence. I know a lot of people [who] have fallen off of things and hurt 
themselves badly, including one of our senior managers on the COBE project—
after he retired, fortunately for the project. So we’re not really good at this. We 
need a formal tool. And we have a formal tool, but if you don’t use it, you will 
deﬁ nitely be in trouble! That’s a conclusion from this. 
So I think our greatest risk is lack of imagination. A lot of imaginary things 
you just have to explore. Once you’ve decided where you’re going to go with what 
you get from your imagination, then you have to imagine all the things that could 
go wrong. You have to rehearse all that. If you were a performer, as my wife is, then 
you rehearse before you go out on stage. And people who are successful in our 
business rehearse and rehearse and rehearse, too. But I know that, at least in my 
history, we have been very easily blinded by thinking about what we have to work 
with rather than is it actually required? Nature doesn’t really care whether we have 
enough resources to think about this problem. Either we did it right, or we didn’t. 
If you didn’t build it right and you think of this fact, then you better tell people 
and get the resources. Otherwise, you might as well not have started.      ■
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From the Earth to the Moon
I’m just a Hollywood screenwriter, and when I look at the 
people on this panel, I think I’m the answer to: “What’s wrong with this picture?” The other 
thing that comes to mind is my Mission to Mars credit. There’s a thing in Hollywood where 
you ﬁ ght hard to get credit on something, because you’ll usually get some money when the 
DVD sells. And you have to weigh the value of that money versus being humiliated in front 
of people at NASA for having been involved in a movie as bad as Mission to Mars. So—I 
really don’t know if it was worth it. But anyway . . .
In 1996 I got a call from my agent and she said that Tom Hanks was doing a history 
of the Apollo program for HBO and did I want to be involved, and I said, “Sign me up.” 
I read the outlines that they had prepared and I read Andy Chaikin’s book. The episode 
that jumped out at me for dramatic purposes was the episode that, at that point, was then 
called “The Fire.” It was later re-titled, for good reason, “Apollo I.” They said, “Sorry, that’s 
already taken by another writer.” And the next day, I got a call that the writer had dropped 
out, so I got a chance to write that episode. In a very personally selﬁ sh way, that changed 
my career. Up until that point, I’d been an action writer. I did Speed and Broken Arrow and 
Graham Yost is a writer/director from Toronto, Canada. His work includes the television series 
From the Earth to the Moon (1998), Mission to Mars (2000), and the 1994 box ofﬁ ce hit Speed, 
starring Keanu Reeves.
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those were fun movies, but this was the ﬁ rst time I got to write real people 
and really interesting and real dramatic situations. And I remember the highest 
compliment that I got was,  at one point, Frank Darabont was going to direct the 
episode—Frank Darabont has directed The Shawshank Redemption and The Green 
Mile. He said while he was reading it, he kept on ﬂ ipping back to the title page 
and saying, “This is the bus guy?” 
As a little Canadian boy, I watched the Moon program from Canada and 
just loved it, which is why I said I wanted to be on board—but it made me a true 
space geek. The term on Earth to the Moon was “you’ve become a helmet-sniffer,” 
if anyone knows the term from sports. That’s why I’m here. And we would follow 
around Dave Scott, our astronaut adviser, and I remember telling my wife, “I just 
keep looking at his feet,” because those feet were on the Moon. 
In the writing of this episode, “Apollo 1,” I decided very early on that I 
wanted to focus on Frank Borman, who was part of the Apollo 1—it was actually, 
technically, called the Apollo 204 Review Board. We’re going to show a clip from 
the episode. So this is Frank Borman. It’s later on in the episode and it’s Frank 
Borman, played by David Andrews, who’s testifying in front of a Senate committee. 
And I made Walter Mondale the bad guy, but that’s a whole other story. 
[Dialogue from video clip is indented.]
Senator Mondale: Colonel Borman, would you have entered the 
spacecraft on the morning of the accident if your turn had been 
called?
Frank Borman: Yes, sir.
Senator Mondale: Would you have had any hesitancy? 
Frank Borman: No, sir. 
Senator Mondale: Were there defects in workmanship?
Frank Borman: There were.
Senator Mondale: And did these defects go beyond workmanship?
Frank Borman: Yes, sir, there were defects in design. 
Senator Mondale: If you had entered that spacecraft on that morning, 
would you have been motivated by a desire to take risks? 
Frank Borman: No, sir. Sometimes there are romantic, silk-scarf 
notions attributed to this business, but we’re professionals. We will 
accept it, certainly, but not undue risks. 
Senator Mondale: Let me rephrase the question. Knowing what you 
know now, would you have entered that spacecraft? 
Frank Borman: No, sir.
Senator Mondale: Colonel Borman, how did Commander Grissom 
and his crew feel about the readiness of the vehicle? 
Frank Borman: I talked to Ed White shortly before the accident. 
OPENING PHOTO: 
Astronaut James A. Lovell, Jr., 
commander of the Apollo 13, testifying 
before members of the Senate Space 
Committee about the problems of the 
Apollo 13 mission. 
(NASA Image # 70-H-515)
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He thought they were over most of their problems and were on 
their way . . .
Senator Mondale: Didn’t Commander Grissom once hang a lemon on 
the simulator? 
Frank Borman: You had to know Gus.
Senator Mondale: Did Commander Grissom 
hang a lemon on the simulator? 
Frank Borman: Yes, sir. 
Second Senator: [interrupts Mondale] Tell us 
about him, Colonel. Sorry, Senator, I just have a 
couple of quick questions. Would you yield for 
a minute or two? 
Senator Mondale: Actually, Mr. Chairman, I—
Second Senator: Thanks. Colonel Borman, 
you just said, “You had to know Gus.” And I 
think that that’s been missing in here the past 
few days. I’d like the record to contain just a 
little about the men who perished in that ﬁ re. 
Colonel, could you do that for us? 
Frank Borman: Gus Grissom was the ﬁ rst 
astronaut to be asked to ﬂ y three times. 
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. He loved being 
an astronaut, except for the publicity and 
display that comes with the job.  There are no 
front windows on the house he built for Betty 
in Timber Cove because he didn’t want people 
looking in. If that gives you the impression that 
Gus was a cranky SOB, well, he was, at times. 
But I would have trusted him with my life. 
Ed White was a big man for an astronaut, a 
shade under six feet. As you well know, Ed was 
the ﬁ rst American to walk in space. There’s a 
story going around that when he was on his 
spacewalk, he stayed out after he had been ordered in because he was 
having such a good time. Funny story, but it would have meant Ed 
White disobeyed an order. Not going to happen. Ed was a West Point 
man. Duty, honor, country were not just words to him. He was one 
of my closest friends. 
Roger Chaffee, I didn’t know that well. He was one of the new guys, 
very energetic, very excited. I heard a story about him, though. He 
was out on Long Island visiting the Grumman facility where they 
were building the descent stage of the lunar module. He saw a group 
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This photograph shows the crew in training for the ill-fated 
Apollo/Saturn 204 mission, more commonly known as Apollo 1. On 
27 January 1967, a sudden ﬁ re broke out in the command module 
during a launchpad test. All three of the primary crew—astronauts 
Virgil “Gus” Ivan Grissom, Edward Higgins White II, and Roger 
Bruce Chaffee—perished. 
(NASA Image # 66-HC-1834)
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of men standing in the corner. He found out these were the fellows 
that make the tools that make the machines. None of the big wigs 
that were escorted through there ever talked to these guys. But Roger 
went over and made them feel like they were the most important 
part of the program. 
Second Senator: Colonel, this isn’t a court of law, so I can ask you 
something that’s completely hypothetical. If you could somehow 
reach beyond the wall of death and talk to Grissom, White, and 
Chaffee, what do you imagine they would say about the ﬁ re?
Frank Borman: I was—I was hoping that someone would ask that. 
I don’t know what Roger or Ed would say, but I can let Gus speak 
for himself. Back in January, he talked to a group of reporters. They 
asked him about the dangers involved in going to the Moon.
[Additional indentation to set off reminiscence of Grissom 
speaking.]
Gus Grissom: We’re in a risky business, and we hope if anything 
happens to us, it will not delay the program. The conquest of 
space is worth the risk of life. Our God-given curiosity will 
force us to go there ourselves, because in the ﬁ nal analysis, 
only man can fully evaluate the Moon in terms understandable 
to other men.
Second Senator: Colonel, at the risk of being gruesome, we’ve heard 
about the ﬁ re from everyone who was there, everyone except the 
astronauts themselves, of course. Can you tell me what they went 
through? What it was like for them?
Frank Borman: I can only tell you what we know or, at least, what we 
think we know. When it happened, they were just waiting for the test 
to resume. 
[Additional indentation to set off ﬂ ashbacks to astronauts caught in 
Apollo I ﬁ re.]
Gus Grissom: How are we going to get to the Moon if we can’t 
talk between three buildings? I can’t hear a thing you’re saying. 
Jesus Christ, I said, how are we going to get to the Moon if we 
can’t talk between two or three buildings? 
Frank Borman: They didn’t see the spark that caused the ﬁ re because 
it was behind the panel door, down below Gus’s feet. Because of the 
oxygen, the spark was able to jump out into the netting under the 
seats. Gus probably saw it ﬁ rst because it was closest to him. 
Astronaut: Fire! We have ﬁ re!
Frank Borman: Procedure would have had Gus push down Ed’s 
headrest so that Ed could have started turning the latches. 
RISK AND EXPLORATION:  EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS        GRAHAM YOST    FROM THE EARTH TO THE MOON
191
Astronaut: We have a bad ﬁ re! [pause] Hurry up!
Frank Borman: Now, it just took me a minute or more to tell you all 
that. In actuality, from the ﬁ rst mention of the ﬁ re to the rupture of 
the hull only 15 seconds went by. 
Second Senator: Colonel, what caused the ﬁ re? I’m not talking about 
wires and oxygen. It seems that some people think that NASA 
pressured North American to meet unrealistic and arbitrary deadlines 
and that in turn North American allowed safety to be compromised. 
Frank Borman: I won’t deny that there’s been pressure to meet 
deadlines but safety has never been intentionally compromised. 
Second Senator: Then what caused the ﬁ re? 
Frank Borman: A failure of imagination. We’ve always known there 
was the possibility of a ﬁ re in a spacecraft. But the fear was always 
that it would happen in space when you were 180 miles from terra 
ﬁ rma and the nearest ﬁ re station. That was the worry. No one ever 
imagined that it would happen on the ground. If anyone had thought 
of it, the test would have been classiﬁ ed as hazardous. But it wasn’t. 
We just didn’t think of it. Now whose fault is that? Well, it’s North 
American’s fault. It’s NASA’s fault. It’s the fault of every person 
who ever worked on Apollo. It’s my fault. I didn’t think the test was 
hazardous. No one did. I wish to God we had. 
Second Senator: Now before we all go home, is there any statement 
you personally would like to make? 
Frank Borman: I think I’m safe in speaking for all the astronauts when 
I say that we are conﬁ dent in our management. We’re conﬁ dent in 
our training, in our engineering, and in ourselves. The real question 
is, are you conﬁ dent in us? 
Second Senator: What do you think we should do Colonel? 
Frank Borman: I think you should stop this witch-hunt and let us go 
to the Moon. [Applause] 
Second Senator: Senator Mondale, back to you. 
Senator Mondale: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have nothing further. 
Second Senator: Thank you, Colonel. 
[End of video clip]
John Grunsfeld: I’m going to exercise my executive privilege here for just 
a minute, and I’ll let Graham continue, but, Graham, this is why we invited you. 
I can’t help watching that without getting a little tear in my eye. I’ve been up 
at NASA Headquarters for a little over a year. When I came to Headquarters 
after the loss of Columbia it was because of the pain that I felt for the crew and 
my friends and this kind of circumstance. When I started watching this video 
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I thought, welcome to Mr. O’Keefe’s world. And Bill Readdy’s world. And all of 
us here from NASA who had to suffer through the loss of Columbia and crew. 
This really does address the central issue that we’re here to discuss, which is 
how do we decide, when do we decide to go on, given the loss of our friends, for 
something we all believe is crucially important personally, professionally, for the 
planet, and for our friends. 
I know Mr. O’Keefe has to leave in just a little bit, but I’d like to take this 
opportunity just to thank you as, hopefully, folks thank James Webb for the 
perseverance, the energy. For those of you who [don’t] know me, I am an intense 
workaholic. I can look to a few members in the audience who are shaking their 
heads in agreement and Mr. O’Keefe, you’re the ﬁ rst person that I have been 
unable to keep up with. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for helping 
sponsor this risk symposium. 
I think in a nutshell that things like that video clip show the key to 
communicating this risk to the public effectively. So, back to you. 
Graham Yost: Thank you very much. After working on Earth to the Moon, 
I was looked at in Hollywood as the guy who, if NASA ever had a problem, would 
write the thing about it. So I became the disaster guy. This was also incredibly 
tough. I wrote a screenplay in ’99 on Challenger. That has never been produced. 
Partly because, I think—it was for 20th Century Fox—and they were looking for 
white hats and black hats, and what I found was human beings. 
Then, I got to work for HBO on a thing on Mir and looked at Jerry Linenger’s 
experiences up there and the ﬁ re that they had. Also Mike Foale and the docking 
incident. At any rate, though, Earth to the Moon was the focus for me in risk. 
We shot it mostly in Florida. We did the lunar surface stuff outside of L.A., but 
we shot the rest of it in Florida. Our joke at the time was, just like the Moon 
program, we’re thousands of miles from home, we’re spending way too much 
money, and it’s taking too long. The difference was, and it’s been mentioned 
about the robotic missions, there were risks to career, risks to family, but there 
really, ultimately, was no risking of life in doing a miniseries for HBO and hanging 
out with Tom Hanks. That’s not a hard thing. 
But when I think about risk as I’ve heard over the past couple of days, 
I’m reminded of George Carlin’s famous line—judging risk is very subjective. 
“ ”
THIS REALLY DOES ADDRESS THE CENTRAL ISSUE THAT WE’RE HERE TO DISCUSS, 
WHICH IS HOW DO WE DECIDE, WHEN DO WE DECIDE TO GO ON, GIVEN THE LOSS 
OF OUR FRIENDS, FOR SOMETHING WE ALL BELIEVE IS CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT 
PERSONALLY, PROFESSIONALLY, FOR THE PLANET, AND FOR OUR FRIENDS. 
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George Carlin’s line about driving was,  “Have you ever noticed, anyone driving 
slower than you is an idiot and anyone who’s driving faster is a maniac?” In 
hearing some of the things, we feel like we can somehow judge our own risk 
level. We know what we can handle. The classic subjective thing is ﬂ ying versus 
driving. We know statistically ﬂ ying is lot safer, and, yet, somehow, we feel that 
if we’re in charge, we can handle that risk. I remember when I was living in New 
York and some crime had happened to a stranger. That was the thing we were 
always concerned with, stranger on stranger crime. You would ﬁ nd out when it 
happened and where it happened and you’d say, “Oh, I never would have been 
there.” So, it’s not risky. 
In terms of Apollo, as I said, one of the great honors of doing Earth to the 
Moon was meeting the astronauts and spending a lot of time with Dave Scott. I 
got to direct the episode about Apollo 9. So I spent a lot of time with him talking 
about that. I also worked with him getting the script ready for the episode covering 
the Apollo 15 mission. He told me that there was a big discussion about what 
the rover walk-back limit on it would be, how far the rover could go before, if it 
broke down, they would have to walk back to the LEM. The proposal was that they 
should have—I forget the term—it was like a double walk-back limit or something. 
Because, what if the rover failed and one of the Portable Life Support System (PLSS) 
backpacks failed, that they should be able to go back on one PLSS backpack. Dave 
said, “No. That’s just going to hamper us too much. That’s going to hamstring us. 
We need to go as far as the single walk-back limit.” I said, “Well, what would have 
happened if you had a PLSS failure and a rover failure?” He said, “Well, we would 
have had a bad day.” That was his perspective, and that was his choice. 
Thinking about risk and NASA and space exploration, you have to realize 
that people like Shannon Lucid and people like [Harrison] Jack Schmitt and the 
other astronauts, they’re perfectly capable of judging whether or not something 
is safe. Just like David Andrews, Borman is saying: We know what we’re willing 
to take. The reality is that space exploration, unlike the Magellan voyages, has 
been a volunteer thing. There’s been no torturing of astronauts and telling them 
that they have to go into space. Which again, may not be a bad idea. [Laughter] 
It’s important not to rule anything out. 
This does bring up the other project I worked on in which that was always 
one of the questions. Judy Resnik and Dick Scobee and Elison Onizuka knew what 
they were dealing with in spaceﬂ ight but did Christa McAuliffe really know? Did 
Greg Jarvis really know? The thing is, they were told. They were told as well 
as anyone can communicate to them. It’s not about statistics. Dick Scobee told 
Christa McAuliffe the classic line, “When you launch the Shuttle, everyone is at 
least three miles away except for us. We’re going to be sitting on top.” For me, in 
researching Challenger—and again it’s probably one of the reasons it didn’t get 
produced—was that the problem with Challenger wasn’t that NASA somehow 
got lax with risk. There are all these theories, by the way. I don’t know if any 
of you have read these books, but that NASA was pressured to make the launch 
in order to meet up with Reagan’s State of the Union address that night and all 
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this stuff. The future of space was in Reagan’s hands, that there was pressure, 
pressure, pressure. I think that’s absurd, when you look into it, and that’s what 
Dave Scott would call an “outside the culture” view of it. When you get inside, 
you realize it was just people doing the job they had and the best job they could. 
Everyone working on the program knew the astronauts or met them at some 
time. There was no laxity in NASA on risk. 
To me, in looking at it, the problem was with public perception of risk. 
This has come up again and again over the past couple of days, but because I’m 
last I get to say it again anyway. What can the public tolerate? What are they 
expecting? I think that when Challenger happened, NASA was a victim of its 
own success. If you consider Apollo 13 was a close call. We’ve heard that term 
mentioned, but other than that, it was just a string of successes with manned 
missions. The expectation in the public rose. There was also media pressure—
the media fed into that. There was a classic tape of Peter Jennings on the 26th of 
January—the night before Challenger—saying another on-time departure is too 
much of a challenge for Challenger, because there was a socket wrench that they 
couldn’t work. 
But, the truth be told, NASA at that time was part of the problem, because 
NASA had promised that the Shuttle was going to be a routine access to space. 
As anyone who I’ve talked to involved with spaceﬂ ight knows, there’s no such 
thing. It’s not routine. It’s not—as Mike Foale said last night—it’s not ﬂ ying a 
big aircraft. It’s something far more complicated and far more risky than that. 
During the Presidential Commission on Challenger a ﬁ gure came up and I don’t 
know the source of it so, if it’s not true, forgive me, but it has been said that the 
Shuttle stood only a 1 in 100,000 chance of having a disaster. It was Richard 
Feynman, who was on the commission, who worked out the simple math that 
that means the Shuttle would launch once a day for three hundred years before 
something happened. That was an unreal expectation, an unreal offer to the 
public, that it’s going to be that good, that sure. 
The thing is that we have public accountability. We have a transparent 
program. There are problems with that, but I still think the good outweighs the 
bad. In researching the NASA stuff, we also, at one point for Earth to the Moon, 
we were going to do a special two-hour episode about the Soviet program. It just 
became too expensive. One of the things that we found out is that there were 
horriﬁ c accidents. The testing of an N1 with over 1,000 people killed in one 
explosion. No one ever heard about it. No one in North America ever heard about 
it. No one in Russia heard about it. 
In fact, I would say that culture of secrecy is something that, as Mike Foale 
said last night talking about the docking crash on Mir, contributed to that: The 
idea that we don’t have to share everything. We don’t have to tell you everything. 
It’s all okay. 
My closing thoughts have to do with the question of humans versus robots. 
A lot of people have said it’s kind of an absurd question. They have to go hand 
in hand. To me, humans versus robots is, frankly, not about risk. Ultimately, 
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it’s about money. My feeling in having written about space exploration is that 
the notion of risk is almost secondary to whether or not we move forward into 
space. I think the public will bear whatever the risk is because they know that 
the people involved will bear it. Because the astronauts sign up, because it is 
voluntary. The question becomes, is the public going to get behind it? The public 
is important because they’re paying for it. 
Even though I’m Canadian, I pay American tax dollars. So, it becomes 
a public concern. If something happened back in the 1960s to Lockheed or 
Grumman or a North American test, well, that was private enterprise. That’s 
okay. That’s their deal. That’s their pilot. But when it’s our pilots, when it’s our 
astronauts, then it becomes something that people have to get behind. 
Dave Scott told me that Neil Armstrong once gave a presentation saying—
and this is sort of a gloomy note to end on—but going to the Moon was really 
the convergence of several important things. The technology was available, the 
money, and there was the public will. And I think the big question is going to be 
to get the public will to go back to the Moon and on to Mars. And I don’t know 
if it’s just a matter of communicating it. I think it is also a matter of, somehow, 
in the zeitgeist, the public has to get behind it. Beating the Soviets was worth it. 
People just signed up and said, it’s worth it. I think that if we found out that a 
Mars base was crucial to protecting us from an asteroid storm or alien invasion, 
we would be there in 10 years. 
So what I believe that NASA has to do is to embark on a massive campaign of 
disinformation and lies. [Loud laughter.] And I pledge to do whatever I can.     ■ 
“ ”
MY FEELING IN HAVING WRITTEN ABOUT SPACE EXPLORATION IS THAT THE NOTION 
OF RISK IS ALMOST SECONDARY TO WHETHER OR NOT WE MOVE FORWARD INTO 
SPACE. I THINK THE PUBLIC WILL BEAR WHATEVER THE RISK IS BECAUSE THEY 
KNOW THAT THE PEOPLE INVOLVED WILL BEAR IT.
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Discussion
JOHN GRUNSFELD: Welcome back to “Risk and Exploration.” Our panelists are eager and 
ready to answer and discuss all of your questions and concerns. I imagine that the audience 
has plenty to offer, so I think what we will do is start. If you do ask a question or make a 
comment, please make sure and stand up, give your name and afﬁ liation, and wait just a 
moment for them to cue up your microphone. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don’t quite know how to phrase my question. It’s been bothering 
me for the last day and a half. It was illustrated very nicely in the ﬁ lm clip we saw. There’s 
an old set of characteristics of projects that has been going around for years, the last two 
of which involved praise and honor for the nonparticipants, and the last one is search for 
the guilty. The search for the guilty was illustrated there with the cross-examination of the 
astronaut for causing a failure. I guess I have been bothered for years by the fact that there 
always seems to be a need for institutional witch hunting. Somebody has to be guilty. This 
has got to be an inhibiting factor for managers and the people who have to make the tough 
decisions. I wonder how people feel about that. Is it really an inhibiting factor, or do you 
not think about it? 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: That’s a great question. I guess you missed the Barcelona Times in 
1522 when Magellan didn’t return, and they started the witch-hunt there. It’s an interplay 
between Congress, the media, and the transparency that Graham discussed. We want to 
have a transparent space administration. That’s part of our process. 
JIM GARVIN: Sometimes the side effect of that mind-set is stimulated reexamination of 
programs. It has been said, and I’ve heard it said here, that we have programs in NASA. The 
one I speak for here, the Mars exploration program, continuously reinvents itself, precipitated 
by different types of catalysts. Sometimes they are the big setbacks. We did that after Mars 
Observer—the big witch-hunt of the early ’90s. We did it after, as Steve said, the Climate 
Orbiter/Polar Lander issue, and we built a better program. So, that transparency and these 
effects you rarely see sometimes have positive consequences. How to live in the risk world 
without them in a highly visible public program is the debate we should all have. In the case 
of Mars, I can say that the level of incisiveness and the view that we took to do the rover, to 
198
RISK AND EXPLORATION:  EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS        
do Mars Odyssey, which is still operating, and that we are applying to the Mars 
Reconnaissance Orbiter has been, perhaps, catalyzed by this mind-set. 
GRAHAM YOST: In researching From Earth to the Moon, the feeling after the ﬁ re in 
Apollo I and the death of the crew was one of recommitment. The whole program 
just came together stronger and better than before out of that. I remember 
researching Challenger. There certainly was a witch-hunt, and Larry Malloy at 
Marshall became the fall guy. He once said that he understood that, as the middle 
manager in a corporation, his neck would be the one to go and his head would be 
the one to roll. I would say, and everyone here is in NASA after Challenger and 
you will see NASA after Columbia as well, that there is sort of a recommitment. I 
think, from the outside point of view, it’s sort of a program that gets stronger. 
STEVE SQUYRES: I think it serves no useful purpose nor is it in any way 
appropriate to have a search for the guilty parties. It just doesn’t do anybody any 
good and should be avoided. At the same time, you cannot let your desire to avoid 
that scare you off from a ruthlessly self-critical evaluation of what went wrong. 
T. K. Mattingly last night said that every great success is preceded by failure. 
Certainly that was the case in the case of our mission, and I can tell you right now 
that the MER [Mars Exploration Rover] mission, as one simple example, would not 
have succeeded had it not been for the ruthlessly critical self-evaluation that NASA 
undertook of its Mars program, as Gene said, after the loss of MPL [Mars Polar 
Lander] and MCO [Mars Climate Orbiter]. I think the CAIB, the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board, that Scott Hubbard was a part of, was a very necessary process. 
It was ruthlessly critical of the Agency in ways that were necessary and ways that 
will save lives in the future. We shouldn’t have a witch-hunt, but you can’t let it 
scare you off from doing a job you have to do when something goes wrong. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I would like to add that I do picture myself sitting in 
Frank Borman’s chair down here answering the questions. Now, you’ve said it 
was a good idea. You just gave up because you couldn’t get the resources? Well, 
what kind of man are you, you know? It gives a person a little more courage to go 
tell the uncomfortable truth that you might have to tell sometimes. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I think one of the questions that comes up as far as 
testing is the James Webb Space Telescope. The James Webb Space Telescope is 
a big telescope. That’s why it has all that deployment, and it is still too small to 
do certain types of work that we know we would want to do at the end of the next 
decade: look for earth-type planets around nearby stars. I ﬁ nd that a compelling 
goal, and we need a bigger telescope. It will almost certainly be too big to test 
on planet Earth, and that gets back into the humans and robotic partnership. At 
what point are our goals important enough, our objectives well known, that the 
scale is such that we cannot test it on planet Earth? In the integrated test such 
that we might want to employ robots and/or humans as we do in the Hubble 
Space Telescope to check it out, how do you make that call? I know that this is 
something you’ve thought about, John. 
OPENING PHOTO: 
Astronaut Harrison H. “Jack” Schmitt, lunar 
module pilot, stands near the United States 
ﬂ ag on the lunar surface during NASA’s ﬁ nal 
lunar landing mission in the Apollo series 
(1972). (NASA Image # AS17-134-20382)
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I would think that we have to do everything that 
we can with robots because they are probably quicker in most areas, and there 
will be some things they cannot do alone. When it comes to our dreams of big 
telescopes to ﬁ nd planets around other stars, I think we have to be really diligent 
in searching for ways to test them on the ground also. We just shouldn’t give up 
on testing them on the ground, because I despair of convincing Congress that 
they have to fund us when we can’t test it before we ﬂ y it. So, I think we have to 
be very, very imaginative about ﬁ nding ways to test on the ground. We then still 
have to ﬁ gure out that it’s maybe not going to work. 
There are some things we cannot adjust in the ﬁ nal stage and we cannot 
conﬁ rm on the ground. We have in mind ﬂ ying constellations of telescopes that 
collect light from several different places and funnel it through a single combiner 
in the middle in an interferometer conﬁ guration, and with this method, you 
can build up the image sharpness that you would have from a telescope that is 
hundreds of meters, maybe kilometers or hundreds of kilometers across. You 
might want to do that to ﬁ nd out about those planets around other stars, but 
we just have no hope of testing that on the ground. Still, we must prove that it’s 
going to work when you get there, so what are you going to use? Imagination? I 
couldn’t tell you the answer today. 
JIM GARVIN: We actually did experiments on the Moon with Apollo that you 
couldn’t have tested on the Earth. The human beings, the crew set up some of 
the impressive arrays that we used to study the interior of the Moon and then 
experienced the collision of leftover space vehicles to generate a pulse; [that] was 
a novel, imaginative experiment that we did. I think there’s an example of that. 
But there was something that we call Robotic Sample Return to bring back pieces 
of Mars to Earth. Some of us call it “Apollo without the astronauts” because of 
the complexity. The reason for that mission is because there are some things we 
think can only be done, at least until we reach projected technology state, with 
people in the loop. We either move a lot of people to Mars, and some of us would 
like to go, or we bring stuff back from Mars so the people here can work on it. 
Because of the testing limitations, you’re there. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: One important point that I think is just good to get 
on tape is that there is no such thing as pure robotic exploration. The stuff comes 
back to the people who want to understand the science, so people are always 
involved. It’s just a question of where are the people in proximity to the context. 
That’s the evidence. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you, David Roberts. Problem for Jim Garvin 
and Steve Squyres and the panel. Besides Mars and Europa, what would be the 
likely planets or satellites for the next landers? Why? If possible, when?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: First, you left out the Moon. Going back to the Moon, 
it’s a planet in its own right. While we visited tremendously with the humans, 
getting back there is a scientiﬁ c and human operation proving ground. Mars is 
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central to our vision, our implementation plan. So the Moon is a place. In fact, 
contrary to common belief, although not contrary to the science community, 
the Moon offers an interesting context for astrobiology. There’s the question of 
early planetary crusts in which there may be aspects of our own history in the 
origins of life from which you gain context. Other than that, I would submit that 
it’s a reconnaissance that will help answer that question. You named Europa. 
In January [2005], we will have the descent of the Huygens probe as part of 
the mission to Titan, unquestionably one of the most interesting objects in 
our solar system, certainly from the standpoint of planetary atmospheres and 
environments. Landing on that surface and sustaining landed experiments 
beyond the scope of Huygens is a wonderful step. We have a mission called Dawn 
that will visit two of the main belt asteroids, which are really planetary objects 
in their own right, Vesta and Ceres in this case, and landing on them, by virtue 
of what we ﬁ nd from the ﬁ rst nonlanded experiments that we’ll be doing, I think 
is important. But I don’t want to leave out Venus. Twelve impressive landings 
by our Soviet colleagues have left many questions that are so fundamental to 
understanding how big, rocky planets work, and their atmospheres, that we have 
no clue about. And, yet, that poses a risk challenge to sustain operations there 
robotically. I don’t know whether the crews want to go yet, John, a little bit hard 
to get back in the gravity wall. There are a lot of places where landed experiments 
as a forerunner to sample returns and, ultimately, human landings, in my view, 
are important parts of our strategy. 
STEVE SQUYRES: I think you answered it well. Actually, I’m glad you 
mentioned Venus because, you know, we have Venus, Earth, and Mars, and it 
brings us back to comments that Jean-Michel Cousteau and Sylvia Earle made 
this morning, which are, we like this planet, this is a nice planet we live on. 
And we also know we don’t want to end up like Venus or Mars, and we don’t 
understand any of them, including the Earth, all that well. 
DAVID HALPERN: I’m happy somebody just mentioned Venus and Mars and the 
Earth. The point that was being made in the morning is not so much we don’t 
want to end up like Venus with the hot house or the greenhouse gas—that’s a 
separate issue. The simplest fact is that we know the topography—the ups and 
downs and the curves of Venus and Mars—to a much, much greater extent than 
we know the bottom of the ocean. That was one of the points that we were trying 
to make in the morning. 
When it comes to exploration, if you want to explore, like Lewis and Clark, 
a continental area, what do you do? You ﬁ rst go there and you see what the height 
is and what the elevation is and where the streams are and where the gullies are. 
But we don’t know that in the ocean. And the point that was being made—and 
then I think there was another comment made this afternoon—about 96 percent 
of the universe we don’t know. Well, we don’t even know 95 percent of the ocean. 
So, I just want to reiterate the point from this morning. 
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JOE FULLER: Joe Fuller, Futron Corporation. Right now, we’re spending a lot of 
time, energy, resources, imaginations to reduce the risk associated with return 
to ﬂ ight. And even though I’m sure everybody’s going to do everything they can, 
there will still be risks. And if we think the unthinkable, what if there’s another 
accident, you know, on the very next mission? It would have a devastating 
consequence. How do we get ahead of the curve in mitigating the risk of, you 
know, such a situation? I guess I’ll refer to Graham Yost—he got very close to it 
in talking about, you know, dealing with the public.
GRAHAM YOST: Again, I think it comes back to the victim of success. The 
manned spaceﬂ ight in America has not been like test ﬂ ight in America, where 
they had accidents all the time back in the ’50s and people just kind of got used 
to that. God forbid, you know, that manned spaceﬂ ight had been like that. But 
it’s hard to say what the public appetite is. Someone was asking me at the break 
about that, and I do maintain that the public is in many ways more concerned—I 
believe and I may be totally wrong in this—they’re more concerned about the 
cost of things, because it’s a pocketbook issue, than they are about the human 
risk. They’re concerned about the human risk, but I think that they do feel that 
everyone is doing absolutely everything they can to make sure these people get 
back safely. I think that’s just the tradition of the American spaceﬂ ight. And, so, 
I don’t know what would happen to the Shuttle program. And, God forbid, you 
know, it took a long time, relatively, between Challenger and Columbia. That was 
a lot of ﬂ ights, and it doesn’t excuse it or make it okay, it’s such an incredibly 
complicated machine—you all know. And the public doesn’t know. But I think 
that the public accepts just the basic notion that it’s risky.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: I don’t know how Shannon feels, but I know for myself 
I’m more amazed each time we launch a Shuttle when you think of the tens of 
thousands of pieces, you know, that are checked out in the few seconds just prior 
to launch that all have to pass those checks before we actually leave. And the tens 
of thousands of people that all have to do their job just right before that Shuttle 
will leave the ground. It’s always amazing to me that we do leave. I’m always a 
little surprised, when I’m in the vehicle, that we actually leave. I sort of prepare 
myself for that, you know, late countdown shutdown for some parameter out of 
limits, which many of us have experienced. 
At the same time, Shannon, how do you compartmentalize? I know I do 
that. When I’m in the Shuttle thinking about the mission, I put the risk part of it, 
the scary part, in a little compartment, and it never really occurs to me when we’re 
sitting out on the launch pad on four-and-a-half million pounds of explosives. 
SHANNON LUCID: Well, you’ve made the decision that’s what you’re going to 
do and you’ve worked with the people that are doing everything. You’ve worked 
with the ﬂ ight control team, you’ve worked with the Cape people, you know. 
And you know that they’re doing the very best that they can. You know that 
they’re only human; you know that mistakes can be made. And you’ve made your 
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decision and that’s what you’re going to do. You don’t sit there and analyze it and 
say, “What if?” at that time.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: That’s right. In speciﬁ c, we talk about the team aspects. And, 
as risk takers, regardless of whether it’s earth, sea, or the stars, when you get into 
the vehicle or into the environment, ultimately, you have to trust those people 
who are making the decisions, and management, that they’ve done everything 
that they can. And often we talk about “as low as reasonably achievable” as a 
method of risk mitigation. For return to ﬂ ight after Columbia, we have a very 
extensive guide, and the Space Operations Directorate has a very detailed return-
to-ﬂ ight plan. So, I think we’re doing everything we can. 
DAVID LONGNECKER: Hi, David Longnecker from the University of Pennsylvania. 
And my question is probably addressed to you, John. And that is, following up on 
what we just heard about mitigating risk, one risk we haven’t really talked about 
so far—at least [to] any signiﬁ cant degree here—is the risk associated with a 
very large organization with multiple components, each doing their job to an 
optimal level, but, yet, creating a series of stovepipes that are not linked together 
across the organization. I’d be curious to know what NASA’s doing to deal with 
that sort of linkage of risk across a huge organization.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: David, that’s a great question. Thank you for asking that, 
and I think you saw on August 1st that NASA engaged in a rather large-scale 
transformation of its organization. The study of organizational risk in high-risk 
endeavors is a very mature study, but not very well understood. And you talked 
about stovepipes. The function of the transformation was to get NASA aligned 
behind a central goal. And you’ve heard that a lot. You have to have a clear goal. 
Everybody has to understand that goal, and everybody has to work together for 
that goal. In the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, they talked about 
integration functions. And, so, one of the things that we’ve done is to strengthen, 
through consolidation and through this transformation, our ability to integrate. 
We have a Science Missions Directorate that now contains all of our science 
and has close ties with exploration systems, space operations, aeronautics; and 
we have an associate deputy administrator for integration who is the corporate 
conscience. And we develop our processes and policies to make sure that we 
have close integration between all these endeavors, whether it’s the expendable 
launch vehicles in the science arena or human spaceﬂ ight and the exploration 
development. And part of that—and, I think, a key part of that—is so that we 
can incorporate lessons learned across the Agency into programs where those 
lessons may apply. 
So, you know, that’s not a full answer to your question, because it’s only 
been a couple of months, but we’re on the road towards trying to get that kind of 
integration and breaking down the stovepipes. 
MITCH BARNEY: Mitch Barney, Goddard Space Flight Center. Ever since I was a 
college student, I’ve done my explorations in a bunny suit and clean-room booties. 
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I’m in the engineering side, developing new instrument-measurement techniques 
and technologies where failure is an option and the challenge is the risk—that’s 
what brings you back day to day. Recently, the NASA environment for us has 
become a more competitive environment. We’re competing and collaborating both 
internally and externally with private industry and with academia. And I wonder 
what the panel’s response [is] to a question about the impact of a competitive 
environment on the risk that NASA’s taking now. Dr. Mather and Dr. Garvin, you 
both mentioned the competitive aspects. So I wonder what you thought about 
competition and what it does—what’s the impact on risk.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: I’d like to start this, if I could, with Steve Squyres. I came to 
NASA as a principal investigator in science programs and considered that process 
to be like swimming with sharks. Yeah, Steve?
STEVE SQUYRES: It is. I think that the competitive process that we go 
through—if exercised appropriately, if the selection process is done in an 
appropriate fashion—is one of the best risk mitigators that we have. My team, 
in various, different permutations and combinations, wrote three unsuccessful 
proposals—each of them, at the time, the best we could do, each of them with 
serious ﬂ aws—to agencies. We sent in the proposals. It was highly competitive. 
We lost. It was painful. We went back and we sharpened our pencils and we did 
a better job. And each proposal got better and better and, ﬁ nally, on the fourth 
try, we managed to convince the Agency that something like MER was a good 
thing to do. I think that competitive process and the intensity of it—the pain 
and humiliation of losing a competition like that—drove us, and it drove us very 
hard to get better; and not just to write better proposals, but build safer, better, 
more-likely-to-succeed hardware. 
And so, it’s very important to have that competition. And I think the more 
broadly the net is cast—opening up the competition to industry, to universities 
large and small, across the Agency—to try to level the playing ﬁ eld so that 
everybody’s competing on roughly equivalent terms, is a very, very valuable 
thing. And I dislike the competitive process intensely, but it’s part of what has 
led to success of many programs doing that.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I think the key for us at NASA is to make sure we 
provide you the tools and the ability to be able to compete head-to-head.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If I may as well. I’ve seen the good and the bad of 
the competitive process for, in particular, science-driven experiments. And we 
haven’t always gotten it right. I mean, Steve tells a good story, but we just spent 
the last couple of years going through that competitive process for 25 wonderful 
contests for missions to go to Mars, robotic missions, at this stage. And I think 
we’ve actually achieved a risk-based lesson learned from honing of that process. 
And I ﬁ rst saw that process as a loser, often, in the ’90s, proposing instruments, 
but I later saw it from the standpoint of implementation, and I saw elegant things 
we want to do in space—both at Earth and on planets—get through the process 
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with great imagination and excitement, and then fail to sustain the cost envelope, 
the research envelope. 
And I saw the community get smarter, that is, the integrated aerospace, 
university, NASA center, you know, community. And in this last Mars scout 
go-round—my one knothole in this—we had dozens of brilliant missions to 
Mars. And in the end, the ﬁ nal four—I’m not a basketball player—emerged 
after withering reviews by hundreds of individuals in which we spent more time 
worrying about being attentive to understanding risk. In fact, the most withering 
review is the risk of implementation review we do. And I think, you know, to some 
extent, it’s the setbacks that have honed that. So that I’m much more conﬁ dent 
from all these analyses that we can do these things. Now, the question is, I think, 
how do we maintain continuous improvement of that process when we reach a 
certain level of performance—success from MER, success from COBE?
JOHN GRUNSFELD: I’m thinking that there are a lot of rules of the game that 
govern how it all plays out and that at NASA Headquarters, when we set up the 
rules of engagement, we basically determine the outcome—in a way that we may 
not anticipate—of how organizations grow or die. And the ability of organizations 
to grow or die as a response to the competitive process is part of capitalism, and 
it’s part of the sort of basic religion of America, practically. But it does have some 
unintended consequences. Creative destruction is sort of [a] motto that people 
carry, and a lot of us may lose. So, well, that’s just part of the deal. And I think that 
we need those competitive forces and, certainly, I’ve had a lot of losing proposals 
as well, so they know that and they deserve to lose, but maybe next time. 
STEVE SQUYRES: There’s one other aspect that we’ve mostly been doing with 
the science side, because we’re a science-heavy panel, but Jim brought up the 
metrics by which you decide who wins the proposal. In the science case, we want 
projects that are viable, scientiﬁ cally top-notch, and so on. One of the duties of 
the commander on a Space Shuttle ﬂ ight—and I presume it was true of a Saturn 
V ﬂ ight as well—is to remind the new ﬂ iers of the group that they’re launching 
on the lowest bidder’s successful project. So sometimes those measures of 
effectiveness may be at odds with low risk. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: It must be getting late. Well, Jim, let me pick on you for a 
minute and ask you something. You’ve ﬂ own a Shuttle experiment, and I’ve 
thought about this. My Ph.D. thesis was on a Space Shuttle. It was on the Space 
Shuttle Challenger, the ﬂ ight before the fateful one, and I didn’t think about the risk 
element to the crew at all. When you ﬂ ew your laser experiment, did you think at 
all about the risk the crew was taking to get science for you and your colleagues? 
JIM GARVIN: Well, in fact, John, we did, and for two reasons: One was the risk 
that we were afraid we were imposing on them. We had 45 millijoules, the number 
in laser metrics, a non-eye-safe, infrared laser transmitter. The light could have 
blinded the crew looking out the back window. And so we developed ﬂ ight rules 
and procedures with the crew so that they would be sleeping, often, when we 
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operated. For two reasons: We didn’t want them moving around, because we were 
trying to measure little things on there, and, second, we didn’t want that risk. 
But I remember vividly the launch of STS-72, which was in January of ’96, and 
the biggest snowstorm in a decade in Washington[, DC].
And I remember thinking that the crew were launching, you know, not 
really thinking about the weather or getting to the payload operation control 
center at Goddard where they were running the experiment, which was causing 
me great stress, but I thought, they were riding these seven million pounds of 
thrust to carry our team’s hundred kilos of stuff to try out an idea. And I thought 
how lucky we were. Because we had all the infrastructure that got them there into 
orbit successfully—in this case, it was a recovery mission for the Japanese—but 
also, to let us have this window on the world with this ﬂ ight. We went with 
checked and set parameters, so I thought, if our straw is the one that breaks the 
back for the crew and, also for the mission and the Shuttle, that would be, you 
know, a tremendous setback. 
We were scheduled to have an experiment like this on the ﬁ rst Shuttle 
launch for science out of Vandenberg. So, we were to go into polar orbit with 
the Shuttle to do experiments looking over the polar ice, being a big thing we 
wanted to measure. But, at any rate, it took us nine years to get back to our 
experiment on Endeavour when we ﬂ ew. I just think those are the challenges of 
human spaceﬂ ight. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I know, from the risk-taker’s side, that the decision to 
go is very easy when it’s making great science or great exploration. That makes it a 
much easier discussion to think about the risks versus the rewards. There are folks 
I’ve ﬂ own with out here in the audience and we’ve done tremendous science. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: Any more? Going once, twice. Very good. Well, I want to 
thank all of the speakers. Let’s give them all a great big hand. I also want to 
take the time, once again, to thank the Naval Postgraduate School. It’s been a 
tremendous venue for us and a great environment to have these discussions 
today for “Sea and Stars.” Also for Ames, which has helped facilitate this. Don’t 
forget, tonight is dinner and a movie. We’ll be watching the Endurance. And for 
those out in the listening world, thanks for watching NASA TV.     ■
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John Grunsfeld
NASA Chief Scientist and Astronaut 
Welcome to “Risk and Exploration—Earth, Sea, and the 
Stars.” Today’s session is entitled “Why We Explore,” but I’m hoping that, mostly, we can 
make it a dialogue, up close and personal. I’m John Grunsfeld. I’m the NASA chief scientist 
and an astronaut. 
I think we have started getting into the discussions on risk and exploration, into some 
of the thorny questions about how do we make decisions. How do we use our judgment? 
How do we, as institutional managers of a public institution, make decisions on behalf of 
the American people, and with oversight of the Congress, that can stand the test of time, 
without being so risk averse that we don’t do anything interesting? 
There’s a couple of things I’d like to show this morning that are personal, that are 
professional as chief scientist, and then, representing the Agency, and then, looking forward. 
I think we’d be remiss in all of this discussion if we avoided the topic of why we’re not 
sending a Space Shuttle back to the Hubble to service it. So I’ll address that in a second. 
One of our favorite cartoons shows a Conestoga wagon heading across the Great 
Plains. And the title reads “Alarmed by the many dangers, the pioneers abandoned westward 
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exploration except for a series of unmanned prairie-probe vehicles.” You know, 
I think many people have summed up succinctly why humans explore. Because 
we want to go. In the face of danger, but managed risk. I am absolutely positive 
that our outward expansion from the cradle that planet Earth is, will not be one 
of strictly unmanned probes, but we will be heading out across the prairies. Why 
[do] we explore? Right now, Spirit at Columbia Hills [Mars] is poised to look over 
those hills and see what’s beyond. 
I’m an explorer who is trained by a group called the National Outdoor 
Leadership School, and we’re privileged to have John Gans, the director of the 
National Outdoor Leadership School, here. I went there in high school and it was 
to learn to be a better risk manager, a better leader in the outdoors and, hopefully, 
not to be reckless like most teenagers. 
But my interest in exploration was largely driven through the pages of 
National Geographic, through the movies of Jacques Cousteau, while growing up 
on the south side of Chicago, that I was able to explore vicariously. But I wanted to 
go. I have a passion for exploration, and I have a weakness. When I see something 
like Columbia Hills, I have a need to look over that hill. And it’s a real challenge. 
It’s a real challenge because you set limits for yourself. And as mountaineers, 
we set limits for ourselves. We have to summit by a certain time so we can make 
it back safely. And I’m constantly torn, wanting to go further, especially when I’m 
on professional travel and I take a day off to go hike. I say, “Well, I only have one 
day and I’ll go this far.” And I get that far and I look forward and I say, “Boy, I’ve 
got to go a little further.” 
So, that’s what we’re doing with Spirit and Opportunity on Mars now. We 
have the opportunity to go further because the rovers are still running, they’re 
still doing great. You know, we had a 90- or a 120-day mission and we’re well 
beyond that now, and we have hope they can go much further. 
This May and June, I had the opportunity to try and climb a little hill in 
Alaska called Denali—Mt. McKinley. It’s 6,157 meters, 20,320 feet tall. This is a 
serious expedition. It’s not quite the kind of thing that Ed Viesturs does, but it’s, 
I think, comparable in many ways. 
It’s at 63 degrees north latitude. That makes it perhaps the coldest mountain 
on planet Earth. You start out already basically in the Arctic. Its conditions on the 
summit are comparable to Everest in winter. The Alaska Range is a large landmass 
that extends up out of plains, basically, a few hundred feet in altitude. It sees the 
full brunt of arctic weather. And, so, it seemed like an appropriate challenge. 
Now, in order to do this as an astronaut—and I see Colonel Cabana in the 
audience—this was my third try. The ﬁ rst time I tried, as an astronaut, I felt 
compelled to write a mission statement and a risk-mitigation statement that I 
submitted to my boss, Colonel Cabana, then chief of the astronaut ofﬁ ce, so that 
I could get permission to go, so to speak. Even though it was personal leave. 
That’s the way I view risk management on this climb: you have my crew 
notebook with checklists. And I think I’m the only mountaineer I know who 
goes up with checklists and says, “Okay.” And part of that was, I recognized that 
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at high altitude I will be hypoxic, I will make mistakes. And this was one of 
my mechanisms to prevent myself from making mistakes. I still made lots of 
mistakes. I think back now and I think, “It’s in the checklist; how could I have 
missed it?” 
But it’s one mechanism of risk mitigation that we use very often in the space 
business, because the line between life and death is so ﬁ ne. We heard in this talk 
something that I think is very characteristic: the farther you go from base camp, 
if the smiles get bigger, you have the right team. And we lived, basically, on a 
glacier for 23 days. All of our water came from melting snow. 
Just a great experience. No cell phones, no beepers, no Blackberrys, really 
just existing in a very primal way, but with the aid of high technology, and that’s 
something I think is part of the real spirit of exploration, that trying to go to the 
next hill. And I got up to the top and I looked back and I waved at Dave Schuman, 
who is another NASA Headquarters employee. I said, “Dave,” and I had to yell. 
I said, “Dave, I have bad news.” And he was thinking “Oh, no.” We thought we 
were close to the summit—we’d been on the summit ridge for about two hours 
climbing up from something called the “Football Field.” And it’s tedious. What 
Ed Viesturs said is right. You take a step, you breathe a bunch of times, and you 
take a step. And every time you stop to breathe, you look forward to see how 
much longer it is. And, very often, you don’t see the top, you know, [you have 
to] climb another ridge. And I said, “I have bad news. There’s no place else to go 
but down.” 
I was actually worried about sort of an anticlimactic feeling. This was 
my third try, and I just couldn’t believe I was actually standing on the highest 
point in North America—just an unbelievable feeling. I was half laughing— my 
climbing buddies say hysterically—and half crying. I just couldn’t believe it. So 
we had three NASA employees on the summit of North America on June 7th of 
this year, 91 years after the ﬁ rst ascent. 
A lot of people have climbed to the top of this mountain—about 12,000. 
About one out of a hundred perish in this. My risk management plan was to 
go through a book called Accidents in North American Mountaineering. It’s 
published every year. Just the fact that a book like this is published means that 
mountaineers are very sensitive to this issue of risk and that we try and learn 
from others’ mistakes. 
”
I HAVE A PASSION FOR EXPLORATION, AND I HAVE A WEAKNESS. 
WHEN I SEE SOMETHING LIKE COLUMBIA HILLS, I HAVE A NEED TO 
LOOK OVER THAT HILL. AND IT’S A REAL CHALLENGE. 
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I went through basically every mountaineering accident on Mt. McKinley 
and in the Alaska Range from 1969 to about 1992 and came up with common 
causes, behaviors that led to those accidents, and then asked myself, how can 
I avoid those behaviors? And, so, that was also in my little notebook. And I’d 
review that every night and then review it with the team. “Okay, we’re not going 
to do this. We’re always going to stay roped, no matter where we are. We’re 
always going to carry an ice axe.” 
We pretty much beat it away so that if you do the statistics, it became more 
like 1 in 10,000. And one of the things that people think about mountaineering is 
that it’s high-risk behavior. In fact, a mountaineer who climbs recreationally, as I 
do, is about three times more likely to die from heart disease in the United States 
than from a mountaineering accident. But, 
of course, when there is a mountaineering 
accident, and a rescue, that short-term drama 
that we discussed here is what plays big, and 
not the many, many safe expeditions. 
The other thing that we will talk about 
in the discussion is the Hubble decision. 
On January 16th [2004], Sean O’Keefe, the 
Administrator of NASA, Ed Weiler, and I 
went out to the Goddard Space Flight Center 
to announce to the Hubbard Space Telescope 
servicing team that Mr. O’Keefe had made the 
hard decision that we were not going to return 
to the Hubble Space Telescope for a ﬁ fth 
servicing mission with the Space Shuttle. 
This hit me extremely hard. I am 
literally a “Hubble Hugger,” as I think many 
of you know. I’ve had the privilege of visiting 
the Hubble Space Telescope twice. I’m a 
professional astronomer. I know Bob Parker 
is here somewhere, he’s another astronomer 
astronaut, and I’m sure he can appreciate 
how tough this was. But Mr. O’Keefe looked 
at all the elements post-Columbia, and, in 
fact, our last mission was on Columbia up to 
the Hubble in March of 2002. And he looked 
at the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. 
Hubble has a clock, an internal clock. And that clock is driven by gyroscopes 
and batteries. And sometime in the next two to three years, the gyroscopes that 
are on Hubble will wear out, and Hubble won’t be able to do science anymore. 
Not too much longer after that, the batteries will run out of juice, their ability 
to charge and recharge, and at that point, the telescope will go cold and won’t be 
able to be recovered. 
Astronaut John M. Grunsfeld, positioned on a foot restraint on the end of Discovery’s 
remote manipulator system (RMS), prepares to replace a radio transmitter in one of 
the Hubble Space Telescope’s electronics bay. 
(NASA Image # STS103-713-048)
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So we have to get to Hubble before the batteries die. And if you look at the 
recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, and if you say 
we’re going to satisfy every single recommendation before we go to ﬂ ight and you 
say that we’re not going to succumb to schedule pressure again, then when you look 
at the risk-to-beneﬁ t of using a Space Shuttle, you put yourself in a real box. 
One of the boxes goes like the following: Imagine that we press forward with 
a Hubble servicing mission with the Shuttle. We have the crew trained, we have 
the big team trained, and we’re on the pad. You know, maybe even we have liquid 
oxygen boiling off and the hissing and the moaning. And, in the launch count, we 
ﬁ nd out that something’s not working right. A computer is down, a multiplexer 
isn’t working, some communication link on the ground isn’t working. Our ﬂ ight 
rules would say, “Don’t launch.” 
But whoever is in the hot seat that day will feel enormous schedule 
pressure to launch that mission anyway, because Hubble won’t wait. We’re all 
success-oriented, that’s what we drive to. And Mr. O’Keefe didn’t want to put 
any manager in that position. 
Worse, when we go to the Hubble orbit, we launch due east. And, so, the only 
self-rescue capability we have—and that’s another very important element in 
mountaineering or any outdoor adventure or going down in caves and, certainly, 
in the Antarctic—is limited to what you really have on the Shuttle. And, so, early 
in his analysis, he said if we’re going to go to Hubble, we want to have a second 
Space Shuttle available on the pad so that you could launch within less than 30 
days, which is probably the maximum you could keep a Shuttle crew going in 
orbit, in case of a Columbia-like accident. Well, imagine the enormous pressure 
if you had to execute that—of the second Shuttle to go rescue the crew. 
Would we do it? Of course we would. If we put ourselves in that position, 
we would do everything we could to mount that rescue mission. And the same 
thing if the weather’s not good, if something’s wrong with that second Shuttle. 
And, I think, about half the time, there’s some issue that delays us. We’re getting 
better and better. I know two of my four missions have been delayed by a number 
of months. Many other missions have been delayed even as close to a few seconds 
prior to launch, when an engine will shut down for good reason, and we then 
recycle to two or three months later. 
That’s not acceptable if we’re doing a rescue mission, even if it is a best-effort 
rescue mission. So I think the managers would feel that extreme schedule pressure 
that would put another crew at risk. So Mr. O’Keefe just felt that, as the top banana 
risk manager for the Agency, he didn’t want to put us in that position. 
That’s a tough call. We all love Hubble. Hubble does extremely important 
science and is, perhaps, the most important scientiﬁ c instrument ever created 
by humans. So this hit many of us hard, and it’s that emotional side that makes 
risk-analysis and decision-making so hard. Someone said that the decisions we 
don’t have control over are the ones that we worry the most about, and the ones 
we do have control over, we worry the least about. Well, this is one that I know 
Mr. O’Keefe has worried the most about. 
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And it really is compliance with all of the recommendations of the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board and where we have raised the bar to make sure that 
we ﬂ y safely with the Shuttle—as safely as we can. 
What we also heard in this conference [is] that the only limit is our 
imagination. Absolutely true. So the question you have to ask—and I did ask the 
Administrator—”Okay, if we can’t go back with the Shuttle to service Hubble, how 
can we service Hubble?” I didn’t quite put it that way, but I came back and said, “If 
we can service Hubble without the Shuttle, can we go forward with that?” 
And I explained to him that it might be possible to use a robot to service 
Hubble. Now, keep in mind that I’m proposing something that puts me, as a 
spacewalking astronaut, out of business. But that’s exactly what we want to do. 
We want to take routine operations of servicing—things that we can do with 
robots, things that we pioneered using humans that now robotics can do—and 
replace humans in hazardous situations. 
EVA, Extravehicular Activity, is a very hazardous activity. We’ve been very 
fortunate in our spacewalks and there have been some close calls. That being said, 
servicing Hubble robotically will be a true, high-performance challenge. So, it’s 
not clear that we can do it yet. But Mr. O’Keefe said we can go investigate that. 
This was an idea that came out of the extremely talented team at the Goddard 
Space Flight Center led by Frank Cepollina, one of our top inventors and out-
of-the-box thinkers, a true explorer, one of the people responsible for the ﬁ rst 
servicing mission. 
Remember, Hubble was a “space turkey,” a “dog in space,” “space junk.” All 
of those things that we heard after it was launched, just because the mirror was 
ground to the wrong shape. Now, it was actually the best mirror ever created, but 
it was the wrong shape. Well, we went up and put contact lenses on it, corrective 
optics, on the ﬁ rst servicing mission. And for three years, people [had] said, “You 
can’t do it. People can’t service it. It won’t work. It will be too hard. You’ll end up 
destroying the telescope.” But we did it. 
It was that same team that came forward and said, “We think we might be 
able to send robots to the rescue.” Well, that alone wasn’t quite enough to put 
us collectively over the edge to suggest that we actually should proceed with the 
robotic mission, until we started listing the key technologies that we would have 
to prove to be able to service Hubble. And those technologies were: autonomous 
robotic rendezvous with a spacecraft, proximity operations close to the telescope, 
reaching out and grabbing the telescope, effectively a docking; doing an assembly, 
putting a new spacecraft underneath the Hubble—robotic assembly, and then, 
having dexterous robotics, agile robotics that can feel, to be able to service the 
telescope the way humans do, new tool development. 
We looked at that list and I said, “Boy, that list looks exactly like our top list 
of things we need to learn how to do to explore—to go to the Moon, Mars, and 
beyond.” And so the idea came up of using Hubble to be a catalyst for exploration. 
Because, after all, what is Hubble? Hubble is out exploring the universe. It’s 
our eyes for exploring the universe. It already is doing our exploration mission. 
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And what a great part of the Hubble story that it can continue to do science and 
be that spark that allows us to go further on. 
Hubble is very hard to work on. This is going to be pushing what we’ve 
done in space, you know, maybe one or two generations. But people perform at 
their highest when we give them high-performance challenges. 
If you ask people the easy things, they’ll do it, but when you ask people 
who are passionate to do something hard, they’ll do it well, and they’ll pull out 
all the stops. And we’ve heard that in all of our panelists and in contributions 
from the audience. 
Once we installed the Advanced Camera for Surveys in the telescope, 
there are a lot of very delicate operations. One of the good things about a robot 
is once its done the operation once, it can repeat it over and over again. And 
we have a greater knowledge of the metrology—of all of the measurements of 
Hubble—than any spacecraft ever, due to four servicing missions and all of the 
metrology we did on the ground—all of the measurements we made. So that we 
could build instruments on the ground while Hubble’s in space and know that 
they’ll ﬁ t. So this is the best setup we’re probably going to have to try some of 
these hard things. 
The proposed robotic servicing mission will launch on an expendable 
vehicle. We’ve got to get it up there sometime around late 2007 or 2008, so 
those of you who’ve heard about the MER, you know, 34 months wasn’t long 
enough; well, we have about the same amount of time. It’ll have two parts. It’ll 
have a part that’s going to stay with the telescope and one that will leave. Once 
it’s on orbit, a robotic arm, much like the Space Shuttle, will be deployed. And 
there’ll be people involved—this is not a push a button and it goes. Folks on the 
ground will be monitoring this and, maybe, controlling it. 
We’re going to grab Hubble in exactly the same way we did with the Shuttle. 
We’ll have the same end effector—a very similar arm, a similar approach—and 
we’ll use the same spots on the Hubble that we grab with the Shuttle. So, we’re 
still in known territory, we’re just using a robot. The robot will then put itself 
on the bottom. And that’s exactly what we do with the Shuttle—we grab Hubble 
and we put the Shuttle underneath. And we latch with these exact same latches. 
Well, now the robot’s doing it. 
Once we let go, now we have to get the arms and the hands. To do that, 
we’re going to use this special-purpose dexterous manipulator. It’s already 
ﬂ ight-ready. It’s a Canadian arm called “Dextre”—that’s the call sign. And it was 
built to service electronics on the International Space Station. 
Well, we’re going to steal that ﬁ rst and use it on Hubble. It’ll deploy some 
cables to hook up the new spacecraft into the Hubble. This is something we 
feel comfortable doing, except for the part with the connectors. The connectors 
are always tricky—they’re tricky for people with hands, especially when you’re 
wearing these big space gloves. In two weeks, we built prototype tools that were 
able to take these connectors on the ground-based version on and off. And so 
we’re reasonably conﬁ dent we’ll be able to do this. 
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But of course, we have to expect the unexpected, and Hubble always 
provides unexpected surprises. So we’re going to involve all of the spacewalking 
astronauts and folks who have controlled robots on Hubble to go through all of 
these and think what could go wrong, and make sure we have the robot designed 
to do that. 
Next, we’re going to take out the wide-ﬁ eld camera. There’s just two bolts 
and a ground strap and it pulls out externally. And we’re going to stow the old 
one and put a new one in. The nice thing is, once we’ve taken it out, the robot 
now knows every motion it takes to put the new one back in. And we’ll have extra 
cameras. One of the things about this robot is it can actually feel force. We’ll have 
monitoring so that if it hits something, we see the force on that particular joint 
rising, and we can back off a little bit and change the attitude. 
We also have to hook the new spacecraft into the brains of Hubble. That’ll 
be another connector. It will be on the computer that Mike Foale put in. There’s a 
connector on the top, fortunately, not on the side, that’s just a shorting plug. So, 
take it off and put a cable on and then close the door on the cable. 
Now we get into the really hard stuff, which is to take the corrective optics 
out. They are not needed anymore. All new instruments have the corrective 
optics built in. These are the sides of the refrigerator, so this is doing the job 
of Jim Newman, who had that advance camera and put in the Cosmic Origins 
Spectrograph. Once that’s done, the servicing part goes away. Hubble, hopefully, 
will get between three and eight years of extended life, and then, at the end of 
life, we have to safely deorbit Hubble. Again, it’s a safety and a risk issue. There 
is about a 1:250 chance that some large part of Hubble will survive to the ground 
in a populated area, and that risk is just too high. 
So that little package on the bottom that has the new batteries in it also has 
deorbit engines. So Hubble will deploy all of its booms, start charging up the new 
batteries, do its science, and then sometime, perhaps as late as 2015, we’ll feather 
the arrays, much like Mike Melvill feathered the wings on SpaceShipOne, and ﬁ re 
the deorbit module. 
I’m hoping to be on a cruise ship somewhere in the Paciﬁ c to watch Hubble 
ﬂ y over and reenter. I think we’ll all have to have a big party and really celebrate 
an incredible voyage. It will be this voyage that will have helped stimulate and 
advance us, probably by ﬁ ve or six years, in the exploration effort. 
So that’s the plan for the robotics. We actually have some contracts in place 
now. I think it was last Friday we announced that Lockheed Martin had won 
the contract to build part of the spacecraft. It is going to be assembled at the 
Goddard Space Flight Center as an in-house project. People say three years is 
impossible. But the really good news is that we have a tremendous amount of 
hardware already built, because we were on the road to a Servicing Mission 4. 
Hubble has produced great images. How many people have seen the Hubble 
Deep Field? Or the Ultra Deep Field? An amazing picture. A thousand galaxies. It 
took 11 days staring into a blank part of space. If you hold a soda straw up to the 
sky at night and look through it, that’s about the area of the picture. If you look at 
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what’s in the background in this relatively short exposure with this new camera, 
you see a lot of things. If you add up all of the spots, each of which is another 
galaxy, there are six thousand galaxies. Remember, that’s just a little soda straw 
with a relatively short exposure. Each one of those galaxies has 100 to 200 billion 
stars. You heard me say yesterday, 10 years ago we didn’t know about any other 
planets outside of our own solar system. Now we know, in just the nearby stars, 
of over 125. There are about twice that many that are being investigated to be 
conﬁ rmed. We now think planetary systems are common. So you can add it up 
just in this picture alone: 6 thousand times 200 billion times a couple of planets 
per star. There are a lot of planets out there. It’s pretty mind-boggling. 
That’s where we’re going on Hubble. Where are we going next with the 
Space Shuttle? Well, we’re going back to the Space Station. In the President’s 
vision for space exploration, our ﬁ rst task is to return the Shuttle safely to ﬂ ight. 
The team is working through that. They are working through it with a passion as 
well. It is also hard. 
We are ﬁ nding a lot of challenges, not the least of which is we don’t really 
have a Shuttle we can launch to test the new foam changes. So, we have our best 
and brightest engineers working on it. We have Admiral Cantrell helping us with 
the safety issues. We have really pulled out all the stops. 
The crew that is going to go is led by Eileen Collins and piloted by Jim Kelly, 
both very experienced. I ﬂ ew with Wendy Lawrence on my ﬁ rst mission. She’s 
an incredibly hard worker, intense and talented, from the United States Navy. 
Charlie Camarda, Andy Thomas, Steve Robinson, Soichi Noguchi from JAXA, 
the Japanese Space Agency. A really exciting crew. We are going to dock with the 
Space Station. We are going to evaluate our techniques for inspecting the orbiter 
and for repairing the orbiter with some EVA ﬂ ight tests. 
The crew patch [referencing presentation slide] has the crew names around 
the outside and on the orbit. It has this swoosh and the STS-107 outline from 
their crew patch in recognition of that crew. 
Before you leave today, we have STS-114 pins for every one of you. I want 
you to wear those as a reminder of this conference and the work we have ahead of 
us. There are going to be hundreds of risk decisions, reward considerations, and 
judgments that we are going to make before we return to ﬂ ight. 
I hope today is the start of a dialogue that you all have with us and that 
we have with you, and that you will take with you to the groups with whom 
you work, whether it’s within NASA or outside of NASA. To continue this 
“ ”
I HOPE TODAY IS THE START OF A DIALOGUE THAT YOU ALL HAVE 
WITH US AND THAT WE HAVE WITH YOU, . . . 
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discussion, either as organizations or as smaller groups or as individuals, we can 
come back and keep this an ongoing dialogue. I think this continuing dialogue 
is very important if we are going to minimize the risk and maximize the return 
in our endeavors. STS-114 is part of that dialogue, and you will all be part of it 
now—those of you within NASA, by deﬁ nition, and those outside—because of 
your participation here. We thank you for that. 
As [NASA] Chief Scientist, I get to spend a little time in the House Science 
Committee room in Congress, probably more than I’d like. There are some things 
written on the wall that I think are really fantastic, and every time I sit there, 
thinking, What am I gonna say? or What are they gonna ask me?, I look up on the 
wall and read, “For I dipped into the Future, far as human eye could see; saw the 
vision of [new] worlds, and all the wonder that would be.” That’s from Tennyson. 
Again, this is something that I think drives us all.     ■
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JOHN GRUNSFELD: With that, I would like to really open the ﬂ oor completely to any 
discussion we might have, to talk about some of the overarching themes that came out of 
this meeting, anything we haven’t covered. I want this to be very personal, and if folks don’t 
ask questions, and even  if they do, I’m going to ask folks that haven’t participated yet to 
volunteer. In fact, let me try and stimulate that a little bit. 
Why don’t I ask our moderators if I can put them on the spot: Dave Halpern, Chris 
McKay, and our dinner speaker, Mike Foale, put you on the spot. We’ll just start talking a 
little bit. 
I think it was clear to me that there was general agreement that the greatest risk is not 
to explore at all. I think that is something that we have to communicate to folks. That we 
should not get so risk-averse that we just don’t go out and explore. I have covered this one, 
but also the greatest risk is the lack of imagination. There are a lot of “greatest risks.” They 
are all up there as the pinnacle of greatest risks. I had written down in my notes: Always 
expect the unexpected. Just like being asked to come down and talk. The other one, which I 
really liked, was Miles O’Brien saying, “The public is not as wimpy as we think.” I can see no 
greater example of the public ﬂ ying a new space ship than SpaceShipOne this morning. 
Last year in the United States, about 40,000 people died in car accidents, of which 
22,000 were not wearing seatbelts. I call that stupid. Folks who do that aren’t thinking 
about the risk and consequence. In exploration, it is harder than that. Mike Melvill, on his 
ﬁ rst ﬂ ight, and, as far as I know, on this ﬂ ight, had no pressure suit. When you get above 
50,000 feet, the remaining atmospheric pressure is such that the partial pressure of carbon 
dioxide and water vapor in your lungs dominates, and oxygen cannot get into your blood. 
Water at body temperature at low pressures will start spontaneously boiling if you expose 
it to a vacuum. 
Mike Melvill had no pressure suit. That’s hanging it out. Why? Why wasn’t he wearing 
a seatbelt and a pressure suit? Well, performance. They are at the edge of the performance 
of what we can do with a vehicle like that, and that’s the decision they made to take that 
risk. It paid off. 
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OPENING PHOTO: 
Commander Yuri Usachev (left) from 
Russia and U.S. astronauts Susan Helms 
and Jim Voss participate in Soyuz winter 
survival training in March 1998 near Star 
City, Russia. The three became members 
of the second crew to live aboard the 
International Space Station. 
(NASA Image # S98-04118)
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They have a very, very good safety program. They look at all of the consider-
ations, and they consider their pressure vessel to be one that can’t fail, at least given 
the risks that they are willing to take at this stage. So they are true pioneers. 
In aviation, so many pilots died early on. As a result of that, we developed 
lots of the safety mechanisms that test pilots like Mike Melvill use to ﬂ y in 
SpaceShipOne. This risk-judgment-beneﬁ t is really tough stuff, and I think it’s 
great when it succeeds. We need to keep pushing. 
Miles also said, “Exploration is driven by fear, greed and curiosity.” I like to 
stay on the curiosity end of things. Focus on the target. Get the right target. Have 
an overarching shared goal. It is just wonderful now that NASA has that in the 
vision for space exploration. We need to keep focusing on that. The other thing 
that I thought was interesting is that 96 percent of the energy content of the 
universe is in stuff that we have absolutely no clue what it is. I think that’s great. 
What I didn’t know is 96 percent of the undersea environment has not 
been explored. Folks say the easy targets have been explored, and it gets much 
harder from here. Largely, that’s true. Technology is no substitute for experience 
and leadership. 
I am going to put Mike Foale on the spot right away, because I’ve talked 
a little bit about NOLS [National Outdoor Leadership School], and technology 
is no substitute for experience and leadership. Mike, in the Astronaut Corps 
now we are doing some things to try and enhance our expedition leadership. 
Maybe you can talk about just a couple of those things, like the NOLS, like the 
NEEMO [NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations], and let folks know 
what we’re doing.
MICHAEL FOALE: Well, John, I covered a bit of that in my dinner talk. To carry 
out any technologically advanced exploration mission which involves complicated 
techniques and new equipment, you have to be trained. You have to know how to 
use your equipment. If you take really fancy gear with you and you don’t know 
how to use it and you waste time on it in a blizzard or on top of a mountain, you 
may actually end up risking more by messing with it than leaving it behind. 
When we train, we are basically putting aside that risk. We are mitigating the 
risk of carrying out the mission when we actually, ﬁ nally, get to space. With 
astronaut training, just as the training we heard about going under the sea or 
into the deep caves, certainly you train for mountain climbing, we try and train 
so that we will perform better once we are there. 
However, the training is not necessarily without risk. The training is not 
necessarily in the simulator, where I think you’re pretty safe, unless a brown 
recluse bites you, which happened with Joe Engle once. Some of our training 
involves going outdoors. Some of it involves ﬂ ying in aircraft that could have a 
malfunction, in particular, as we look toward exploration beyond Earth orbit, and 
in particular, when we can’t turn around. Think of the Apollo 13 example, when 
your problem occurs on the way out to your destination, or where you are forced 
to go a long way out before you get to come back, then you are in a situation of 
survival or making the best of all the materials and resources at hand. 
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We have started to develop training that will take astronauts in small 
groups, crew size roughly. Six is what we’ve been choosing. We are then 
working with the National Outdoor Leadership School for one, the Canadian 
government for another, and the NEEMO group in Key Largo, Florida, to explore 
and develop leadership, followership, and self-management skills in our crews. 
That is one task. 
Second, we are starting to get a feel for what we need to do when we are 
isolated and when we are dependent only on each other and the things we have 
at hand. That training we are still in the process of discussing and inventing. 
I showed you three cases. One is the National Outdoor Leadership School, 
where we go out either into the Canyon lands or into a mountain environment. 
Another one has been exercises. We have taken part actually starting off in Cold 
Lake, Canada, where basically we are given a scenario more of “expeditioning” 
from one point to another. It is kind of a fancy series of walking through the snow, 
managing yourselves, looking after your team, and managing the equipment that 
you have with you. It is led by instructors who already have a plan on what the 
exercise is going to be, and it is covered in terms of risk, because we also have 
the full resources of the Canadian Armed Forces to get us out of there if we 
actually got seriously hurt. 
Another analogue that we have been exploring and using is the Aquarius 
Laboratory in Key Largo, Florida. There we’ve put together crews that are three 
astronauts with three nonastronauts. We have actually included our Mission 
Control ﬂ ight leads, who would normally be in the Control Center controlling 
a mission, to take part in those dives and those missions. And there we have 
actually solved another issue which is the classic problem of “What on Earth is 
ground control thinking!” when you get these strange instructions. Especially 
if you actually have people who have a stake in your activities. Scientists who 
are not in the team but [are] back at home in safe conditions will be asking 
things of you that might be rather difﬁ cult or seem rather strange or irrelevant 
at that point in your difﬁ culties. And we’re trying to bring together the Mission 
Control teams with the astronaut teams that would be deployed so that they 
would see each other’s problems. And we’ve done that two or three times now.
Looking to the future, as we plan for moving to the Moon ﬁ rst and then Mars, 
we need to develop further the idea of being able to maintain our equipment, look 
after those resources that we have, even if they break and are a long, long time 
away from any kind of refurbishment back on Earth. To that extent, we want to 
actually follow-up on some of the Apollo lessons that we saw to teach geology at 
ﬁ rst. And these were in the deserts, I think always in the United States. Because 
of the Martian meteorite interest now, it’s very exciting. We have thought about 
attempting expeditions, taking part with other scientiﬁ c expeditions where there 
is a scientiﬁ c goal that we, the astronaut ofﬁ ce, do not have a stake in but they 
have a stake in our performance. So, that would be realistic and an analogue to a 
real mission on Mars or the Moon, where we have to carry out some of the grunt 
work—the deployed work—that would be required.
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We are also looking at going to hot deserts, where meteorites also occur. 
This would combine the expedition training with acquiring ﬁ eld geology skills 
that would also be required of a small group going to the Moon or Mars. I think 
that summarizes it.
I should just add, once we get to these deployed situations, there are risks. 
And I myself was a little perplexed a number of years ago, when I was asked to come 
up with the whole safety/risk mitigation plan. And I had to have a safety review of 
what we were talking about and planning. At that time, we were sending roughly six 
astronauts at a time for survival training in Russia. And at that time, I talked about 
needing to have some insight into the other partner’s processes. The same would go 
for the Canadians. The same would go if we hire another group, such as NOLS, for 
example. NASA has to know what you do when we use your services.
With Russia, they had had a number of helicopter accidents, and the 
training we were proposing was to do some of those search and rescue exercises 
with the Russian helicopters. And in the end, people were so just alarmed by the 
stories coming out of Russia we had to turn that off. I didn’t know how to ﬁ ll out 
a kind of safety/risk plan or matrix on that. Sometimes, you just have to use good 
judgment. You use your intuition. You ask all the questions that you can. We heard 
how James Cameron manages his ﬁ lm set. That was interesting to me, because he 
doesn’t have the formal process that NASA has in its bureaucracy, forced on as a 
result of many, many mishaps over many, many years of experience. Sometimes, 
in smaller groups, you have to use judgment. And I think we are going to be in a 
position of having to use our judgment as we assess some of these new activities, 
not only just processes and safety reviews.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: One of the things that you brought up was working with our 
international partners. That, I’m sure, is going to be a major issue with pushing 
out beyond lower Earth orbit to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. And it happens on 
Earth frequently, the issue of different international cultures. And we heard a little 
bit of that. I think that’s one we’re really going to have to grapple with. Not just the 
day-to-day living types of things, but how different cultures deal with the safety 
issue. Whether it’s documented or whether it’s trusting people’s good judgment.
MIKE FOALE: I know Chris, and certainly others from Ames who have been doing 
research, they’ve had to work, in particular, with Russians. And I know James 
Cameron did. I’d love to know what their opinions are and how they manage 
insight into systems that they don’t know all about.
CHRIS MCKAY: It’s difﬁ cult, and in Russia, in particular helicopters ﬂ ights—ﬂ ying 
with the U.S. Navy in Antarctica is very different than ﬂ ying with Aeroﬂ ot in 
Siberia. And we’d like to take you on both trips, Mike. Actually, we would like to 
get you into the ice-covered lakes. I think you and Dale and I ought to talk after.
But, actually, what I would like to do is come back to this conference and just 
think about it a little bit. It’s been an incredibly fun and interesting conference. 
I can’t remember when I’ve enjoyed one as much. My question to the audience 
is, how do we make it a useful conference? How do we take what we stated here 
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and make it something that could be useful—and I would say, useful to whom? 
Useful to three parts of NASA. The robotics program, which, after we heard Steve 
Squyres talk, I think is clearly in need of a better risk assessment strategy. The 
near-term human program, which we’re hearing about. I think John, Mike, and 
others are well involved in that, and I think that’s been in the impetus for this 
conference. And I applaud them for their efforts. And I think that’s the light that 
makes a way of doing something useful possible, [your] attention to this. And, 
then, third is, [as] Mike was just saying, long-term human exploration of distant 
planets—which is going to be a completely different category of risk and danger. 
So, how do we make this conference useful to the robotic program, to the near-
term human program, and to the long-term exploration program?
And I know that there are a lot of people in the audience with a lot of good 
ideas about this, because I would hear them, as I was scarﬁ ng down my dessert 
at the dinners and lunches. And I think it would be good to get a dialogue going. 
How do we make this conference useful, rather than just all going home and 
having had a fun and interesting time?
QUESTION: Andy Presby. I’m student here at the school. I’m glad you asked . . . 
The sign on the wall there behind you says, why do we explore? And I think I’ve 
heard a lot of very inspiring and interesting stories over the last couple of days 
about why individual people—panelists and people in the room—have chosen 
to explore. And a lot of them are the same reasons that NASA has inspired me 
pretty much since I was born, since I can remember. But I think an important 
thing for you guys to realize is that the ﬁ rst thing that struck me is [that] not all 
of you explore for the same reasons. And when you’re looking at NASA from the 
outside in—and I think some of the folks from Hollywood and the media have 
identiﬁ ed it correctly—the public is not as concerned about risk maybe as the 
explorers are. The public seems to have sort of understood that you guys accept 
the risk and you do it because you love it, for whatever reasons. 
What the public is worried about is, why are we going? And why should 
I pay for what you love to do? Why is it helpful to me to pay for what you love 
to do? And I think that if you guys walk out of here with anything, perhaps a 
useful thing would be an internal dialogue amongst yourself culminating in an 
intensiﬁ ed outreach program to explain to the public, in terms that they can 
understand clearly, why they should pay for what we all in this room, I think, 
would agree is one of the most important things our government does for us in 
this country.
MICHAEL FOALE: I think we heard very eloquent expressions over the last 
three days as to why we explore. I’m actually more worried about the public not 
perceiving when it’s dangerous. I don’t believe people expected the Columbia
accident. Astronauts do expect the Columbia accident. And I think there are 
misconceptions out there. Someone referred to it. It’s the repetition of anything 
that makes us numb to the risks. And because we’ve seen Space Shuttles launch 
and land successfully a number of times, it was a surprise. 
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The risk has not been well communicated. What SpaceShipOne did today 
was extraordinary. And you saw, if you were watching, how something very 
unexpected happened during the ascent. The Space Shuttle goes—there’s 25 
times more energy in that whole business. I mean it’s 100 tons, is it? Take the 
speed, divide by 25, and square it, you’re going to get the answer. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: It’s 25 squared over 3 squared. [laughter] We’re two 
physicists. We’ll have this in a moment. 
MICHAEL FOALE: So if it’s Mach 3, and we go Mach 25 in a Space Shuttle, divide 
3 by 25 and you get about 8. And then you square it, and it’s 64. But it’s huge. 
The difference is that their heating on entry is just going above boiling—if that. 
It’s not anywhere near risking a metal hull. If it’s a composite hull, it’s going to 
start risking it pretty soon. 
A space vehicle gets up to 2,000–3,000 degrees Fahrenheit. So these issues 
are engineering issues, they’re mundane, they’re arcane to the public, who don’t 
really care to hear the details. But the ﬁ nal answer is that it’s dangerous. It’s risky 
if any of these things fail. 
John brought up an interesting comment about the risk of this launch 
today, which I would like to get to, to tell you that there is risk here even in 
SpaceShipOne. He talked about the lack of a pressure suit. He talked about the 
need for closing the hatch and living only in shirtsleeves there. We don’t do much 
different on the Space Shuttle. We have pressure suits, and we have parachutes. 
They didn’t do the Columbia crew any good. I don’t know they would have done 
the Challenger crew any good. 
So the situation really isn’t so different. And, yet, John pointed to the risk 
this morning for Mike Melvill as he did that climb. The risk is still there for 
every Shuttle astronaut that will be ﬂ ying on the Space Shuttle henceforth. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: I was trying to use the seatbelt analogy. It doesn’t guarantee 
it. But it reduces the risk. Good point. 
CHRIS MCKAY: Why does the public think then, that NASA is going to make it 
risk free? There is the perception that if we were disciplined, if we followed the 
Columbia accident report rules, and if we had a culture of safety, we would be risk 
free. Somehow the message that you guys are saying, which is that it is inherently 
risky, people are going to die, crashes are going to occur, is not being conveyed by 
NASA. We’re not getting across the message that you’re articulating. 
And that’s what I’m saying is, how do we turn this conference into something 
useful? Well, maybe we need to start ﬁ guring out how to get that message across, 
and stop giving the impression that we can make perfect systems. 
QUESTION: Tom Krause, BST. We’re involved in assisting with the culture 
change effort at NASA. It seems to me that the issue is not so much that the 
public doesn’t recognize the risk, but rather that the public ﬁ nds unacceptable 
the possibility that something could have gone wrong organizationally that led to 
the accident. So, when the investigation ﬁ nds that errors and mistakes were made 
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that could have been prevented, then it seems to me the public says, something 
about this just isn’t right. 
CHRIS MCKAY: Can I react to that for just a bit?  If you take just about any 
accident and trace it back, you can ﬁ nd a step or a place where it could have been 
prevented. That’s just the nature of these complex systems. And I don’t think 
that you’ll ever be able to come up with an institution, a large group or even 
a small group, where your accidents due to human factors or human error are 
gone. I think that’s unrealistic. And maybe Scott,  who is on the Board, we might 
put him on the spot here, since I think he works at the same Center I do, could 
comment on it. 
SCOTT HUBBARD: Yeah, let me see if I can parse a little bit from where you’re 
coming from, and what he’s saying. It took a long time to be sure we had the 
physical part [about the Columbia accident], in the end we got that with no 
equivocation. Everybody absolutely knew that. The organizational part took a 
lot longer, or took a different approach, and was in many ways more complex to 
understand. And, I think, having people come in and talk to us, having members 
of the community as well as experts in behavior and complex systems and human 
factors talk to us, the distinction was that we had, perhaps, led the public to 
believe that we had done everything we could reasonably do. And, in fact, as we 
peel the onion on the accident, we found that there were cases where, because 
of repetition of something that started off as an inﬂ ight anomaly and became 
a turn around issue, because of other situations where people had fallen into 
poor habits of engineering analysis and so forth, we really did make some human 
errors that, with a different type of approach to it possibly, could be addressed. 
And, in fact, that’s the result of the culture change.
So, now what we have to do, I think, is to tell the public that there is a 
level of risk. That we are doing everything we can to mitigate that risk, but it is 
not going to go away past a certain point, there aren’t perfect systems. We are 
going to address the culture issues as much as possible, but there is going to be 
an irreducible residue in there that you’re going to have to deal with. I think the 
danger is that, with the talented people in this room, and the Astronaut Corps 
in particular, you make it look so easy. All the thousands of people that support, 
with all the things that are done, the impression comes across—whether it’s 
in the robotic program, with the perfect landings of Spirit and Opportunity, or 
whether it’s with the Shuttle program with, by all accounts, a perfect takeoff and 
landing—that we’ve got it down. 
The fact is that anybody who has participated in a launch, particularly if 
you’ve been in the position of being the last person to say go, and you hear in the 
background, through your earphones, all the thousands of things that have to be 
right, all the systems that have to be polled, you know that there is an irreducible 
risk of something catastrophic happening. 
We do not tell the public that story. I think if the public just had the 
earphones on of the guy in the polling chain as you’re getting ready to launch 
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and was aware of all the people at all of the systems and all of the things that have 
to happen, they would immediately realize, gee, what we have to go through to 
make this happen, it’s truly extraordinary. So, I think that that’s part of what we 
need to communicate, and part of what this business is all about. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: Let me put John Gans on the spot. He’s the director of 
the National Outdoor Leadership School. They have thousands of students every 
year who go out into the wilderness, go out into risky situations. I imagine 
occasionally a parent will call and say, my son or daughter is going to go out and 
do this rock climbing, is it safe? And how do you communicate to them the risk 
element as an institutional risk manager? 
JOHN GANS: Well, ﬁ rst off, we try and be as clear as possible that we can’t 
guarantee anyone’s safety, and we’re up front about that. I think every time I 
get on United Airlines and I hear, you know, “Safety is our number one priority,” 
it runs through my mind that, no, getting us there is the number one priority. 
Safety may be number two. But say safety is number one, we wouldn’t take off. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: It’s clear that proﬁ tability is not number one. 
JOHN GANS: So we try and be as clear as possible. And you mentioned the 
parent-child thing. I’m going to switch the question some, because Dr. Sylvia 
Earle talked about the role of education as it relates to exploration and risk 
management and getting people outside and other things. And I think the 
interesting thing that I have been thinking about in this conference is that my 
daughter, this summer, started climbing in a more aggressive way. Safely, but in 
a more aggressive way. My daughter was 10 this summer, and she wanted to get 
ready to climb Devil’s Tower with me this fall. 
I adore my daughter, you can probably tell. And it really hit me that, suddenly, 
I’m on the other end of this, and I’m hesitant about what she was going to do. 
Now, climbing has been one of my passions in life. That’s where I’ve felt most 
alive. It’s where I’ve had some of my best relationships with people around me, 
with the world around me, and the environment around me. And, suddenly, was 
it okay for my daughter to do it when it moved beyond the walk-up situation into 
something that was more serious?  And I came to terms with it. We are going up 
to Devil’s Tower in October. 
But there is something about generational passing as it relates to risk 
management. And we certainly run into it with parents making decisions for their 
children. It certainly is tied into the educational issue. But it’s something that goes 
to each individual family, and it’s something that I’ve thought a lot about over 
the last few days. It’s something that goes to the space program, the generational 
difference between the people that grew up with Apollo, the generational difference 
now. Look at the number of parents now that won’t let kids go off and ride a bike 
alone, wander out of their neighborhood alone, whatever else is the case. 
I realize I’m broadening the issue far beyond NASA here, but it goes so far 
beyond what we’re talking about here, and, somehow, I think there is a role to play 
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for our society in making the parent-child relationship understand risk better. And 
there is a role there for our schools. So, now that I blew up your question totally 
into something else, I’ll pass off the mike and not go on further. But the long and 
short of it is, we try and be very clear with parents that we can’t guarantee any 
safety out there, but we manage it very well, and then we convey the beneﬁ ts. And 
we know the beneﬁ ts right down the list, and we rock at all those beneﬁ ts, and are 
clear about them, much the same conversation that’s gone on here. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: That’s great, and it brings up another point, that you 
brought out, which is, if you think about the early part of the space program, 
prior to the ﬁ rst American going into space, rockets generally blew up. Most 
rockets blew up while we were trying this. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They still do, John.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: They still do. Not most. Some. Let me just take this a little 
further, which is, when Michael and I were growing up, that’s what we saw. We 
saw the struggles, there was no question that it was risky. And as we started 
ﬂ ying more, and then we built a spaceship that looks like an airplane, it brought 
it into everybody’s daily experience. Then, people who are growing up now, like 
my children, space is part of their culture. It’s become the norm. And so people 
don’t really notice the space program now until we don’t have one. And I think 
that’s an indication that it is part of our culture, and that the education can help. 
Go on, Mike.
MICHAEL FOALE: I just want to add that people in this room are probably aware 
that . . . I don’t know of any rocket system that can launch 1,000 times and not 
have an accident. Most rocket systems launch 100 times and have an accident. 
So if that is the only way, if you’re on the rocket on the 100th time, and you do 
a lot of trials, and you do the statistics, that’s [it], you die on that rocket. So the 
way you get better than one in a hundred on any rocket system is to have a way 
of surviving that explosion that 100th time. And the Russians have done quite a 
good job with the Soyuz escape system, it’s worked twice in all of their launches, 
hundreds of launches. Apollo was a good system never used. I think Gemini has 
an interesting case. It’s a story as to why they didn’t have an escape system quite 
like the Mercury before it. 
But that is the way we get away from those—the fact today is that rockets 
do still blow up, and we can’t do anything about it right now. We don’t have a 
strange, wonderful, anti-gravity technology that will get us away from that. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: And one in a hundred is the best of the best. Most are not 
nearly that good. 
QUESTION: Joe Fuller. I’m sitting here very anxious, because I don’t think we’re 
getting down to business. It’s been a wonderful conference, you know, over the 
last two and a half days, and I think we’ve learned a lot. The problem is, how do 
we capture the knowledge that’s been just ﬂ owing out here? 
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At some level there’s a connection with the way we do business, and we 
need to search for that. So what I would suggest is that, the ﬁ rst thing, we 
capture the proceedings of this, and the second thing is, we form some kind of 
organization, you know, ad hoc or whatever, to pursue this information and make 
the connections that are so obviously there. 
[In] some kind of way, the institutions have got to get involved in this. 
I think that, as someone said, every individual has a value calculation that 
they have to make, and they have to make that trade. We can’t determine the 
perception of risks for the individuals. We can’t determine the value for them. 
But what we have to do, and what we do in business is, the value proposition has 
got to be so large that the risk is acceptable. 
So what I would suggest is that you’ve got to go farther than this. You 
can’t stop here today. You’ve got to put some organization in place to carry 
this forward, and mine this knowledge for the value and the beneﬁ ts that are 
obviously inherent in it. 
I’m involved in risk management professionally. I haven’t seen too many 
other people here that are. I did hear Mike Gernhardt talk about how he’s using 
quantitative risk analysis. So I would volunteer to be a part of that group, to 
determine a strategy for extracting the knowledge and information so that it 
would be more useful and of value as we go forward and explore. 
CHRIS MCKAY: I have a suggestion. I think that’s a good suggestion, how do we 
connect to the institution of NASA, in particular, the results of this conference? It 
seems to me [that] to do that you need someone who is close to the Administrator. 
He clearly wants to get advice on this topic. Someone who is passionate with 
experience in this area. Somebody like the Chief Scientist, John Grunsfeld. I 
think we should add to his responsibilities this area. I think this would be a 
perfect opportunity. You’ve seen the conference. You were obviously one of the 
ones who put it together and organized it. I really think that the mantle falls on 
you to carry this forward within NASA as an institution, not just the near-term 
ﬂ ight program, the return to ﬂ ight. But also thinking long down the road.
Also, I think the robotic program is in need of a clear-headed assessment 
of risk. Now there the risks aren’t to lives, but they are to resources. And I think 
that that program also needs a clear risk assessment. And I think the Ofﬁ ce of 
the Chief Scientist right now is a good place to do it. So, all voting for John as the 
representative of this? 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: Thank you, Chris, for your kind comment. But, seriously, I 
think we have Tom Krause here from BST working on our culture. This is something 
that the Ofﬁ ce of the Chief Engineer, that my ofﬁ ce, the Ofﬁ ce of the Chief Scientist, 
Bill Readdy, Ofﬁ ce of Space Operations, Space Operations Mission Directorate—
this is a dialogue we have everyday. And we wanted to broaden that from NASA 
management to you folks, and, as I said up front, the start of a dialogue. 
But the other point was capturing this and you were just captured. You were 
captured on videotape. We’re going to convert that. We’ve been talking, prior to 
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the conference, about how are we going to put all this together. A number of folks 
have been chronicling this individually, but we’re going to do it institutionally as 
well. And I know, Keith, you’ve thought about that a little bit. Do you want to say 
anything?  Let me put Keith on the spot, and then back to you.
KEITH COWING: I think we are quadruply redundant here. I am recording this 
on my iPod, so I can be listening to it as the transcripts arrive in my e-mail box 
in about an hour up at Ames. We hope to have this online in a very short period 
of time, just the raw verbatim transcripts, with the “ums” and the “ahs” and the 
spelling errors taken care of. I’d have to talk to Bob Jacobs and some of the Ames 
folks to get the speciﬁ cs on what the follow-ons are, but there is talk of putting 
some of this on a DVD, of putting a more comprehensive document together. 
Steve Dick and I have talked about something more comprehensive, in terms of 
a history monograph. So the initial concept here, John saw the ﬁ rst e-mail that 
started this, was capture everything in as many ways as possible, so Joe, you’re 
psychic, you knew what we were doing when we were ﬁ rst doing it. 
QUESTION: Scott McGinnis: I’m a student here. What we do in the military, and 
I’m sure a lot of you are military, but if you assume this conference is like a six-
month deployment, every time before you leave the ship you have to give your 
lessons learned. You get one line, everybody. Then the XO, I think, Dr. Grunsfeld, 
that’s you in this case, forces everyone to read it prior to going on [to] their next 
deployment. 
So that built a database, and as the XO you are required to make sure that 
they all sign and verify that they have done this, proving that they have read it. 
Then, when they make the mistake again, the responsibility then lies with the 
responsible individual, the person making the mistake. Therefore, you have a 
traceability and a responsibility for each individual action, and also, it shortens 
the amount of data; instead of having to watch our three days of deliberation, 
being able to shorten that and pull out the small pieces. 
So that’s part of the military structure, and you’ve got a little more 
discipline—I think we talked about the ﬂ ogging and all that kind of stuff. 
[Laughter] We have a little more coercive nature in the military to be able to do 
that. But I’m sure NASA can muster that up. And second, you’re talking about 
the [pressure] suit of SpaceShipOne, the risk that they’re taking. And I think it 
all goes back to the beneﬁ t that we haven’t discussed, we’ve tapped around it. Dr. 
Spudis brought up the three reasons why we explore. 
I think the fourth, and Magellan showed it with his cloves, is money. And 
SpaceShipOne is doing it, one, to explore. But come on, we’ve got a $4.5 billion 
market in the tourist industry. And they are exploring not because they want to 
prove science or prove humanity. We’ve proved we can do it with the money. But 
can we make it proﬁ table? And I think if you saw the big “Virgin” on the side, and 
you saw the big Sprite advertisement going on, and the M&Ms ﬂ oating around, 
I think we have found one of the keys to space exploration, and that is the good 
old American greenback. 
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I think NASA also needs to ﬁ nd a way to maybe encourage that, like we did 
in the early ’20s with the prizes. I think we’ve tapped around cost as a beneﬁ t, 
or money as a beneﬁ t. I know NASA can’t get beneﬁ t monetarily that way. But 
it’s deﬁ nitely a point we haven’t brought up.  
JOHN GRUNSFELD: No, we’ll be offering prizes. We’ve got Congressional 
authority to do that for similar challenges. But it’s clear that for Rutan, this is 
about his passion, about pushing new envelopes. The X prize is $10 million [he 
blew off] quite a bit more than that. And I think it’s great that he’s been able to 
leverage the commercial sponsorship there to help offset his cost of developing 
this Because it is opening a new frontier. 
Eventually, folks who want to actually sell services will have to start 
incorporating more of the safety rigor. You probably wouldn’t go out on a cruise 
ship today if you knew that one out of every four or ﬁ ve times you weren’t 
going to come back. So that’s, again, that comes down to the proﬁ tability. And 
what Mike Gernhardt said is, you have to have a successful dive operation to 
have a commercial operation be successful. And so, safety is a critical part of 
that greenback. 
QUESTION: David Liskowsky from NASA Headquarters. I’d like to perhaps 
comment on some of the discussion that’s been going on. We’re at a point in 
time at the Agency where we’ve just gone through a large transformation to 
hopefully meet the exploration vision. I think we’re all behind that, and that’s 
what we’ll be going forward with. 
Maybe we can take this opportunity at this time to use these changes that 
are going on in the Agency to change our message. Change our message to the 
decision-makers, mainly Congress and the public, about what the nature of this 
business is, that it is risky business. Everyone talks about that, that NASA has 
been a victim of its own success. 
But maybe it’s time that, as we go forward with this new exploration vision, 
and this is something that can be done through John as Chief Scientist, we have 
the PAO [Public Affairs Ofﬁ ce] folks who shape the NASA message let folks 
know, truly, what the nature of the business is, and to let them know that, as we 
go forward with this new vision, it is going to be risky. And without abdicating 
our responsibilities to meet the requirements of the CAIB [Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board] report, there is going to be that element of risk. And it’s 
part of us shaping the Agency’s message and how we convey it to the public. 
Maybe this symposium can be the ﬁ rst step in trying to do that, in shaping 
what that new message should be for the exploration vision, and making, 
perhaps, a little more realistic vision than the Agency has had in the past. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: Good comment. Well, last comment, and we’ll go to 
“Moose” Cobb—Robert Cobb—he’s been dying to say something. Then we’ll 
stay around for comments afterwards. In the packet, we gave everybody a pad of 
paper and a pen. And so, before you’re allowed to leave, you’ll have to write down 
at least one lesson learned, and provide that. You don’t have to have a name on 
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there, but if you have any ideas, sketch that out and put it in the bin before you 
take your STS-114 pin, which I really want you all to have. 
ROBERT COBB:  I’m the NASA Inspector General. I’ve been with the Agency for 
two and a half years, with no exploration or science background coming into the 
Agency. It’s my perception that NASA works hard to dispel the notion that what 
it does is inherently risky, and the reason it does that is because there is a fear 
that the public won’t fund it if NASA tells the truth about the risk. 
That’s something that I think that this conference goes a long way towards—
I think people recognize that the public is willing to accept risk. And that the 
idea is, the object is, that it’s important for NASA to have a transparency into 
the risks that it is accepting and to allow the public to share in understanding of 
those risks. 
QUESTION: I’m Sandra Cauffman. I’m from Goddard. I think we’re missing some 
basic thing here. The question is, why we explore, and we are not really answering 
that question. We’re talking about the risks and, yes, that is very important, but 
the people out there need to understand why it is that we’re doing what we’re 
doing and what they are getting in return. They like to understand why we are 
risking the people, but what are they getting back?
In the DOD world they understand why we are risking our soldiers and why 
we are sending people to war and whatever, but in the NASA world they do not 
understand why are we sending astronauts. And they see pretty pictures of the 
stars and stuff, but what is it that they are getting back in return as taxpayers? 
And we need to really send a clear message to them. And it’s not PAO [Public 
Affairs Ofﬁ ce] stuff. It depends on each and every one of us to do that. 
Just a little story. I was in National Night Out in my neighborhood a couple 
of years ago and I was talking to my neighbor, a nice little old lady. And I am the 
Deputy Project Manager for the GOES-R Satellite. And she was asking me what I 
did for a living and I told her about the weather satellites and all this and all that. 
And she just looked at me with this puzzled look on her face and she said, “Why 
do we need weather satellites when we have the Weather Channel?” You know, 
that’s what we have to deal with, the perceptions out there. Yes, the risks are 
there, but they need to understand, okay, we are risking, but what are we getting 
back? So, I just wanted to say that.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: That’s a great comment. Natalie, why don’t you take that?
NATHALIE CABROL: Actually, I would like to add on that comment because this 
is probably translating better, what these guys were saying yesterday. What is 
the gold? Not the goal, but the gold, you know? Five hundred years ago, Magellan 
leaves, and he brings back cloves and he brings back riches. What are the riches 
that we can show to the people today? And there are many. And we are good at it 
at NASA, but we are not good at telling people. You know, from the Moonwalks 
people today are going to ski better. They have good Moon boots, medication, 
things that we do in space better the health of people, the expeditions in the sky, 
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in the sea, or on the land are bringing [generating important discoveries]. We 
have that, but we are not translating enough to the public. And I think this is 
where we need an effort.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: Steve?
STEVE DICK: Following up on that—I’m Steve Dick, the NASA historian. On 
Friday we’re launching a series of essays on the nasa.gov Web site called “Why 
We Explore.” And I think this will address some of the questions just raised. And 
it’s not Public Affairs, it’s historically nuanced and historically based. (And, by 
the way, this is the 46th anniversary of NASA, on Friday, October 1st.) The ﬁ rst 
essay will deal with why we explore in the sense that exploration is necessary 
for a creative society. And I’ll talk about Ming China, which was mentioned by 
Jack Stuster the other day. That’s on the NASA Web site at http://www.nasa.gov/
missions/solarsystem/explore_main.html. And it’ll be a once-a-month, “Why We 
Explore” series, a different essay each month.
NATHALIE CABROL: I will wrap up quickly. But, you know, why do we explore? 
I think within us it’s just because we think that somewhere on the other side of 
the hills, as you were putting it, it must be better or something is better than 
what we have now. Otherwise, we wouldn’t be doing it. And it’s true that maybe 
the other side of the hill has nothing particular, but what we learn along the way 
is bringing a lot of good to society, et cetera. So we need to emphasize this really, 
really hard.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: And again, it comes down to both personal and institutional, 
as well as national. In the President’s vision [for space exploration] he said, “The 
purpose of this is to advance U.S. scientiﬁ c, economic, and security interests.” 
And it’s through a broad range of things. As you say, along the journey you learn 
a lot of things that improve our life here on planet Earth. 
But it’s also the higher purpose. You know, we’re trying to understand where 
we came from. Why is there a universe? And in the process of very basic research 
like that is where we learn the really valuable things—like quantum mechanics 
that leads to lasers—that it would be a long time before you’d do that with just 
subsistence farming. So, these types of things are very important. 
I also have something that often ends up resulting in controversial 
discussions, but I have a statement that I think is true. I can’t prove it, but it’s 
“Single-planet species don’t survive.” 
QUESTION: Dave Leckrone, Hubble Space Telescope and NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center. I guess we’re all ganging up on you because several of us must 
have made the same comment to you. So, I want to start out by thanking you 
for stimulating this conference, which has been absolutely fascinating. What 
fascinated me most in hearing all the speakers and the discussion and seeing the 
ﬁ lm last night about Ernest Shackleton and the Endurance expedition was this 
business of what compels us to explore and take these risks in the ﬁ rst place, 
instead of just adopting the fetal position in our lives.
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And I have my own ideas. I actually wrote it all down and I’m going to 
exchange this for my pin later. But it sort of goes to what was said just a moment 
ago, and I think Scott Hubbard mentioned this on the ﬁ rst day. We explore because 
we have no choice. It’s an evolutionary imperative. Our species became what it 
became because it explored. What was over the next hill was either a threat or a 
source of sustenance. And if there wasn’t anything there, then you had to go to 
the next hill yet to check that one out. And I think this is built into our DNA. 
Poor Ernest Shackleton was so obsessed with exploring he couldn’t even 
really articulate why he kept going back to the Antarctic. He just had to do it. 
And I think at least some of us, if not all of us, within the species have it built 
into our DNA. And I think corollaries to this are all having to do with survival—
acquisition of knowledge, commerce, education, creating a national identity, 
ﬁ nding not only individual self-fulﬁ llment but group fulﬁ llment. And I think 
every one of those relates, going way back perhaps, to our need to survive as a 
species. And maybe we can’t survive as a one-planet species.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: I agree with that absolutely. You know, we try and raise it 
to a higher plane but, ultimately, it is, I believe, hardwired into us to do this. But, 
as well, our evolution has taken us to be a species which is a thinking species, 
sometimes rational species. And, so, it’s also provided us the ability to question 
what we do. And that’s where this becomes a little bit messy, because we say, 
“Well, is it worth the risk?” And that comes back to where we are.
And if anybody doubts that we have a survival imperative to explore, 
just look at the situation we’re in with science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics in this country and where that may lead to eventually—because 
technology is the key to economic prosperity, which is the key to security, which 
is the key to freedom. And I believe that exploration is linked to our ability to 
stimulate people to, directly and indirectly, get a good education and make use 
of that productively.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I’m just going to build on some of these other things 
that people have been commenting on. And, in particular, I want to play devil’s 
advocate to some of the spinoff comments that have been made. 
I agree that this is very important, and some of the discoveries have 
been fantastic. But really—and this builds on your comment earlier—I think 
that there’s one question that NASA needs to be accountable to, or one big 
question, and that’s quite simply, are we pushing the frontier? Are we pushing 
the frontiers of science, technology, and exploration in a way that no one else 
can—no individual, no company, no university—in a way that only NASA can? 
And that’s the thing that we constantly have to be asking ourselves. And I think 
this conference is part of getting at that issue. 
JIM GARVIN: Well, thanks, John. I think there’s one comment notwithstanding 
the spinoffs and everything. I mean, we can all play the game as, Dave, you said so 
well about, this is an investment choice. It’s part of our DNA. But I think it also 
bears witness to trying to generate metrics and look at what the impacts have 
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been. And we do that perhaps ineffectively, as you’ve said, Nathalie. But they are 
not transparent, they are major. And if you ask some of the technology leaders, 
exploration has begotten these catalytic effects. 
So without it, the question that you raised, John, is the one I think this 
group needs to raise. How fast would we have progressed in different areas? I 
mean, maybe Darwinian progression—you know, seeking optimization whenever 
we can—is not the game afoot, and natural selection in technology doesn’t work. 
I don’t know. That’s a great thing to debate. You know, maybe Steve Dick’s group 
in history can study that.
But I’m still struck by questions that when we ask people in other sectors of 
society—IT [information technology] being a good example—in remote sensing 
of this planet, the beneﬁ ts, while maybe not tangible in terms of dollars in your 
pocket, are there. We would not have microcomputing with fault tolerance, ever. 
There would have been no imperative, except perhaps a very narrowly-deﬁ ned 
security interest area—which is important, of course—without this exploration 
imperative. And we demonstrated that.
So I think we need to do better at deﬁ ning those metrics. I mean, yes, the 
textbook metric, I think, is an important one that most people seem to forget. 
I like to think that all the textbooks have been rewritten in the last 20 years in 
many of the areas of astronomy, physics, planetary science, and even this place 
of our own planet.
But anyway, I think that’s the ampliﬁ er on technology progress in areas 
that aren’t the ones that have instant economic gain. That’s what we should be 
doing, and that follows on what you said so well. That’s NASA’s unique role as a 
government agency. Otherwise, it would be private. Thanks.
QUESTION: I’m Becky Ramsey, NASA Headquarters. Recently we had someone 
do a study for us. And while it was a very interesting study, I won’t go into the 
whole thing. But one of the stats that struck me is that a majority of the people 
we talked to said that they like NASA. They don’t have a clue what we’re doing, 
but they like us. And I think we cannot lose sight of the fact that we’re not the 
only ones who want to go. It’s not conﬁ ned to the people in this room or the 
people who attended this conference. 
I walked over to the little lobby bar last night. I was sitting there watching 
the baseball game, and I got into a conversation with the bartender and some of 
the servers. They said, “Are you with the NASA group?” “Yeah.” “That’s so cool!” 
You know, they don’t know what we do, but they like us! And we have to build on 
that personal connection. We are their representatives. Until Burt Rutan starts 
charging ﬁ ve bucks for a trip into space, most of the people out there are not 
going to get to go. We have a responsibility to be their representatives and to do 
what they can’t do yet. I mean, we talk about the spinoffs. They don’t really care 
about the spinoffs. Yes, they’re important. Yes, the beneﬁ ts that we [generate] 
make everybody’s lives better. But they don’t know about that, you know? We 
tell them, but they don’t read our cool little magazine. They don’t know the 
weather satellites from the Weather Channel. They don’t care that much about 
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that. They like it because it’s cool, because they want to go. And I think we can’t 
lose sight of the fact that that’s why exploration is important to everyone else.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: I absolutely agree. In fact, in other studies we’ve found 
that the NASA logo—the meatball—is likely the number one brand recognition. 
There may be a couple others that are close. The other thing we found out is that, 
when we were working on our renewed vision of discovery, we found out that 
most people assumed we were already doing all these things. You know, when 
we’d say, “Well, what do you think about having a renewed trip to go beyond 
low Earth orbit to the Moon and Mars?” folks would say, “Well, isn’t that what 
you’re doing?” And we’d say, “Yes, that’s what we’re doing!” And we have to 
communicate that a lot better.
MEL AVERNER: That’s not true. We’re not going to Mars and Moon. We are 
attempting to do that, but it’s not our mission yet. And if we say, “Yes, we’re 
going,” people will go away saying, “Great! Great! You’re going!” Okay, you got 
my drift.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: I wish Steve Squyres were here right now. I think he would 
argue with you. He has two of his children on Mars right now. I don’t know. Jim, 
do you want to comment just a little bit about our program, what some of the 
next steps are that are already in place?
JIM GARVIN: Yeah. Well, I think maybe Steve would do it better but if you 
don’t think we’re exploring now, maybe we don’t communicate that well. But I 
think—two rovers 270 days on another world wandering at 300 percent beyond 
expected lifetime is a new demonstration of that. Cassini alone is exploring at 
the highest order. 
MEL AVERNER: I’d like to respond.
JIM GARVIN: But, let me ﬁ nish. I mean, I can go on and on with the legacy of 
how we explore. It’s just that, right now, a lot of people, perhaps in the public 
sector—and I can’t speak for them because I’m a geek and work for NASA—but 
when I talk to them at hockey games and things where they don’t always care 
what we do, they’re stunned by what we’re doing and how we’re exploring. And 
how we’ve learned to go from people on the surface of the Moon as our agents 
of exploration, being our representatives, to machines being those agents. And 
we’re doing that so many different ways. We’re so diversiﬁ ed. In fact, if you ask 
corporate America and many of my colleagues there, they’re stunned. “You’re 
doing all that, with that portfolio? You’re nuts!”
MEL AVERNER: I’d like to get back to the bar last night. Becky, was that your 
name, doing what I would have done—drinking at the bar? Suppose you were to 
go back to the bar and talk to those people and say, “Well, we are exploring. We 
have two robots on Mars doing terriﬁ c scientiﬁ c things.” Would they say, “Wow, 
that is great, but when are we going?”
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JOHN GRUNSFELD: Absolutely, I agree. But just to give you the counterargument—
and I don’t know what the current number is, but there have been 13 billion hits 
on the NASA Web site of which three-quarters . . .
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That’s a false number. It’s not 13 billion people.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: No, no. I didn’t say it was 13 billion people.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I know, but that’s the impression that it leaves.
JIM GARVIN: But there are well over 100 million unique IP addresses, maybe 250 
million total. It’s all around the world, predominantly the U.S., but all around 
the world. And, you know, you could argue about the numbers, but it is so much 
greater than any other Web site that it’s phenomenal. There is interest there, and 
there’s interest speciﬁ cally because, I believe, that what we’ve done is we’ve put 
two human eyeballs on the surface of Mars. So people see what the rovers see and 
they think, “This is kind of what I would see when I get to go.” Or, “When we send 
people, this is what they will see.” And we want to do that.
QUESTION: I’m Nancy Ann Budden, Naval Postgraduate School and Lunar 
Planetary Institute in Houston. I want to build on some comments that were made 
by Joe Fuller and others about getting the word out and on some communications 
issues that Jim brought up. I joined Johnson Space Center’s Exploration Ofﬁ ce in 
’88 and I worked with a lot of you, Chris and Dale, on human exploration issues, 
and this was about the time that Bush ’41 came out with his announcement that 
we were going back to the Moon and on to Mars.
One of the things that we neglected to do over the next 12 years, really, was 
put into place a communications plan. We all had great ideas. We had a lot of 
meetings. And now we have another opportunity with Bush ’43 coming out with 
a much more reasonable, cost-rational plan and vision. And one thing I think we 
really need to do is put together a communications strategic plan, like a mission, 
and have a schedule and a budget and have somebody own that. Whether it’s PAO 
[Public Affairs Ofﬁ ce] through NASA Headquarters or whether it’s an industry/
NASA/university team. But we need to have a plan for that, that actually has 
someone own it, someone that’s going to pay for it, and understand who are the 
advocates that we need to build. Obviously, there are communities we need to get 
to within NASA, of course. We need to get to the [Capitol] Hill. But we need to 
do it in an integrated, planned way with someone thinking about, okay—who are 
the ﬁ rst people we need to get to, and when and why, and how do we integrate this 
message? I nominate Keith Cowing to put together the message [laughter]. And, 
John, I think everyone would love for you to run the communications strategy 
idea since you’re getting asked to do a lot of other things this morning and since 
you have a lot of spare time! 
Anyway, I would like to see someone own that and put together a message that 
people agree with and actually stand behind, and make sure that it is consistent 
with our Commander in Chief’s vision of the future for space exploration. 
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JOHN GRUNSFELD: That is absolutely a great comment. We’ve received that 
comment quite a lot, so we’ve actually heard that message and we’ve acted on 
it. Part of the transformation was to create a communications group, and we’ve 
linked the legislative and the public affairs and our external relations into one 
team so that we can help craft it. We were at the bar as well last night, talking 
about a budget, speciﬁ cally, or an increased budget, line items, and management 
for public affairs as well. That’s crucial, that we have to treat that as something 
that’s very high-priority. But in the transformation, we’ve combined all of those 
for exactly the reason that you mentioned. Thank you. 
QUESTION: David Gast. I’m the other student here for the school. The thing that 
I think everyone here is touching on, and building on some of the things that 
have just been said, is it is about communicating to the public. I think everyone 
in this room and most of the people watching NASA TV already know, kind of, 
the reasons that we want to go out there, what we hope to accomplish, where we 
hope to go, and understand the risks that are inherent to doing that. With this 
communication message, what we have to do is say to everyone else, the people 
that aren’t in this room and aren’t watching NASA TV, “This is where we want to 
go and this is why we want to go there. And, you know what? It’s dangerous. Very 
likely, things are going to crash. Maybe people are going to die. But the people 
that are putting themselves on the line for that understand that and accept those 
risks for themselves and believe that the goal of what we’re trying to accomplish 
is worth that risk.” So, I think it’s all these things.
We have to communicate the risk, yes, coupled with why we think the risks 
are worth taking. We can’t just say, “We’re going to do these great things, we’re 
going to go to Mars, go to the Moon, and it will all be safe and happy and fun.” 
Neither can we say, “It’s dangerous to travel through space.” We have to say all 
these things at the same time.
We talk about [that] the American people won’t accept that something 
went wrong that we could have avoided. There’s always one more thing we could 
have avoided had someone happened to think of it, had someone happened to see 
it. And I think they’re willing to accept that if we’re doing the best we can with 
what we have, there are always dangers there. And they’re willing to accept that, 
again, if we communicate that to them in advance. Like I said, the people here all 
understand that. We need to take what we’ve talked about here and present that 
to American people.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: I think it’s T. K. Mattingly who told us, “Success always has 
failure as its predecessor.” He was more eloquent.
QUESTION: Keith Cowing.  Thank you, Nancy, for the nomination. When you 
hear what I have to say, you may withdraw it. To the point of Web trafﬁ c—and 
you’re right, I do Web sites for a living—citing Web numbers is so 1997, so 
Pathﬁ nder. [laughter] Google does that trafﬁ c before lunch on Sunday. It’s great 
to hear these numbers, but I could go write something in my room right now. 
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Drudge Report would pick it up and have a million hits by tonight. Big deal. The 
Web hit numbers are important. A lot of people are looking at NASA’s Web sites. 
But we need to move on to other metrics. When a nine-year-old girl raises her 
hand at a Presidential visit and asks about space—things like that—then you 
know. When the late-night shows make different jokes about space—Jim Garvin 
has done yeoman’s duty, going on Letterman and so forth. When you start to see 
this consciousness of space percolating up in other places . . . These numbers can 
be very deceiving. Anybody can generate hits. You’ve just got to look for other 
metrics. You’ve got to have a new metric every month. Just some advice from 
somebody who does this for a living.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: This sort of follows your point, Keith. But when the 
NASA crews come into the small town of Lander, Wyoming, to go on [National 
Outdoor Leadership School] courses, they often stay after and talk to the kids 
attending courses. And when those kids leave the room, they’re changed. And 
following on your point, I believe, it’s not about communicating to the public, 
it’s about changing the public. 
KEITH COWING: As the Administrator of NASA loves to say—it is this Jesuit 
thing he has—“one conversion at a time.” It works. [laughter] It’s self-propagating 
if you do it right.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: I should say that every time an astronaut leaves the school, 
they’re changed as well. 
QUESTION: Bill Clancy at NASA Ames. One concept that we haven’t talked a lot 
about here that I found very useful as it relates to the public, and also inside, is 
the word sustainability. To me that’s the most important word, I think, that’s in 
our current vision. And I found it very useful to the shift from thinking about 
particular missions to the program. So, rather than just talking about mission 
risk, we have program risk. And we’re talking about building competence and the 
ability to go places and so on.
I ﬁ rst understood this, I think, with Mars Polar Lander, where we didn’t 
have the telemetry that we needed to give us the information for building 
the redesign that we needed. I think your example this morning is a beautiful 
example as well, of the investment that one can make to build tools that will give 
us a competence that we know we want to have [as] part of our tool kit. So, I 
think when we’re articulating to ourselves what’s our priority and our objective, 
it’s the clear objective, maybe dates, and the sense of challenge. But it’s all about 
sustainability, and we make decisions because we need to be here tomorrow. 
We’re not going to climb Everest today, because just getting to Everest today is 
not our goal. We want to be able to climb again tomorrow. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: Anyone else? David.
DAVID HALPERN: Thank you, John. And one of the things we’ve learned—some 
of us knew before, but some others learned—that 96 percent of space needs to be 
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explored and 96 percent of the ocean needs to be explored. One [space] has zero 
pressure and one [the ocean] has a very large pressure on the bottom. And then 
the question comes that the ocean deﬁ nitely is a place to explore, for two reasons. 
One is [for] the creation of new knowledge, which is the same as what you’re 
talking about for outer space. But inner space also has a well-recognized aspect 
of creation of wealth. I mean, a number of [beneﬁ cial] activities have always gone 
on in the ocean—and I don’t mean just transportation, but subsurface as well—
and new ones are coming along, like genomics, oceanography, things like that.
So, then comes the question. In the new, transformed NASA, the challenge, 
now, would be to make use of the fact that oceans—or inner space—require the 
same type of dedication and the same type of methodologies as are being used in 
exploration of outer space, and it’s something that the new NASA might want to 
consider. And it’s actually well-poised for that because all of the science now is 
in the Science Mission Directorate. Rather than in two different stovepipes, it’s 
all in one. It’s a comment, not a question. 
JIM GARVIN: I’m really grateful for you for saying that because my new job at 
NASA, with the many hats, is, in fact, to try to integrate the inner and outer 
space exploration in this new vision. So I’m looking, as is Ghassem Asrar 
[NASA’s Science Deputy Associate Administrator] and John, we’re all looking for 
the connections. Because I think the point with a vision, with an objective, with 
some of these good points about program-thinking, which we’ve had in EOS for 
Earth science, we’ve had in the Mars program, we hope to have throughout our 
program—the Shuttle program—is an aspect of risk that I think is the one that 
right now strangleholds a lot of us. And that is risk of our own interpersonal 
management structures to get the job done.
And that, perhaps, is the genesis of the transformation, to get around 
some of those things. But, you know, when organizations grow old they become 
well-rooted in certain directions. And breaking roots, it’s like taking a root off a 
redwood out there. I mean, it’s going to stay three hundred feet tall, so you don’t 
want to have it fall over. You want to have it move. And other than slime molds, 
most large plants don’t move. 
But I think that’s the challenge. The ocean is an exploration frontier that 
will teach us about high-pressure environments and knowledge and all that, 
and some shared technologies could be trialed there in the name of science and 
exploration to good end. And, you know, it’s rather ironic to me that a large 
fraction of the ocean exists at 100-bar pressure, which is the average surface 
pressure of the planet Venus. And, you know, lots of living stuff there. Interesting 
to think about. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: Thanks, Jim. We’ll take one more. 
QUESTION: George Tahue from NASA Headquarters. Listening to some of the 
comments here, an analogy is coming to my mind. If you’re familiar with the 
paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould and his description of evolution as punctuated 
evolution, I think NASA is, as a government agency, going through an evolution, 
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and we will continue to do so. Where we’re going with this is going to take a 
very long time, but there are certain points where there will be punctuations 
that make great changes in very short amounts of time. And I think Apollo, that 
era, was one of those points. We may go through slower periods of time where 
we go through those changes. But here we’re at another point where we may be 
at another one of those punctuations. And this new transformation that we’re 
looking at isn’t just rearranging the deck  chairs. And it’s something that we have 
to take internally and not just focus only on, why didn’t the public understand 
what we’re doing and how can we make them understand? It’s something that we 
have to do over this long period of time, even internally.
When we had our transformation and the Ofﬁ ce of Earth Science and 
the Ofﬁ ce of Space Science came together, I was listening to some of the Earth 
science guys and saying, “Wow, you do that? That’s cool!” Same reaction [as] at 
the bar. So, I’d like to charge all of us to try to take a lot of this internally and 
focus on those goals. 
Another key thing we’ve heard here is to focus on the target. Stay on target. 
Protect and understand our planet. Search for life. Understand the limits of it, 
and recognize that humans and robots are the tools to do those goals. It’s not just, 
“Get us there.” It’s not just, “Get the robots there.” Focus on those [larger] goals. 
We’ll have these punctuated evolutions where we have a grand target that we’re 
looking for. And, in between, we’ll have this balance that we keep going forward 
in trying to get that message to the public to understand that we, as an agency, 
have a role as a public function in our society. So, those are my thoughts. 
QUESTION: I’m John Gaff from the Glenn Research Center. I think the Agency, 
while it does wonderful things—and I’ve been in it a long time, is not recognized 
by our society as critical to the survival of society. Nobody questions why you’ve 
got the State Department, nobody questions why you’ve got the Treasury, and 
nobody questions why you’ve got the Defense Department, or Agriculture, 
even. But for some reason, we have been unable, in my opinion, to transfer the 
knowledge that we are able to acquire for the future to being something critical 
for the survival of the economic success of the Nation. And for the long-term 
viability of the Nation.
Somehow, we need to start some mechanism—and maybe it’s in the 
education programs, these outreach things—where we get more institutionalized 
as a recognized, long-term investment. Until that happens, we’re always going to 
be at the margin, we’re going to be at less than half a percent of the budget, and 
we’re not going to be able to compete for the other critical needs of, “What’s in 
it for me?” with the society. Thank you.
JOHN GRUNSFELD: I think that’s a very good comment. I would like to point 
out that we’re in relatively tough economic times right now, yet NASA is the only 
agency that’s basically gotten an increase in its budget. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Did it get one?
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JOHN GRUNSFELD: Well, in the request, in the request. And even in the 
appropriations meetings, we’ve fared better than virtually all discretionary 
agencies. I think the issue is: We’re still a discretionary agency. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I’d like to kind of second that and say two things. You 
guys are in a really tough position, almost a harder position than you were in the 
Apollo era, because Apollo was something we all thought we needed to do. You 
guys are in the very, very hard position of deciding what we should do. We don’t 
necessarily need to do anything, it doesn’t look like. There’s not an immediate 
and obvious need. But you guys can do lots of different things. I’d like to tack onto 
Dr. Halpern and Dr. Garvin’s comments. I think you guys recognized this, but I’m 
not sure that the rest of the population does—one of the amazing things about 
the way NASA is exploring the new frontiers in space, and the way that ocean 
science explores our frontiers here on Earth, is that for the ﬁ rst time, I think, in 
human history, you’ve got the conservationist, the naturalist, the scientist, and 
the greedy capitalist wound up, in many cases, in one mind, in one human being. 
And you’ve got an organization that’s already looking to protect resources that 
we can’t even exploit yet or use yet.
I mean, does that seem strange to anybody else? That’s new, folks! I mean, 
I think even more so than technologies, you guys can share lessons learned and 
organizational experiences based on how do we commercialize this thing, and 
how do we get beneﬁ t out of it as a people without destroying it for ourselves and 
our posterity? And perhaps that could be part of your public outreach program, 
because, for instance, look at the market for the Toyota Prius cars. It’s huge! 
They’re back-ordered, I don’t know how long. Eight months back-ordered on the 
cars! You know? The public gives a darn about that kind of thing and you guys 
do it [balance beneﬁ ts and conservation] every day. It’s innate. It’s part of your 
nature. That’s important. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Coupled with that and, again, talking about expanding 
the vision and explaining the risk, is that the vision we want to put out there is 
not just [that] we want to go back to the Moon and learn how to go to Mars. But 
I think it’s a bigger vision than that. It’s partially this and partially the thing that 
he’s talking about. It’s [that] we need to present both, this is the next step on 
which we are currently embarking, but also, this is a vision for the future that we 
hope to achieve by taking these steps. And that vision doesn’t have to be perfect. 
It doesn’t have to be exactly what we’re going to arrive at. But it has to be a goal 
beyond just, you know, as great as the goal was to put a man on the Moon and 
bring him back to Earth. Why? Now why are we doing that?
And we’ve talked a lot about that, but I think that needs to be part of what 
would go out to the public, and what NASA thinks about internally, and each of 
us thinks about internally, in ourselves, as what is our long-term pictured goal 
that all these things are steps toward? And that goes for exploring the seas as 
well. You know, all these explorations are not just, I want to go to the bottom 
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of the Marianas Trench. It’s, I want to ﬁ nd out more about the Earth. I want to 
discover more about us as a species. I want to maybe discover things that will 
save our species or our Nation or whatever at some point in the future. So that 
needs to be a part under consideration as well. 
JOHN GRUNSFELD: Okay, well, I think we’re up to the end here. I just want to 
give all of you a big “thank you very much” for participating in this. I know I’ve 
learned a lot. I think we’ve all had a lot of good dialogue. I got a few too many 
action items, but they’re very important ones and we will take that forward, back 
to NASA, and for those of us here from NASA, I hope you take that all out. I really 
want to encourage you again, though, as you leave here, to regard this as the start 
of a dialogue. There’s no question that this is one we’ll talk about sustaining. I 
think this dialogue will be sustained probably for all of human history as we push 
our frontiers, as we move out.
I’d like to bring Scott Hubbard, the Director of the Ames Research Center, 
to give us some closing comments.     ■
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Scott Hubbard serves as director of NASA’s Ames Research Center, in the heart of California’s Silicon 
Valley. Hubbard’s tenure at Ames began in 1987 and has included a variety of management roles. From 
1997 to 1999, he served as the deputy director of the Space Directorate at Ames Research Center. Prior 
to his current appointment, Hubbard was deputy director for research at Ames. In March 2000, Hubbard 
was called to NASA Headquarters where he successfully redeﬁ ned all robotic Mars missions in response 
to the Mars failures in 1999.
Scott Hubbard 
Director, NASA Ames Research Center
My job mainly right now is to roll the credits and thank a whole bunch 
of people who made this all happen. Before I do that though, I’d like to take the prerogative 
of the chair here and just make a few additional comments from things that I’d written 
down in the last couple of days as well as some prethinking. One is the incredible speed 
with which we are moving ahead in space exploration. Now that sounds perhaps silly on the 
surface of it, but think for a moment. In the ﬁ rst 50 years of aviation, a million aircraft were 
built, most of them used multiple times. In the ﬁ rst 50 years of space exploration, there 
have been exactly 4500 launches total worldwide.
The difference, the gap, between where we are in commercial aviation today and 
where we are in space exploration is huge. The fact that Burt Rutan and his group can be 
so successful today is built on investments that were made, in some cases decades ago, by 
the government. Now where does this lead us? This leads us to establishing a viable space 
exploration industry eventually, such that there will be a trailing edge of people who can 
make a business case and make money out of not only communication satellites, but types 
of space travel.
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The two analogies that are already there are the railroads, and, as I said, 
commercial aviation. The railroads that got the right of way, Union Paciﬁ c, 
Southern Paciﬁ c, came together and drove that nail out there in Utah [joining the 
two railroads]. In aviation, the government invested in mail routes. And, eventually, 
this form of investment and technology and subsidies led to multibillion dollar 
industries. I think we are just on the verge of being able to see something like this 
come out in space exploration, beyond something like the commercial satellite 
industry. And I think it’s going to be an absolutely fascinating journey over the 
next 10 years or so—maybe it’s 5 years, we’ll see—as this plays out.
The second major point is to underscore the false dichotomy of human 
versus robots. The only thing that will happen is the ratio will change over time. 
And, at some point, a human being, I’m looking at Chris McKay here, will be the 
tool of choice for exploring the Moon, and, particularly, exploring Mars. If we 
could put him in a little box, I’m sure he would go with the MSL (Mars Science 
Laboratory) in ’09.
So where do we go with this dialogue? I agree completely with what John 
said, with what many of you said. This can’t be a one-of-a-kind. I think the 
public will come along if we tell our story well, but we need professional help. 
Some people say we’re beyond help; we need treatment.
But if we can talk about the risk of not exploring, the risk of losing our 
imagination, and maybe, ultimately, a second home for humanity, I think that 
we have some compelling things in addition to the kind of spinoffs that may 
come from what Nathalie Cabrol found by exploring these lakes, that your blood 
oxygenation goes up, your heartbeat goes down. What does that mean? What 
does that mean for the biomedical community?
There are a lot of things in there, but telling the big future story, I think, 
is something we haven’t done and we need to do. And we saw some storytellers 
here in the last few days who just grabbed us. In giving a lot of talks, there’s 
the pin-drop moment, and we hit the pin-drop moment in those places were 
everybody was just absolutely transﬁ xed by the story.
So, where can we go with this dialogue? One thing is that taking risks can 
prepare you for the future—often in ways you didn’t even think of. I’m going to 
give you one or two examples from my own experience, which has been largely 
taking programmatic and technical risks. 
In 1975 very little was known about repairing neutron damage in gamma 
ray detectors. So I conducted, at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, a bunch of 
experiments with a 72-curie plutonium-beryllium source. Now, if you consider 
that your smoke detector is picocuries, you get some idea of how hot this was.
So, we went through the safety procedures. I signed up to the risks. Twenty-
ﬁ ve years later, at the age of 50 or so, I had dual cataracts in both eyes, which 
was a possible outcome of doing that. But today, Bill Boynton with that same 
detector orbiting Mars, ﬁ guring out where all the water-ice is, is able to repair 
his detector, because of what we learned doing those experiments, almost 30 
years ago, about how you heat the detector and get rid of the neutron damage. 
OPENING PHOTO: 
The Space Shuttle orbiter Endeavour and 
its crew of six glide in to Runway 15 at 
Kennedy Space Center’s Shuttle Landing 
Facility after spending nine days in space 
on the STS-72 mission, the ﬁ rst Shuttle 
ﬂ ight of 1996. 
(NASA Image # 96PC-0155)
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You never know what kind of a risk, and what kind of information, is going to 
prepare you for the future.
In a similar fashion, in April of 1990, I went in front of the Headquarters 
folks and proposed the ridiculous mission of using a Delta-2 and a single probe 
and a cruise stage going to Mars and landing, of all things, using an airbag. 
The risk there was ridicule and being laughed out of the room, which almost 
happened. Fortunately, Jim Martin, the legendary leader of the Viking mission, 
thought there was something to it. And 14 years later, we have now used that 
technology three times successfully.
So, what I’m building up to is the analogy of setting up the Astrobiology 
Institute in 1998. We took a risk—and Keith Cowing was part of this—in bringing 
together an interdisciplinary group of physicists, biologists, mathematicians, 
astronomers, who never talk to each other. Or if they do, the intersection is only 
at one point. And saying, let’s all think from our disparate points of view about 
a much broader series of questions, like where do we come from, are we alone in 
the universe, where are we going?
Out of that came a ﬁ eld today, and you’ve heard references to it, of more 
than 1,000 scientists worldwide who are engaged in this in everyday research 
and view this interdisciplinary work, the interaction—the action is at the 
intersections—as being where we’re headed for research in the future. So I 
would say today, the group that has participated the last two and a half days at 
this has been at a seminal, similar event of bringing together communities that 
have perhaps not communicated as much as they should—robotic, human, risk-
evaluators, decision-makers. And, so, what we need to do to keep this moving is 
have the dialogue; perhaps we have a road map, we certainly need a distillation 
of lessons learned from this, and I would be willing to bet that we’re going to 
ultimately have, if John takes his action items here, thousands of people, maybe 
tens of thousands of people, who are engaged in doing the kind of work that we 
got started here over the last two days.
So with that, let me roll the credits and, ﬁ rst of all, thank the idea men—
John Grunsfeld, Keith Cowing, the people that had some of the initial concepts 
for this. Let me thank the Naval Postgraduate School, Admiral Dunne, and, 
“ ”
IN AVIATION, THE GOVERNMENT INVESTED IN MAIL ROUTES. AND, EVENTUALLY, THIS 
FORM OF INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY AND SUBSIDIES LED TO MULTIBILLION 
DOLLAR INDUSTRIES. I THINK WE ARE JUST ON THE VERGE OF BEING ABLE TO SEE 
SOMETHING LIKE THIS COME OUT IN SPACE EXPLORATION, BEYOND SOMETHING 
LIKE THE COMMERCIAL SATELLITE INDUSTRY. 
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particularly, Chris Walla for hosting us in this incredible venue. It’s just been 
delightful being here. At NASA Headquarters, Bob Jacobs was the lead for pulling 
this together. Trish Pengra, Al Feinberg, and the inestimable Tony Stewart of 
NASA TV, thanks to you all.
The group from Ames, from my own Center, Rho Christensen, Danny 
Thompson, event coordinators. Victoria Steiner and Ed Schilling, public affairs. 
The video crew—I won’t go through all the names. There are many, many people 
stafﬁ ng the cameras here, but I do want to mention Jim Taylor and the planners 
collaborative, Mark Shaddock and Spotlight Productions, Donovan Gates, 
Donovan Gates Production, and Michael Ditertay and his staff on this 30-person 
television crew. And out of this will come, I’m sure, an outstanding DVD.
Then there are a couple of other people from Ames that I want to mention—
Mike Mewhinney and Kathleen Burton of public affairs, who were part of the 
advance group getting all this together. Then, ﬁ nally, a contributor, I’m looking 
at him right now—one of the real concept, idea, content contributors to this, 
who through some personal adversity, has managed to stay focused on making 
this entire thing very successful, Mel Averner. Mel, thank you. Then ﬁ nally, our 
moderators—Miles O’Brien of CNN, Chris McKay, Dave Halpern, and again, 
John Grunsfeld, NASA Headquarters.
So, ﬁ nally, to wrap it up completely, we want to thank all of you who have 
spent the last two and a half days with us, and, of course, the honorable Sean 
O’Keefe, the NASA Administrator.     ■
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I had to rearrange my thoughts after going through the day. I had 
given some time to thoughts about risk and the way we use it and the way we misuse it 
and all of those things. Well, as the morning went on, the ﬁ rst speaker ticked off the ﬁ rst 
three or four of my items, and the next speaker came along and ﬁ xed them all up. And, so, 
most of the things that I thought I would like to comment on were gone. Then, just to put 
the crowning blow on it all, we go in this afternoon and I listen to the most amazing set of 
people that I could ever imagine. And I’m sitting here listening to this and saying, “Every 
one of these people, individually, has done more than me and all my friends.” Now, how in 
the world do you get up and talk after that? 
Well, I decided that the ﬁ rst thing I had to do was to talk about something different. 
So, what I would like to do tonight is perhaps a little deviation, but I hope my thoughts are 
in the context of what you are discussing. 
We have a nomenclature issue when we talk about exploration and the word explore: to 
some people, that means visit planets. To some people, it means do great science. To some 
T. K. Mattingly is one of the 19 astronauts selected by NASA in April 1966. He served as a member of 
the astronaut support crews for the Apollo 8 and 11 missions and was the astronaut representative in 
development and testing of the Apollo spacesuit and backpack (EMU). He was designated command 
module pilot for the Apollo 13 ﬂ ight but was removed from ﬂ ight status 72 hours prior to the scheduled 
launch due to exposure to the German measles. He has logged 7,200 hours of ﬂ ight time—5,000 hours in 
jet aircraft. A veteran of three space ﬂ ights, Mattingly has logged 504 hours in space, including 1 hour and 
13 minutes of extravehicular activity (EVA) during his Apollo 16 ﬂ ight. He was the command module pilot on 
Apollo 16 (16–27 April 1972), was the spacecraft commander on STS-4 (26 June to 4 July 1982) and STS 
51-C (24–27 January 1985). After retiring from NASA in 1989, Mattingly continued his work in space science 
in the private sector, focusing on developing low-cost and reusable launch systems for commercial use. 
Thomas “T.K.” Mattingly II 
Former NASA Astronaut
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OPENING PHOTO: 
Astronaut Thomas K. Mattingly II, 
Apollo 16 Command Module pilot. 
(NASA Image # S71-51295) 
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of us—I like to call ourselves explorers—but I tell you what, the ride is one hell 
of a good show. So I think we have different perspectives on what exploring is. 
But once you get away from this community of ours, you ﬁ nd that the word 
takes on a different connotation. We use the expression “to explore business 
opportunities” and the expression “explore new kinds of things.” And, in my 
mind, this “explore” means to do or to learn something new. It doesn’t matter 
whether it’s science or how to manage an organization or how to go places. It’s 
when you do something new. And, in my mind, that can take on something of a 
different connotation. And so, if you look at it that way, then there are a lot of 
people in the world that take risks. In our business, we talk about risk and the 
ﬁ rst thing we think of is some poor kids’ young bodies laying there in the ashes. 
Well, there are a lot of other risks, and they’re very, very real and they’re 
very important. And for those of you that have tried to start a business or have 
tried to run one with your own money, you understand what the word risk means. 
And it is just as overpowering as anything else. 
When I had an opportunity to launch the Atlas rockets—which, by the 
way, I consider to be one of the highlights of my career opportunities—I can tell 
you, it’s inﬁ nitely easier to sit on top of one of the things that NASA launches, 
because you are absolutely in the best hands you could ever be and you will never 
ﬁ nd a lower level of risk. When you go launch it and it’s your decision—it’s not 
a committee—you’ve got investors that you’ve just assured it’s going to ﬂ y. But 
it’s the same old rocket hardware and it’s just as interesting. And that really gets 
your attention. 
I know that the docs like to record the heart rate—they want to know what 
Jim’s heart rate is at launch and at entry and when he steps around. I tell you 
what—any of those statistics they collected on us won’t compare with making 
the decision to launch something that’s got your money riding on it. That’s a 
different ball game. And it is just as interesting as people. 
So, my point is not to belittle people. My point is to say risk is a different 
thing to a lot of different people for a lot of different reasons. And, so, when we 
say we’re taking an acceptable risk or whatever we’re going to do, you have to put 
yourself in the place of “risk to whom and for what?”  One of the speakers this 
morning reiterated that we all think of risk of life. Okay, that’s pretty easy. There 
is a property risk, but, actually, I think we can take almost all physical property 
and lump it together under ﬁ nancial arrangement of some sort, except in those 
rare cases when we’re going to use or deplete a natural resource that doesn’t get 
refurbished. I remember one time in the Shuttle program, we just woke up one 
day and discovered that our demands—if we met the ﬂ ight schedule—would have 
depleted the Earth’s supply of helium the ﬁ rst year. So we kind of had to do some 
more engineering. So there is an example of another kind of property that you 
put at risk. But you also put at risk opportunities, and that’s opportunities for 
you to do something else with your time. The investor could invest in something 
that’s going to come out better—there’s a million things that could happen. So 
the connotation of risk is something that you have to stop and think about. 
THOMAS “T.K.” MATTINGLY I I     REMARKS
251
John Young (left) and T. K. Mattingly in the recovery raft after 
the splashdown of the Apollo 16 capsule. 
(NASA Image S72-36510)
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It seems to me that in a democratic world one of the principles we have is 
that there are human rights that belong to everybody and we go to great lengths 
to take care of those. And as school kids we were taught that our rights would 
end when yours start. Okay? That was an easy principle. 
That same thing applies to third parties. When we do our trick and we 
launch things over people and around them, or when you run nuclear power 
plants, or when you do all kinds of things, there are innocent parties who did not 
get to vote on taking a risk. And one has to think very seriously about who it is 
that has the authority to put in jeopardy somebody who didn’t even participate 
in the decision. One of the nice things about the discussion this afternoon was 
everybody that I listened to was in activities that did not put 
third parties at risk. They were responsible for other people, 
they were responsible for a lot of things, but the innocent 
bystander was generally immune to their activities. And so 
that [responsibility to innocent parties] puts an obligation on 
all spaceﬂ ight from the beginning. 
When we go out of the atmosphere on those missions 
and come back in, we’re going through something that’s 
very traumatic and irreversible. Spaceﬂ ight is complex by its 
nature. It’s large in scope and it has a whole range of critical, 
irreversible decisions in a harsh and unforgiving environment. 
Other than that, it’s a wonderful place. [Laughter] 
That ﬁ rst step has got to be right, and with that comes 
an obligation to all those kids out there in the world that 
aren’t part of our club and aren’t having fun doing things that 
we enjoy. It’s easy for us to decide, “Hey, this is good stuff,” 
whether it’s good science or just a ball to go do, that’s one 
thing. That’s different than saying, “I’m going to ﬂ y over your cow pasture and 
maybe drop something on your house.” People tend to get irritated at that. 
So, what I wanted to do is step back for just a second and talk about some of 
the perceptions so that it can help frame the question. Now, I’m not a visionary. 
I don’t know what the world should do—I don’t have any idea about whether we 
should explore Timbuktu or Saturn or whatever. But in my opportunities in life, 
I’ve had a chance to do a lot of really neat things where you could have a vision 
about how to get it done. And so I guess I’m one of those people you call an 
implementer instead of a visionary. That’s what I enjoy doing, and I think that’s 
the kind of things that have just worked out in my favor. 
So while not a visionary, I have watched some. What I’d like to do is share 
with you some thoughts about groups that I have watched and the characteristics 
of them. Because I’m going to make two assumptions—and these are not 
debatable, because they’re assumptions. I’m going to assume that you either 
go forward or you die. Civilizations do that. So if you aren’t making progress, 
you’re in deep trouble. Maybe it’ll take time to play out, but that’s the end. And 
I can’t prove that, but, boy, do I believe it. 
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Somebody gave me the analogy that it’s like riding a bicycle. If you try to 
sit still and not move, it’s a very difﬁ cult job. And if you can get up a little speed, 
you can do a lot of things. That’s one assumption. 
The other I’m going to assume is that there is no way we will not explore 
the universe. I have no idea what the timeframe is, but one of my investor friends 
gave me a piece of counsel one day when we were having trouble and couldn’t 
ﬁ gure out how we were going to make the next step. And he said, “Just don’t get 
in the way of success.” 
Going back to Jim Lovell’s [Apollo 13] mission, there’s one lesson that I 
gathered from our ground risk management and getting a chance to watch the 
real pros go do that. When we started, within an hour of Jim telling the world 
he’s got a problem, we didn’t have electricity, we didn’t have oxygen, we’re on a 
trajectory that’s not coming home, and we don’t have any ideas. And those cats 
on the ground solved these problems one at a time. The only rule was, you’ve got 
a problem to solve, you’ve got one to solve, and you’ve got one to solve, and we 
do have a cutoff date when we need to have all this ﬁ nished—it was later than Jim 
wanted it, but it beat the deadline. 
But the principle was, don’t get in the way of success. Assume that your 
buddy is going to do his job and you don’t want to be the one that’s holding up 
the show. With that, we went through a series of really challenging resolutions to 
problems. Where folks really didn’t know, but they said, “Boy, if they can ﬁ gure 
out how to get the water to last, we’ll ﬁ gure out how to get the electricity over 
there.” And it all came together, as you know. 
So I’m going to assume that we’re going to go do these things and that 
we’re mature enough we recognize that, I think, every success is preceded by 
a failure. At least in my experience, it’s not real clear you can have a success 
without preceding it with something that’s humbling or threatening. Certainly 
my career has gone through that sort of cycle. 
The things we learn, we learn most easily from things that don’t work. 
You’ve got to be objective, you’ve got to be honest with yourself, but the things 
that fail are the things that teach us. I have known a few people who could learn 
from success, but you know, when you’re feeling good, it’s really hard to be self-
critical. And so you miss a lot of lessons that you could have had. So don’t ever 
be afraid of failure. 
So, if that’s the case, if my premise is right—we’re going to make progress 
and we’re going to go explore—then our job is don’t get in the way of success. 
We don’t know from the government side what the funding proﬁ les will be, what 
the timing is, but we need to be prepared to do whatever opportunity presents. 
So how do you do that? I don’t know. And I certainly wouldn’t tell you anything 
other than sea stories about places I’ve been. But we’re not in those places. We’re 
going forward. And that’s a new game and a new set of challenges and new places 
to go. That means rethink. 
So, in that vein, let me just summarize my observations from spending 
20 years in government programs and then a few years working as a contractor 
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NUMBER ONE, YOU HAVE TO HAVE A CLEAR, QUANTIFIABLE, SIMPLE-TO-
UNDERSTAND OBJECTIVE. STEP ONE. IF YOU DON’T FILL THAT SQUARE IN, 
DON’T WORRY ABOUT THE REST OF THEM, BECAUSE THEY DON’T MATTER. “ ”
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on government programs and then the last ten years working on commercial 
ventures. I’ve been in large corporations—government certainly is a large 
organization, DOD’s a large organization—and I’ve been in some small startups 
and entrepreneurial ventures. We’ve made mistakes and we’ve had some successes. 
So I’ve tried to catalog for you the signatures that have shown up in every success. 
And some were hinted at today and I just wanted to reiterate them. 
Number one, you have to have a clear, quantiﬁ able, simple-to-understand 
objective. Step one. If you don’t ﬁ ll that square in, don’t worry about the rest of 
them, because they don’t matter. 
Once you’ve got that, you have some more challenges. And it takes creating 
an environment where getting it right is more important than who’s right. You 
have to have a group—and big things can’t be done by small groups and by 
individuals, only by large organizations. The trick in leadership is to create the 
environment where getting it right is all that counts, because the job’s too hard 
to do anything else. 
So if you’ve got that, then you have to have competent practitioners. 
Without that, you won’t go anywhere. Now, back in the Apollo days, that was one 
thing no one had to worry about. Because if you just said, “Job opening—work 
on Apollo,” you know, the line went all the way around the county, because it was 
something every one of the young kids wanted to do. 
Today we have to compete for opportunities and people, especially. They 
will come to an electric environment. The kinds of things that you folks do will 
draw people. They are there—and they’re the people who want to be there, people 
who want to be personally accountable. 
So in this group, this constellation of things that I have observed as uniform 
qualities, you have got to have a good objective, you have got to have personal 
accountability—eyeball to eyeball, participant to participant. That’s not an org 
chart with lines on it, that’s real-world accountability based on human relations 
that we have with each other. You have to be competent in your job. 
I would caution that one place we’ve gotten trapped is the resume trap 
or the logo trap. I’m the world’s worst in reading a resume and knowing what 
somebody can do. I feel pretty good after working with them for a couple of days, 
and then I know what kind of people I’m around. But I have a real hard time with 
a resume; they can look really good or really bad. 
The logo trap is the other side of that. How many times have we worked in an 
industry that’s maturing, where the logo of the company is on the wall and it has a 
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record of miraculous accomplishments—year after year they’ve done spectacular 
things. All of us, including the employees, believe that we are part of that logo. 
And it happens at NASA, it happens at any large organization with a history. We 
identify with that logo, that’s a symbol of things that have happened. 
Maybe, after a period of time, the people that do those things aren’t there 
anymore. And unless somebody has been very, very careful to be prescient 
enough to create an honest-to-goodness succession plan, you’ll ﬁ nd people who 
know the language, who look good, but do not have that personal, gut feeling for 
what it’s about that’s necessary to do these things that push the envelope. When 
you ﬁ nd that situation, the places that succeed recognize it, and then they take 
steps to ﬁ x that. 
There’s nothing magic about this except to face up to the fact that you know 
what you know and you know what you don’t. And with that, those signatures 
have shown up at every one of these little organizations that I’ve had a chance to 
be exposed to. 
So, while I can’t tell the answers to the next job and the next challenge, 
because each one’s unique, I would commend to you that these observations, 
that I think I picked up primarily from working at NASA; they have been 
uniform signatures. We even applied the much-maligned aerospace management 
process to turning around a very nonglamorous company, where we did a really 
excellent job of turnaround, coming out of bankruptcy to create some almost 
embarrassingly good results—done with people in a nonglamorous ﬁ eld and a 
group that two years ago was absolutely demoralized and hopeless. 
It all came from just getting them all on the same page with the right orders. 
So these are techniques that are not just peculiar to the high-tech business, they 
work everywhere in life. So that’s my observation. 
I do have one question I’d like to ask of you. When I was a kid, I lived in 
Miami, and I used to go down to the beach, like all high school kids, and look up at 
the sky and see the Moon, and you kind of wondered, “Gee,” you know, beer talk, 
“Hmm, wonder what the Earth would look like [from] up there?” Well, that was 
too preposterous for even high school kids to talk about. Strange things happen. 
I had a chance to go and serve what I thought would be a couple-year tour 
with NASA, and they were doing this program called Apollo and space-centered 
life. I knew that when I got there, I wasn’t going to the Moon. But, you know, I 
might be getting in at the right time to go to Mars. [Laughter] Well, that schedule 
has been modiﬁ ed a couple of times and I said, “Well, okay. I did get to go to the 
Moon, I hope that doesn’t blow my trip to Mars.” [Laughter] 
Then I woke up and said, “Maybe I could be the program manager to send 
somebody to Mars.” So tonight, I would plead with all of you in the exploration 
world. Before I turn the lights out, I want to see pictures of people bouncing on 
Mars. And that’s your job. Thank you.     ■
 
Back to Contents page 
RISK AND EXPLORATION:  EARTH, SEA AND THE STARS        
Michael Foale
NASA Astronaut
Remarks
This morning, we heard an awful lot of eye-opening stories 
about how we are exploring the planet today. I’m awed to be in the presence of so many 
notable people here in the Monterey Bay Aquarium. Actually, this aquarium has ﬁ gured 
inspirationally in motivational movies such as Star Trek and other grand works of science 
ﬁ ction. I should tell you I have been motivated by Star Trek, I think we heard that this 
afternoon from Chris McKay. 
Preparing for this talk, I continually asked myself why I, of all people, have been asked 
to speak to you this evening. And I kind of went through the thoughts. Maybe because 
I most recently returned from space—that seems an obvious one. Or because I’ve been 
fortunate enough to survive six ﬂ ights to space. Or worse, because somebody sees me as 
prone to avoiding near disasters throughout my life. I know someone in my management 
chain believes that. 
I do not feel I’m a particular specialist in risk-taking or taking risks personally. Rather, 
I see myself as rather conservative about mitigating risks that I see ahead of myself and 
my family.
Michael Foale was selected as an astronaut candidate by NASA in June 1987. He served as a mission 
specialist on STS-45, STS-56, STS-63, and STS-103. He was ﬂ ight engineer 2 on Mir 23 and Mir 24 
(ascent on STS-84 and return on STS-86). On his last ﬂ ight, 18 October 2003 to 29 April 2004, Foale 
served as International Space Station (ISS) Expedition-8 Commander. The Expedition-8 crew launched 
from Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan aboard Soyuz TMA-3 and docked with the ISS on 20 October 
2003. His six-month tour of duty aboard the International Space Station included a 3 hour, 55 minute 
extravehicular activity (EVA). Mission duration was 194 days, 18 hours, and 35 minutes and, at its 
conclusion, Foale became the U.S. record holder for most cumulative time in space, having logged 374 
days, 11 hours, and 19 minutes.
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OPENING PHOTO: 
Equipped with a bungee harness, 
astronaut Michael Foale, Expedition 8 
commander and NASA’s science ofﬁ cer 
on the International Space Station (ISS), 
performs squat exercises on the Treadmill 
Vibration Isolation System (TVIS) in the 
Zvezda Service Module, the ISS living 
quarters. (Zvezda is Russian for “star.”) 
(NASA Image # ISS007-E-17762)
There are many guests amongst us who do not work at NASA, but have very 
relevant experience in exploration. Please believe that I see risk perception and 
its mitigation as a rather subjective issue—I think we’ve heard that a number 
of times today.
I, and NASA, do not know all the answers. In fact, I feel we may have strayed 
off course concerning our approach to risk in some areas. We, NASA, need to 
hear more than anything else not Mike Foale’s point of view on risk, but those of 
people outside of NASA looking in. I feel my job today is to sort of set the scene 
and issue provocative opinions to you—I mean, I’m opinionated—and you are 
obliged to dispute them in the coming days. 
That said, I’m going to give you my personal view of America’s space 
exploration and the risk that comes with it. But ﬁ rst, I’d like to set the scene for 
space exploration in the future, inspired by the President’s vision for exploration, 
by showing the ﬁ rst part of a video made within the astronaut ofﬁ ce by astronauts 
and narrated by astronauts—one of whom is myself. 
[Narration from video is indented.]
Female speaker: We are, by nature, explorers. Look at the centuries of 
histories where people were committed to ﬁ nding new worlds and 
establishing them. And now I think it’s time for us to go beyond low 
Earth orbit and do the very same thing.
Female Speaker: Human beings are insatiably curious. We want to 
know what’s out there in the stars. It’s part of who we are; it’s part of 
what we are.
Male Speaker: Being outside on a spacewalk is the coolest thing you 
can imagine—beyond belief. You’re doing this important thing, 
you’re building a spaceship and the world is rolling by. It’s absolutely 
breathtaking.
Male Speaker: The Space Station is teaching us how to explore. Before 
we can go to the Moon or to Mars, we have to learn a lot about the 
human body. What happens when you put yourself inside a spaceship 
for weeks and even months? What food are we going to eat? Are we 
going to bring it all in cans or are we going to grow some food on 
board? What sort of spaceships do we have to build?
Michael Foale: When we look back 50 years to this time, we won’t 
remember the experiments that were performed, we won’t remember 
the assembly that was done. What we will know was that countries 
came together to do the ﬁ rst joint international project, and we will 
know that that was the seed that started us off to the Moon and Mars.
Male Speaker: I think you have to learn to live and work on the Moon 
ﬁ rst, so you can make mistakes when you’re only two and a half days 
away from a can of beans. 
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Male Speaker: Human beings can do things that robots will never be able 
to do. They can anticipate, and they can handle, unexpected problems.
Male Speaker: On the Moon, we ran into about 97 problems that 
nobody thought we’d run into, and we ﬁ xed every one.
Male Speaker: We are going to continue to explore. We can confront the 
majority of the problems by going to the Moon. And then, building on 
that will give us the conﬁ dence and the technical ability to be able to 
step further into the solar system and turn our sights towards Mars.
Male Speaker: We go to places where human beings typically can’t 
live because these environments offer discoveries that defy our 
imagination. We’re going to say, “Wow!”
Male Speaker: We want to know where we should land; we want to 
know where the water is. The robots blaze the trail—provide us with 
a path to get there. They’re ﬁ nding out whether we could stand on 
the surface of Mars. Those robots have raised their electronic eyes 
and given us those ﬁ rst glimpses of the horizon of Mars. To be able to 
stand on the surface of Mars and feel the wind blowing of Mars’s thin 
atmosphere is going to be a tremendous achievement.
Female Speaker: Can we use some of these resources? Can we prosper 
here? Can humans live here?
Male Speaker: So far, we have only sent people as far as the Moon, 
and sent our robots just as far as the edge of our solar system. We are 
just starting to understand our place in the universe, the perspective 
that the universe gives us, and the tremendous, inﬁ nite variety that 
the rest of the universe holds. That’s where we are headed, and that’s 
where we’ll go after Mars.
[Video segment ends]
After watching that video, or others just like it, I ﬁ nd myself kind of 
naturally responding with enthusiasm and excitement. I kind of go, “Wow!” It 
makes me feel that we humans can do anything if we agree on a common purpose 
and simply put our minds to it. 
However, evocative and inspirational as my astronaut colleagues can be, 
we are leaving out of the message something terribly important—risk. Why is 
that? It’s because we feel instinctively, maybe—especially in this year—it will 
spoil the mood of our message. That it will conjure up very painful and recent 
memories of lost friends and failed missions. 
My theme to you this evening is that we must always talk about risk when 
we enthuse about exploration. The two are inevitably connected. And I think that 
message is coming home today. 
Risk—what is it? It’s obvious when disaster strikes, such as when Shackleton’s 
ship, Endurance, was forestalled in his second attempt to reach the South Pole, 
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crushed by the ice while trapped far from his goal. We consider an activity to 
have risk if a foreseeable outcome has undesirable or dangerous consequences. 
Everybody knows what risk is, but it’s according to their own subjective standards. 
Risk today, in Western society, might be perceived to be—as T. K. Mattingly 
referred to—a ﬁ nancial activity or the stock market, allowing your children to take 
the bus to school, not evacuating in advance of a hurricane warning, or not wearing 
a seatbelt. And these examples are seen as risks because the consequences can 
signiﬁ cantly change our lives through ﬁ nancial ruin or loss of life. 
So this evening when I speak of risk, I mean the risk of people being killed. 
Historically, or even today in underdeveloped countries, loss of life was an 
unfortunate, but commonplace, occurrence within families and all other types 
of social units. Every child experienced soon in their childhood somebody dying 
or they saw a dead person. This might have included the ravages of marauding 
neighbors, war, starvation, and disease. 
Before Christopher Columbus, if a proposal of exploration was made—be it 
to scout the far hills and tribes at a distance, or to utilize substantial resources 
of the community to send ships on marauding or exploring adventures—the risk 
entailed would appear to carry consequences not worse, and possibly better than, 
the risk of inaction. 
Inaction might simply mean waiting for unknown peoples to ﬁ nd and attack 
the community or running out of food or tradable goods. So the imperative to 
explore then and to take risks then was strong, because the risk was understood 
widely to be a means to survival and the reduction of future risk. 
When a ship that had carried away a large fraction of the able-bodied 
community did not return or became known to be lost, the news would be just as 
painful then as it is today, but I think the shock should have been less. 
How do exploration and risk play a part on Earth now? I see exploration 
taking place under the sea, such as underwater archaeology, or on land, such as 
the search for Mars meteorites in deserts or Antarctica, or in mountaineering—
and in space, as we develop human and robotic space missions beyond the realm 
of Earth. I do not see these combined exploration activities consuming anything 
but a small fraction of the world’s economic and human production. 
I do not know how today’s activity should be compared to that [of] more 
than a hundred years ago, but my feeling is that outlays for exploration today 
represent a smaller fraction of our output than in the past. So, in risk terms, 
nowadays activities are just as dangerous for participants as any exploration 
undertaken in history—dying is dying. There has been no change in the fact that 
people can be injured today and lose their lives while exploring. 
What has changed is the public expectation for success, and the public 
shock when risk and danger show themselves as injury and loss of life. We’re 
not often exposed to death and severe illnesses or injury in our personal lives, 
unless we’re in a group that we could label as thrill-seekers—and we’ve been 
avoiding that term here today—or work in medical or emergency services, or in 
a war zone. 
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I’m going to show you slides of a series of missions that I did not take part 
in. I was too young. I was just an enthusiastic, dreamy watcher of these events 
that took place in the ’60s. I’m going to show you astronauts walking out to their 
vehicle and then the vehicle launching. And I want to tell you to think about how 
you, the manager sending that astronaut out to the launch pad, might feel—or 
the family. And then I think about how you, as the astronaut or the risktaker 
walking out to that launch, might feel about your risk. 
[slide] This is Alan Shepherd getting into his Mercury capsule in 1961, May 
5th. After the Soviet Union had orbited Yuri Gagarin, April 12th of that year, 
President Kennedy stated in a press conference, “No one is more tired that I am 
in seeing the U.S. second to Russia in the space ﬁ eld.” And he went on to say, 
“We are, I hope, going to be able to carry out our efforts with due regard to the 
problem of the life of the men involved this year.” 
So he did not say it directly, but he was referring to the high risk of putting a 
human into space. James Webb, the then NASA Administrator, issued a statement 
no more optimistic. “NASA has not attempted to encourage press coverage of 
the ﬁ rst Mercury Redstone manned ﬂ ight.” I think that’s incredible in today’s 
environment. “We must keep the perspective that each ﬂ ight is but one of many 
milestones we must pass. Some will completely succeed in every respect. Some 
partially, and some will fail. From all of them will come mastery of the vast new 
space environment on which so much of our future depends.” 
 [slide] This is Alan Shepherd’s lift off on a Redstone rocket, ﬂ ying for no 
more than 15 minutes until splashdown. The ﬂ ight was a success. Afterwards, 
the risk perceived by the public may have been assuaged a touch. But my point 
to you is, because this was a ﬁ rst ﬂ ight of a new nature carrying a human, it had 
great risk. So, like a test pilot, I believe any ﬁ rst ﬂ ight with a human being carries 
increased risk, especially in recently designed, new space vehicles. 
I’m going to show you a series of slides of space missions, as I mentioned, 
that I believe carried a particularly high and increased risk. Initially, these 
missions are ones I did not take part in, and so your opinion is as strong as mine. 
I think you should hold your opinion and see if it corresponds with that which 
I’m going to express to you. 
In some cases, this risk may have been well understood by the public, such 
as this ﬁ rst ﬂ ight of Al Shepherd. Other slides I will show, the public was much 
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less aware of how great the risk was and found themselves surprised. [slide] 
Here’s John Glenn, 20 February 1962, walking out to the ﬁ rst human ﬂ ight of the 
Mercury-Atlas vehicle. John Glenn walked out to a much more risky launch than 
the one before him by Gus Grissom, which had also been on a Redstone rocket. 
Why? In my opinion, it’s pretty clear. Because the vehicle had been changed. 
The mission was very different. Launched to orbit with 3 times the speed of the 
Redstone, 10 times the energy to gain getting into orbit, and 10 times the energy 
to dissipate in excess heat reentering from orbit. 
This is the basic fact of the physics of spaceﬂ ight into orbit and away from 
the Earth. The energies needed to be acquired or dissipated are huge, roughly 300 
times the kinetic energy of airliners, 290 that of supersonic jets, 25 times that of 
SpaceShipOne this week, on which I, personally, pin much hope, and I think the 
rest of you do, also. 
Was this huge difference compared to Alan Shepherd’s ﬂ ight understood 
by the public? Kennedy did say only later that year, in September, “We choose to 
go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things not because they are easy, 
but because they are hard.” 
[slide] When Gus Grissom and John Young walked out, in March 1965, to 
Gemini 3, the risks were again increased, in my opinion. It was a new human 
launch vehicle, a ﬁ rst ﬂ ight for humans, and it was a new, larger spacecraft, 
the Gemini capsule. On the previous rockets, there was an escape tower. The 
crew escape system was reduced in this case—ejection seats—diminishing its 
capability compared to Mercury. It was a big, risky step for our nation’s space 
program, but probably not perceived [as so] by the public. 
[slide] This is Ed White on the ﬁ rst U.S. spacewalk—deﬁ nitely a new risk 
in our space program, adding to others as a ﬁ rst-time test. 
[slide] Here’s Neil Armstrong and Dave Scott docking with the Agena upper 
stage, only to experience high rotation rates when they docked. They undocked 
and experienced even worse rotation rates, tumbling. They saved themselves 
by switching to a different attitude control jet system and made an emergency 
splashdown thousands of miles from the planned recovery area. 
So the risk of human space exploration then, in this program up to that 
point, had been successful. Shows itself as a real hazard, but in NASA parlance, 
we call that a close call. It’s where we go, “Whew! That was dangerous,” breathe a 
sigh of relief, but nobody lost their life. 
[slide] The death of the Apollo 1 crew—Gus Grissom, Ed White, and Roger 
Chaffee—in January 1967, in a ﬁ re inside the command module while on the 
launch pad, pulled NASA and the Nation up short. But the tragedy brought the 
best out in NASA and the Nation at that time, with new public resolve and tough 
lessons learned. 
[slide] Two years later, an incredibly bold and risky decision was made 
by George [Mueller] and others to send Apollo 8 to the Moon after only one 
manned Apollo ﬂ ight. Jim Lovell talked about that this morning. I think it is an 
incredible ﬂ ight, especially risky because they did not take a lunar module with 
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them, which, because of its independent systems as a spacecraft in its own right, 
mitigated for future Apollo missions the risk of command-module failure. 
[slide] Apollo 11 was well-perceived by the public to be risky. I think failure 
would have been tragic, in their minds, and awful, but not a shock. There was the 
unknown risk of landing on the lunar surface, plus the high risk of the Apollo 
system as a whole, but, so far, successfully ﬂ own. I remember as a young boy of 
about 12 or 13, the success made me sigh with relief, as if the risk had somehow 
gone away at that point. 
The reward for the United States, for the Nation, when we are willing to 
take risks and to explore, is really so obvious in lunar rendezvous; the liftoff 
from the lunar surface with just one engine—only one engine to get you into 
orbit—carried a whole other set of risks with it. 
And then we come to Jim Lovell’s ﬂ ight with Apollo 13. Its emergency was 
more of a type—in my mind, Jim—that NASA actually expects and tries to plan 
for. Risk again showed itself as real. I’ve wondered how I might have felt leaving 
the Earth when the accident happened. 
As he pointed out, it was a fortuitous place—200,000 miles from the 
Moon—from his point of view. But, in my case, I think of not being able to turn 
around as the power systems of their command module failed. I think of what 
the cold, dead spacecraft may have seemed like when I was on Mir, when we lost 
energy, lost power, without a single sound and no power and the cold of space 
sucking the heat out of the spacecraft and yourself and your crewmates. It’s a 
very, very hard task dealing with a dying spacecraft because it gets so cold and so 
wet. For Apollo 13, the risk was seen to be a close call. I don’t mean to diminish 
that, Jim Lovell, but it was a close call because we pulled it off—you pulled it 
off—no one died, thanks to thousands of people on Earth and your crew. 
[slide] STS-1, with John Young and Bob Crippen. This was the ﬁ rst powered 
ﬂ ight of a Space Shuttle. I feel this was the boldest, riskiest ﬂ ight in NASA’s history. 
But if you mention that to John, he just seems to mutter some understatement 
characteristic of only John Young. The launch involved three characteristically 
different components to work perfectly and all together for the ﬁ rst time in 
a manned test. These were the external tank, the solid rocket boosters, and the 
orbiter. And within these, the main components—engines, hydraulic power units, 
fuel cells—all had to work reliably, but at least these had been tested in an integrated 
fashion before powered ﬂ ight. This was not true of all three components together. 
No unmanned ﬂ ight of the STS had been conducted. And the buildup to STS-1 was 
slow and difﬁ cult for NASA, so the public heard about its risk in the press as much 
because it had been so long since the last manned launch of Apollo to Skylab. For all 
that risk, the crew escape system—ejection seats—was especially limited compared 
to that of Apollo, adding even greater risk to the crew for this ﬁ rst ﬂ ight. 
But STS-1 was a success, as were subsequent ﬂ ights up to the 25th, 
Challenger. The ejection seats were removed. Our public and NASA seemed to 
expect space exploration to be like that of airline operations. And to be fair to the 
public, this is an understandable misconception. 
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Only recently—just two weeks ago when I was climbing Mt. Baker—we 
were discussing the loss of Columbia with people who do not work in the space 
program. And the genuine question goes, “After all, the Shuttle lands like an 
airliner, right? So it must be as risk-free as an airliner. You spent all that money on 
it.” I’ve heard this from generally well-informed people in different professions. 
So the public is especially shocked when the Shuttle is destroyed. 
Okay, so why do astronaut applications to NASA actually increase after 
we’ve had a disaster, including me in 1981, watching STS-1 from Cambridge, 
England, driven to become an astronaut. Would-be astronauts do risky things to 
acquire the skills of explorers—I think Bill Stone overdid it this morning—such 
as ﬂ y gliders or scuba dive on expeditions in Greece; this is something I thought 
was really captivating and interesting. Or excavating human remains in the low 
visibility and cold conditions on the Mary Rose in the English Channel. There 
was risk in these exploration activities for me and the two people who preceded 
me. Two people had died in the course of many dives on the Mary Rose [before I 
joined the] project. But the excitement of discovering new things was compelling 
and it pushed me to do more. 
[slide] Becoming an astronaut in Group 15 in 1987, after Challenger. Yeah, 
you’ll recognize some characters here, it’s an in-crowd, but it was a result of my 
desire not to take risk, but to experience space exploration. My desire outweighed 
the risk I perceived, a risk greater than I probably realized at the time. 
[slide] This is astronaut spaceﬂ ight readiness training, and it carries risk. 
We may have to eject out of a T-38 or be picked up by helicopter in search-and-
rescue exercises. Or—this is not hazardous—overeat during a survival exercise. 
But these training activities to prepare astronauts are undertaken to reduce our 
future risks during space missions. 
So our training carries risk also, and this is to be balanced carefully with the 
higher risks that we are trying to mitigate in the conduct of our space missions. Our 
remote outdoor expedition training is a key to preparing crew members to make use 
of local resources, solve technical and mechanical failures in difﬁ cult conditions. 
[slide] Here John Young and Charlie Duke are being trained in geology to 
increase the science return of Apollo 16, which was highly successful. I believe 
we need to place future exploration astronauts into geology ﬁ eld work, in a long-
duration expedition context, as part of scientiﬁ c expeditions where scientists 
have a stake in these activities of the astronauts. So the astronauts feel the 
pressure that stake has on them, [as] for example, searching for and recognizing 
Martian meteorites in the deserts or in Antarctica. 
Post-Challenger, my ﬁ rst ﬂ ight was on STS-45 in 1992. And my family 
took the risk very seriously, as the families of all astronauts do, as did my ﬁ rst 
commander—Charlie Bolden. And he was already a three-time ﬂ yer, I think, at 
that point. And he strongly encouraged me—and I was a bit surprised by this—
to write a will. It was honest advice for a risk-taker from a risk-taker. 
NASA managers work to the very best of their ability to manage our risk 
when we ﬂ y, but they are limited to the tools at hand, the architecture of the 
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Space Shuttle system, and the inherent risk in all launch systems attempting 
orbital speeds. 
In the late 1990s, NASA was directed to work with the Russian Space Agency 
to build the International Space Station (ISS), providing sustaining ﬁ nancial 
support to, at that time, a Russian space industry in severe difﬁ culty. And it 
jump-started the redesign of the ISS and initiated a series of joint Shuttle-Mir
missions throughout which a NASA astronaut would be left aboard the Mir to 
gain experience in the conduct of long-duration space ﬂ ight. 
[slide] So here a few of us and our Russian support staff are gathered in front 
of Yuri Gagarin’s statue in Star City. As Charlie Precourt and our crew brought me 
towards Mir in 1997, I was anxious actually not about the risk, not for my safety, 
but my ability simply to interact well with my Russian hosts, my cosmonaut crew. 
The launch was behind me, and I reckoned the on-orbit phase should be less risky. 
Lloyd’s of London must have thought the same, because they charged me the 
same $1,500 for mission life insurance, just as they had for my shorter Shuttle 
missions. They would have been horriﬁ ed as that mission unfolded, I think. 
The risk of the U.S. working with Russia in the conduct of these expeditions 
was that the two sides did not, and could not reasonably, know everything about 
each other’s decisions and processes. I certainly did not know or understand that 
well at the time. A lesson learned during this program was that we are obliged to 
know as much as possible about each other’s operations that carry risks. 
Jerry Linenger, who I was replacing, happened to tell me in the handover a 
hairy story about a manual Progress docking attempt, which Vasili Tsibliev had 
been instructed to carry out earlier and which, in the end, failed, ﬁ nishing in a 
close call, a ﬂ y by of the station. I listened attentively, but did not know how to 
calibrate it as a risk. At any rate, I considered the presence of an independent 
space vehicle—the Soyuz—to be sufﬁ cient to insure our lives in the event of 
bad events on the space station. And, as it would turn out, we came very close to 
testing my supposition.
I’m going to show you, very brieﬂ y, a clip of a collision of a Progress vehicle 
that took place while I was on board the space station Mir in 1997. Before the 
actual collision takes place in this video, I will show you the way this docking 
attempt should have taken place. There you will see a Progress vehicle coming 
in towards the space station, towards the docking axis. And it will dock in a 
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nominal fashion, stopping at about 100 meters, and then the crew takes over, 
using manual controls.
In this successful attempt, carried out by Anatoly Soloviev and Pavel 
Vinogradov, that I witnessed actually later on in that year, they were using all of 
the full capabilities of the Progress docking system—the range and range rate, 
the radar system—that allow a normal automatic docking to take place. Vasili 
Tsibliev, my commander in Mir 23, had been asked to turn off that equipment—
not use it. Why? Because the program in Russia wanted to cut the cost of buying 
a $2 million electronic box in the Ukraine. That was the rationale for this test. As 
it unfolded, and as I learned about it, I realized this was a gross miscalculation of 
what we were ready to do that day, and it was very improperly thought through 
[about] how to carry out this docking test.
 [video] The sound you hear is in the Soyuz as I was ﬂ ying around in 
there looking at the damage, actually. This is the docking module that we’re 
talking about—the docking core. Here’s Anatoly monitoring the TORU docking 
equipment. And he sees the Mir in his sights as he ﬂ ies the Progress manually, 
looking through a camera from the Progress towards the Mir. 
This now is the scene as Vasili saw it. We’d already gotten too high above 
the Mir. You can see the solar arrays of the Mir here, this is the long axis. I snuck 
this video, by the way, which is why it’s such poor quality. They didn’t know I 
took it. And the docking was along this axis, it was meant to be. You can see 
we’re high above the Mir. Vasili is not really saying anything in this audio yet. I’m 
just watching over his shoulder. Sasha is nearby. We should be docking on this 
axis, but we’re now moving this way. 
Sasha is saying, “You should move out.” Sasha is saying, “Break out! Break 
out!” He says to me, “Get to the spacecraft.” This is my feet coming by the scene 
here. And then, that’s the crash as the Progress hits. At this point, I’m ﬂ oating 
into the space towards the Soyuz and the pressure’s already falling, I can feel the 
pressure, in my ears falling. 
This is the classic klaxon that you hear when you have a loss of pressure. 
Afterwards, when we did the survey, ﬂ ying around in the Soyuz spacecraft, we 
looked at the damage and we saw that the solar array had been badly crashed. 
After big events—after risk—you relax. And I wanted to show you what the 
handover’s mood looked like as we ﬁ nished up. After that pretty terrible day for 
Vasili Tsibliev and the rest of us, but particularly bad for the commander who 
suffered the stigma of this collision, every day we would look out of the window 
at this scene. 
The damage to the Spektr module was serious, and it broke the foundation 
of that solar array that comes in here towards the Spektr module—so much [so] 
that I feel that the bearing was the location of the breach in the hull or [the] 
leaks. And Anatoly Soloviev and I did a space walk in Russian suits to survey the 
damage and try to ﬁ nd a hole, but we were not successful. 
More serious and risky were the successive—and this takes me back to Jim 
Lovell’s experience—times when we would lose complete attitude control of the 
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space station and tumble slowly. When we had isolated that module—the Spektr 
module, Sasha and I—after the collision, we had cut off 30 percent of the Mir’s 
power supply in so doing. And so now, the Mir was in a very critical energy state. 
Actually, orienting the Mir using the Soyuz, which was the way we did this 
to overcome the loss of attitude control, always made me nervous that we would 
have inadvertently stabilized it in a spin, so stable that we would forever be stuck 
in it and direct the arrays away from the Sun and then, therefore, kill the station. 
[slide] This is for John Grunsfeld. To put risk on Mir in perspective, I have to 
add that the risk of a Space Shuttle ﬂ ight, for me, after the Mir, was just as real to 
me. It was while participating in a Hubble repair mission—with John Grunsfeld, 
by the way, over here—on STS-103 in 1999, commanded by Kurt Brown, that 
I felt the most anxious about what we’re planning to do. And the task simply 
was performance anxiety for me. To change out the brain, the 
main computer, of the telescope—that made me more nervous 
that day, about my own performance and the risk of my actions, 
than anything I have ever experienced in all of six space missions. 
To leave Hubble worse off than we had found it, now that was a 
nightmare I did not ever want to contemplate. 
Coming back to Russia again, NASA’s experience on Mir, 
I believe, went a long way to reducing risk in working with the 
Russians on the International Space Station. We gained insight 
into their commissions and launch decision-making processes. 
[slide] So here you see me. I want to show you, this is 
the management point of view, and it’s a serious one of launch 
readiness. Ten days before launch on that Soyuz TMA-3 in October 
of last year, I am being presented as kind of an item—Exhibit 
A—to the Russian commission. Not only as a risk-taker, but as a 
form of risk mitigation. The argument was presented, in front of 
me and my crew, by Star City that our training was complete and 
sufﬁ cient and so, therefore, our performance did not represent a 
risk to the completion of Expedition 8. It was kind of a unique 
situation to be in for me. 
As we approached the time of departure from Star City to 
the launch site in Baikonur, Kazakhstan, my family—Rhonda, Ian, 
and Jenna, and those are my crewmates, Aleksandr Kaleri and 
Pedro Duque—were toasted very seriously by the Russians and 
thoughtfully, acknowledging the unspoken risks in front of us as we embarked on 
Expedition 8. At this point, no one talks about risk. 
[slide] I’m going to show you the walk out from the suit-up building in 
Kazakhstan out to our designated squares, and then the salute, and then on 
to the launch pad for a Soyuz launch. On the way out to a Shuttle launch, you 
become introspective, somewhat, as you notice all the other vehicles for a Shuttle 
launch are leaving. On the way out to a Russian launch, I’m always amazed that 
in Kazakhstan, when you get to the base of the rocket, you’re surrounded by 
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hundreds of senior ﬁ gures and VIPs, and they’re all clamoring to be there, right 
next to a steaming, hissing, breathing rocket. I guess they want to take part in the 
same risk as we three have to at that point in the launch sequence. 
At this point, though, they’ve moved everybody away. The ride is incredible. 
I don’t know how to describe it. There’s a lot of rumbling noise, vibration. Very 
abrupt cutoffs as we go through staging, and then there’s peace and quiet when you 
get to orbit. And all the hoopla you went through getting to the launch pad is kind 
of behind you. 
You think about, if you have a reﬂ ective moment, your family back at the 
launch pad, thousands of miles away already.
If you were to watch the faces of launch teams at Cape Canaveral, and the 
managers, you would ﬁ nd expressions of concern and nervousness and prayer 
and hope written all over their faces. At this moment, if people have forgotten 
the risk of the launch, then they remember it. 
On board, it’s more simple. Crew members have to only perform reliably and 
carefully. In my mind, once embarked on a risky phase, be it crossing a crevice 
ﬁ eld on a glacier or carrying out procedures using dynamic operations in a space 
vehicle, at that point, you have to stop worrying and move on to minimize the 
risk of your own failure. That’s the risk-taker’s point of view. 
Of course, there’s time to relax sometimes, such as New Year. A long-
duration mission is very much an act of endurance and perseverance. The risk 
I take most seriously is being part of a crew that cannot shift out of relaxation 
from routine to operational readiness for dynamic operations. An example of 
that would be shifting to operational readiness for reentry in a space vehicle after 
you’ve spent 194 days in space. 
This transition for our crew, including a long-time unseen ﬂ ight engineer, 
was probably the greatest risk we were exposed to during this otherwise pretty 
nominal expedition. The ride is incredible. From four hours ago, [when] we 
were enjoying chocolate and drinks, and then, after a deorbit burn, pyro belts 
ﬁ ring, tumbling, the shock of parachute opening, rapid depressurization of the 
spacecraft, and then the smell of cordite coming in through the vents of the 
spacecraft into the cabin; ﬁ nally, you touch down onto the Kazakhstan plain. 
[video] He’s saying, “I congratulate you.” This is the hole made by a thruster 
made on the Soyuz spacecraft as it did the braking burn. 
After the risk is past, crew members, family, space managers, all of us are 
relieved, and we celebrate how we have cheated death once more. It shows in our 
faces that the risk of spaceﬂ ight and space exploration is always present, and 
we must always be honest about it, explain it, and do our utmost to reduce it, 
without hiding it. That way, when we risk-takers are back with our families and 
we talk about committing to new space exploration—she says, “Don’t you dare 
ﬂ y again!” [joking] No, you talk about it. Nobody should ever, ever be shocked if, 
in taking those steps, we should falter and not return home. 
Exploration today carries risk just as dangerous as it did in history. I believe 
we must honestly explain that risk, just as we move forward to carry out the 
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President’s space exploration vision. Americans can suffer discomfort, hardship, 
and overcome the greatest difﬁ culties when the goals and risks are laid out plainly 
side by side. We must take on these most challenging adventures, while looking 
into the face of risk. In that way, we will achieve some incredible things in space. 
You’ve listened this evening to me and the excellent discussion today. 
Please continue to let me and us know what you, the public, and our 
Congress, think about risk-taking in space exploration. Thank you for being here 
this evening.     ■
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